Enclosure (C) is the record of proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which contains the Court's findings and opinion.

3. After examination of the record of proceedings and the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy has found that the evidence obtained by the Court does not warrant and will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

4. Upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, the Secretary has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

5. The Secretary has further found that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that the investigation directed by Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted.

6. The Secretary's present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed, in the light of all the evidence then at hand.

7. You are hereby detailed to make a study of the enclosures and then to conduct such further investigation, including the examination of any additional persons who may have knowledge of the facts pertinent to the said Japanese attack, and to re-examine any such person who has been previously examined, as may appear to be necessary, and to record the testimony given thereby. You are required for inclusion in the record.

8. Under the authority of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter. Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your examination in an informal manner and without regard to legal or formal requirements. Upon completion of your examination you will submit the record direct to the Secretary of the Navy.

9. You are being ordered to report to the Secretary in Chief, United States Fleet, for temporary duty for this purpose, and will request such additional orders from him as you find necessary.

HEWITT INQUIRY EXHIBIT NO. 2

NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

With Cross-References to Admiral Hart's Investigation Together With Addendum Thereto (Admiral Hewitt's Findings and Conclusions)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
Foreword		363
Chapter:		
I.	A. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Pacific Fleet	365
	B. Basing of Fleet at Hawaii	365
	C. Air Patrol from Hawaii in 1940	367
	D. The International Situation; Likelihood of Attack and the Status of Defenses Prior to Admiral Kimmel's Command	368
	E. Joint Estimate of Richardson and Kimmel as to Situation and Defenses	369
	F. The Grew Report of Rumored Japanese Attack and ONI Evaluation	370
II.	Assumption of Command by Admiral Kimmel—His Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet and His Staff:	
	A. Assumption of Command	370
	B. Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet	371
	C. Admiral Kimmel's Staff	371
	D. General Orders Nos. 142 and 143	374
III.	The Chief of Naval Operations—His Staff and Duties:	
	A. The Chief of Naval Operations	374
	B. Admiral Stark's Staff	374
	C. The Duties of the Chief of Naval Operations	377

Chapter.		Page
IV.	The Commanding General Hawaiian Department—His Major Mission:	
	A. The Commanding General	375
	B. General Short's Major Mission	379
V.	Relations in General Between Navy and Army Commanders:	
	A. In Washington	379
	B. In Hawaii	379
VI.	The War Plans Relating to Hawaii and the Adequacy of the Pacific Fleet:	
	A. The Plans for Defense of Hawaii	381
	B. Testimony Concerning the War Plans in General	395
	C. Adequacy of Fleet Generally to Carry Out its Tasks	400
VII.	The Possibility of Aerial Torpedo Attack at Pearl Harbor:	
	A. Knowledge and Evaluation of Secretary's Letter	402
	B. Correspondence on Anti-torpedo Baffles in Pearl Harbor	403
VIII.	The Situation Prior to the Freezing of Japanese Assets:	
	A. The Inadequacy of Local Defense Forces and Necessity for Reliance on the Fleet	405
	B. Admiral Kimmel's View Concerning the Possibility of a Surprise Attack	405
	C. Admiral Kimmel's Desire for Information as to Developments	406
	D. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel Concerning the International Situation	406
IX.	Admiral Kimmel's Visit in June and Annual Report:	
	A. Admiral Kimmel's Visit	407
	B. Kimmel's Annual Report—Year Ending June 30, 1941	407
X.	Reconnaissance Toward Jaluit	407
XI.	The Freezing of Japanese Assets—Deterioration of Situation and Fleet Security Order:	
	A. The Freezing Order	408
	B. Further Deterioration of Situation	409
	C. Inadequacy of Equipment and Efforts to Rectify	411
	D. Admiral Kimmel's Letter on Security of the Fleet	411
XII.	Intelligence in Washington—The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications:	
	A. ONI Distribution and Acquisition of Intelligence in General	413
	B. The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications	416
	C. Failure to Send this Secret Information to Admiral Kimmel	418
XIII.	Resignation of Japanese Cabinet—Arrival of Kurusu—The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement:	
	A. The Dispatch of October 16, 1941	418
	B. Admiral Stark's Letter of October 17, 1941	420
	C. Japanese Messages Concerning German Attitude; Nomura's Desire to Resign	420
	D. Admiral Bloch's Letter on Inadequacy of Local Defense	421
	E. Admiral Kimmel's Estimate and Action	421
	F. The First Japanese "Deadline" Message	422
	G. Admiral Stark's Letter of November 7, 1941	422
	H. Japanese Interest in Ships at the Philippines and Seattle	423
	I. Arrival of Kurusu; Stark and Marshall Recommendation as to Ultimatum	423
	J. Further and Final Japanese "Deadline" Messages	424
	K. The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement	425
XIV.	Dispatches Concerning Reinforcement of Wake and Midway	426
XV.	Intercepted Japanese Communications of November 26th and 27th	427
XVI.	The State Department Note of November 26th	427
XVII.	The War Warning of November 27th:	
	A. The Warning	430
	B. Preparation of the Warning	431
	C. The Failure to Mention Hawaii	432
	D. The Direction to "Execute an Appropriate Defensive Deployment"	433
XVIII.	Repetition of Army Dispatch on November 28th:	
	A. General Marshall	435
XIX.	Reinforcement of Midway and Wake	435
XX.	Pearl Harbor—Estimates of the Situation:	
	A. Admiral Kimmel	437
	B. Admiral Bloch	438
	C. Admiral Pye	438
	D. Admiral Smith	441
	E. Admiral McMorris	443
	F. Admiral Delaney	446
	G. Admiral Calhoun	447
	H. Captain Layton	447
	I. Admiral Bellinger	447
	J. Admiral Kitts	448
	K. Admiral Withers	448
	L. Colonel Phillips	448
	M. General Short	448
XXI.	Conferences Between Admiral Kimmel and General Short after November 27th	449
XXII.	Action Taken by Admiral Kimmel—Extent of Reconnaissance:	
	A. In General	450
	B. Responsibility for Long Range Reconnaissance	453
	C. Readiness of Aircraft and Drills	456
	D. Extent of Reconnaissance	457
	E. Extent of Reconnaissance Which Could Have Been Taken	457
XXIII.	Action Taken by General Short	462
XXIV.	Japanese Espionage and United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor—Japanese Military and Fleet Move nents:	
	A. Japanese Espionage	463
	B. United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor	466
	C. Japanese Military and Fleet Movements	478
XXV.	Intercepted Japanese Communications After the "War Warning" and up to December 6, 1941:	
	A. Failure to Transmit to Admiral Kimmel	490
	B. Concerning the Diplomatic Negotiations and Situtation	491
	C. Concerning United States Ships and Planes	496

Chapter:		Page
XXVI.	The "Winds" Code and Messages:	
	A. The Winds Code	501
	B. Monitoring for the Code Words	502
	C. Admiral Kimmel's Knowledge of Winds Code	502
	D. "Winds" Messages Using the Code Words for Russia	502
	E. Was There a "Winds Code" Message Relating to the United States?	503
XXVII.	Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel After the "War Warning:"	510
XXVIII.	The "Mori" Conversation: Japanese Burning Papers	523
XXIX.	The Likelihood of a Japanese Attack at Hawaii as Estimated in Washington, December 6, 1941:	
	A. Navy Estimates	525
	B. Army Estimates	527
	C. State Department Estimates	527
XXX.	Japanese Message Advising of Fourteen Part Reply and First Thirteen Parts:	
	A. Message advising of Fourteen Part Reply	527
	B. The First Thirteen Parts of the Reply	527
	C. Delivery of the Translations of the Above Messages	528
XXXI.	December 7, 1941, in Washington:	
	A. Intercepted Communications Other Than Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message"	529
	B. Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message"	530
	C. Delivery of Part Fourteen and the "1 p. m. Message" and Action Taken	531
XXXII.	Conditions at Pearl Harbor Prior to Attack:	
	A. The Ships in Port	536
	B. The Anti-aircraft Guns	538
	C. Army and Navy Conditions of Readiness	539
	D. Number and Condition of the Men	541
	E. The Aircraft Warning Service	542
	F. Ships' Radar	549
	G. Steps Taken by Commander Local Naval Defense Force	550
	H. Army Aircraft	551
	I. The Submarines	552
	J. Reconnaissance Airplanes and Air Reconnaissance	552
XXXIII.	The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor:	
	A. Japanese Submarines	556
	B. Detection of Planes by the Army Radar System	561
	C. The Air Attack	562
	D. The Arrival of the Army's Message	565
	E. The Failure to Telephone on December 7th	566
	F. What Could Have Been Done if There Had Been Advance Notice	566
	G. The Casualties and Damage	568
Appendix:	List of witness before Court of Inquiry	571
	List of witnesses before Admiral Hart	573

Foreword

Public Law No. 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, directed the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify.

A Court of Inquiry, consisting of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, U. S. N. (Retired), Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, U. S. N. (Retired) and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, U. S. N., (Retired), with Commander Harold Biesemeier, U. S. N., as Judge Advocate, was appointed on July 13, 1944. The Court was directed to convene on July 17, 1944, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into all circumstances connected with the attack made by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941; to inquire thoroughly into the matter, and to include in its findings a full statement of the facts it might deem to be established. The Court was further directed to state its opinion as to whether any offenses were committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval Service, and, in case its opinion was that offenses had been committed or serious blame incurred, to recommend specifically what further proceedings should be had.

The Court of Inquiry commenced its proceedings on July 31, 1944, and submitted the record of its proceedings on October 20, 1944. During its investigation, the Court took the testimony of thirty-nine witnesses, and received seventy-seven exhibits. Certain portions of the record of proceedings before the Court, including the findings and opinion of the Court, have been classied "TOP SECRET," and the balance "SECRET."

By letter dated October 21, 1944, the Secretary of the Navy requested the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to advise as to how much of the records of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bear such a relation to present military operations as to require high security classification.

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations advised, in a letter dated November 3, 1944, that a substantial part of the records of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry bears such a relation to the national security and to current military operations as to make it essential that that information not be revealed publicly.

After thorough review of the record of proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, the Secretary concurred with the views of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, as expressed in his letter of November 3, 1944, and accordingly has directed that in the best interests of the present and future military operations of the United States, the existing "TOP SECRET" and "SECRET" classifications of the record must be continued. The Navy Department has stated that the record of the Court will not be made public while the war is in progress.

The net result of the findings of fact and opinion of the Pearl Harbor Naval Court of Inquiry, as reviewed by Judge Advocate General of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and by the Secretary of the Navy is that the evidence now available does not warrant and will not support the trial by general court martial of any person or persons in the Naval Service.

The Secretary in his findings upon the evidence before the Court of Inquiry and all the other proceedings in the matter to date, has found that there were errors of judgment on the part of certain officers in the Naval Service, both at Pearl Harbor and at Washington.

The Secretary is not satisfied that the investigation has gone to the point of exhaustion of all possible evidence. Accordingly, he has decided that his own investigation should be further continued until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained and all possible evidence exhausted. Some of the testimony will be much delayed because certain witnesses who are actively engaged in combat against the enemy are not available and will not be available within the predictable future. The present decision of the Secretary will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed in the light of the evidence then at hand.

The Secretary made this personal statement to the press on December 1, 1944: "In reaching the above conclusions and decisions I am fully mindful of the wide and legitimate public interest in the Pearl Harbor attack. However, there is one consideration which is paramount to all others, and that is: What will best serve the continued successful prosecution of the war? The actions I have taken in my judgment, are taken in the light of that consideration, and I accept full and complete responsibility for them."

In connection with the Secretary's further investigation, the following statement has been prepared, narrating the evidence obtained by the Court of Inquiry. It is believed that all significant evidence so obtained has been included. Because reference is made to "TOP SECRET" material, this statement has been classified "TOP SECRET."

On June 15, 1944, two days after the enactment of Public Law No. 339 of the 78th Congress, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, USN (Retired), completed an examination of witnesses and the taking of testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harobr, which had been directed by the Secretary of the Navy in a precept to Admiral Hart, dated February 12, 1944. In the course of his examination, Admiral Hart took the testimony of forty witnesses, some of whom also testified later before the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, and received forty-two exhibits. Various of the witnesses before Admiral Hart furnished information which does not appear in the Record of Proceedings of the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry. The evidence obtained by Admiral Hart has been digested. The following narrative statement of the evidence obtained by the Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry has been cross-referenced to the evidence obtained by Admiral Hart. The left-hand "pink" pages refer to the record of the examination of witnesses conducted by Admiral Hart. It should be noted that the record of proceedings before Admiral Hart has been reclassified as "TOP SECRET."

JOHN F. SONNETT.

ADDENDUM TO FOREWORD

After reviewing the evidence obtained in the prior investigations and examining the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Secretary of the Navy having determined in his Third Endorsement dated 1 December 1944, that it was neces sary, by precept, dated 2 May 1945, appointed Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, U. S. Navy, as investigating officer, with John F. Sonnett as counsel, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR, as assistant counsel, to examine such witnesses and to obtain such other evidence as might be necessary in order to fully develop the facts in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The further investigation by Admiral Hewitt was completed on 12 July 1945.

A digest of the evidence obtained in the further investigation by Admiral Hewitt has been prepared, and keyed into the following Narrative Statement in the manner in which the evidence adduced before Admiral Hart was treated. The left-hand yellow page, under the left-hand pink pages, contain the evidence adduced before Admiral Hewitt, keyed on the white pages at the points indicated by the yellow crayon.

The findings and conclusions of Admiral Hewitt are attached to the following Narrative Statement as Addendum I.

JOHN FORD BAECHER,
Lieutenant, USNR.

TOP-SECRET

NARRATIVE STATEMENT OF RECORD OF NAVAL PEARL HARBOR COURT OF INQUIRY

[The digest of testimony from the Hart Inquiry will be found set forth in bold face type at the pertinent point. The digest of testimony from the Hewitt inquiry will be found similarly indicated in italic type]

I. BACKGROUND

A. COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET AND PACIFIC FLEET

At the time of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN (page 273). Admiral Kimmel's predecessor was Admiral J. O. Richardson, USN. He had occupied that post from January 1940, when he had relieved Admiral Bloch, until February 1, 1941 (page 1053).

B. BASING OF FLEET AT HAWAII

According to Admiral Richardson, in May 1940, while the Fleet was in Hawaii as part of the Fleet exercises, he received directions to announce to the press that "at his request" the Fleet would stay in Hawaii to carry out further exercises. He did not think that Hawaii was a proper base for the Fleet and so advised the Chief of Naval Operations (page 1057). The reason for basing the Fleet at Hawaii, as he understood it, was so that it would act as a restraining influence on the Japanese (page 1058). (See also Exhibits 26 and 27.)

Admiral Stark testified that the Fleet, which was normally based on the Pacific Coast, was kept at Pearl Harbor in 1941 as a deterrent to Japan, and for training for its task, which included the security of the Fleet when at anchor; Admiral Richardson had advised basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast and did not agree that the Fleet should be based at Pearl Harbor (pages 21, 22, 91). The President he said, made the decision as to the base of the Fleet (page 91). The ships, however, were allocated or based, prior to December 7, 1941, in accordance with Admiral Stark's views and recommendations (page 189).

Admiral Turner said that CincPac recommended several times that the Fleet be returned to the West Coast; Admiral Stark discussed this with the President, but made no recommendation to the President, who would not approve the change (page 1020).

Admiral Turner said that the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Pearl Harbor had been discussed a number of times and each time the decision was reached to leave the Fleet there (p. 261).

It appears that there were some differences of opinion on the part of various other Naval witnesses as to the advisability of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Admiral McMorris, for example, said that he personally felt that Hawaii was a proper base for the Pacific Fleet (page 896).

Admiral McMorris said that he had always held the view that he would have based the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the Pacific coast, although, he said, there was considerable difference of opinion about that (p. 248).

Admiral Pye said that he had expressed the opinion that it was unwise to base the battleships there (page 439).

Concerning the basing of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that there were several reactions, first, that it might incite Japan and second, that it was a poor time to make such a move because we were not prepared

to move to the westward in time of war due to poor logistics support. There was, however, one great advantage which was that the expenditure of money on the ships for repair and overhaul in Pearl Harbor permitted expansion of the Navy Yard at a greater rate (p. 151).

And Admiral DeLany testified that he personally saw no reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 496).

Admiral DeLany thought that it was inconsistent to place the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with the idea of having it as a threat to Japan and at the same time being advised whenever they asked for material that the war was in the Atlantic and also to get units of the Pacific Fleet moved to the Atlantic. He thought that Admiral Kimmel discussed this very thing during his trip to Washington in the summer of 1941. He thought that there was some effect on morale because of the indecisiveness about whether the Fleet was going to stay at Pearl Harbor or be returned to the West Coast but there was no effect on the material condition of the Fleet. The fact that the Fleet was based there resulted in the development of a number of wartime practices which were beneficial to the Fleet when war came (p. 82).

Admiral Smith testified that during 1940 the Fleet was told to remain at Pearl Harbor and everyone thought this meant a probability of war in the Pacific, but he knew of no military reason for keeping the Fleet there. In his opinion neither the development of the Navy Yard nor fleet logistics was a sufficient reason for keeping the Fleet at Pearl Harbor (page 528). The objections in 1940 were: (1) no protected anchorage, (2) no air cover, (3) single channel entrance to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not due to administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which resulted from the fact that the Fleet had been based at Pearl Harbor for a long time (p. 64).

Admiral Smith said that the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland did not affect the matériel conditions or readiness of the Fleet for war; he said that Admiral Kimmel often discussed the question of the conditions of the Fleet and that they felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro; he said there might have been a question in the minds of some of the officers as to why the Fleet was being kept out there; a great many felt that the Administration was keeping them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in the Pacific; the movement of a part of the Fleet undoubtedly had some effect upon the minds of the personnel of the Fleet (p. 39).

Admiral Smith said that to his absolute knowledge, Admiral Kimmel never made a recommendation during 1941 that the Fleet should be returned to the California coast either by letter or dispatch. Admiral Smith never heard him say that the Fleet should return to the coast although Admiral Kimmel knew that his predecessor had recommended it. Admiral Smith said that if Admiral Kimmel ever made any such recommendation it might have been in July 1941 when he made a trip to Washington accompanied only by Captain McMorris, but that Admiral Smith thought he would have heard about it (p. 40).

Admiral Smith said that the transfer of certain units to the Atlantic affected the mental attitude of some officers in that the danger of immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them if the units had not been transferred (p. 40).

Admiral Smith said that in his opinion the general warmindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii (p. 40).

Captain Murphy indicated that previously he had been War Plans Officer for Admiral Richardson; that at that time he had advocated basing the Fleet on the Pacific coast instead of Pearl Harbor.

Captain Glover's view was that the Fleet was kept in Hawaiian waters for the purpose of assisting in the protection of the United States east of the 180th Meridian and also to be in a position from which raiding operations could be projected (p. 176).

Admiral Halsey said that he thought that the closer the Fleet was to the Japanese, the better off they were and therefore, he thought that Manila was the first best base, then Pearl Harbor the second. (p. 295)

It may be noted that according to Mr. Grew no official representations were made to him by Japan with respect to the United States keeping the Fleet in Pearl Harbor (page 1065).

Admiral Schuirmann said that so far as he knew, there was no open disagreement beyween the State and Navy Departments as to the disposition of the Fleet. He said that the State Department generally favored the retention in the Pacific of the greater portion of the United States Fleet (p. 407).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled during the winter 1940–1941 that the question was raised about continuing to base the Fleet at Hawaii and that it was considered that that was the most advantageous point and that the Fleet should be kept there. He recalled no discussion of the particular point of the Fleet's security at Hawaii in that connection and recalled no protest by Admiral Kimmel and no pressure by the State Department to keep the Fleet there (p. 418).

C. AIR PATROL FROM HAWAII IN 1940

Admiral Bloch testified that in June, 1940, General Herron, then Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, came to Admiral Bloch and stated that he had received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to the effect that he must be on the alert against a raid from the west by a hostile nation (page 1139). Bloch told him that he had no patrol planes for the purpose and suggested that they go to the Senior Officer Present, who was Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment. They did so and Admiral Andrews instituted a dawn-to-dusk patrol, informing the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, who was then at sea. Admiral Richardson flew in to discuss the matter and finally sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, asking for information about the situation, to which the Navy Department never replied. Admiral Bloch did not recall for how long they continued that reconnaissance. To the best of Admiral Bloch's recollection, the long distance reconnaissance established by Admiral Andrews in 1940 was for three days and then was discontinued by Admiral Richardson (page 1149).

Admiral Bloch said: "Sometime in the summer of 1940, the date I cannot recall, General Herron, the Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had received a similar dispatch. I told him, no; I knew nothing about it. He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be, what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, 'Well, I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an officer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here, Vice Admiral Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch.' We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this, and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks. When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid, they were not told it was an exercise or drill, they were told it was an overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a position of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Commander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but so far as I know, we got nothing there." (p. 13–4)

Admiral Richardson said that in June, 1940, he received a warning from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to the effect that there was a possibility of war, and as a result of this he increased the air patrols which he had established. He reported, he said, this warning to the Navy Department and asked for information, but received no reply (page 1056). He asked the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department whether this was a real warning, but was informed that the Commanding General had no idea, and he acted as though it were such a warning. It appears that in personal letters he had also received warnings of the possibility of war which, he said, were not definite or clear cut (page 1055). In view of these warnings, and his belief that when war came it would come as a surprise, which was based on 20 years' study of the

Japanese, he felt that he had to maintain as adequate a patrol as he could with the available means (pages 1053, 1060).

The air patrol directed by Admiral Richardson during 1940 was a patrol of particular sectors which was daily rotated. As Admiral Richardson recalled it, this patrol covered 170° to 350° to a distance of 300 miles. A dawn and dusk patrol was also established. He regarded the Southwest sector as the sector from which an attack most probably would come (pages 1053, 1055).

Admiral Richardson did not recall the number of patrol planes which were available to him. He stated that toward the end of his command it was planned to restrict the air patrol to adequate searches of operating areas, and that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention to continue this same patrol in effect when he assumed command (pages 1055, 1053).

Admiral Bellinger's recollection was that under special conditions and orders there had been a dawn patrol of 6 to 12 planes flying to 300 miles (page 682). This patrol was discontinued after the time that Admiral Kimmel took command as CinCPac. It had covered a constantly changing sector (page 683).

D. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION; LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK AND THE STATUS OF DEFENSES PRIOR TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S COMMAND

Shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, as appears from a dispatch of January 21, 1941 (Exhibit 76) from the Chief of Naval Operations to CincUS and others, it was thought that the international situation was continuing to deteriorate and that the Pacific Fleet should be in a waiting attitude or execute the tasks assigned to it in the area eastward of 160°, depending on the action which might be taken by the Japanese.

At this time Admiral Bloch, as ComFOURTEEN, complained of inadequate local defense forces and pointed out that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and that for such reconnaissance requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat. This was set forth in a letter of December 30, 1940, by Admiral Bloch.

> **According to Admiral Bloch, in the fall of 1940, he became convinced that the Army's defenses against aircraft attack were insufficient. He discussed this matter with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson. As a result of that conversation, Admiral Richardson asked the then Commanding General, General Herron, to go around with him and to interview first hand the officers and find out what equipment the Army had. At the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts, Admiral Richardson gave Admiral Bloch a memorandum informing him of the numbers of aircraft, guns and planes which were at Oahu. As the result of this information and of his conversation with Admiral Richardson, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter to the Navy Department concerning the inadequacy of the defenses. This letter was forwarded with a strong endorsement by Admiral Richardson. (The letter is Exhibit 23.) That correspondence was the basis of the letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War dated January 4, 1941 (p. 3). (That letter and the reply of the Secretary of the Navy constitute Exhibit 40.)**

Admiral Richardson's endorsement on this letter (January 7, 1941, Exhibit 28) stated that the Army's equipment was inadequate to meet a surprise attack; that the defense of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor would have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor; that plans for cooperation with local defense forces were being made; that constant readiness of fighter squadrons was not contemplated; that there did not appear to be any practical way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor; and considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of the enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of fleet operations, it was not regarded as necessary to lay such nets. This endorsement urgently recommended that local defense forces be provided ComFOURTEEN.

On January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War (Exhibit 9) and discussed in some detail the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the adequacy of the local defense forces. The Secretary of the Navy's letter stated that the security of the Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, had been reexamined because of the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and because of reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. The letter stated:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl

Harbor * * *. The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probabilities are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

The letter continued that defense against all but the first two of the dangers appeared to have been provided for satisfactorily. As to an air bombing attack or an air torpedo plane attack, it was stated that both types were possible and might be carried out successfully simultaneously or in combination with any of the other possible operations. Attacks, it was said, would be launched from a striking force of carriers and other supporting vessels. The counter-measures to be considered were the location and engagement of enemy carriers before the attack could be launched: the location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire, the concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; and the protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. The letter pointed out that the location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched were largely functions of the fleet, but quite possibly might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning and prior to a declaration of war; and, then discussed the status of the Army's preparations, such as pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft information service, and anti-aircraft batteries.

Various proposals were made in this letter, including proposals that the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii, and that local joint plans be drawn for effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gunfire, against surprise aircraft raids; that the Army and Navy forces agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids on Pearl Harbor; and, that joint exercises designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continued to exist.*

E. JOINT ESTIMATE OF RICHARDSON AND KIMMEL AS TO SITUATION AND DEFENSES

The views of both Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel, at that time, were set forth in a letter which they prepared and sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on January 25, 1941 (Exhibit 70). This stated that if Japan entered the war or committed an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific would be primarily defensive. Certain assumptions were then outlined, upon which the action of the Pacific Fleet would be predicated. These included:

(a) United States is at war with Germany and Italy,

(b) War with Japan is imminent,

(c) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying positions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel are possible.

Their letter continued, that the tasks to be undertaken by the Fleet in connection with such assumptions included the taking of full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port. The letter pointed out that the Fleet was handicapped by deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and stated that, among other things, it would be necessary to expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One; that it would be necessary to establish an inner air patrol; to arrange for alertness of a striking force of planes; and to augment Army anti-aircraft defenses with batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor; also that it would be necessary to assist in local defenses of the Fourteenth Naval District, which task would require the increase of district forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels would become available to the Commandant. Various other measures were discussed, including those to be taken if Japan entered the war, among which was reconnaissance of the Marshalls.

The letter then discussed in some detail the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu among which were the inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns, the small number and condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking

* The Secretary of War's reply to this will be found at page 402.

groups of Fleet planes and the use of Fleet planes for local patrols, the lack of patrol vessels for ComFOURTEEN, and the lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. It stated that it was considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies.

Admiral Smith said that about a week before Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, and Admiral Smith were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in a conference with Commander McCrea, who was returning from a mission to CincAF. At that time, Comdr. McCrea furnished Admiral Hart's estimate of each one of the Japanese naval leaders, which was the best estimate that had ever been received; this included information concerning the Japanese Admiral Yamamoto to the effect that he was efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous; Comdr. McCrea's information was copied down and put in the secret file (p. 45–46).

F. THE GREW REPORT OF RUMORED JAPANESE ATTACK AND ONI EVALUATION

On the day when Admiral Kimmel assumed command, Naval Intelligence wrote to him concerning the rumored Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (See letter of February 1, 1941, Exhibit 67). The letter referred to the report from Ambassador Grew, based on information from the Peruvian Minister, that in the event that trouble broke out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese would make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor. This information the Peruvian Minister had transmitted, although he considered it fantastic. The letter of Naval Intelligence stated that no credence was placed in these rumors and that based on known data regarding the disposition and employment of Japanese forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appeared imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future.

Admiral Schuirmann said that a low evaluation had been given to Ambassador Grew's report (referring to page 113 "PEACE AND WAR") that in case of trouble the Japanese planned a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. He recalled no discussion of that report with the State Department. He said that he did not think that a particularly high evaluation had been placed upon that information by the Ambassador or his staff and could not explain the prominence given to this report in "PEACE AND WAR" (p. 411).

Ambassador Grew said that the information of Japanese intention to open war by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor that he transmitted to the State Department on January 27, 1941, was a rumor from reliable sources (the Peruvian Minister—page 1066). This was only such report of this rumor (page 1062). He also said that in making his later reports during 1941, including a report of November 3rd, he advised that the Japanese might strike with dramatic suddenness.

Admiral Turner said that he usually attended the State Department conferences. He never heard of Ambassador Grew's statement that Hawaii might be attacked suddenly, until it came out in the newspapers (page 1019).

Captain Smith-Hutton, Naval Attaché at Tokyo, said that since there was so much secrecy of Japanese movements, it was highly improbable that the plan, if real, would have been known in diplomatic circles (page 1080).

II. Assumption of Command by Admiral Kimmel—His Reorganization of the Pacific Fleet and His Staff

A. ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, assumed duty as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, on February 1, 1941. He served as such until December 17, 1941, when he was retired on his own application (page 273).

It may be noted that Admiral Stark had recommended Admiral Kimmel for this assignment. In the fitness report on Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 25), which Admiral Stark prepared after the issuance of the Robert's Report, and in which he stated that an adverse report had been made on Admiral Kimmel, he also stated that he had always considered Admiral Kimmel to be an outstanding officer and still did (page 86).

It may also be noted that in his statement to the Court, Admiral Pye volunteered that he thought that the appointment of Admiral Kimmel as CincPac was excellent, and that he performed his duties as such in an excellent manner (page 446).

B. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE PACIFIC FLEET

Admiral Kimmel testified that he reorganized the Pacific Fleet (page 274). The organization established by him existed, he testified, throughout the entire period of his command in substantially the same form as is set forth in Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41 of October 31, 1941 (Exhibit 52) as follows:

(a) *Task Force One* (Commander Battle Force) consisting of six battleships, Carrier Division One—less the LEXINGTON. Cruiser Division Nine, and part of Destroyer Flotilla One, etc;

(b) *Task Force Two* (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force) consisting of three battleships, Carrier Division Two, Cruiser Division Five, Destroyer Flotilla Two, etc:

(c) *Task Force Three* (Commander Scouting Force) consisting of Cruiser Division Four and Six, the LEXINGTON plus Marine Air Group Twenty-one, and Destroyer Squadrons, etc;

(d) *Task Force Four* (Commandant 14th Naval District) which comprised that part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, and Admiral Bloch, who was ComFOURTEEN, was also designated in other directives as Naval Base Defense Officer;

(e) *Task Force Seven* (Commander Submarine Scouting Force);

(f) *Task Force Nine* (Commander Patrol Wing Two); consisting of PatWings One and Two.

(g) *Task Force Fifteen* (Commander Base Force).

It may be noted at this point that this directive also provided that current employment schedules for the task forces would remain in effect; that the Commanders of Task Forces Seven and Nine were to submit revised schedules for the period November 15th to December 31, 1941, at the earliest practicable date. It was indicated that those schedules were to contemplate various arrangements for further training.

C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STAFF

Vice Admiral Pye was Admiral Kimmel's next senior in command, and was Commander of Task Force One;

Admiral Herbert F. Leary during 1941 was in command of Cruisers, Battle Force, and under the command of Admiral Pye. (p. 363)

During 1941, Admiral Walter S. Anderson was Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet. His superior was Admiral Pye. He was Admiral Pye's most important subordinate commander. (p. 390)

During 1941, Admiral Joel William Bunkley was Commanding Officer of the USS CALIFORNIA which was attached to the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Buckley's ship was Admiral Pye's Flagship. (p. 413)

Vice Admiral Halsey was Commander of Task Force Two; Vice Admiral Brown of Task Force Three;

Admiral John Henry Newton, during 1941, was in command of Cruisers Scouting Force. His superior was Admiral Brown. (p. 314)

Admiral Bloch of Task Force Four; Rear Admiral Withers of Task Force Seven; Rear Admiral Bellinger of Task Force Nine; and, Rear Admiral Calhoun of Task Force Fifteen.

Admiral Bloch testified that during 1941 he was ComFOURTEEN,

From March 15, 1941 until the end of the year, Captain Irving H. Mayfield was District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He had had no previous experience in Intelligence work except two weeks temporary duty in Washington and two years as a Naval attache in Chile.

After July 1, 1941, Lieutenant William B. Stephenson, USNR, was designated as head of the Counter-Espionage Desk of the District Intelligence Office of the Fourteenth Naval District (p. 323).

Until June 9, 1941, Captain J. B. Earle was in command of Destroyer Squadron Five, thereafter he was Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District (p. 368).

Commander Wesley A. Wright was Assistant Communication Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was on temporary duty with the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit. He had had no experience in traffic analysis, which includes the location of forces by instruments, but had had about nine years' experience in other closely related branches of communication intelligence work (p. 379).

Commander Local Defense Forces, Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier, Commandant Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, Commander Task Force Four, as Naval Base Defense Officer. He performed his duties in cooperation with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that he and Admiral Kimmel worked harmoniously together and conferred four to five times weekly. Admiral Kimmel, he said, made an honest effort to keep him fully informed. He was conscious that in 1941 Japanese–United States relations were strained. He did not disagree with decisions made by the High Command of the Fleet. He was not called upon to make any independent decision (page 393).

According to Vice Admiral Bellinger his duties, in general, were as:

(a) Commander Task Force Nine. This comprised Patrol Wings One and Two, plus other units as assigned by CincPac for specific operations. His senior officer was CincPac.

(b) Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Commander Patrol Wing Two. The larger command included the patrol squadrons, aircraft tenders, attached to Patrol Wings One and Two. His senior officer was Commander Aircraft Scouting Force based at San Diego.

(c) Commander Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. Administrative authority in local matters over all aircraft actually based on Naval Air Station.

(d) Liaison with ComFOURTEEN for aviation development with the district, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnstown Island.

(e) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, and when performing such duties, his senior officer was Admiral Bloch (pages 660–61).

Captain Logan C. Ramsey, who also testified, was Operations Officer to Admiral Bellinger between November 1 and December 7, 1941 (page 574).

Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun said that he was Commander Base Force, United States Fleet, during 1941. His duties included logistic support of the Pacific Fleet, assisting ComFOURTEEN with services in Pearl Harbor, command of fleet security measure until August or September when relieved by Admiral Bloch, and he was Senior Patrol Officer in charge of all naval shore patrol (page 931).

Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, during 1941, was Chief of Staff to CincPac

Vice Admiral Smith testified that he was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941 to 7 December 1941 (page 335), and that his duties, as prescribed by Staff Instructions, Pacific Fleet (Exhibit 34), issued 14 July 1941, which he himself signed and issued with the approval of Admiral Kimmel, were:

"112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation, but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of Staff whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay."

"200. CHIEF OF STAFF—01—Personal Aide.

(See Navy Regulations Articles 785–786.)

(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.

(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of the Staff.

(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readiness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.

(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.

(e) Signs correspondence as follows:

(1) Routine Matters.

(2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which a policy has been established.

(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.

(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.

(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or guidance.

(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval of previous recommendations; action on legal papers" (NCI Rec. p. 336).

(page 528).

Admiral Smith, on December 7, 1941, was Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet which position he assumed on February 1, 1941. Previously, he served a year and a half as Captain of one of Admiral Kimmel's cruisers while Admiral Kimmel was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet. As Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith supervised all divisions of the Staff (p. 32) and everything which transpired between the Staff members and the Commander-in-Chief was brought to Admiral Smith's attention. (p. 33)

Admiral Smith said that he felt that entirely too much of his time was taken up with administrative matters; when the Commander-in-Chief and Staff moved ashore, Admiral Smith found it difficult to keep a day-by-day routine going; possibly he was to blame himself for this situation, but he attempted to reduce the paper work. However, the Commander-in-Chief kept him too long in the Commander-in-Chief's office, and he knew that because Admiral Smith told him so; Admiral Smith believes that they spent entirely too much time on staff discussions. (p. 60) Admiral Smith stated that because of his preoccupation with day-to-day matters he was not as free as the Commander in Chief to think of future events.

Rear Admiral DeLany was Chief of Staff for Operations for Admiral Kimmel from February 1 to December 7, 1941 (page 496). Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris was War Plans Officer during the last half of 1941 (page 887).

On December 7, Captain Vincent R. Murphy was on the staff of Admiral Kimmel as Assistant to the War Plans Officer, and on that day was Staff Duty Officer (p. 195).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was War Plans Officer for CincPac from February, 1941 until the end of 1941 (page 293). He stated that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Staff of CincPac, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

"207. War Plans Officer—16.

"(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff, for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining thereto.

"(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.

"(c) Member of Schedule Board.

"(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Commanders.

"(e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters—via District Commandant if appropriate.

"(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships—general features—and on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.

"(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material, particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their distribution.

"(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans matters.

"(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these Plans may affect the Fleet." (page 294)

[2] Captain E. T. Layton testified that between October and December 7th, he was Fleet Intelligence Officer for CincPac (page 904).

Captain Layton testified that for one year prior to 7 December 1941, and subsequently, he had been Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, (page 182) and that his duties, as prescribed by "Staff Instructions, Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 1941" (Exhibit 34) were:

"214. Intelligence Officer—25.

"(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminating to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

"(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for current estimates (monograph material).

"(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.

"(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.

"(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual.).

"(f) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.

"(g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or practices of other navies and prepares definite recommendations as to any action to be taken within own Fleet.

"(h) In charge of censorship.

"(i) Internal Security of ships.

"(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

"215. Assistant Intelligence Officer—26.

In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs the following additional assignments:

"(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.

"(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to Fleet.

"(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.

"(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and location plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies" (page 183).

Rear Admiral Kitts was Fleet Gunnery Officer on Admiral Kimmel's staff and was in charge of training (pages 511–12). (3)

On December 7, 1941, Admiral Arthur C. Davis was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He had been performing these duties for about a year and a half (p. 96). His duties primarily were concerned with technical training and logistics matters (p. 97).

On December 7, 1941, M. E. Curts, Captain, U. S. N., was Pacific Fleet Communication Officer and had served in that capacity for about two years.

D. GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 142 AND 143

General Order No. 142, dated January 10, 1941, of which the Court took judicial notice, assigned a dual status to the Commandants of various Naval districts, including the Fourteenth, in that as Commandants they were to operate under orders of the Navy Department, and as officers of one of the fleets they were to operate under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief thereof, (1) with duties corresponding to those of the Senior Officer Present Afloat, when their relative rank made them such, and (2) in command of task groups of the fleet in question when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief. It was further provided that as Commandants they were to be governed by all instructions relating to the duties of Commandants of Naval districts and the units under their command would be those prescribed in existing regulations and instructions, and would include the local naval defense forces. Their duties as officers of a fleet were to be guided by such instructions as the Commander-in-Chief of that fleet might consider desirable.

General Order No. 143, dated February 3, 1941, which the Court also judicially noticed, provided for the organization of naval forces of the United States, which included the United States Fleet, composed of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets. These were described as administrative and task organizations normally operating under the instructions of the Navy Department. The United States Fleet was said to be an administrative organization for training purposes only and a task organization when two or more fleets were concentrated or operating in conjunction with each other. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, was to prescribe standards and methods of training. It was also stated that the Commandants of Naval districts had administrative responsibility direct to the Navy Department for naval local defense forces.

III. The Chief of Naval Operations—His Staff and Duties

A. THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral H. R. Stark, USN, was Chief of Naval Operations through the period when Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

B. ADMIRAL STARK'S STAFF

Admiral Stark's principal advisers during this period, he said, were Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, head of War Plans.

Captain Robert O. Glover was in the plans division of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was assigned various planning duties. (p. 171)

Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, head of Central Division, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

From May until October, 1941, Admiral Howard F. Kingman was head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI, and from October on was Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence. As head of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, he had general supervision of the activities of the several districts' intelligence organizations. (p. 335–6)

Captain L. F. Safford was in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications during 1941. (p. 355)

the heads of the Divisions of Ship Movements,

(3) During 1941, Admiral Roland Munroe Brainard was Director of the Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 399)

The duties of the Ship Movements Division were summarized by Admiral Brainard as follows:

"The general functions of the Ship Movements Division involved preparation of the publications "Operating Force Plan," "Assignment of Vessels to Fleets and Forces," "Assignment of Vessels to Districts," assignment of home ports; and collaboration and coordination with the Fleet Maintenance Division of overhauls, schedules of Fleet activities as submitted by the Commanders of the forces afloat, these tentative schedules being submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and circulated for the approval or modification by the divisions under the CNO, and final approval; then returned to the forces afloat by the Chief of Naval Operations; scheduling and itinerarying of NTS ships, the recording and accountability of ship locations in rather detailed form as the result of position reports and location reports from the ships operating individually and from Fleet units, as reported by Fleet Commanders. During the period of my incumbency, a War Information Room was started under the late Rear Admiral F. T. Leighton for the purpose of plotting and keeping track of all combatant ships of the navies of the world. Also a section of Convoy and Routing, as now called, whose duties were the plotting and as close an accountability as possible to keep track of the merchant shipping of the world. Positions of our own naval vessels also was obtained through a movement report system. Information on merchant shipping and foreign shipping and men-of-war was obtained through the various sources of ONI, naval observers at ports of the world, Naval Attaches, Maritime Commission, and other such sources. The acquisition of small craft was accomplished by the NTS Section which, later, grew into a sizeable division, and the assignments to Districts and Sea Frontiers was determined by the Chief of Naval Operations as set forth in the publication previously mentioned as prepared and distributed by this Division." (p. 399–400)

Admiral Brainard said that the assignment of important naval units was determined by echelons higher than his division. (p. 400)

Admiral Brainard said that the Ship Movements Division was primarily a record keeping division and something of an information bureau, available to proper authorities, as regards the location of shipping and that he and his division did not participate in questions of broad general policy. (p. 402)

Ship Maintenance, Fleet Training, and his Flag Secretary (pages 2, 18).

During 1941, Captain John L. McCrea was an aide to Admiral Stark. He was assigned special duties by Admiral Stark.

During 1941, Captain Charles Wellborn, Jr. was Administrative Aide to the Chief of Naval Operations (p. 383).

Admiral Royal Ingersoll said that he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations in 1941, and as such generally acted for the Chief of Naval Operations in matters where policy had been established, and in an advisory capacity. He knew generally what was going on in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (page 816).

During 1941, Admiral Ingersoll was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. He described his duties as follows:

"As Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, I had no duties that pertained solely to the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that is, I did not have original cognizance of any matters. All matters for the consideration of Chief of Naval Operations were taken up with me before presenting to the Chief of Naval Operations. All matters of policy, of course, were referred to the Chief of Naval Operations. Once he had decided upon a policy, I then endeavored to carry out the details without further reference to him unless it was a question of which I thought he should know. I signed most of the correspondence except letters going to heads of other government departments or letters to Commanders-in-Chief which embodied orders to them. I frequently released many dispatches that had previously been

considered by the Chief of Naval Operations after I knew they were in the form in which he wished them sent." (p. 417)

Concerning Admiral Ingersoll's familiarity with matters coming before Admiral Stark, he said:

"Generally speaking, I now feel that Admiral Stark kept me fully informed of all matters of which I should have had knowledge. I was usually present when conferences were held with other officers of the Navy Department or officers of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I was not always present when Admiral Stark conferred with officials of the State Department or with officials of the War Department. Frequently these conferences took place in the State Department or in the War Department and I usually did not accompany Admiral Stark for such conferences. I felt, however, that when these were over that Admiral Stark told me everything that I should know. I do not recall now anything that transpired of which I was not told and of which I thought I should have been told. There may have been conferences between Admiral Stark and the President and the Secretary of State of which he did not tell me all the details." (p. 417)

Vice Admiral R. K. Turner said that between July and December 7, 1941, he was Director of War Plans in the office of CNO. He was a professional adviser to CNO in the preparation of plans for war (page 988).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was Director of the Central Division during 1941 and was the liaison with the State Department.

The liaison between the Chief of Naval Operations and the State Department was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows:

"The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time, the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling." (p. 257)

Admiral Turner summarized the situation in regard to the State Department by stating that on the whole, he was satisfied and had no complaint or criticism on the attitude of the State Department. (p. 258)

Captain Wellborn discussed the general exchange of information with the State Department. (p. 385)

The records kept of the meetings with the State Department officers were described by Admiral Schuirmann as follows:

"A 'Liaison Committee' consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May, 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was

commenced; prior to that time I would make notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were 'off the record' discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these 'off the record' discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials." (p. 405)

"Memo: The examining officer has identified the records mentioned by the witness as being contained in file titled 'Record of Liaison Meetings and some other special papers,' now on file in the Central Division (Op 13) of the Chief of Naval Operations' Office, Navy Department." (p. 405 and 406) Admiral Schuirmann said that he had some informal memorandums which would be in the files of the Central Division. (p. 406)

Liaison was made by personal visits, conferences, and by telephone. He dealt with Dr. Hornbeck, Maxwell Hamilton, Joseph Ballantine, Under Secretary Welles, and Secretary Hull. Incomplete minutes were kept by the Central Division of State Department meetings. ONI kept him informed, he said, but there was no established system for getting information to him. He also received information, for some time prior to the attack, during daily morning conferences conducted by the Secretary of the Navy, at which the War Plans Officer, who kept a current estimate, was present (pages 195–198).

C. THE DUTIES OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

The duties of Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, are set forth in Article 392 and Article 433, Navy Regulations, of which the Court took judicial notice at pages 74–77, as follows:

Article 392:

"(1) The Chief of Naval Operations is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate from among officers of the Line of the Navy, not below the grade of captain, for a period of four years. He is charged, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, with the operations of the fleet, with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war, and with the coordination of the functions of the Naval Establishment afloat, together with the determination of priorities relating to repair and overhaul of ships in commission or about to be commissioned. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

"(2) The Chief of Naval Operations, while so serving, has the rank and title of admiral, takes rank next after the Admiral of the Navy, and receives pay and allowances as specifically provided in the Act of 10 June 1922. All orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties assigned him are performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and his orders are considered as emanating from the Secretary and have full force and effect as such. To assist the Chief of Naval Operations in performing the duties of his office there are authorized by law for this exclusive duty not less than fifteen officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander of the Navy or major of the Marine Corps. Should an officer, while serving as Chief of Naval Operations, be retired from active service, he may, in the discretion of the President, be retired with the rank, pay, and allowances authorized by law for the highest grade or rank held by him as such Chief of Naval Operations.

"(3) During the temporary absence of the Secretary, the Under Secretary when serving, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations is next in succession to act as Secretary of the Navy."

Article 433:

"1. The Chief of Naval Operations shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the fleet and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. (Act of 3 Mar. 1915.)

"2. The duties of the Chief of Naval Operations shall include the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Division of Fleet Training; the operation of the Communication Service, of naval districts, of vessels assigned to the

Naval Reserve, and of mines and mining; the operations of the Marine Corps, except when operating with the Army or on other detached duty by order of the President; and the operations of Coast Guard vessels when operating with the Navy; and the direction of all strategic and tactical matters, organization of the fleet, maneuvers, gunnery exercises, drills and exercises, and training of the fleet for war; ocean and lake surveys; with the collection of foreign surveys; with the publication and supply of charts, sailing directions, and nautical rules; dissemination of all nautical, hydrographic, and meteorological information to ships and aircraft, and with the upkeep, repair, and operation of the Naval Observatory and Hydrographic Office.

"3. He shall so coordinate all repairs and alterations to vessels and the supply of personnel and material thereto so as to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the fleet for war.

"4. He shall keep all bureaus and offices of the Navy Department informed in regard to action within their cognizance that is at any time necessary or desirable to improve the war efficiency of the fleet, and shall arrange for the coordination of effort of his office and of the bureaus and other offices of the Navy Department in relation thereto.

"5. He shall under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy direct the movements and operations of vessels of the Navy, including the time of their assignment for docking, repairs, and alterations, and shall prepare schedules and issue orders in regard thereto.

He shall keep records of service of fleets, squadrons and ships.

"6. He shall advise the Secretary in regard to the military features and design of all new ships and as to any alterations of a ship which may affect her military value; as to the location, capacity, and protection of navy yards and naval stations, including all features which affect their military value; also, as to matters pertaining to fuel reservations and depots, the location of radio stations, visual signal stations, reserves of ordnance and ammunitions, fuel, stores, and other supplies of whatsoever nature, with a view to meeting effectively the demands of the fleet.

"7. He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy on all business of the department in regard to insular governments and foreign relations, and all correspondence in regard to these matters shall be presented for the Secretary's action through his office.

"8. He is charged with the preparation, revisions, and record of regulations for the government of the Navy, general orders, tactical instructions, drill books (except such as are issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the individual instruction of officers and enlisted men), signal codes, and cipher codes.

"9. In preparing and maintaining in readiness plans for the use of the fleet in war, he shall freely consult with and have the advice and assistance of the various bureaus, boards, and offices of the Department and the Marine Corps Headquarters, in matters coming under their cognizance. After the approval of any given war plans by the Secretary it shall be the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to assign to the bureaus, boards, and offices, such parts thereof as may be needed for the intelligent carrying out of their respective duties in regard to such plans and their maintenance in constant readiness.

"10. In carrying out his duties he shall utilize the facilities of the appropriate bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.

"11. The Chief of Naval Operations shall from time to time witness the operations of the fleet as an observer."

The Court of Inquiry also took judicial notice of General Order No. 170, dated March 23, 1942, which provided that the duties of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of Naval Operations were combined and placed under one officer with the title "Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations."

IV. The Commanding General Hawaiian Department—His Major Mission

A. THE COMMANDING GENERAL

Major General W. C. Short, USA, became Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in February, 1941, and was relieved December 16, 1941 (page 220). General Marshall testified that he considered General Short a very superior officer (page 853).

Colonel W. C. Phillips, USA, became General Short's Chief of Staff on November 5, 1941, prior to which he had worked through the various staff sections. He

stated that General Short discussed all important communications with him. He was relieved December 18, 1941 (page 477, 493).

B. GENERAL SHORT'S MAJOR MISSION

General Marshall said that he wrote to General Short on February 7, 1941, when General Short took command. The reason for the letter was a conference he had had with Admiral Stark on the inadequacy of Army equipment for the protection of Pearl Harbor (pages 865–6). His letter stated that Kimmel had written Stark about it but did not realize that the Army was tragically lacking in AA material, and that Hawaii was on a better basis than other places. The fullest protection for the fleet, he stated, is "*The* rather than *a* major consideration for us."

Captain Wellborn said that generally it was the Navy's view that there was no more important commitment that the Army might have than the defense of Pearl Harbor, but that this view appeared not to be completely concurred in by the War Department. (p. 386)

The Navy itself, he said, made demands for other places that made it difficult to meet their demands for Hawaii. He was doing everything to build up the defenses but could not perform a miracle; Short was to make this clear to Kimmel; he was sending planes, some of which were not up to Jap speed, et cetera; he was trying to augment the machine guns. The Navy had approached the Army for barrage balloons and probably the first test would be in June in Hawaii.

General Marshall's letter also stated (page 867), "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real peril in the Hawaiian Islands."

In this letter he also said that Short should keep clearly in mind, "that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel." (Page 867.)

V. Relations in General Between Navy and Army Commanders

A. IN WASHINGTON

General Marshall said that he held frequent consultations with Admiral Stark and that their relations were excellent (page 856).

B. IN HAWAII

The Navy and Army witnesses were unanimously of the opinion that relations between the Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii were satisfactory.

Admiral Pye stated that the cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel was greater than had ever existed previously between such commanding officers (page 441).

Admiral Delaney stated that there was complete cooperation between the higher echelon of the Army and the Navy at Pearl Harbor (page 507).

Admiral Smith testified that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were very close and that there was a free exchange of military information (page 536).

Admiral Smith said that "Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him; both were in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between the Army and the Navy out there were excellent." (p. 35)

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel never felt that Admiral Bloch was General Short's opposite number, rather Admiral Kimmel felt that he was General Short's opposite; he felt that when he was present he was the

man who should deal with the Army and with everything himself; he took that responsibility although that might not have been indicated on the official documents. However, Admiral Smith did not recall that this left Admiral Bloch in any state of uncertainty; Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch. (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that the method of command in effect in Hawaii as between the Army and Navy was the method of mutual cooperation, but that CincPac had the predominate interest which General Short recognized and that the Navy was not very much impressed with the Army's provision for defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by the Fleet itself, "which it was." (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that "Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and he dealt directly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordinate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually, however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything important to say." (p. 36)

Admiral Smith said that the primary reason why the Army and Navy business was conducted by Admiral Kimmel and not by Admiral Bloch was that after Admiral Kimmel moved ashore in the summer of 1941 and was there all the time practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature. That responsibility included the responsibility for the safety of the Fleet for it was realized that the only defense would be by the Fleet and that there was no defense ashore except the net or the gate. (p. 37)

However, Admiral Smith thought that it was Admiral Kimmel's intention in issuing his security order that the tasks therein prescribed for the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District involving coordination with the Army, should be performed directly by Admiral Bloch. (p. 37)

Admiral Calhoun said that Kimmel and Short were on excellent terms and cooperated fully (pages 936–937).

Admiral Kitts said that relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short were cordial and cooperative (page 523.)

According to Admiral McMorris, the relations of Kimmel and Short were cordial and cooperative, as to the development of plans for local defense and for utilization of fleet units in port for local defense, there may, from time to time, have been differences of opinion, but relations were habitually pleasant (page 901).

Admiral DeLany said that the relationship between the Army and the Navy out there was one of complete understanding and was very close. (p. 78)

Vice Admiral McMorris testified with respect to whether the cordiality in relations as they existed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short extended down to elements of the staffs, that there was much interchange of information on a habitual informal basis; that he himself not infrequently saw members of General Short's staff. He stated that he knew that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger had meetings not infrequently.

He stated further that prior to joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, he was Operations Officer for Admiral Andrews, who was Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and Senior Officer Present in Hawaii until the Fleet came out sometime during 1940; that during that period he frequently visited Fort Shafter and discussed defensive plans with the Army officers, and that after joining Admiral Kimmel's staff, his association at Fort Shofter with the Army continued. He stated that he felt he was not exceptional in that respect (p. 332–333).

Captain Ramsey said that he did not usually attend Army-Navy conferences but sometimes went with Admiral Bellinger. In general, cooperation between the Army and the Navy was very good (page 587).

Commander Rochefort, in charge of combat intelligence at 14ND, testified that relations between the Army and Navy were satisfactory and they worked closely together (page 476).

Admiral Bloch testified that his personal relations with General Short were friendly and his official relations were good. They had no serious disagreements and cooperated fully (page 408).

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February 1941, almost immediately after he assumed command and with the exception of possibly a couple of trips as sea and one trip to Washington, he

was there the entire time although his intention, in the event of hostilities, was that he would go to sea. (p. 7) Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel's presence ashore did not make him either unhappy or embarrassed. His relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good and his relations with the Commanding General were cordial and their cooperation, he thought, was good. But the Commanding General had a right to go to Admiral Kimmel directly and he also had a right to discuss matters with Admiral Bloch and on one or two occasions Admiral Bloch didn't know whether General Short had discussed particular matters with Admiral Kimmel or whether he was coming to Admiral Bloch in the first instance. This, however, did not cause any disagreement because Admiral Bloch talked everything over fully with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch did not think that there had been any doubt in his mind as to where he stood in the picture. (p. 7)

Admiral Bloch had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly concerning the matters in connection with the Joint Coastal Defense Plan. Among these were Captain J. B. Earle, Chief of Staff and Commander C. B. Momsen, the War Plans Officer and Captain Graham, the District Communications Officer. They had no serious differences of opinion with the Army. Some matters were referred to Washington but they were always settled. Admiral Bloch thought that their preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously. (p. 8)

General Marshall was informed that relations between Short and Kimmel and Bloch were excellent (page 856).

According to Admiral Kimmel his relations with General Short were "O. K." in all respects (pages 367–8).

General Short testified that in matters of cooperation with the Navy he dealt with Admiral Bloch on routine matters and with Admiral Kimmel on matters of importance. He frequently conferred with both. There were no regular conferences, but conferences were held from time to time. He and Admiral Kimmel were friendly personally and officially (pages 220–21).

Colonel Phillips said that relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were very good, and that General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Bloch conferred frequently, and that relations between them were cordial and cooperative (pages 482, 493).*

VI. The War Plans Relating to Hawaii and the Adequacy of the Pacific Fleet

A. THE PLANS FOR DEFENSE OF HAWAII

In the Hewitt investigation, the war plans were fully examined. They were:

1. U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five:

On 26 July 1941, U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Exhibit 35) was distributed to the Pacific Fleet by Admiral Kimmel. This plan was designed to implement the Navy basic war plan (Rainbow Five) in so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. Pacific Fleet were concerned. It was approved 9 September 1941 by the Chief of Naval Operations (Exhibit 36).

According to this plan the day of execution was to be designated as W-Day, and the day upon which hostilities opened with Japan would be J-Day, which might or might not coincide with W-Day. The plan (Exhibit 35) provided in part:

"INTRODUCTION

"Chapter IV. Mobilization

"0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization. To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day." (Exhibit 35)

*In connection with the relations between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, it will appear subsequently that there may be questions raised concerning the extent of their knowledge of action taken by one another, particularly after November 27, 1941, their exchange of information, and the degree of cooperation which existed in connection with the Army radar system at Oahu.

"CHAPTER II. ASSUMPTIONS

"1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:

"a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Governments in Exile, China, and the 'Free French' are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

"1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

"2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

"NOTE.—As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia, and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of the Axis but not necessarily against Japan." . . . (Ex. 35)

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

"1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC–1 is as follows:

"Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East." (Exhibit 35)

"CHAPTER III. INFORMATION

SECTION 3. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY ACTION

"1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.

"1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:

"a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia (including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.

"b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Indian Ocean, and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.

"c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.

"d. The principal defensive efforts to be:

"1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.

"2. Holding positions for their own use and denying positions in the Central and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced bases.

"3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.

"1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action will be toward:

"a. Capture of Guam.

"b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, by the establishment of advanced bases, and by the destruction of United States and allied air and naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon.

"c. Capture of Northern Borneo.

"d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas area by the use of fixed defenses, and, by the operation of air forces and light naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.

"e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval forces.

f. Possibly raids on stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying United States positions.

"1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:

"a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairly strong defenses in the

Carolines, and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.

"b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position (possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the Mandates.

"c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanoa-Celebes area (probably main base in Halmahera).

"d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces in that area.

"e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.

"f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and submarines in the Hawaiian area." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN—MISSION

"2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:

"a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions;

"b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;

"c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy;

"d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as Longitude 155° East;

"e. Defend Samoa in category 'D';

"f. Defend Guam in category 'F';

"g. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy raiding forces;

"h. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere;" . . . (Ex. 35)

"CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS

"2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption a1 and divides the tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phases, as follows:

"a. PHASE I—Initial tasks—Japan not in the war.

"b. PHASE IA—Initial tasks—Japan in the war.

"c. PHASE II, etc.,—Succeeding tasks.

"2202. Phase I tasks are as follows:

"a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter maintain all types in constant readiness for distant service.

"b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.

"c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.

"d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.

"e. Assign twelve patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and a similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-Day.

"f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

"g. Protect the communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups as necessary. In so doing support the British naval forces south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155° East.

"h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.

"i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the possible raider bases in the Japanese Mandates, if authorized at the time by the Navy Department.

"j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.

"k. Continue training operations as practicable.

"l. Move the maximum practicable portion of Second Marine Division to Hawaii for training in landing operations.

"m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan." (Exhibit 35)

"PHASE IA

"2203. Phase IA tasks are as follows:

"a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.

"b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been completed.

"c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and tenders in the Northern Pacific.

"d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, and of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, chiefly by covering operations.

"e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.

"2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids against Japanese shipping in waters between Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.

"f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.

"g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and outlying bases.

"h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, between the Hawaiian area and the West Coast.

"i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.

"j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier as necessary.

" k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the Second Marine Division.

" l. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island area." (Exhibit 35)

"PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT

CHAPTER I. PHASE I

"SECTION 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)

"3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following paragraphs of this section.

"3142. On W-Day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.

"3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I)." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND IA

SECTION 1. PHASE I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Operation Plan
"No. 1–R5"

"1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II and III of Navy Plan 0–1, Rainbow Five.

"2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south

of the equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding against attack by Japan." . . . (Exhibit 35)

"ANNEX I

United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date

"Patrol and Sweeping Plan." . . .

"1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this Navy Plan 0–1, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions, estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.

"2. Phase I.

"This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communications of the Associated Powers by:

"(a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-Pacific westward of Midway, and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.

"(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.

"(c) Covering.

"(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.

"(e) Routing shipping." . . . (Ex. 35)

"3. (d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).

"(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

"(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.

"(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South Pacific.

"(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.

"(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.

"(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.

"(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in sweeping during initial sweep of Phase IA.

"(8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0–1)." . . . . (Exhibit 35)

2. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, Orange 14ND–JCD–42.

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and FOURTEENTH Naval District (14ND–JCD–42), was signed and placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Ex. 80). The plan was based on the joint Army and Navy basic war plans, and was to constitute the basis on which all subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans would be based. The method of coordination under the plan was by mutual cooperation which was to apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy would operate in coordination until and if the method of unity of command were invoked. (Ex. 80)

It will be seen that under this Plan the Army task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; and to support the Naval forces; and, that the Navy task was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein; and to support the Army forces; and, that the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance.

The tasks assigned were as follows:

"14. Tasks.

"a. JOINT TASK. To hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.

"b. ARMY TASK. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers; to support the naval forces.

"c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces." (Ex. 80)

The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone was defined as "The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Zone comprises the waters of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" (Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu). (Ex. 80)

"17. ARMY. The Commanding General, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, shall provide for:

"a. The beach and land, seacoast and anti-aircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces persent thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS–WHEELER FIELD–LUALUALEI area. The increasing importance of the KANEOHE area is recognized.

"b. An antiaircraft and gas defense intelligence and warning service.

"c. Protection of landing fields and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces.

"d. Defense of installations on OAHU vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, power, water, and for interior guard and sabotage, except within naval establishments.

"e. Defense against sabotage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, except within naval shore establishments.

"f. Establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of the OAHU D. C. A., in cooperation with the Naval Inshore Patrol (see par. 18.a.), and an aerial observation system on outlying islands, and an Aircraft Warning Service for the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"g. Support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers.

"h. Provide personnel for and Army communication facilities to harbor control post provided for in paragraph 18.e.

"i. In conjunction with the Navy, a system of land communications (coordinated by means of teletype, telegraph loops, and radio intercepts, and detailed joint instructions) to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of hostile intelligence. Radio communication between the Army and the Navy will be governed by 'Joint Army and Navy Radio Procedure, The Joint Board, 1940'.

"j. An intelligence service, which, in addition to normal functions, will gather, evaluate, and distribute both to the Army and to the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"k. Counter-espionage within the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"l. Control of dangerous aliens or alien sympathizers in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"m. Any measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Supply of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"o. Hospitalization of all Army and civil population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.

"p. Reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civil population.

"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, shall provide for:

"a. An inshore patrol.

"b. An offshore patrol.

"c. An escort force.

"d. An attack force.

"e. Provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS.

"f. Installation and operation of an under. water defense for PEARL and HONOLULU HARBORS. (Hydro-acoustic posts, fixed, when developed and installed probably will be under cognizance of the Army.)

"g. Support of Army forces in the OAHU-D. C. A. and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of the OAHU-D. C. A. as may be deemed necessary and practicable.

"h. Sweeping channels and mine fields.

"i. Distant reconnaissance.

"j. Attacking enemy naval forces.

"k. Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments.

"l. In conjunction with the Army, as provided for in paragraph 17 i., a local communication service to insure prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence.

"m. Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control and censorship over communication systems which will conform to Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter IX.

"n. Operation of a Naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information.

"o. Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces.

"p. Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto." (Exhibit 80)

3. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated 28 March 1941, and approved by Admiral Bloch and General Short 2 April 1941 (Exhibit 47), dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

This provided for joint defensive measures for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war (including joint air operations and for the use of Army aircraft by the Navy for long distance patrol when Navy forces were insufficient), and was to become effective when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action.

It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization for war, there were adopted the following agreements:

Paragraph II, in respect of joint air operations, provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distant patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available, these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph III provided for joint communications, and, among other things, that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade and the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center; that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. (Ex. 47)

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, the arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and Army Aircraft Warning Service. It provided that the latter service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable." (Ex. 47)

4. Joint Estimate Covering Army and Navy Air Action in the Event of Sudden Hostile Action Against Oahu.

On 31 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two), and Major General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet units in the Hawaiian area (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph I of the estimate included a "Summary of the Situation," which indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying, that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by

a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph II of the estimate embraced a "Survey of Opposing Strengths," indicating, among other things, that Orange might send into the Hawaiian area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers; that the most difficult situation to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinating their actions; and that the aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph III of the estimate dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." It stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two; that it appeared the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack, most likely launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. It was further pointed out that a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust; that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier;" and that in a dawn air attack there was a high possibility that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using. (Exhibit 49).

Paragraph IV of the estimate considered "Action Open to Us." It was stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period, and, as a practicable measure, could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. Reference was made to other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the islands, and pointed out that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred. (Exhibit 49)

Paragraph V contained "Decisions." The primary decision was that the Naval Base Defense Air Force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. A number of subsidiary decisions were made, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, the assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions, of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and, in accordance with current conditions of readiness, included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons. (Exhibit 49)

5. Pacific Fleet Letter on Security of the Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued in February, 1941 and reissued in revised form on 14 October 1941.

This order provided that the Security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) for screening heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas, as directed by Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force, an air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times. There also was to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

C. Sortie and entry.

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G), described the principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenses of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist the Army in manning them; and provided that in the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all Fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; it prescribed air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor. It further provided that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; and that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft, arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Embarked (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain, and by holding drills, etc.

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed by the task forces in the event of an air attack was also set forth: The Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie order, sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie; the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc.; and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. It was provided that the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details; various actions were to be taken by other ships; and the Patrol Wings were to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, to carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and to prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. It was further provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack," that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefore, assemble his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means." (Exhibit 8, Naval Court of Inquiry).

The war and defense plans relating to Hawaii were contained in Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, U. S. Navy–WPL–46 (Exhibit 4); in United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5, WP–PAC–46 (Exhibit 5); in "Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935" (Exhibit 6); and, particularly, in Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Theatre, Orange 14ND–JCD–42 (Exhibit 7); and in Operation Plan No. 1–41, issued by Admiral Bloch as Naval Base Defense Officer (Exhibit 53).

In accordance with the Basic War Plans, United States Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow 5 was approved by Admiral Kimmel and issued about July 1, 1941. It was offered in evidence as Exhibit 16. Admiral Smith said that these plans contemplated that the Pacific Fleet was to deny to the enemy the Marshalls and Carolines, and to capture a fleet base in Truk. With the available equipment and personnel, he said, the Marshalls could have been raided, but could not have possibly been captured.

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion, war plan Rainbow 5 was not yet up to date and that he considered that the whole basic war plans had really not been operations plans but development plans and had been used as a lever to get more men, ships and naval shore establishment development. (p. 160)

Admiral Pye said that under the provisions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the responsibility for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii was apparently the Navy's under the direction of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 163)

The record submitted by the Naval Court refers to, but does not include, copies of Exhibits 4 to 7, inclusive. There was, however, considerable testimony concerning the local plans for the Hawaiian area.

Annex VII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, dated March 28, 1941 (Exhibit 23). dealt with joint security measures and protection of the Fleet and Pearl Harbor base. It stated that in order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements were adopted.

Paragraph II provided for joint air operations. It stated that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take such preliminary steps as were necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as circumstances warranted in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the following plans: (a) joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels to be conducted under the tactical command of the Navy; (b) defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu to be executed under the tactical command of the Army; (c) when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft were made available these aircraft would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. . . .

Paragraph III provided for joint communications and, among other things, stated that all information of the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu which was secured through Navy channels would be transmitted promptly to the Command Post of the Army Provisional Anti-Aircraft Brigade. It also stated that subsequently, when the Army aircraft warning service was established, provision would be made for transmission of information on the location or distance of hostile and friendly aircraft, and that special wire or radio circuits would be made available for the use of Navy liaison officers so that they might make their own evaluation of the available information and transmit it to their respective organizations. Information relating to the presence or movements of hostile aircraft offshore which would be secured through Navy channels was to be transmitted without delay to the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center.

Paragraph IV related to joint anti-aircraft measures, dealt with arrival and departure procedure for aircraft, balloon barrages, and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, and the Army Aircraft Warning Service. This stated that that service was to be expedited in its installation and operation by the Army and, "during the period prior to the completion of the AWS installation, the Navy, through use of Radar and other appropriate means, will endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as may be practicable."

Admiral Brown said that he would have expected the Army to depend on Navy planes to discover the approach of the enemy. (p. 144)

Admiral Bellinger said that the Commanding General of the Army's Air Force at Hawaii apparently expected the Navy would have early information and seemed surprised when Admiral Bellinger told him that they should not expect such information. (p. 131)

ADMIRAL HEWITT'S EXAMINATION

Captain John B. Earle, USN, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District in December, 1941, was shown Annex VII, Section VI, Joint Agreements, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, dated 28 March 1941 (Exhibit 47), which deals with joint Army and Navy measures for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet. Regarding joint anti-aircraft exercises and drills in the months preceding December, 1941, Captain Earle stated that definite problems were developed for training purposes, which would serve to develop the control features of anti-aircraft defense and also develop the necessary coordination between Army and Navy operations. In addition, about once in every ten days a drill was held in which planes flew over Pearl Harbor during either day or night and ships in the harbor simulated anti-aircraft fire. The Pearl Harbor area was divided into sectors, with a naval sector commander aboard ship responsible for controlling the fire from that sector and making required reports (p. 457-458).

Captain Earle stated that about once a month a drill was held which entailed locating an aircraft target at a certain bearing from Pearl Harbor, with warnings being sent to both Army and Navy that an enemy aircraft carrier or unit was located at a certain distance and bearing. Fighters planes would then be sent up and bombers dispatched to attack the simulated target. Captain Earle believed that at least three of these drills were held prior to 7 December 1941, but could not recall the date of the last drill or whether any was held between 27 November and 7 December (p. 458).

Questioned regarding the command set-up for the joint exercises, Captain Earle said (p. 458-459):

"My recollection is colored from operations that took place after Pearl Harbor, but it is my belief that the entire problem of this aircraft coordination was handled through the fleet and the Army. In other words, after the word came through that an enemy had been signed on a certain bearing, this word was given to the fleet and to the Army and that then arrangements were made between the commander of the fleet air and the Army air to coordinate their operations, including order as to—detailed directions as to direction, speed, and number of planes to be used, and so forth.

"To amplify the above statement, there was no joint command post or operations center actually set up for these drills before the war. The Operations Office in the Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, which consisted of an operation switchboard with necessary communication personnel and a watch officer, was set up to handle these drills from the Fourteenth Naval District. I do not recall the exact time, but either somewhere just before Pearl Harbor or just after, a coast artillery liaison officer was placed in this Operations Office. Plans had been made for a joint command post, but no definite steps had been taken as to location or details prior to the start of the war. It is my recollection that plans had been made for a joint command post, but this had not gone beyond the planning stage."

Exhibit 47 provided in part that pending completion by the Army of an aircraft warning service, the Navy would by radar and other appropriate means attempt to give such warnings of hostile attacks as might be practicable. Captain Earle said that to implement this agreement, the Navy had established communications with the Army over radio nets and the teletype system, so that any information received could be promptly disseminated; had ordered the communications activities to make prompt report of enemy movements; had directed the few destroyers assigned to the Fourteenth Naval District to promptly report contacts; and since there were no planes attached to the District, had instructed fleet planes to forward immediately to the Army any pertinent information (p. 460).

Captain Earle said that prior to 7 December 1941 the Fourteenth Naval District assigned a liaison officer to General Short's headquarters for general liaison duties (p. 460). Captain Earle stated further that there had been a naval officer engaged in assisting the Army to get their aircraft warning system installed and that at one time this officer came to him and asked for assistance. This officer also stated that several naval liaison officers would be required at the warning center. Captain Earle told him that the District Communications Officer would be glad to give him all possible assistance, but that there were no spare personnel in the District who could be used for naval liaison officers at the center (p. 461).

The above agreement was approved April 2, 1941, by Admiral Bloch and General Short.

Exhibit 22 is a letter forwarding the joint agreement between General Short and Admiral Bloch and the Joint Estimate, which was sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on May 1, 1941. (p. 86)

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that the Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District would be a member of the Joint Planning Committee established by that plan. Captain Earle, however, did not act formally as a member of that Committee, but said that the Chiefs of Staff acted informally with sub-committees appointed for the majority of the detailed work. (p. 368)

Captain Earle said that when he first had his assignment as Chief of Staff it took some time to get the plans approved by the Army, but as time went on and various warnings were received, it became easier to accomplish joint action. (p. 369)

Captain Earle said that the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not effective during the period preceding the attack, except as to the portion relating to planning. (p. 369)

Concerning annex No. VII to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which required the Army to expedite the warning service and the Navy to endeavor to give warning of hostile attack until such time as the Army system was in operation, Captain Earle had no recollection of discussion of this requirement. Neither did he have any definite recollection of the provision for liaison officers in connection with the dissemination of information, but vaguely recalled some talk with a fleet radar officer on the question of assignment of Navy personnel, and recalled that he told the fleet radar officer that as soon as they could get somebody who was qualified they would be glad to turn him over to the Army. (p. 369)

Captain Earle's recollection was vague as to other provisions of the Joint Plan such as procedure for recognition of aircraft and the use of barrage balloons, etc. (p. 370) Captain Earle could recall no plan for the coordination of Fleet anti-aircraft fire with Army anti-aircraft fire in the Pearl Harbor area. Captain Earle discussed generally his recollection of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 372–3)

To the agreement was annexed Addendum One, dated March 31, 1941. Addendum One was a joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

Concerning the estimate in Admiral Bellinger's air plan that the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack, Admiral Pye said that the estimate did not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than to do something else. (p. 160)

In paragraph I of the addendum there was a "Summary of the Situation." The summary indicated that relations between the United States and Orange were strained, uncertain, and varying; that in the past Orange had never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war; that a successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period; that a strong part of our fleet was constantly at sea in the operating areas, organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which Initiated hostile action; and, that it appeared possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with nor prior warning from our Intelligence service.

Paragraph II of the addendum was a "Survey of Opposing Strengths." This indicated, among other things, that Orange might send into the area one or more submarines and one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. Also that the most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The aircraft available in Hawaii were inadequate to maintain for any extended period from bases on Oahu a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier could not arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

Paragraph III of the addendum dealt with "Possible Enemy Action." This stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, a surprise attack on Oahu, including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor, or a combination of these two. Further, that it appeared that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be

an air attack, which would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. That a single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes waiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. It was also stated that: "(d) any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." It was further stated that in a dawn air attack there was a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrol that we might be using.

Paragraph IV of the addendum dealt with "Action Open to Us." This stated that it would be desirable to run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360°, but this could only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure could not therefore be undertaken unless other intelligence indicated that a surface raid was probable within rather narrow limits of time. It contained other types of action open in the event of a surprise attack on ships in the operating area or on the Island, and stated that none of the outlined courses of action could be initiated by our forces until an attack was known to be imminent or had occurred.

Paragraph V contained the "Decisions." The primary decision was that this force would locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack, and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. There were a number of subsidiary decisions, including decisions for the establishment of a search and attack group, an air combat group, assignment of missions to the groups, and definitions of conditions of readiness. The search and attack group was to be under the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force-Commander Patrol Wing Two, and was to include various units in accordance with current conditions of readiness. These units included patrol squadrons and Army bombardment and reconnaissance squadrons, among others.

Admiral Bloch, as Naval Base Defense Officer, issued his Operation Plan No. 1–41, on February 27, 1941 (Exhibit 53). The Task Organization prescribed was (a) Destroyer Patrol (Commander Inshore Patrol) consisting of two destroyers, a boom patrol, a harbor patrol, an A/B boom and minesweepers, (b) Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two) in conjunction with the Army, (c) Antiaircraft Defense (District Marine Officer) in conjunction with the Army, (d) Harbor Control Post (District Operations Officer) in conjunction with the Army. This plan directed attention to, among other things, the Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and stated:

"By cooperation in support of the Army, Naval security measures will be established as necessary for the joint protection of PEARL Harbor Base in order to safeguard the Fleet.

"In conjunction with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) will arrange to coordinate joint effort; to set conditions of readiness; to hold required drills; to make "alarm" and "all clear" signals.

"ASSUMPTIONS

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war under existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nations of such powers may attempt:

"(1) Sabotage from small craft on ships based in PEARL HARBOR.

"(2) Block the entrance channel to PEARL HARBOR by sinking an obstruction in the channel.

"(3) Lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to PEARL HARBOR.

"(b) That a declaration of war might be preceded by:

"(1) A surprise submarine attack on ships in base area—probable.

"(2) A surprise air attack on ships in PEARL HARBOR—possible.

"(3) A combination of these two—possible."

A detailed Inshore Patrol Plan was Annex "A" to Operation Plan 1–41, a detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was Annex "Baker," a detailed Anti-Aircraft Defense Plan was Annex "C", a detailed Harbor Control Post Plan was Annex "D", and a detailed Communications Plan was Annex "Easy."

Annex "Baker", the detailed Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, was dated April 9, 1941, prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch.

According to Admiral Bloch, after Admiral Kimmel assumed command and before information was received about the correspondence between the

Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War dealing with the Pearl Harbor defenses, Admiral Kimmel reviewed certain information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided that since the ships had anti-aircraft batteries, they should be used to the fullest extent to increase the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in the harbor. He also decided that since the Navy also had a number of planes on shore many of which were carrier planes that had been sent ashore while the carriers were alongside, they also should be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned Admiral Halsey and Admiral Ballinger to Admiral Bloch to talk over with the Army the coordination of action of the airplanes. Conferences were held with the Army authorities and an agreement reached with the Army under which all fighter planes, including Navy fighter planes on shore at the time of an attack, would be placed under the Army's command and that all bombers would be turned over to the Navy. (p. 4)

Admiral Bloch said that generally speaking, he took no exception to the Air Defense Plan which had been worked out by Admiral Ballinger and General Martin. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that Admiral Kimmel had a copy of the Joint Air Operating Plan; that it was fair to assume that he must have known about the plan; and that General Short also must have known about the plan. (p. 89)

Admiral Smith said that the Commander-in-Chief was apprised of all of the plans made by the Army and by Admiral Bloch. However, Admiral Smith did not recall the Joint Defense Plan, Exhibit 5. (p. 37)

It divided the Task Organization into (a) Search and Attack Group, consisting of patrol squadrons and other planes, including Army reconnaissance squadrons, and (b) an air combat group. This plan was made in accordance with, among other things, the Joint Estimate, dated March 31, 1941, which is digested above. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was, according to this plan, to locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or Fleet units in the operating areas. The plan was effective upon receipt and would become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness, prescribed in Addendum Two to this plan, would be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units, and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (ComFOURTEEN) for Navy units. The condition of material readiness was to be signified by a letter, such as "E", signifying that all aircraft were conducting routine operations and none were ready for the purposes of this plan, and the condition of operational readiness by a number, such as "5", signifying that all types of available planes would be ready in four hours. It was also required that a dispatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day, be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan stating the number of planes and readiness.

General Short testified that the local joint defense plan was in effect prior to the attack, but was not in operation because, he said, it was predicated on the Rainbow Plan which had not been executed, and, therefore, the action taken under it prior to the attack was only drills (pages 259–260).

Admiral Bellinger testified that about March 1, 1941, CincPac directed him to report to ComFOURTEEN to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force. He did so and worked with Major General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. The operations plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans, the most important of which was the plan for the Naval Base Defense Air Force, which outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to that force (page 661).

Army and Navy orders, he said, were based on the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941. He believed this estimate was sound, but that unity of command was missing (page 662). The plan was to function through mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy, and the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in an emergency or when proper authority directed. The composition varied with the planes made available by the various Army and Navy commanders; the determining factor of availability was the daily employment schedule of planes belonging to various units. Available planes were subject to operational control only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure for vitalizing this organization for drill was an "air raid" dispatch from ComFourteen, as Base Defense Force Commander; then Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Commander, would send a dispatch to all units which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuits, ordering them to

place all available planes in highest readiness; searches would immediately be started then, and an attack on enemy surface forces when located (page 662).

The authority of "Commander Naval Base Defense Air Officer" was nonexistent until an emergency was apparent or appropriate authority placed that force in a functioning status, and when called into existence covered not pursuit, but only the search and attack groups of that force (page 663). The planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on naval base defense (page 663).

Admiral Kimmel, he said, made final approval for naval aircraft operation. He or ComFourteen could vitalize the NBDA Force. ComFourteen worked under CincPac. NBDA Force was not composed of all aircraft but only of aircraft reported available (page 665).

Their estimate, he said, that "it appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence service" was an estimate of hostile action and not of Japanese war plans (page 666).

In summary, the NBDA Force would come into being in the event of: (a) a drill, (b) an actual emergency, (c) orders from higher authority based on information as to the imminence of attack (page 678).

Admiral Bloch said that the agreement with the Army concerning the use of aircraft was effective from the date of signature and would be put in execution in the same manner as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. (p. 7)

B. TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE WAR PLANS IN GENREAL

Admiral Bellinger stated that unity of command is essential to the preparation for meeting such an air attack as that on Pearl Harbor; the organization, operating twenty-four hours a day, must be fully manned and functioning. Reconnaissance, radar nets, complete information regarding shipping, and control of all aircraft in the zone of operations are essential. Such an organization must be in effect and functioning smoothly before the attack. Not much can be expected from a mutual cooperative organization existing only on paper, developed only through intermittent drills (p. 510).

It appears from the testimony of various of the witnesses that (1) the decisive theater, as laid down in the war plans, was the Atlantic, and that the military strategy in the Pacific was to be defensive; (2) that the primary responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's, and that the Navy was to assist the Army in that task; (3) that the method of command at Pearl Harbor was one of joint cooperation between the Army and Navy and not unity of command; (4) that the principal mission which had been assigned to the Pacific Fleet was to train for war with Japan; and (5) that the war plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the fleet technically mobilized.

(1) The decisive theatre the Atlantic; defensive strategy in the Pacific.

Admiral Bloch said that "Rainbow I" contemplated the United States at war with the Axis Powers, including Japan, without any assistance except perhaps some of the South American Republics; JCD was based on that plan; "Rainbow 3" was based on the assumption that the United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies against the Axis nations, including Japan; he believed that the provisions of "Rainbow 5" were about the same as in the earlier plans insofar as they related to the Fourteenth Naval District. No. 1 was a purely defensive plan. No. 3 had certain offensive tasks in it, and he did not recall the tasks assigned by "Rainbow 5." (p. 23)

Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, on December 7, 1941, was assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and was under then Captain McMorris. He was responsible for the preparation of the written war plans for the Pacific Fleet which were required to implement the basic Navy war plans then in effect. He had reported for that duty on February 1, 1941. (p. 66)

Admiral McCormick said that the commitments of the Pacific Fleet for the first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 Plan, in general were to defend the United States and its possessions, some of which were in special categories such as Guam, which was regarded as more or less indefensible; to divert the Japanese strength away from the Malay Barrier by

raids, and the capture of positions in the Marshall Islands; to protect our sea communications; and to raid or interrupt Japanese communications east of longitude 180. This provided, therefore, for the use of task forces composed of combatant ships for offensive operations consisting of raids, and if the use of a covering force were taken into account it might be said that the whole of the Fleet would thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase. (p. 66–7) In his opinion, had the three carriers which were attached to the Fleet been available, they could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without undue risk. There were only two carriers available around December 7th, but it is Admiral McCormick's belief that Admiral Kimmel intended to carry out the plan even with the two carriers which were then available. The operating schedules were more or less built around the war plans insofar as the operations of the task forces were concerned. (p. 67)

Captain Glover worked on portions of Rainbow 5, which was completed in May. The plan contemplated, he said, the dispatch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic. (p. 161) According to Captail Glover, the plan gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an offensive task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. Also, to divert the enemy strength from the Malay Barrier, through the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. Captain Glover's concept of the plan was that initially, the attitude of the Pacific Fleet was to be defensive and that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offensive. The movements which he had mentioned were to be classed as raids rather than movement of total force and he considered that the logistic support provided the Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids. (p. 173)

Captain Glover said that he thought that WPL–46 represented a realistic appreciation of the situation existing at that time and a calculated risk in the Pacific and that the plan was elastic.

Captain Glover referred to a memo, dated August 21, 1941, to the Plans Section of the War Plans Division re: "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5." This indicated that the Plans Section was charged with preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the plan in effect and continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so that advice might be given in regard to matters relating to the execution of the plan.

No change was made in Rainbow 5 prior to December, according to Captain Glover. (p. 174)

Admiral Turner discussed the background and form of WPL–46, known as Rainbow 5. (p. 251–2) Admiral Turner said that the contributory plan of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was approved by the Navy Department in about September, 1941. Concerning the offensive tasks of the war plan, Admiral Turner said, "So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Central Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls. The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive. Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, expressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conducting an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island territory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it. While the Navy Department believed that our major military effort, considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany—that view, I may add, was also held by the War Department—we were all in agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific." (p. 252)

Captain Wellborn said that his recollection was that generally the officers concerned with the preparation of the war plans were of the view that the initial major effort must be in the Atlantic. (p. 383–4)

Concerning the concept that Germany was the principal enemy to be first disposed of, Admiral Ingersoll said: "Naturally, there was a discussion of the situation that was developing and, of course, it was realized that if Japan

entered the war against us that she would be a very strong foe. Nevertheless, the United States, at that time, was too weak to engage in offensive warfare in both oceans and a decision had to be made whether a major effort would be made in one ocean or the other. It was felt that Germany was the principal enemy to be disposed of first, except to eliminate the soft member, Italy, and that after Germany was defeated all the allied Nations could concentrate on Japan. I do not recall that there was any formal representation made to the Chief of Naval Operations that his plan was not sound. At some time during 1941, the general features of WPL–46 were explained at a conference in the Navy Department at which I seem to recall that Secretary Hull, and I believe the Chairman of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees were present. I'm quite sure that the general consensus of opinion was that Germany should be eliminated first, after Italy, and then Japan." (p. 422)

Admiral Stark testified that the over-all military strategy which regarded the Atlantic as the decisive theatre had been established by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy (pages 80–1). Despite this, however, he said, the Atlantic did not have exactly priority over the Pacific, and he did not believe that men had been transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic (page 794).

Admiral Smith testified that he thought the CNO considered the Atlantic more important than the Pacific since in May, 1941, the best BB's, four CL's, and two squadrons of DD's were secretly transferred to the Atlantic (pages 529–30).

Admiral Smith said that in May, 1941, the YORKTOWN, Battleship Division Three Cruiser Division Eight, and two squadrons of destroyers were detached and sent to the Atlantic; these he said were equipped with all of the modern devices that they had tried to get for them while they were attached to the Pacific Fleet. (p. 38)

(2) Testimony concerning the primary responsibility for defense.

Both Admiral Stark (page 193) and Admiral Kimmel (page 294) testified that the basic responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was the Army's. The Army, Admiral Kimmel said, had the duty of locating and engaging enemy aircraft before they reached their objectives; the Navy was to support the Army. The Army had the duty of repulsing air attack by artillery, the Navy to assist. Under the joint plan, the Army operated all pursuit planes and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes (page 295).

Admiral Pye stated that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, assisted by the Navy in such manner as possible (page 438).

Admiral Bloch stated that the method of command was joint cooperation and that the Army's task under JCD–42 was to hold Oahu against attack and support the naval forces (page 385, Exhibit 7); the Navy's task was to patrol and control the coastal zone and to support the Army (page 386).

Admiral Bloch said that it might be stated that the Navy had no responsibility because there was nothing said in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan to the effect that the Navy had any responsibility for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack, but yet, by 2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity to help out on account of the fact that he had means that he could use. (p. 11)

Admirals Ingersoll, Delaney, and Smith testified that under JCD–42 the Army was responsible for the defense of Hawaii (pages 848, 505, 551).

Admiral Kitts testified that the Army was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 521). The Navy's function was to support the Army. When ships were in port, the guns of the Fleet were made available to Army command through the Base Defense Officer (page 521).

Admiral McMorris said that the Fleet was not charged with its own defense while in Pearl Harbor.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the phrase "territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area," as used in sub-paragraph (h), page 24, of the "Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, (WPPac–46)", (Exhibit 35), included Hawaii, and that the duty prescribed in sub-paragraph (m) of Phase I of the Initial Tasks which was to "guard against a surprise attack by Japan," contemplated that it was a task of the Pacific Fleet to guard Hawaii against the surprise attack by Japan. (Page 295–296).

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified, with reference to the statements in the "Summary of the Situation" appearing in Addendum I to the Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A–1–41, dated March 31, 1941, to the effect that a declaration of war might be preceded by "a surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor," that he agreed with the thought there expressed but had considered such an attack much more probable in the approaches to Pearl Harbor than in Pearl Harbor itself. (Page 299–301).

Vice Admiral McMorris also testified that at or about the time of the issuance of the Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter number 2CL–41 (Revised), dated October 14, 1941, he agreed with the assumption therein stated that a declaration of war might be preceded by either a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, or a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area, or by a combination of both of those two forms of attack. (Page 301–302).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection yet he entertained no doubt that he had reviewed, Annex VIII, Section VI to the Joint Coastal Frontier or Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department, and also that he had reviewed Addendum I of Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan Number A–1–41, dated March 31, 1941. (Page 297–298).

but CinPac was concerned over the safety of the Fleet and felt a responsibility for urging the strengthening of the defenses (page 899).

Admiral McMorris said that Admiral Kimmel had felt an overall responsibility for safeguarding the Fleet, although he did look to ComFOURTEEN and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to protect Hawaii. (p. 239)

General Marshall said that the Army was responsible for protecting Pearl Harbor against air attack; the Navy was to do long distance patrol and to search for and to attack hostile surface ships (page 855). The mission of the Hawaiian Air Force was to defend Oahu against air attack in cooperation with fleet aircraft and to attack hostile vessels (page 863).

Colonel Phillips testified that the Army's mission was the defense of the island, but that the Navy was jointly responsible (page 479).

(3) Command by joint cooperation, not unity of command.

Admiral Bellinger said that one of the main impediments of the air agreement and of the air organizations was the provision requiring agreement between the Commanding General and the Navy Base Defense Officer that a hostile raid was sufficiently imminent to warrant action; the set-up that existed was a paper organization which could not really function to prevent or take action in an air attack; it was not the primary objective of either the Army of the Navy; there was no unity of command or control. (p. 119–120)

He said that if the Commanding General or he had seen an emergency situation, he felt that the Commanding General would have cooperated in any specific instance. Drills had been arranged previously by special arrangement with the Army. (p. 120)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not talk over with Admiral Kimmel the possibility of a carrier raid by the Japanese nor was the wording of his estimate discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and that Admiral Kimmel knew, of course, that Admiral Bellinger was not satisfied with the organization's set-up because it was based on too much cooperation and on the assumption that it would go into effect when an emergency arose, and that no such organization is any good unless it functions on a 24-hour basis. There were, he said, insufficient personnel to have an organization functioning on that basis. (p. 122–3)

Admiral Bellinger said that when the situation in the Pacific grew more tense, those portions of his estimate dealing with a carrier raid came back to his mind; he remembered discussing the subject matter with a high Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he complimented Admiral Bellinger on the organization that had been set up, and Admiral Bellinger told him that that was all right but it would not work in case of war and indicated that there must be unity of command to make it work and also additional facilities and equipment. (p. 123)

Admiral Bellinger said that he did not think that any joint plan based on cooperation alone would or could function properly in an emergency and he mentioned his more or less dissatisfaction with the general set-up of this air defense, both personally in conversation with Admiral Kimmel and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of the Navy. (p. 124)

Admiral Bellinger ended his testimony with a statement which in part was as follows:

"Although it was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of cooperation by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically non-existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and function effectively at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty-four hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. However, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little, if any more, in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position." (p. 134)

Captain Glover said that unity of command for Hawaii had been discussed but never came anywhere near following through to any action.

Admiral Pye said that for at least ten years before the attack, he felt that there was need for unity of command at Pearl Harbor; for more than a year before the attack, he had advised several Commanders-in-Chief that coordination was not adequate and that they should get some Army officers on their staff so that it would be better arranged at least. (p. 168)

Concerning the absence of unity of command, Admiral Stark testified that thought had been given to unity of command for the whole area, but that no satisfactory solution had been reached (page 29). He said that the President or Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War could have put unity of command in effect. Admiral Stark and General Marshall could have, subject to approval, he said, of the Secretaries. Local Army and Navy commanders could have done so by agreement. Admiral Bloch probably could not have acted independently of Admiral Kimmel (page 39). He occupied, under directive, a dual status when directed by OPNAV or on "M" day (page 41).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not discuss with the Army the desirability of invoking unity of command. Unity of command would have made operations easier. ComFOURTEEN could not, he said, have invoked unity of command without reference to him, and he would have referred the matter to the Navy Department (page 296).

Admiral Ingersoll said that unity of command at Hawaii was not discussed at the Secretary's and CNO's conferences when he was present (page 848).

Admiral Turner and General Marshall both said that there had been discussion of unity of command, but that no decision had been reached (pages 858, 1009).

Admiral Turner said, "That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain cases in WPL–46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases, but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard to the Fleet and troops on shore." (p. 271)

(4) The principal mission which had been assigned was training for war.

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was familiar with the problems of the Pacific Fleet in 1941. The Pacific Fleet was assigned its missions in the War Plans, and until war broke out its major mission was to prepare for war (page 820).

Admiral Smith testified that the principal mission of the Pacific Fleet during 1941 was training for war with Japan (page 529). And this was not changed prior to December 7th (page 539).

(5) The plans were not technically executed prior to the attack, nor was the Fleet technically mobilized.

Admiral Stark admittedly sent out no order to mobilize under WPL–46 (page 102).

Admiral Pye discussed the various phases of mobilization at page 440.

Admiral Smith's testimony concerning WPL–46 and the assigned tasks of the Pacific Fleet appears at pages 541–2. He said that the War Plan was not executed by the Navy Department before the attack (page 561).

Admiral Delaney said that no "M" day was set prior to December 7, 1941 (page 505). He did not consider the Fleet mobilized because of deficiencies in men and material.

Admiral McMorris said that the War Plans, which were not executed provided that the greater part of the patrol planes of the Fleet were to be advanced to Midway and Wake and a minimum number to be left under control of the sea frontier, based on Pearl Harbor (pages 901–2).

Admiral Bloch also said that no parts of JCD–42 (Exhibit 7) were executed prior to December 7th; parts of appendix VII thereof were in effect in regard to agreements for tactical control of aircraft in case of attack (page 386).

Admiral Turner, on page 1011, discussed the Rainbow War Plans and their development; WPL–46 was a realistic plan. Mobilization without war, he said, is not practical in a democracy as the authority of Congerss to mobilize is tantamount to a declaration of war. The Fleet was, however, so mobilized that the only thing left to be done by mobilization was the taking over of merchant shipping which can only be taken after war is declared. Execution of a part of WPL–46 would have been an act of war. Provision for the execution of a part of the plan was put in to provide for war with Germany without war with Japan (page 1012).

Admiral Ingersoll (page 844), read Articles 3721 and 3722 of WPL–46 (Exhibit 4). Mobilization of the Fleet, he said, was not ordered because the Fleet was in effect already mobilized. In this connection, the Government did not want to take any action that could be considered an overt act, and mobilization is always an act preliminary to war (page 845).

Admiral McMorris said that no technical execution of WPL–46 was necessary, he thought, to put the Fleet on a war footing; it was on a war footing (page 895).

It may be noted that Admiral Kimmel was aware, at the end of November and early in December, that WPL–46 was not yet in effect and that one of the first steps which his War Plans Officer recommended be taken, in the event of American-Japanese war, was to send dispatches to Task Force Commanders advising that WPL–46 was effective (Exhibits 69A and 69B).

C. ADEQUACY OF FLEET GENERALLY TO CARRY OUT ITS TASKS

Admiral Stark testified that certain units were detached from the Pacific Fleet during 1941 for an amphibious operation in the Atlantic. The units transferred in June were three BB's, four CA's, one CV, and one DesRon, which amounted to about 25 per cent of the Pacific Fleet (pages 100–101).

He stated that from October to December, 1941, the Pacific Fleet was considered adequate to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL–46 (pages 23, 25); and later testified that in 1941 the United States did not have sufficient men and material to meet an attack on one ocean, much less in both (page 800).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Pacific Fleet was regarded as adequate to carry out the initial tasks prescribed for it in the War Plans, which were primarily defensive with the exception of diversionary raids against the Carolines and the Marshalls. (p. 421–2) Admiral Ingersoll discussed the transfer of ships of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic which he said was in accordance with the basic concept of the War Plans which indicated that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis powers. These contemplated that the British would release certain forces for the Far East but Admiral Ingersoll did not know why it took until November, 1941, for a small detachment of British capital ships to arrive in the Indian Ocean. (p. 419)

Admiral Turner considered that the Pacific Fleet was fully prepared on November 26th to carry out missions assigned to it in the War Plans. These missions were defensive, except for possible raids (page 1017).

Admiral Turner said that forces were withdrawn from the Pacific Fleet to support an occupation of the Azores but that project was abandoned and the occupation of Iceland was substituted and some of the forces which had been withdrawn were then retured to the Pacific.

Admiral Turner said that he did not recall any official protest by Admiral Kimmel concerning the detachment of units to the Pacific Fleet, but that Admiral Kimmel did not approve the matter. (p. 253)

Admiral Turner discussed the Rainbow Plan No. 3, the practice of keeping the war plans up to date and the movement of forces in accordance with the commitments of the war plans. Concerning the adequacy of the Fleet,

Admiral Turner said, "We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island, and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those positions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defensive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally, was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far removed for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful engagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength." (p. 256)

Admiral Turner said that the Fleet logistics were believed to be adequate for initial Fleet operations. (p. 257)

According to Admiral McMorris, while there were deficiencies in the Pacific Fleet, he felt that it would be effective to carry out the missions of WPL–46. WPL–46 was based on the Japanese starting war (page 893). The Fleet would have been alerted by dispatch and was advised for sometime that the situation was tense (page 894).

Admiral McMorris was of the view that the Pacific Fleet was adequate to carry out the missions assigned to it in the War Plans, although there were many marked deficiencies in the Fleet, particularly in anti-submarine craft. He said that he thought that Admiral Kimmel considered that the Pacific Fleet did consist of strong naval forces which could be effectively employed notwithstanding some handicaps. (p. 234)

Admiral McMorris said that he was not happy over the logistics situation, but certainly not discouraged over it. (p. 235)

Admiral McMorris thought the intention of Admiral Kimmel with respect to the carrying out of the War Plans in the event of war was to sweep for Japanese merchant ships, to make immediate reconnaissance of the Marshalls, to carry out as expeditiously as possible operations to establish our forces in the Marshalls, and to inaugurate patrol plane searches in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 235)

Admiral Pye testified that the Pacific Fleet could have operated as far as the Marshall Islands, but no farther (page 431). It would have been difficult to operate long there because of the scarcity of tankers. Fuel was also short (page 432), but there was sufficient to operate up to 7 December. The fleet would have been more effective if the detachment had not been sent to the Atlantic (page 432).

Concerning the detachment of three battleships, four cruisers and a squadron of destroyers in June of 1941, Admiral Pye said that this materially reduced the power of the Pacific Fleet, but that it did not make much difference in what the Pacific Fleet could have accomplished because the situation with regard to logistics was such that the Fleet could not have operated more than 2,500 miles from Honolulu no matter what its strength. Admiral Pye said that the greatest deficiency was in tankers. Another deficiency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. He said that he thought all of the officers agreed that the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands and that even with plenty of tankers, he doubted that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that because of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases. (p. 151) Admiral Pye said that during the training periods previous to December 7, fuel was being used at a greater rate than the rate at which fuel was being delivered so that the reserve was being reduced. (p. 152)

Admiral Delaney testified that he was familiar with the naval war plans in 1941 (page 500). He stated that WPL–46 could not have been executed with the forces then available to CincPac, but some of the tasks might have been carried out (page 501).

Admiral Calhoun was familiar with WPL–46 and the preparation for carrying out the tasks of the Pacific Fleet (page 931). He said that their tankers were adequate to maintain the fuel supply at Pearl Harbor (the fuel tanks there were

filled to capacity on December 7, 1941), but not sufficient to do this and also to supply the fleet while operating any considerable distance to the westward of Pearl Harbor and at high speeds (pages 932–3). The number of provision ships was hopelessly inadequate to supply fresh provisions to the fleet if operating to the westward (page 933). The logistic support of the fleet, however, was adequate to carry out the initial tasks of WPL–46, which were of a limited nature (page 938). There were, he said, personnel shortages in the Pacific Fleet in 1941 (page 943).

Admiral C. W. Nimitz testified that he was Chief of BuNav during 1941 (page 947). Because of the expansion of the fleets and new construction, it was necessary to draw on the fleets for trained personnel to man new ships. About December, 1941, the ships were fully manned as to officers and about 90 per cent manned as to men. There was a large proportion of Reserve officers, and a large proportion of the men were untrained (page 948).

VII. The Possibility of Aerial Torpedo Attack At Pearl Harbor

A. KNOWLEDGE AND EVALUATION OF SECRETARY'S LETTER:

Shortly after he assumed command, Admiral Kimmel saw the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, which discussed the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor and set forth the types of attack regarded as most likely (page 286).

In that letter, it will be recalled, the Secretary said that:

"If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor . . . The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire."

Apparently, Admiral Kimmel also received a copy of the reply of the Secretary of War to that letter. It may be noted that the Secretary of War in his reply of February 1941 (Exhibit 24), expressed complete concurrence as to the importance of the questions raised by the Secretary of the Navy, and as to the urgency of making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. In his letter, the Secretary of War stated that the Hawaiian Department was the best equipped of the overseas departments and continued to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet. The letter discussed the Army's pursuit planes at Hawaii and those to be sent to Hawaii, the present and prospective anti-aircraft guns, the fact that the aircraft warning service equipment would be delivered in June, advised that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department was being directed to give consideration to the question of employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Also, it stated with reference to the other proposals for joint defense that a copy of the Secretary of the Navy's letter and of the reply were being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department with instructions that he cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective. It appears from the copies of the endorsements annexed to this letter that a copy of the letter was sent to CincPac and to ComFOURTEEN.

Admiral Kimmel's testimony showed some confusion as to his agreement with, and his evaluation of, this correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War. He testified that he felt that the most probable form of attack on Pearl Harbor was by submarine and that a bombing attack was the second most probable form of attack, and that the danger of an air torpedo attack was nil because the water was too shallow (page 286). He then corrected his testimony and stated that his previous testimony was erroneous and that he had regarded an air attack as no more than a possibility (page 287).

Captain McCrea described his conferences which he had had with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, early in 1941. He recalled that Admiral Kimmel, who was shortly to relieve Admiral Richardson, specifically discussed the short-comings of the air defenses of Pearl Harbor. (p. 275)

Admiral Stark testified that the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War had been prepared by Admiral Stark and his assistants (page 24).

Admiral Ingersoll was familiar with the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War concerning the inadequacy of defenses at Pearl Harbor. He recalled that there was some subsequent discussion of the question of balloon barrages and that the Fleet did not want

them at Pearl Harbor because of interference with aircraft operations. He recalled no further formal representations being made to the War Department on the subject of the deficiencies. (p. 418–9)

General Marshall was familiar with the Secretary of War's reply to the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941 (page 853). In this connection he said that he personally took steps to meet the deficiencies discussed therein; that Hawaii for years held first priority on material and was by far the best equipped Army installation; that additional planes were sent to Hawaii, seriously handicapping the training program in the United States, and special efforts were made to expedite production. The problem of expansion was very serious in terms of limited equipment and personnel needed both for Hawaii and elsewhere, and also needed here for training essential to expansion (page 854).

Admiral Bloch said that after the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, 1941, a large number of fighters and some bombers were sent to Hawaii, but that so far as he knew, no additional anti-aircraft guns were sent. He said that they knew nothing about the defenses of the coast artillery and as to the adequacy of Army personnel, but that he was definitely of the opinion that the personnel of the Army was being increased all the time and was considered by the Army generally adequate for its task. Admiral Bloch knew that the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types of planes capable of performing inshore patrol. (p. 8)

General Short testified that he saw both the Secretary of the Navy's letter and the War Department's reply. He agreed with the Navy's recommendations except as to smoke and balloon barrages (page 237).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that the Secretary of the Navy's letter had not been shown to him, and that the State Department had not been apprised of it. He said, however, that the State Department was kept informed of the Navy's estimate of United States-Japanese relations (page 199).

Admiral Schuirmann said that he was sure that the State Department had not seen the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 24, and the Secretary of War's answer concerning the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. He believed, however, that they were fairly well informed of the lack of certain equipment and of personnel shortages in the Army and Navy generally. (p. 408)

In his voluntary statement, Admiral Anderson said that the Robert's report indicated that nothing was done about the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 27, 1941 by the top commanders or any of the junior flag officers. He said that so far as he was concerned, he never knew about the Secretary of the Navy's letter. (p. 398)

B. CORRESPONDENCE ON ANTI-TORPEDO BAFFLES IN PEARL HARBOR

On February 15, 1941 (Exhibit 49), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac regarding anti-torpedo baffles for protection against attacks on Pearl Harbor. This stated that the shallow depth of water limited the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor and the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limited the practicability of the present type of baffles. The letter indicated that a minimum depth of water of 75 feet might be assumed necessary successfully to drop torpedoes from planes and that the desirable height for dropping is 60 feet or less. There were various other considerations stated. The recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief were especially desired. A similar letter was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of various Naval Districts, including the Fourteenth, on February 17, 1941 (Exhibit 54).

The reply to the request for recommendations and comments was made on March 20, 1941, in a letter by Admiral Bloch, stating that the depth of water at Pearl Harbor was 45 feet, and for that and other reasons, he did not recommend anti-torpedo baffles. CincPac agreed, until such time as a light efficient net were developed (page 293).

In June, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent another letter to the Commandants of Naval Districts, copy to CincPac and others, referring to recent developments, and to experience at Taranto, which stated that no minimum depth of water could be assumed safe as regards torpedo attack if there were sufficient water around a ship to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo, but that such attack in 10 fathoms or more was more likely than in shallow water (Exhibit 55). The torpedoes at Taranto,

it was said, were launched in thirteen to fifteen fathoms although some may have been in eleven.

Admiral Kimmel testified that on this correspondence he based his opinion that there was no chance of an air torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor—and that even after the June letter, he did not think torpedoes would run in such shallow water. He pointed out that the Navy made no effort to place such nets in Pearl Harbor (page 293). He later stated that he did not think an aerial torpedo attack would be made because he did not think such torpedoes would run in Pearl Harbor and did not give this a great deal of consideration for that reason (page 331).

Admiral Smith recalled the first letter from the Chief of Naval Operations concerning anti-torpedo nets, but not the June letter. He said they did not think the Japanese would attack with torpedo planes (page 536).

Admiral Smith said that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence on the subject of the need for anti-torpedo nets, and that they concluded that because of the shallow water at Pearl Harbor no such nets were necessary; he did not recall ever having seen the second letter. Exhibits 17, 18 and 19 are copies of the letters in question. (p. 60–1) Admiral Smith said that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, as set forth in his letter of March 12, 1941, that anti-torpedo nets were not necessary, was never reconsidered. Admiral Smith complained that the Navy's torpedo information was kept too secret so far as the Fleet was concerned, other than the submarines. (p. 62)

Admiral Bloch testified that he believed that air torpedoes could not be launched profitably in Pearl Harbor (page 394).

Admiral Bloch said that he was familiar with the discussions concerning the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor; that he was familiar with the earlier correspondence but he never saw the later correspondence modifying the earlier views. (p. 26)

Admiral Halsey said that he had felt, prior to December 7, that the Fleet should have been protected at Pearl Harbor by anti-torpedo baffles and was strongly in favor of having them. (p. 306)

Admiral Bloch pointed out that such nets in Pearl Harbor might interfere with the take-off of seaplanes and with the sortie and entry of ships. Admiral Kimmel, he said, reached the conclusion and, insofar as Admiral Bloch was concerned, that settled the matter. Moreover, he said they had no nets available at the time except some makeshift nets used at harbor entrances which they had manufactured themselves. (p. 27)

It may be noted, incidentally, that on February 11, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance stating that experimental and development work should be undertaken on nets and booms; that there appeared to be an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which could be laid and removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary use; and that efforts should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets and booms (Exhibit 56).

VIII. The Situation Prior to the Freezing of Japanese Assets

During the five months of Admiral Kimmel's command which preceded the freezing of Japanese assets, Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark exchanged, in addition to official correspondence, "personal correspondence," which referred to official matters. This, Admiral Stark testified, was a "Navy custom," but these personal letters never changed official orders (pages 41–2).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel showed him every letter which he wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations; that these were personal letters, but had to be considered as official documents. (p. 33)

Admiral McMorris said that he thought he had read every one of the "personal" letters between Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Stark. (p. 242)

The highlights of this correspondence concerned

(a) The inadequacy of the local defense forces at Hawaii and the necessity for reliance on the Fleet,

(b) Admiral Kimmel's view concerning the possibility of a surprise attack,

(c) Admiral Kimmel's desire for information as to developments,

(d) the international situation.

A. THE INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES AND NECESSITY FOR RELIANCE ON THE FLEET

Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel on February 10, 1941 (Exhibit 29), and said, among other things, that he wished they could send Admiral Bloch more local defense forces but they simply did not have them. He said: "If more are needed I see no other immediate solution than for you to supply them. I am moving heaven and earth to speed a considerable program we have for small craft and patrol vessels for the district, but like everything else, it takes time and 'dollars cannot buy yesterday.' "

In a letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark on February 18, 1941 (Exhibit 30), it was stated, among other things, that as many Army bombers and supplies as the Army could send to Oahu should be sent, together with Army aircraft guns; that active and immediate steps were being taken to coordinate Army and Navy effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor; that Admiral Kimmel had a couple of interviews with General Short and found him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative, and Admiral Kimmel recommended that Admiral Stark keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu; that the detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District would have to be made from the Fleet, which was a further strain on the Fleet's small craft. He adverted to the possibility of a surprise attack and then discussed a question of the "highest importance," the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet and the need for such planes.

Admiral Stark replied on March 22, 1941 (Exhibit 32) to Admiral Kimmel's letter of February 18, 1941, and, among other things, pointed out that the highest priority had been given to Naval planes including patrol planes.

On May 7, 1941 (Exhibit 41) and on May 20, 1941 (Exhibit 42), there were letters from Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel concerning the vessels and planes needed for defense, particularly against submarine attacks. Admiral Bloch's letter stated that he had no aircraft and complete reliance had to be placed ("exclusive of the Fleet") on Army planes. The letter of Admiral Kimmel referred to previous correspondence on the subject and discussed in some detail the additional vessels needed. A memorandum was sent by Admiral Kimmel discussing various matters of interest and various inadequacies of Pacific Fleet. In connection with aviation it was stated, among other things: "Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early possibility for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area."

The memorandum also stated that the defense of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor was a matter of considerable concern and that "we" should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more anti-aircraft guns, airplanes, and radar equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this continental and expanding Army needs. The Naval forces available to the Commandant, it was said, were meager to the point of non-existence.

Admiral Stark replied to Admiral Kimmel's letter dealing with the inadequacy of the local defense force of the Fourteenth Naval District on June 23, 1941 (Exhibit 43). He stated that he realized the necessity of increasing the strength of the Naval Local Defense Forces, but advised that "until the unsatisfactory situation pointed out by the Commander-in-Chief can be remedied, the light forces and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet will have to be employed in the local defense of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier."

Admiral DeLany discussed in general the forces available to CincPac and the organization thereof; the general nature of the tasks assigned in the war plans to the Fleet; methods of training the Fleet prior to the attack, which also involved training with the Army in exercises. He said, among other things, "I think everybody realized that the defense of the island did depend on the Navy there because certainly the Army didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or anything else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operating base." (p. 75–6)

B. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VIEW CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE ATTACK

In his letter of February 18, 1941, to Admiral Stark, concerning inadequacy of the local defense, Admiral Kimmel stated: "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need antisubmarine forces—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive."

C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S DESIRE FOR INFORMATION AS TO DEVELOPMENTS

In a postscript to his letter of February 18th, Admiral Kimmel stated that he had been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considered it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature, and that he had also heard that Operations considered that the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information was that of ONI. Admiral Kimmel said he did not know that he had missed anything but if there were any doubt as to whose responsibility it was to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, would Admiral Kimmel kindly fix that responsibility so that there would be no misunderstanding.

In his reply Admiral Stark stated that ONI was fully aware of its responsibility to keep Admiral Kimmel adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States; and that information concerning the location of Japanese Merchant Vessels was forwarded by air mail weekly and if desired could be issued more frequently.

In a memorandum dated May 26, 1941, surveying conditions in the Pacific Fleet as to personnel, aviation, material, communications, operations, national policy, and information, Admiral Kimmel stated that it should be a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, should be immediately informed of all important developments as they occured and by the quickest secure means available.

D. INFORMATION SENT TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

On February 25, 1941 (Exhibit 31), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel, forwarding a copy of a memorandum for the President, dated February 11, 1941, discussing the possibility of sending a detachment to the Philippines via the Southern route. Also enclosed was a copy of another memorandum for the President, of February 5, 1941, consisting of an analysis of the situation in Indo-China, which had been prepared by Admiral Stark. This stated Admiral Stark's views that Japan had some fear that the British and the United States would intervene if Japan moved into southern Indo-China and Thailand; that the size of Japanese land forces in Formosa and Hainan was insufficient for occupying Indo-China and Thailand, for attacking Singapore, and for keeping an expeditionary force ready to use against the Philippines, and so far as Admiral Stark could tell, an insufficient number of transports was assembled for a major move; and, that as Admiral Stark saw the situation, Japan desired to move against the British, the Dutch, and the United States in succession, and not to take on more than one at a time, and at present she desired not to go to war with the United States at all.

Admiral Newton discussed a trip which he had made around March, 1941, under secret orders, with a force consisting of cruisers and destroyers. He never learned the purpose of this trip." (p. 315)

Admiral Stark's observations on the international situation were also set forth in a letter of April 3, 1941 (Exhibit 73) to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Asiatic Fleet, and Atlantic Fleet, which incidentally also discussed the preparation of Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5. The basic idea of this plan, he said, was that the United States would draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce the Atlantic Fleet, that the British, if necessary, would transfer naval forces to the Far East to attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier, and that the U. S. Asiatic Fleet would be supported by offensive operation of the United States Pacific Fleet.

He then discussed the British proposals and the dangers facing Britain. He stated that the Japanese attitude would continue to have an extremely important bearing on the future of the war in the Atlantic; that for some time past, Japan had shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East; and, he advised the addressees to watch this situation keenly. Unquestionably, he said, the presence of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. The question, he said, was when and not whether we would enter the war. Admiral Stark's personal view was that we might be in the war against Germany and Italy within about two months, but that there was a reasonable possibility that Japan might remain out altogether. However, he added, we could not act on that possibility. In the meantime, he advised that as much time as available be devoted to training.

IX. Admiral Kimmel's Visit in June and Annual Report

A. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S VISIT

Admiral Kimmel visited Washington in June, 1941 and, according to Admiral Stark, they reviewed matters of policy (page 113). According to Admiral Turner, in the fall of 1941, Admiral Kimmel came to Washington and they discussed the proper methods of conducting the initial phases of war (page 1019).

Admiral Kimmel said that in June, 1941, he told Admiral Stark and the President of the dangers to the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, i. e. air attack, blocking of harbor, etc. He told the President that the only real answer to an air attack was not to have the Fleet in port when an attack came; that it took two to four hours to sortie and that once an attack was started it would be completed before they could change the disposition of the Fleet (page 567). In general, he said, he felt that the Fleet should not stay in Pearl Harbor; but he made no protest and made no recommendation for withdrawal of any of the battleships or carriers.

On June 4, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote a memorandum for Admiral Stark (Exhibit 10) with copies to General Marshall, Admiral King and Admiral Towers, in which he stated:

"The agreement entered into betwixt the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in regard to joint action of the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii provides:

"(a) That in activities in the defense of Oahu and the other islands against enemy bombing attacks the command shall be vested in the Army Air Corps assisted by Navy fighters which may be available.

"(b) That in a mission which involves bombing of enemy ships the command shall be vested in the Navy Air Commander in charge of the Base. Briefly, when an alarm is sounded the Navy patrol planes take off to locate the enemy ships and when located the Navy directs the efforts of the Army and Navy bombers in the offensive action which they take against the enemy ships.

"The liaison betwixt the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held. These drills have developed many weaknesses but the conditions are steadily improving and it is felt they are in much better shape now than they were a few months ago. The conditions will continue to be unsatisfactory until certain equipment has been supplied and the personnel drilled in its use.

"There are about 140 light Army planes (fighters and light bombers) and 21 heavy bombing Army planes now in the Islands. These in addition to some obsolescent bombers and fighters. It is believed that the number of Army bombers in the Islands should be at least four times the number that they have there now and it is felt these planes should be sent out as soon as it is practicable to do so.

"There are not now a sufficient number of Army pilots to man all the Army planes in the Islands."

B. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S ANNUAL REPORT—YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1941

This official report, dated August 15, 1941 (Exhibit 44), was in five parts (1) Organization, (2) Operations and Training, (3) Material, (4) Personnel, and (5) Inspections. The report stated, among other things, that the Fleet had been organized into three Task Forces; that the Fleet was adequate for only limited offensive operations; and, that there were many deficiencies of ships, planes, equipment and men. The deficiencies included "inadequate local defense forces to provide for the safety of the Fleet in harbor . . ." and it was said, there were insufficient patrol craft, and district patrol and observation aircraft, though allocated in the aircraft expansion program, were not yet available.

X. Reconnaissance Toward Jaluit

Captain Layton testified that in the latter part of November, 1941, either Admiral Kimmel directed him to establish contact with the Hawaiian Air Force pertaining to this reconnaissance or else his opposite number, Colonel Raley, came to him with the information of the pending reconnaissance and requested his assistance towards delineating the appropriate objectives and to furnish the pilots and crews with intelligence material for briefing. The reconnaissance never materialized, he stated, because only one plane arrived, and there were delays due to uncompleted camera installations. He was never informed that one plane had arrived, but later learned that it was destroyed in the attack on Hickam Field. The Navy was extremely anxious that the reconnaissance

be made at the earliest possible date and Admiral Kimmel, upon receipt of Captain Layton's memorandum concerning information he had obtained at the conference, asked him how soon the reconnaissance might be expected. Captain Layton advised the Admiral to the effect that the delay was due to non-installation or non-completion of installation of cameras and that the time was still not definitely fixed. There is in evidence a photostatic copy of a memorandum of November 28th from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel concerning this reconnaissance (Exhibit 28). Captain Layton stated that the question of using Navy planes for this reconnaissance was not discussed with him, but he thought that PBY "Catalinas" could not be used because their appearance over the Marshalls would have been an overt act, while the Army planes, on the other hand, would have been ostensibly flying from Wake to Port Darwin en route to the Philippines. Captain Layton was particularly anxious that this reconnaissance be carried out to check on his information as to the presence or absence of air strength, and carriers, submarines and naval concentrations in the Marshalls area, including Truk (p. 265–267).

Admiral Bellinger recalled nothing concerning the proposed Army reconnaissance flight over the Mandated Islands (p. 499).

Admiral Bloch stated that long range reconnaissance was instituted in the summer of 1941 when he received some Intelligence information, and thought that it would be advisable to make long distance reconnaissance on a sector toward Jaluit (page 1139). Admiral Bloch went to Admiral Kimmel and recommended that he put in this service. He thought it was to 500 miles out (page 1140).

Admiral Bloch said: "In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I cannot recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate, Admiral Kimmel had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 to 20 degrees. And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued." (p. 14)

Admiral Bloch said that somewhere about the summer of 1941, after the President by Executive Order designated Midway, Wake, Palmyra and Johnston as defensive sea areas, Admiral Bloch gave the commanding officers instructions that planes which came in and were not identified as friendly were to be fired on. (p. 14)

XI. The Freezing of Japanese Assets—Deterioration of Situation and Fleet Security Order

A. THE FREEZING ORDER

On July 24, 1941 (Exhibit 71), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Hart and sent a copy of the letter to Admiral Kimmel which, among other things, referred to a two-hour conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that he thought that Nomura was sincere in his desire that the United States and Japan avoid an open rupture; they had a very plain talk; that Admiral Stark liked him, and that he had many friends in the Navy; that he had dwelt at length on Japan's need for the rice and minerals of Indo-China; that Admiral Stark's guess was that with the establishment of bases in Indo-China, Japan would stop for the time being, consolidate her positions and await world reaction; that no doubt the Japanese would use their Indo-China bases from which to take early action against the Burma Road; of course, there was the possibility that they would strike at Borneo, but Admiral Stark doubted this in the near future unless we were to embargo oil shipments to them. Admiral Stark also said that he had talked with the President and hoped no open rupture would come but conditions were not getting better.

Admiral Schuirmann did not recall the extent to which the office of the Chief of Naval Operations participated in the decisions to establish "moral embargoes" to prevent the export to Japan of various strategic commodities. (p. 406) He did remember that there was a discussion of the question of Japanese reaction particularly to the oil embargo and that Admiral Stark expressed the view that a total embargo on oil would of necessity force the Japanese to move south or to collapse. (p. 407)

In connection with Admiral Stark's conversations with Nomura, it may be noted that on July 25, 1941, Nomura reported (Document 1, Exhibit 63) to Tokyo that:

"Apparently Admiral Pratt had put in a good word for me to the Chief of (Naval) Operations, for ever since I assumed this post, I have been shown many courtesies by him. His opinions concerning U. S.-Japanese relations coincide with mine; he once told me that the only result of a war between the two countries would be mutal exhaustion.

"Once while conversing with the Admiral (Stark) I happened to mention that it seemed to me that the higher officials in the Navy Department here seemed to be men of excellent character and qualifications.

"To this, the Admiral replied that both the Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Director of War Plans were exceedingly able men. The same is true of the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. As for the fleets, he continued, both Kimmel and King were recommended by him, and both are of the highest caliber. Although Hart had reached the age of retirement, he had been kept on in active duty because of the critical times, he added.

"Please relay this information to the Navy."

Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark on July 26th (Exhibit 34), requesting information as to steps to be taken in the event of Russian participation in the war, and making various requests for equipment.

According to Admiral Stark, the Navy Department knew of the proposal to freeze Japanese assets but was not consulted prior to the issuance of the Executive Order.

Admiral Turner said that he did not participate in any discussion prior to the freezing order, but was informed of it after the decision was made. (p. 258)

Admiral Schuirmann believed that the Executive Order freezing Japanese credits was taken up by the State Department with the Navy Department. He did not recall any reports by the Navy to the State Department concerning the Navy's readiness in the Pacific as balanced against the risks of the freezing order. Admiral Schuirmann said that his own state of mind was that the Japanese would go their own way in China, Indo-China and perhaps Malaya and put the onus of using force to stop them on the United States in hopes that the division of opinion in the United States would delay effective measures by the United States. (p. 408)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall whether or not the State Department consulted the Navy Department before issuing the order in July freezing Japanese credits. (p. 422)

He stated that he advised the State Department that if the United States embargoed oil shipments to Japan, Japan would go to war but "not necessarily with the United States," and that such an embargo should not be made effective unless this country were prepared to accept the risk of war (pages 43–45).

Admiral Turner said that the freezing order was issued without any particular advance knowledge on his part, although he had heard it mentioned previously. He thought this meant a war between Japan and the United States (page 989).

Admiral Turner said that the Navy and War Departments both felt that the freezing of Japanese credits would almost surely result in war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. (p. 254)

As a result of the freezing order the Japanese, according to Admiral Schuirmann, conducted a bitter press campaign against the United States (page 198). And, General Short testified, relations became strained and he noticed uneasiness in the local Japanese population (page 247). Admiral Kimmel stated that this worsened Japanese-United States relations (page 296).

B. FURTHER DETERIORATION OF SITUATION

The correspondence between Admirals Stark and Kimmel indicated that the situation in the Far East continued to deteriorate, and that the conversations with Nomura were not improving the situation. Thus, in a letter dated July 31, 1941 (Exhibit 72), he discussed the over-all situation, and stated that "after the Russian situation broke" he proposed to the President that they should start escorting immediately and that we should consider, along with the British, a joint protectorate over the Dutch East Indies; that he thought it fairly safe to say that opinion here in general held that Japan would not go into the N. E. I.; but that Turner thought Japan would go into the Maritime Provinces in August and that

Turner might be right and usually was; Admiral Stark's thought had been that while Japan could ultimately go into Siberia she would delay going until she had the Indo-China-Thailand situation more or less to her liking and until there was some clarification of the Russian-German clash. He also said that we would give aid to Russia and that he hoped that Russia and Germany would exhaust themselves; that a Europe dominated by Russia was no more, and in fact, less attractive picture than a Europe dominated by the Nazis. A postscript to this letter stated, among other things, that "obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to deteriorate; this is one thing that is factual."

In a letter of August 28, 1941 (Exhibit 11), Admiral Stark, among other things, discussed the status of the Japanese situation and said that the Japanese seemed to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods; that some very strong messages had been sent to them, but just what they were going to do Admiral Stark did not know; that he had told one of their statesmen that another move, such as the one into Thailand, would go a long ways toward destroying before the American public what good will still remained; that Admiral Stark had had some extremely frank talks with them; that Admiral Stark had not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but he could wish the thread by which it continued to hang were not so slender.

Admiral Kimmel raised specific questions in a letter of September 12, 1941 (Exhibit 36), such as whether he should not change his orders and issue orders to shoot to the escorts for ships proceeding to the Far East. Admiral Kimmel also raised the question of what to do about submarine contacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity. He said, "As you know, our present orders are to trail all contacts, but not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea areas. Should we now bomb contacts, without waiting to be attacked?"

Admiral Stark answered on September 23, 1941 (Exhibit 12, 37), and stated, among other things, that at the time the President had issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and Southeast Pacific submarine area; that the longer they could keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. He said that no orders should be given to shoot, at that time, other than those set forth in Article 723 of the Navy Regulations, which Article was quoted. The Article provides for the use of force in self-preservation, in the sound judgment of responsible officers, as a last resort.

The letter also stated, in connection with the question of submarine contacts that they had no definite information that Japanese submarines had ever operated in close vicinity to the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, or our Pacific coast; that existing orders, i. e. not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, were appropriate, and continued: "If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step. Keep us informed."

Admiral Stark also stated that the British planned to send various battleships to the East Indian station by late December, and that these, with other British ships, should make the task of the Japanese in moving forward considerably more difficult. "It should make Japan think twice before taking action, if she has taken no action by that time."

Admiral Stark said that he might be mistaken, but he did not believe that the major portion of the Japanese Fleet was likely to be sent to the Marshalls or the Caroline Islands under the circumstances that then seemed possible; and that in all probability the Pacific Fleet could operate successfully and effectively even though decidedly weaker than the entire Japanese Fleet, which certainly could be concentrated in one area only with the greatest difficulty.

In this letter, Admiral Stark asked ". . . would it not be possible for your force to 'carefully' get some pictures of the Mandated Islands?"

A postscript to this letter stated that Secretary Hull had informed Admiral Stark that the conversations with the Japanese had practically reached an impasse. He said that, as he saw it, we could get nowhere toward a settlement and peace in the Far East until there was some agreement between Japan and China, which seemed to be remote. Whether their inability to come to any sort of an understanding at the time was or was not a good thing, he hesitated to say.

A second postscript to the letter referred to a conversation between Admiral Stark and Nomura. Admiral Stark said that Admiral Nomura usually came in when he began to feel near the end of his rope, and that there was not much to spare at that end then. Admiral Stark stated that conversations without results could not last forever and that if the conversations fell through, which looked likely, the situation could only grow more tense. Admiral Stark had again talked to Hull and thought Hull would make one more try; Hull kept Admiral Stark

pretty fully informed, and if there was anything of moment, Stark would of course hasten to let Kimmel know.

This letter also enclosed a copy of a memorandum from General Marshall to Admiral Stark setting forth what was being done to strengthen the Philippines, which indicated, among other things, that on September 30th, twenty-six Flying Fortresses would leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

C. INADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT AND EFFORTS TO RECTIFY

There was during this period further correspondence on the inadequacy of equipment in the Hawaiian area. Thus on July 26, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark and stated that when the proposed visit of Mr. Forrestal had been announced, a list of topics for discussion had been prepared by Admiral Kimmel's staff. Admiral Kimmel said that not knowing the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit, or whether Mr. Forrestal was informed of the war plans and of Admiral Kimmel's problems, that he decided it was better to combine the notes into a letter for Admiral Stark. The principal items were then listed in the letter. These were the importance of keeping CincPac advised of the Department's policies and decisions, and changes to meet changes in the international situation; questions of priorities in connection with a Pacific war, such as the need for transports and for guns and ammunition for Marines, for new construction to complete ammunition facilities, for building up the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, for more personnel, for small craft for patrol in the Naval District, etc; the necessity of improvement as to communications, including identification, friend or foe, equipment for aircraft; and, various aviation requirements.

On August 22, 1941 (Exhibit 35), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (in answer to Exhibit 34) and discussed the efforts made in connection with the development of radar equipment, and the other requests made by Admiral Kimmel.

Again in August (Exhibit 45), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to CincPac stating that he was fully aware of the seriousness of the situation in the Fourteenth Naval District, and related his efforts to secure additional patrol vessels.

D. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S LETTER ON SECURITY OF THE FLEET

Admiral McMorris testified that no formal written estimate of the situation was maintained by him, but that a mental estimate was maintained (page 887).

His estimate of the situation on October 1st was that United States-Japanese relations were strained and that the Japanese might go to war with Britain and the United States, or possibly with Russia, in which case the United States might not be involved (page 887); also, that war between the Japanese and Dutch and British was possible without the United States being initially involved.

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL–41 (Revised) from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet concerning the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, was issued on October 14, 1941 (Exhibit 8). This was Admiral Kimmel's security order for the Fleet and the only general order for this purpose (page 278). This order, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not primarily an estimate but was a basis for training in order to meet contingencies (page 283). The possibilities of attack set forth therein, he said, were not necessarily in order of importance as to probability of attack (page 287).

> **Admiral Bloch said that almost immediately after Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, he issued a "Base Defense Order" known as "2CL." As Admiral Bloch understood it, the object of this was to assure the security of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet insofar as the Commander-in-Chief could augment the forces of the Army which really had the responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor. This order was revised in October, 1941. (p. 3)**

This order provided that the security of the Fleet was predicated on two assumptions:

(a) that no responsible foreign power would provoke war under present existing conditions by attack on the Fleet or base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers might attempt (1) sabotage on ships based in Pearl Harbor from small craft, (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the channel, (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor;

(b) that a declaration of war might be preceded by (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,* (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating areas, (3) a combination of the two.

Admiral Smith said that the October 14th directive on Fleet security contemplated air attack on Pearl Harbor, but that in the minds of the people out there such an attack was not expected. Unfortunately, he said, he believed that the attitude of most of the officers there was that they did not believe that the Japanese had the "guts" to try such an attack, and if they had they would not get away with it. He said that the estimate of the situation contained in the Pacific Fleet Contributory War Plan issued around July 1, 1941, had contemplated Japanese attack upon the outlying islands and against Malay and the Philippines, but did not consider an air attack against Pearl Harbor itself. (p. 57)

Security measures were prescribed covering:

A. Continuous patrols, inshore, boom and harbor.

B. Intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol and an air patrol. The destroyer patrol was to consist (a) of a patrol to 10 miles from the entrance, (b) three destroyers to search 12 hours prior to sortie or entry of Fleet or Task Force, (c) one destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships, other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, to be on one hour's notice. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of operating areas as directed by Aircraft, Scouting Force; an air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force; air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in the preceding. There was also to be a daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

Security provisions were also prescribed for:

C. Sortie and entry.

Concerning Pacific Fleet Confidential letter 2CL–41 dealing with the security of the Fleet, Admiral Anderson said that prior to December 7 on more than one occasion he had proposed changes to the effect that whenever ships entered or sortied, depth charges should be dropped by the destroyers. This would be for the purpose of training and also for the purpose of having any Japanese submarines in the area assume defensive rather than offensive attitudes. (p. 395)

D. Operating areas.

E. Ships at sea.

F. Ships in port.

The security provisions covering defense against air attack (G) referred to the anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor, and directed that Marine defense battalions would assist; that any part of the Fleet in harbor, plus all fleet aviation shore based on Oahu, would augment the local air defense; that air defense sectors and a berthing plan in Pearl Harbor were prescribed;

Admiral Pye said that in regard to the Commander-in-Chief's instructions for the security of ships at port, the only thing that was questionable in his mind was the part about the sector fire control; he never felt that ships could or should be confined to one sector; he had written a modification of the order which he said was not in effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which he did not feel could be carried out by any Sector Commander. (p. 167)

that the senior officer embarked, exclusive of CincPac, should insure berthing so as to develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire; that ComFOURTEEN as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, and take other action including supervisory control over naval shore based aircraft and arranging through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and the Navy, and coordinating Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by advising the Senior Officer Present (exclusive of CincPac) of the condition of readiness to maintain,

Admiral Smith interprets the directive in 2CL–41 concerning the condition of readiness as granting authority to ComFOURTEEN to order conditions of readiness. (p. 55)

and by holding drills, etc.

*This, Admiral Kimmel testified, contemplated a surprise air attack. However, it was merely an assumption on which to base training—there being sufficient probability of such an attack to justify training. He thought it more probable that the Japanese would attack while the Fleet was away from, rather than at, Pearl Harbor. But it was never considered more than a possibility which ordinary prudence would make him guard against (page 287).

Three conditions of naval base defense readiness were prescribed. Condition III read as follows:

"Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector.) Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer."

The procedure to be followed in the event of an air attack was also set forth, under which the Senior Officer embarked was to execute an emergency sortie orders sending destroyers out and preparing a carrier and heavy ships and submarines for sortie, the Task Force Commander at sea was to dispatch a striking unit, etc., and the Naval Base Defense Officer was to give the alarm indicating that an attack was in progress or imminent, should inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and type of attacking aircraft, should launch air search for enemy ships, and arm and prepare all bombing units available.

The action to be taken if a submarine attacked in the operating area was set forth. This provided, among other things, that in such event the ship attacked was, among other things, to originate a plain language dispatch containing the essential details, various actions were to be taken by other ships, and the Patrol Wings to assume readiness for search and for offensive action, carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander, and prepare to establish station patrol at a 220 mile radius from the scene of attack at one hour before daylight of the next succeeding daylight period. The shore based fleet aircraft were to prepare to relieve planes over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor were also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by the Naval Base Defense Officer would have priority. This also provided that "It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack." It also stated that "(3) it must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must, therefor, assembly his task groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means."

It may be noted that Admiral Kitts stated that he continued as Fleet Gunnery Officer until September, 1942, and that the plans made by Admiral Kimmel were not essentially changed after the attack. The plans were generally sound, he said, but after Pearl Harbor, the Fleet got guns and men to make the plans effective. Nets and balloons were subsequently installed, but the balloons were later removed, as they interfered with operations (page 527).

> **Admiral McMorris said that they were not entirely satisfied with the arrangements for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore, and there were discussions and conferences to improve the same. On the whole, however, he felt that his view was that the security arrangements set forth in the Fleet Security letter was satisfactory or else he would have recommended a change. (p. 239)**

Exhibit 58—Pacific Fleet Letter 23CL–42, prescribing battle organization and conditions of readiness watches at sea, as issued by Admiral Nimitz on May 6, 1942, it was said, amounts to a reissue of Admiral Kimmel's instructions (page 503). It may be noted that Condition III, as defined in this letter, provided that all anti-aircraft batteries were to be manned on BB's, CA's and CL's, and one-half on CV's. Also it may be noted that in this letter, Admiral Nimitz stated that he believed that with efficient radar and the security afforded by air and surface screening, Condition III would normally meet security requirements when not in contact with the enemy. These provisions differ somewhat from Admiral Kimmel's letter on the same subject, dated February 21, 1941, a copy of which is annexed to Exhibit 58.

XII. Intelligence in Washington—The Interception and Decoding of Secret Japanese Communications

A. ONI distribution and acquisition of intelligence in general

Captain McCollum, officer-in-charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., said that his duties consisted of evaluating all forms of intelligence concerning the Far East, correlating it, and informing the Director of Naval Intelligence and through him the Chief of Naval Operations. (p. 10) In case information of serious import

was received, it was his responsibility to immediately bring it to the attention of the Director of Naval Intelligence and recommend necessary action. Usually direct access was available to Admiral Turner, Director of the Plans Division, and to the Chief of Naval Operations himself. (p. 20)

Speaking of the dissemination of information to the fleet commanders, Captain McCollum said that the Office of Naval Intelligence was responsible for preparing from the information available to it factual statements, which did not make an estimate of enemy intention. These statements were then submitted by the Intelligence Division to the Plans Division and to CNO, who made the decision as to what, if anything, was to be disseminated to the fleet. (p. 20) He said that prior to about February, 1941, the Division of Naval Intelligence had occasionally submitted estimates of probable enemy intentions, but that at about that date its authority to do so was removed. Thereafter, ONI was restricted to presenting the facts of the situation, and higher echelons made and disseminated the estimates as to enemy intentions. (p. 41–42)

Captain McCollum made the following general statement as to the organization of the office of Naval Intelligence: (p. 40–41)

"The ONI was not an omnipotent and over-all intelligence center for the fleet as a whole. It operated primarily as an intelligence center for the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department; equipped to supply combat type of intelligence, which prior to outbreak of war is nearly always closely related with diplomatic negotiations. Each of our major commanders in the Pacific was equipped with a staff of intelligence and with a radio intelligence staff which served him directly. With the exception of more static types of intelligence, such as the design of a Japanese battleship, and so on, your combat intelligence was designed to function in the Navy Department to advise the Chief of Naval Operations, at Pearl Harbor to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, through his fleet intelligence officer, . . . and in the Asiatic Fleet, which in some respects, from an intelligence point of view, was our strongest organization, to keep the CinC. Asiatic Fleet, advised.

"The Division of Naval Intelligence, in addition to that, did try to make [available] certain over-all intelligence agencies in foreign countries which would produce intelligence. In each case in the Asiatic Theatre those intelligence agencies operating out there were made known to the CinC, Asiatic Fleet, and their reports in every case funneled to him and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Our naval attaches, for instance, were under orders to submit copies of every report that they made both to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as well as to the Department. So, you had in effect a three point system in which combat intelligence common to any one of them was common to all the others, with each Commander-in-Chief supreme in his own area. And that is essentially the way it has functioned throughout the war."

Captain McCollum said that there was close cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division (Army). He stated (p. 20–21):

"The Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division had full information of the situation. We were in daily consultation. I saw Colonel Bratton or one of his assistants daily. They usually came to my office in the afternoon. They had full access to my charts showing the location and movements of ships, and they had full access to all of the radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department. That was given by me personally and verbally and the situation discussed from day to day with officers of the Far Eastern Section of MIS in the War Department, and that had been true for some months past. We made no major move, for instance, such as withdrawing our naval language officers from Japan or sending a dispatch out to destroy all codes and ciphers . . . without notifying my opposite number in the War Department what we intended to do."

Captain McCollum said that so far as he knew all Army information was made available to his section in ONI. He said, however, that the Army radio intelligence organizations did not furnish information of value regarding the Jap Fleet, since "they didn't touch the Jap Navy systems." Any radio intelligence organizations were working on Jap diplomatic ciphers and on certain minor Japanese Army systems. (p. 22–23)

The cooperation between the Far Eastern Section of ONI and the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelligence service was "unofficial," but had the sanction and approval of both the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Military Intelligence, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2. (p. 23)

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence on 7 December, 1941, and for about 2 months prior to that date, named the following as, in general, the sources of information available to the Far Eastern Section of the foreign branch of ONI: Naval Attache reports from Japan and China, observers reports from various ports in the Far East, reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Section, collateral items of interest produced by the investigations of the domestic branch of ONI, particularly from Honolulu, radio intelligence, State Department reports from diplomatic agents and reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor with respect to searches and radio intelligence (p. 390).

Admiral Wilkinson stated that it was his understanding, confirmed by Admiral Ingersoll, Assistant Chief of Operations, that final evaluation of information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence was the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations. Dissemination of information outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet was, likewise, understood to be the responsibility of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations following their evaluation and selection of those items which they believed should be forwarded. (p. 392)

Admiral Wilkinson said that such analyses as were made in the office of Naval Intelligence were submitted to War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations to use as they saw fit. (p. 392)

Questioned regarding the exchange of intelligence in Washington between the Army and the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson replied that ONI and G–2 were in constant communication with each other and that in fact General Miles, Head of Military Intelligence was dining with him on the night of 6 December. (p. 408–409) Admiral Wilkinson stated that through this steady and effective liaison, all the information the Navy had regarding movements of the Japanese fleet was furnished the Army. (p. 409)

The organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence had been revised on August 11, 1941. It consisted of a Director, Assistant Director, Domestic Branch, Foreign Branch, Administrative Branch, and field offices (page 461). Captain Heard was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI from October 9, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (page 461).

He stated that Intelligence was distributed as follows: Urgent, by oral report; usually a daily Japanese summary to the Director of Naval Intelligence by the head of the Far East Section, which was relayed to CNO; a daily summary of State Department dispatches; weekly reports of dispositions of foreign fleets; a daily bulletin for the Naval Aide to the President; fortnightly summaries of current international situations and sometimes special summaries; and dispatches to foreign posts and naval attaches. Generally, the information was evaluated as to credibility and to a less degree as to the conclusions to be drawn. War Plans made the final evaluation of enemy intentions. Copies of all reports and oral reports were directed to the Chief of Naval Operations. A daily report of political information was made to CNO (page 462). Military information was promptly passed to CNO (page 463). (1)

Admiral Ingersoll recalled receiving frequent visits from a Naval Communications Officer who had Japanese messages, but whether he saw all of the messages or not he did not know. (p. 417–8)

In the exchange of information as to United States-Japanese relations, there was close cooperation between the State Department and the Navy, according to Maxwell M. Hamilton, who during the latter part of 1941 was Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department. He stated that he had frequent contact with Admiral Schuirmann (page 1070) which involved questions which came up for decision involving foreign policy and naval policy (page 1071). The methods of furnishing information to the Navy on matters of United States-Japanese relations were: (1) the liaison office forwarded copies of paraphrases of telegrams or mail reports of interest to the Navy; (2) the Division of Far Eastern Affairs transmitted paraphrases of telegrams and mail reports from the Far East of interest to the Navy Department; (3) Conferences between Navy and State Department officials and meetings of the war council and Cabinet (page 1071). In general, he said, diplomatic information was transmitted to the Navy (page 1073).

One of the sources of Japanese military and naval information was Captain Smith-Hutton, who in 1941 was naval attache in Tokyo and who, as part of his

duties, was part of ONI. Ambassador Grew, he said, expected him to keep advised as to the Japanese Navy and they exchanged information (page 1079).

He had great difficulty in obtaining Japanese military and naval information (page 1077). He had informed the Navy Department by implication in a report that they could not depend on him to keep them informed concerning the Japanese Navy. He had to report to the Japanese Navy whenever he left Tokyo and his movements were restricted (page 1080).

He transmitted information by Japanese cable to the 4th Marine Radio in Shanghai and thence to the United States; and also by reports to Ambassador Grew and to the Navy Department by diplomatic pouch (page 1078).

By far the most important source of information in Washington as to the Japanese, however, was communications intelligence, which is discussed in the following paragraph.

B. THE INTERCEPTION AND DECODING OF SECRET JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS

Captain Safford made the following statements regarding the methods of obtaining and decoding Japanese diplomatic and consular dispatches during 1941. (p. 103–104):

"They were initially obtained from intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and foreign points; mostly radio intercepts and occasionally land wire or cable. Some were photographs of station copies as they passed through the various commercial communication facilities, but roughly ninety-five per cent were obtained by radio intercept of the U. S. Army and U. S. Navy at various points. They were all decoded by means of reconstructed Japanese systems. The principal was the 'purple,' which is a complicated electrical machine solved by the Army and machines made both by the Army and the Navy and two machines, in fact, sent to London for the use of the British. The Jig–19 at this period was solved by cryptographic analysis. That had to be done over again each day, and it really took more time and effort to keep abreast of the Jig–19 than it did the 'purple' once we had the machine reconstructed. In all these systems, 'purple,' Jig–19, and the minor systems, we had an exchange between Washington, Singapore, Corregidor, and London. We pooled our efforts on that.

Captain Safford said that after Japanese messages were decoded they were evaluated and distributed as follows (p. 104–106):

"They were translated in the translation sections of the Navy Department unit and the War Department unit and the senior translator decided which were of relative unimportance, not worth writing up smooth, mostly connected with financial matters and visas and things like that; and the others were all typed smooth and turned over to Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, respectively. Originally the two intelligence organizations had prepared briefs or memorandums giving a summation or a paraphrase of the messages and they were distributed to the higher officials in the War and Navy Departments and to the Secretary of State and to the President.

"In the Navy Department the people that saw them were, specifically, the Chief of Naval Operations and his aide usually saw them; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Intelligence, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of the War Plans Division. The Secretary of the Navy also saw them and usually his aide saw them. The Naval Aide to the President saw them and took them in to the President.

"In the War Department they went to the Military Intelligence, Chief Signal Officer, Director of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of Staff, War Department, and also to the Secretary of War.

"Later on, in November, when things became critical, at the request of the President and after conference agreement between Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, the system of summaries and briefs was dropped and the original messages were prepared in folders and each day the folder was taken through. By agreement, all dissemination to the White House was handled through the Navy Department, and in return all dissemination to the State Department was handled through the Army, but the two things were duplicates. Anything the Navy was sending around, the copy was sent to the Army, and anything the Army was sending around, a copy was sent to the Navy; and they put on a serial number. Ours were JD–1 and the Army's were SI–X, with a serial; so they were substantially duplicates unless something went wrong.

"In addition, it was the habit to put notations on the bottom as to references, and Kramer, when he took his stuff around, everything that was referenced to anything bearing on this subject was put on the off side of the page, so that you had the message on one side and the references on the other side, the left hand side, of the folder. Then, anybody seeing them had a complete picture. And Kramer went with them and stood in the doorway or outside and if there was any doubt, he could be called in to explain further to anybody who was interested in the subject. Kramer also went to the White House, I believe twice. Normally he would explain things to the Naval Aide to the President and the aide would depend on his memory to answer any questions the President might want to ask. The President insisted on seeing the original messages because he was afraid when they tried to condense them, some one would change the meaning."

Admiral Wilkinson stated that with regard to the exchange of ratio intelligence with the Army, that complete liaison existed between the decrypting agencies and complete exchange of actual texts immediately after their translation (p. 408).

A vitally important Japanese code had been broken. This source of intelligence was handled jointly by Naval Communications and the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, who was Director of Naval Communications, said that Communications handled the interception and crypto-analysis of Japanese code messages and the information derived was turned over to ONI. This was a special procedure followed because this information was most secret, and would be useless if any inkling reached the enemy that we could read his communications (page 1026).

According to Admirals Redman and Ingersoll, it was the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence to evaluate and to distribute this information (pages 1102, 818).

Admiral Ingersoll stated that there was no set routine for the distribution of this information. It was distributed by Commander Kramer when there was anything important involved. The Director of War Plans kept a current estimate of the military-political situation and conferred frequently with the Chief of Naval Operations (page 819). He said that Commander Kramer almost daily brought quite a number of intercepts to him (page 824). These were given to Admiral Stark's Aide and were also shown to the Secretary of the Navy and possibly to the Assistant SecNav, the President, the Secretary of State, the Director of War Plans, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and to Captain Schuirmann.

Commander A. D. Kramer testified that between October 1 and December 7, 1941, he was attached to ONI and loaned to Op–20–G, Naval Communications. He was head of a translation section of communication security. This consisted of translating decrypted intercepts and delivering them to ONI or to any persons named by DONI or CNO. Fourteen copies were made and seven went to the Army. The other seven copies were for delivery to officers in the Navy Department and also to the White House or State Department. He had the responsibility for delivery to the White House and Army for delivery to the State Department. Addressees in the Navy Department who normally got copies were the Aide to SecNav, CNO, DONI, Head of Far East Section of ONI, Director Naval Communications, and Head of War Plans Division (page 950). The seventh copy was a file copy. A complete copy went to each addressee, delivery being made daily or oftener if urgent. Earlier in 1941 he had attached a summary with asterisks to indicate important documents as the daily volume was so heavy (sometimes 130 messages a day) that the addressees would not have time to read all the messages. He marked and delivered the messages and it was up to the addressees as to what they would read. All decrypted Japanese traffic was passed to his section. He knows the Japanese language (page 951).

The decision as to whether translated messages should be passed to higher authority was made by ONI and he acted for DONI. As a rule an attempt was made to show the messages to McCollum and DONI before distributing them. Nothing was eliminated from the books of messages, but occasionally DONI would indicate something as being of greater or lesser interest to CNO or SecNav (page 953–4). During the latter part of the year he discontinued making summaries (page 954). As Japanese-United States relations were then strained, he used clips to indicate the important matter so as to get the information to those con-

cerned as swiftly as possible. He left the folder of messages for CNO with CNO's aide customarily. On "hot" messages, he often gave it to CNO personally (page 955).

C. FAILURE TO SEND THIS SECRET INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL

The information obtained from the interception and decoding of secret Japanese communications was not sent, as such, to Admiral Kimmel. It will be recalled that he had earlier requested that he be kept promptly advised of developments and that the responsibility for furnishing secret information to him be fixed by Admiral Stark; and, that he had been advised that ONI was aware of its responsibility in this connection.

Information of the greatest importance, as will later appear, was obtained from secret Japanese communications, particularly after the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet and the arrival of the special Japanese emissary, Kurusu.

In his testimony, Admiral Kimmel asserted that he had not been adequately informed of this information; Admiral Stark asserted that Admiral Kimmel had been kept adequately informed by the various dispatches sent to him.

Admiral Redman said that although none of the intercepted messages were sent to Admiral Kimmel, as intercepted and decoded, they were used as the basis of the dispatches sent to him. He said that it was beyond the capabilities of his organization to encode and transmit all this traffic to CincPac. This information could not be sent by air mail. Its security was important as the source of intelligence would be jeopardized if the enemy knew of our success in interpreting it. The secrecy of this material has been vital to war effort since December 7, 1941 (page 1102). His section could have handled sending briefs of these messages to CincPac (page 1105). Admiral Noyes said that it would have been a physical impossibility to keep CincPac informed of the contents of all "purple" messages (page 1045) and, according to Admiral Ingersoll, it would have been too much of a burden on naval communications to repeat all the intercepts to CincPac, although selections therefrom might have been sent (page 839).

Admiral Turner said that Admiral Kimmel was kept adequately informed and that the information not sent to him would have been of no help to him (page 1014). Moreover, he had thought that CincPac had the same intelligence that CNO did, including the "super-secret" class of information (page 1018).

It may be noted that General Marshall said that he did not see all of the intercepts, nor was the decision as what should be passed on to the field commanders always instituted by him (pages 874–7).

XIII. Resignation of Japanese Cabinet—Arrival of Kurusu—The Possibility of a Surprise Aggressive Movement

A. THE DISPATCH OF OCTOBER 16, 1941

Following the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet, Admiral Turner drafted a dispatch to CincPac and others, which the Joint Board approved (page 989).

Admiral Turner said that he prepared the dispatch of October 16 which had been discussed with the Army and modified by the Joint Board. (p. 263)

Admiral Ingersoll said that the dispatch of October 16 concerning the change in the Japanese cabinet was based on an estimate by Admiral Stark and Captain Turner and he had no recollection of any correspondence from the State Department which would have formed the basis for that dispatch. (p. 423)

Admiral Turner said that at this time he was convinced that if the Japanese attacked England in the Far East, the United States would go to war to aid England, and that the Japanese had decided to drive Britain out of the Far East. Some Japanese, he said, wanted to keep the United States out of this war, but the United States during 1940 and 1941 had made movements contrary to Japan's interest, and the whole political situation and Japanese interest in the Philippines convinced him that war was not far off. He considered that Japan would take the initiative (page 990).

He estimated where such an attack might be made, and had issued Rainbow War Plan No. 3 in January, which envisaged an attack by Japan against the Philippines, Borneo, and Malaya, and called attention to the fact that the Secretary of the Navy had written to the Secretary of War in January, 1941, stating that such an attack would be accompanied by an attack on Hawaii and on the Fleet by air, submarine or surface vessels (page 990).

On October 16th, when the dispatch was sent, he still considered that the same considerations set forth in the Secretary of the Navy's January letter continued in effect. These matters, he said, were constantly discussed with Admirals Stark and Ingersoll (page 991).

The dispatch of October 16, 1941 (Exhibit 13), stated that the resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation; if a new cabinet were formed, it would probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American; if the Konoye Cabinet remained, it would operate under a new mandate which would not include rapproachment with the United States; in either case, hostilities between Japan and Russia were a strong possibility; since the United States and Britain were held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation, there was a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities, the addressees were directed to take due precautions, including such "preparatory deployments" as would not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. CincPac and CincAF were directed to inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities.

Exhibit 6 is the October 16, 1941 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30)

Admiral Leary said that he thought there was complete and free interchange of information among the higher naval command. He, however, did not recall having seen or having heard discussed the October 16 dispatch or the war warning. (p. 364–5)

Concerning the change in the Japanese Cabinet in October, 1941, Admiral Schuirmann said that the State Department had not taken as serious a view of this Cabinet shift as had the Navy Department. (p. 408)

General Short stated that he had been advised of this dispatch through Admiral Kimmel (page 247). Apparently the Navy Department did not advise the State Department of the dispatch (Schuirmann, page 200).

According to Admiral Turner, the "preparatory deployments" contemplated by the dispatch were the sending of submarines to the Marshalls and sending the Fleet to sea westward of Hawaii and in supporting and covering positions for Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands (page 991).

Admiral Smith said concerning the directive to take "preparatory deployment" that an alert was sent to the forces in the operating areas, the training exercises were halted, the ships assembled with their destroyer screens and placed until further orders as a fleet and kept at sea, and directed to advise of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area; the ships in port, however, were not moved out although conditions of readiness were prescribed; this was not done for the protection of the base. (p. 49–50)

Admiral Halsey said that the "preparatory deployments" effected after the October 16 dispatch included readiness of the ships to take action and the dispatch of submarines to Midway and Wake, and also sending additional guns and ammunition there. (p. 296)

Concerning "preparatory deployments" directed in the October 16 dispatch, Admiral Ingersoll said:

"I think the prepatory deployments that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intention against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the southern Philippines, rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here, in connection with this dispatch and others which followed, that they were released by me. In all cases, such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases, I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not bother him further, I released the dispatch in the form which he had approved." (p. 423)

Admiral Ingersoll said further he did not recall that they expected the Pacific Fleet, as distinguished from the Asiatic Fleet, to make any important new dispositions. (p. 423)

The direction not to take provocative action against Japan was inserted by him because the State and Navy Departments were agreed that the United States should get as much time as possible to prepare, and there were conversations with

the Japanese which appeared on the surface to be a possible solution so there would be no war, and this government did not desire war with the Japanese at that time. Therefore, they did not want the Fleet to assume a threatening position by cruising near the Marshalls or sending submarines near the Japanese islands. Nor did they want to arrest disloyal people in Hawaii. They wanted to retain peace as long as possible and to make sure that when war came, it would be Japan and not the United States which started it (page 992). The question of shifting the Fleet back to the West Coast had been continuously discussed, he said. This was put up to the President and each time it was decided to keep the Fleet out there, except that about one-third or one-quarter of the Fleet would come to the West Coast for repairs and recreation. But, by October 16th, every one believed that the Fleet should stay at Pearl Harbor (page 992).

It is of interest to note that at about this time Admiral Turner had a conference with Nomura, at which, according to Nomura, Admiral Turner said to him that what the United States wanted was not just a pretense, but a definite promise; that should a conference be held between the leaders of the two governments without a definite preliminary agreement, and should an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament; that Japan spoke of peace in the Pacific as if she could decide matters independently, and so it would seem to Admiral Turner that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance (Doc. 2—Exhibit 63).

B. ADMIRAL STARK'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 17, 1941

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel (exhibit 38). In this letter, Admiral Stark advised that things had been popping here for the last twenty-four hours, but from the dispatches Admiral Kimmel knew about all that they did. He said, "Personally, I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the 'possibility;' in fact, I tempered the message handed me considerably. Perhaps I am wrong, but I hope not. In any case after long pow-wows in the White House, it was felt that we should be on guard, at least until something indicates the trend."

Admiral Stark continued that Admiral Kimmel would recall that in an earlier letter, when War Plans was forecasting a Japanese attack on Siberia in August, Admiral Stark had said that his own judgment was that they would make no move in that direction until the Russian situation showed a definite trend. In this letter he said that he thought this whole thing worked up together. He stated that efforts would be made to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it could be kept going, he did not know, but the President and Mr. Hull were working on it. To this letter was annexed a postscript, stating in part, "General Marshall just called up and was anxious that we make some sort of reconnaissance so that he could feel assured that on arrival at Wake, a Japanese raider attack may not be in order on his bombers. I told him that we could not assure against any such contingency, but that I felt it extremely improbable and that, while we keep track of Japanese ships so far as we can, a carefully planned raid on any of these island carriers in the Pacific might be difficult to detect. However, we are on guard to the best of our ability, and my advice to him was not to worry."

Also annexed was a memorandum of October 17, 1941, by Rear Admiral Schuirmann, estimating the importance of changes in the Japanese Cabinet. The substance of this analysis was that the military would determine Japanese action whether to attack Russia or move southward, and would make that decision on the basis of opportunity and what they could get away with, and that it would not be determined by the cabinet in power.

C. JAPANESE MESSAGES CONCERNING GERMAN ATTITUDE: NOMURA'S DESIRE TO RESIGN

On October 18, 1941, the Navy translated an intercepted Japanese communication from Berlin to Tokyo, dated October 1, 1941, which stated that the Germans were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Japan's position, particularly because Japan was not advising Germany of the negotiations with the United States, although the United States was advising England (Document 4, Exhibit 63).

A Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated October 16, 1941, was intercepted and translated on October 17, 1941. In this Toyoda advised Nomura that although he had been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-United States negotiations, he had, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early in October, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent revival of the movement for revision

of the neutrality act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message that if the Roosevelt Administration continued to attack the Axis powers, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany, Italy and the United States, which, under the Three-Power Agreement, might lead Japan to join immediately the war against the United States. It was indicated that such a message was being considered and there were reasons which would not permit of postponement (Document 3, Exhibit 63).

On October 22, 1941, Nomura sent a message to Tokyo which was intercepted and translated on October 23, 1941, in which he said that he was sure that he, too, should go out with the former cabinet; that he knew that the Secretary of State realized how sincere he was and yet how little influence he had in Japan; that there were some Americans who trusted him and who said that things would get better for him, but that their encouragement was not enough; that among his confreres in the United States there were some who felt the same way, that they were all poor deluded souls; that the instructions could be carried out by Wakasugi; that Nomura did not want to be the bones of a dead horse; that he did not want to continue "this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people"; that he was not trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor, that was the only way open for him to tread; and that he sought permission to return to Japan (Document 5, Exhibit 63).

On October 23, 1941, a message from Tokyo to Washington of the same date was intercepted and translated, which stated that the efforts Nomura was making were appreciated; that, as he was well aware, the outcome of those negotiations had a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government would proceed; that as such it was an exceedingly important matter; that they were placing all of their reliance on Nomura's reports for information on this matter; that for these reasons they hoped that he would see fit to sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post (Document 6, Exhibit 63).

D. ADMIRAL BLOCH'S LETTER ON INADEQUACY OF LOCAL DEFENSE

On October 17, 1941, Admiral Bloch wrote a letter dealing with the local defense forces and their inadequacy (Exhibit 46). In this letter, Admiral Bloch stated that he recently had tried to obtain, without much success, the assignment from the Commander-in-Chief of certain planes which could be used in connection with anti-submarine patrol; the only planes available for the purpose were Army planes, the types and numbers of which were inadequate for the purpose. Admiral Kimmel's endorsement pointed out that any assumption that forces could be diverted from the Fleet for this purpose were false; that a Fleet tied to its base by diversion of light forces necessary for its security at sea is no Fleet at all, and that the Fleet was assigned, in the event of war, certain tasks which would require all of its units and men.

E. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S ESTIMATE AND ACTION

Admiral Kimmel stated that after receiving the October 16th dispatch, he did not consider war imminent. He tried to find out, he said, what the United States would do if Japan attacked the maritime provinces, but received no answer; he learned, after December 7th, that the United States had made a commitment to England to the effect that, even if not attacked, she would aid England in the Far East (page 297).

> **Admiral Turner said, "That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicating to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our conversations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment that at any particular time the United States would enter the war, for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive Department did not have the power to put the Country into war. Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were drawn up but we never could be sure that if the Netherlands East Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely come into the war. (p. 254)**

He took the action described in his letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 14), which was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (page 297). In his letter, Admiral Kimmel advised that the action taken included maintaining two submarines for patrol at Midway, dispatching twelve patrol planes to Midway, preparing to send six patrol planes from Midway to Wake, and to replace the six at Midway from Pearl Harbor, sending two submarines to Wake, and sending additional Marines and stores there, dispatching additional Marines to Palmyra, placing Admiral Pye and his ships on twelve hours notice, getting six submarines ready to depart for Japan on short notice, putting some additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor.

It may be noted that in connection with his need for cruisers, Admiral Kimmel stated in this letter that, "I can easily keep three or four more divisions profitably occupied when war breaks." The letter also stated, among other things, that Admiral Kimmel was forwarding an exhaustive study on the installations and defenses of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra.

Admiral Stark testified that Admiral Kimmel's action, as set forth in his letter, was considered satisfactory.

Admiral Kimmel's War Plans Officer, Admiral McMorris, testified that the October 16th dispatch had indicated to him that there was a greater chance that the United States would be involved in war with Japan (page 887). Admiral Pye stated that he had not seen the October 16th dispatch, nor did he have any knowledge of it. He was on the Pacific Coast and about that time received a dispatch from CincPac to be prepared to return to Oahu, whereupon he recalled his officers and men and put his force on twelve hours sailing notice (page 423).

Admiral Bloch recalled that after the dispatch advising of the change in the Japanese Cabinet there was a conference with Admiral Kimmel, whom he saw practically every day. He does not recall who else was present. (p. 14)

Concerning the October 16, 1941 dispatch, Admiral Smith said that to the best of his recollection no specific change of plans was made because they had received warnings constantly for a period of more than a year; he did not recall that anything was done particularly about that dispatch; he believed that everyone of the dispatches of that nature were discussed by General Short, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, and usually with members of the staff. (p. 48)

F. THE FIRST JAPANESE "DEADLINE" MESSAGE

It will be recalled that throughout this period the Navy Department was receiving information from intercepted Japanese communications. Some of these indicated that the Japanese Government had established "deadlines" for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. The first was a Navy translation on November 5, 1941 (Exhibit 63, Document 7), of an intercepted Japanese message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 5, 1941, the substance of which was: This message is of "utmost secrecy." It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of the month. . . . I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. . . .

G. ADMIRAL STARK'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 7, 1941

On November 7, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in reply to Admiral Kimmel's letter of October 22nd (Exhibit 74). He stated, among other things, "O. K. on the dispositions which you made in connection with recent change in the Japanese cabinet. The big question is—what next?!" Also, "Things seem to be moving steadily towards a crisis in the Pacific. Just when it will break, no one can tell. The principal reaction I have to it all is what I have written you before; it continually gets 'worser and worser'! A month may see, literally, most anything. Two irreconcilable policies cannot go on forever—particularly if one party cannot live with the setup. It doesn't look good."

Admiral Kitts said that he was in Washington on temporary duty between October 6 and November 8, and that when he returned to Hawaii he carried a message from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel to be delivered orally, that Admiral Stark outlined the courses of action which the Japanese might follow, and that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no way indicated by the message which he carried. (p. 187)

H. JAPANESE INTEREST IN SHIPS AT THE PHILIPPINES AND SEATTLE

During the first half of November, there were translated in Washington various intercepted Japanese communications concerning ships and planes at Manila and Seattle (Documents 1–8, Exhibit 68). According to one of these messages, which was dated November 5, 1941, the Navy General Staff wanted investigation done at Manila as to the conditions of airports, types of planes and numbers of planes there, warships there, machinery belonging to land forces, and the state of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

I. ARRIVAL OF KURUSU; STARK AND MARSHALL RECOMMENDATION AS TO ULTIMATUM

The special Japanese emissary Kurusu arrived in Washington at this time.

Admiral Smith said that when Kurusu was en route to the United States, his plane broke down at Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission to fly him on in a PBY, and Admiral Smith told him not to do this for it might be that the plane had been told by the administration to break down; that they knew more about what was going on than Admirals Bellinger and Smith knew and that Kurusu should be permitted to stay there.

Captain Wellborn discussed the general reaction to Kurusu's visit. (p. 386).

The situation then existing was summarized by Nomura, in a report to Tokyo, dated November 10, 1941, intercepted on November 12th (Document 8, Exhibit 63) by reference to a report from the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy, who had conferred with Senator Thomas and Secretary Hull, that the United States was not bluffing, that if Japan invaded again, the United States would fight with Japan, that psychologically the American people were ready, that the Navy was ready and prepared for action. Nomura also reported that he had a conversation with "a certain Cabinet member" who had said that Nomura was indeed a dear friend, that he would tell him alone this: that the American government was receiving reports that Japan would be on the move again and did not believe that Nomura's visit to the President or the coming of Kurusu would have any effect on the general situation. Nomura said that he had explained how impatient the Japanese had become since the freezing, how eager they were for a quick understanding, how they did not desire a Japanese-American war, and how they hoped for peace until the end. The Cabinet member replied, however, that the President and Secretary of State believed "those reports." Nomura also said that his friend had stated that the United States could not stop because if Japan moved, something would have to be done to save the "face" of the United States.

Admiral Stark was not hopeful that anything in the way of better understanding between the United States and Japan would come from Kurusu's visit. His opinion was that it would be impossible to reconcile the Japanese and American views. Admiral Stark so advised Admiral Kimmel by letter dated November 14, 1941 (Exhibit 39).

Concerning the withdrawal of Marines and gunboats from the Chinese territory and waters, Admiral Schuirmann said: "I remember this proposal but the United States and British armed forces from China were withdrawn principally because they were in jeopardy and not because of a desire to withdraw our forces as an example to the Japanese. Naturally, the suggestion to the Japanese that they undertake to withdraw all their military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China was probably based on desire to capitalize on this action in diplomatic course. The question of withdrawal of our gunboats and Marines from China had been under discussion for since sometime during 1940. Various recommendations were received from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and the question was taken up with the State Department at various times during the year 1941. The difficulty in reaching a decision was because of a number of factors, such as the effect on the Chinese of our withdrawal, i. e., would it appear to them that we were abandoning China to its fate; the question of the effect on the Japanese, principally whether the Japanese would regard it as withdrawing from China in fear of the Japanese or whether they would regard it as a step preparatory to clearing the decks for action. As the situation became more tense and upon receipt of Admiral Hart's letter of August 28, 1941, which was transmitted to the State Department on October 3, 1941, the question was discussed many times with the State Department. Failing to reach an agreement with the State Department, I prepared a memoran-

dum, dated November 4, 1941, which Secretary Knox approved, suggesting a plan for withdrawing from Shanghai, and on 8 November, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a confidential message to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, stating that the President had approved the withdrawal of Marines from China except those required for communication and custodial duties, and subject to State and Navy making a plan for orderly that civilians, nationals, and others might have prior notice. November 14, the President announced the decision to withdraw the Marines from Shanghai, and that withdrawal would begin shortly." (p. 409–410)

Admiral Schuirmann said that the delay in taking the foregoing action was due to a lack of agreement as to the effect on the Japanese and the Chinese and a certain lack of agreement as to the urgency of withdrawing the Marines. The State Department was of the view that sufficient time should be allowed to withdraw civilians in China before completely evacuating the Marines. The State Department generally was in opposition to the removal at least to the extent that the Navy was unable to get a definite answer as to whether or not prior to November 4 the State Department would agree. (p. 410)

With this letter, Admiral Stark also sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of a memorandum, dated November 5, 1941, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall, for the President. This was concerned with the belief of Chiang-Kai-Shek that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent and that outside military support was the sole hope for the defeat of that threat. The memorandum considered whether the United States would be justified in undertaking offensive operations against the Japanese to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. The memorandum stated that the Fleet in the Pacific was inferior to the Japanese Fleet and could not undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. It pointed out that by the middle of December 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Phillippines would become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The recommendations were in general that all aid short of war be given to China and that no ultimatum be given to Japan.

According to General Marshall, during 1941 he felt that war with Japan was imminent and both he and Admiral Stark exerted their efforts to delay a break with Japan as long as possible in order to be better prepared (page 860).

J. FURTHER AND FINAL JAPANESE "DEADLINE MESSAGES"

At this time, information was received in Washington that the Japanese Government had established a further and final deadline for the completion of diplomatic negotiations. This consisted of two messages from Tokyo to Washington, which were intercepted and translated by the Army, as follows:

(a) A translation on November 17, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 63), of a dispatch, dated November 16th, the highlights of which were:

. . . The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

What you say is of course so . . . but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725 (in which Togo says that conditions within and without Japan will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States) . . . try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient . . . the situation renders this out of the question. "I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to side-track us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution."

(b) On November 22, 1941 (Document 11, Exhibit 63), a translation of a dispatch of the same date, reading in substance:

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great

Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."

General Marshall had no definite recollection but thought that he had been informed of the various intercepts concerning the course of diplomatic conversations prior to December 6, 1941, such as the preceding "deadline" message (page 871).

Admiral Turner was familiar with the second message establishing November 29th as the final "deadline" date. He interpreted this as meaning that Japan was going to attack England, the United States, or both, and that forces were already under way which could not be recalled. He knew such movements were under way from sightings and dispatches from China and he thought that troops were moving south and into Indo-China (page 904).

K. THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURPRISE AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

Mr. Grew said that on or about November 17, 1941, he telegraphed the State Department and emphasized the need to guard against sudden Japanese action, naval or military, in areas not involved in the Chinese theatre. He was taking into account the probability that the Japanese would exploit the advantage of surprise (page 1063). He had no idea of the definite date Japan would attack, though he knew they had been preparing for any eventuality (page 1065).

Admiral Stark testified that he had received intelligence early in November that the Japanese situation was so bad that the Japanese government had concluded that a war or a diplomatic victory was necessary to distract popular attention, and that a deadline had been fixed and then changed (page 159) He probably saw the "deadline message."

On November 24, 1941 (Exhibit 15), a dispatch (which Admiral Stark said was based in part on the "deadline" intercept—page 775), was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincAF, CincPac, ComELEVEN, ComTWELVE, ComTHIRTEEN, and ComFIFTEEN for action, reading:

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility x Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam will be informed separately"

Exhibit 7 is the November 24 dispatch from CNO to CincPac. (p. 30) Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 24th did not indicate to him any new information. (p. 244)

Admiral Stark testified that he personally was responsible for the statement that "... asurprise aggressive movement in any direction ..." was a possibility. He stated that he had thought at the time that it might be on Hawaii and had said so when he wrote these words in (page 49–50). The Philippines and Guam were mentioned specifically, he said, because Japanese movements indicated an attack to the south; this dispatch was intended to give a condensed picture of the situation and left up to Admiral Kimmel the question of any additional measures to be taken. No specific instructions were sent; they did not wish to go "all-out" at the time (pages 50–53). Admiral Stark said that he always considered Japanese hostile action without declaration of war possible, and that Hawaii was a possible place of attack, but that the information which he had did not indicate that it was a probable place of attack (page 792).

Admiral Turner said that the dispatch of November 24th was discussed in the Joint Board and that at this time Admiral Stark and General Marshall were conferring daily. Admiral Turner prepared this dispatch and it was referred to General Marshall. It was changed in order to keep it from being too specific. The Navy Department and War Department were not specific as they did not want Admiral Kimmel not to be on guard as to other matters under his cognizance. At this time, Admiral Turner was convinced that the Japanese were going into Siam, Malaya, and attack the Philippines (page 996). He pointed out that late in October 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations was convinced that

war was coming and had diverted merchant shipping from the Central Pacific to the south so that the ships would not be captured (page 1013).

Admiral Kimmel testified (page 298) that he felt that the dispatch of November 24th required no action other than the action which he had already taken; that he considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility; that he expected a submarine attack at Pearl Harbor if the Philippines were attacked; that he considered the words "in any direction," as used in the November 24th dispatch, included Pearl Harbor only as regards submarine attack, and that any other attack, other than on the Philippines or Guam, would be on foreign territory (page 299).

Admiral Smith stated that the words of this dispatch "in any direction including Philippines or Guam" implied that the Japanese were not going any farther eastward (page 534).

On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 47), Admiral Stark wrote to Admiral Kimmel in response to his letter of October 17, 1941, on the inadequacy of local defense forces in Hawaii (Exhibit 46). Admiral Stark stated that CincPac had taken cognizance of his responsibilities in connection with tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and that the forces available in the Hawaiian area, both Fleet and local defense forces, and the actual operations of our own and hostile forces would indicate the numbers of Fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned to local defense tasks. Admiral Stark's letter continued by summarizing the situation in regard to increasing the local defense forces and, among other things, pointed out that the Department had no additional airplanes available for assignment to the FOURTEENTH Naval District. A Marginal note on a copy of this letter, apparently written in Hawaii, stated, "In other words, look to the Fleet. They seem to forget that the Fleet has offensive work to do."

On November 25, 1941 (Exhibit 16), Admiral Stark also wrote a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel stating, among other things, that Admiral Stark agreed with Admiral Kimmel that, for example, to cruise in Japanese home waters, Admiral Kimmel should have a substantial increase in the strength of his fleet, but pointed out that neither ABC–1 nor Rainbow–5 contemplated this as a general policy; after the British strengthened Singapore, and under certain auspicious occasions, opportunity for raids in Japanese waters might present themselves, but this would be the exception rather than the rule. A postscript to this letter stated that both Mr. Hull and the President confirmed the gravity of the situation indicated by the message which Admiral Stark sent a day or two before. It stated further that neither the President nor Mr. Hull would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack; that from many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us; and there were some who thought it likely to occur. Admiral Stark further stated: "I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not the time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. . . . I won't go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be anything."

XIV. Dispatches Concerning Reinforcement of Wake and Midway

On November 26, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 40) was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac stating that the Army had offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station, if Admiral Kimmel considered that desirable: also, that the Army proposed to prepare, in Hawaii, garrison troops for advance bases which Admiral Kimmel might occupy, but was unable to provide any antiaircraft units. Admiral Kimmel was instructed to take this into consideration and advise when practicable the number of troops desired and recommended armament.

Also on November 26, 1941, another dispatch (Exhibit 18) was sent to CincPac, which stated that in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use, OPNAV had requested the Army, and the Army had agreed, to station twenty-five Army pursuits at Midway and a similar number at Wake, provided CincPac considered this feasible and desirable; that it would be necessary for CincPac to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on aircraft carriers, and that the planes would be flown off at destination; that ground personnel would be landed in boats and essential spare parts, tools and ammunition would be taken in the carrier or on later

trips of regular Navy supply vessels; that the Army understood that these forces must be quartered in tents; that the Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies; that the stationing of these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to the Philippines; and, that additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. A question was raised as to whether or not Navy bombs at outlying positions could be carried by Army bombers which might fly to those positions in order to support Navy operations. CincPac was directed to confer with the Commanding General and advise as soon as practicable.

XV. Intercepted Japanese Communications of November 26th and 27th

On November 26th and 27th, there were available in Washington additional intercepted Japanese messages, all of which had been sent from Tokyo, as follows:

(1) A Navy translation on November 27, 1941 (Document 14, Exhibit 63) of a message to Nanking, dated 15 November 1941, in the so-called "Purple" code, addressed to "Naval authorities" which stated:

"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while."

(2) A Navy translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 13, Exhibit 63) of a message to Washington, dated 19 November 1941, stating that:

"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

"(1) if it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI",
"(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA",
"(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.), "NISHI."

"The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco."

(3) An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 9, Exhibit 68) of a message to Manila, dated November 20, 1941, in the "Purple" code, marked "Strictly Secret" and stating:

"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of draft—presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay. (Near Manila, P. I.)

"Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo."

(4) An Army translation on November 26, 1941 (Document 12, Exhibit 63) of a message to Washington, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code, which stated:

"To be handled in Government Code.

"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your request to him. At that time we will use the following code: (Codes were then set forth.)"

XVI. The State Department Note of November 26th

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, of the State Department, testified that by the end of October it was evident that Japan and the United States could not agree. Early in November, the Secretary of State came to the conclusion that the question could not be solved by diplomacy (page 764). On November 20th, the Japanese submitted the things they wanted, which it was impossible to agree to. On November 26th, the Secretary of State gave Nomura and Kurusu a note setting forth the United States position. The following day the Secretary of State again said that he could not settle this by diplomacy, but that he still hoped that the Japanese might come forward with some reply. Between November 26th and December 7th, the President sent a note to the Emperor of Japan (page 764). While it was evident that no agreement could be reached, this did not necessarily mean that Japan and the United States could not get along without an agreement (page 765).

Dr. Hornbeck had no recollection of discussing the note of November 26th with Admiral Stark or the Secretary of the Navy (page 765). He did not consider this note as an ultimatum to Japan (page 766). The text of the note of November 26th was not released until after December 7th. The Secretary of State had a press conference at which he announced that a note had been sent and the press discussed a variety of possibilities (page 772).

Mr. Hamilton, also of the State Department, said that on November 21st, there was a conference which the Secretary of State, Admiral Stark, General Gerow, and Mr. Hornbeck, Ballantine and he were present, and at which the general military and diplomatic situation in the Pacific was discussed (page 1073). There were later meetings at which he was not present, including one of the War Council on November 25th and also on November 28th (page 1074). Mr. Hamilton could not be sure whether the note of November 26th or the substance thereof was given to the Navy Department (page 1073).

Admiral Turner remembered the Japanese dispatch concerning the note to Japan of November 26th and he saw it on November 28th. He believed that Admiral Schuirmann had brought it over from Secretary Hull to show it to Admiral Stark, and that Admiral Stark had stated that there was no possibility of Japan accepting this note (page 995).

Admiral Stark stated that he did not recall the November 26th note to the Japanese (page 108) but that on November 27th, Secretary of State Hull had advised him that negotiations were terminated (page 109). Admiral Stark later testified that when first asked about this note he had not remembered it, but after reading it his recollection was refreshed, and that Admiral Schuirmann may have discussed this note with him at the time (page 809).

Admiral Schuirmann stated that to the best of his recollection he did not deliver a copy of the November 26th note to the Navy Department, nor did he specifically inform Admiral Stark of this note (page 217). He characterized this note as an "ultimatum" in the sense that no one expected the Japanese to accept its terms (page 716).

Admiral Turner said that negotiations with Japan had been conducted so as to delay war as long as possible in order to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for war (page 1013). He knew that the Army and Navy had recommended that no ultimatum be given to Japan (Exhibit 39A). He did not consider that the note of November 26th was an ultimatum, although he did not expect Japan to accept its terms (page 1015). He did not know whether Admiral Stark saw a draft of the November 26th note before it was sent, but Admiral Turner did see it. He said that no note given by one government to another is ever entirely acceptable (page 1016). He did not regard the note as important (page 1023), nor think it hastened the time of war because Japan was then already on the move (page 1024).

General Short testified that prior to December 7th, he had no knowledge of the State Department note of November 26th (page 263).

The court took judicial notice of the note of November 26th (page 147). A Japanese summary of the diplomatic situation and of the American proposal, and the reaction of the Japanese to that proposal, were contained in communications intercepted, decoded and translated on November 28th. These were:

(1) An Army translation (Document 16, Exhibit 63) of a message from Washington to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent," Message #1180, reading:

"From NOMURA and KURUSU.

"As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

"We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would.

Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

"In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire back instantly."

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was familiar with this message, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark (page 696).

(2) An Army translation (Document 17, Exhibit 63) of a message from Washington (Nomura) to Tokyo, dated November 26, 1941, in the "Purple" code and marked "Extremely urgent", which stated:

"At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

"HULL said, 'For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th.' So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

"A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called 'four principles.'

"B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggressive treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

"(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

"(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

"(4) Japan and the United States both defiintely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

"(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

"(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

"(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

"(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

"(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)"

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thia that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having seen this message, but that it may have been discussed (pages 776–777). Admiral Schuirman said he was familiar with it, but had not delivered it to Admiral Stark, although he probably told Admiral Stark that such a note had been sent (page 697).

(3) An Army translation (Document 18, Exhibit 63) of a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated November 28, 1941, in the "Purple" code, reading:

"Re your #1189.

"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say

that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." (NOTE.—The man is the Navy Minister.)

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen this message (pages 775–6). Admiral Schuirmann was familiar with this, but did not deliver it to Admiral Stark (page 698). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 826).

Captain Layton said that neither he nor Admiral Kimmel had been advised of the note of November 26th. He thought that Admiral Kimmel could have been better informed, and that if he had had a full picture he would have had a clearer conception of Japanese-United States affairs (page 914).

Admiral Kimmel stated that he was not advised of the contents of the United States' note of November 26th, which was given to the Japanese, until after his return to the United States (page 301). And, he and Admiral Smith stressed, the press and radio indicated that negotiations between the Japanese and the United States continued after November 27th. But, Admiral McMorris, his War Plans Officer, said that the press may have indicated that Japanese-United States negotiations were continuing after November 27th; he did not recall (page 893).

Admiral Stark testified that he had no recollection of press and radio statements between November 27th and December 7th which indicated that negotiations with the Japanese were resumed. He pointed out that, according to "War and Peace" on November 25th and November 28th, Secretary of State Hull had said that there was practically no possibility of an agreement, that the Japanese might break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force, that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, and that the plans for military defense should include the assumption that the Japanese might use the element of surprise and attack at various points (page 149). There was, Admiral Stark said, a further conversation with the Japanese on December 1st (page 149).

Dr. Hornbeck stated that between November 26th and December 7th, there were some further conversations with the Japanese representatives (page 767).

Mr. Hamilton stated that there were some meetings with the Japanese Ambassadors between November 26th and December 7th. He, however, considered that negotiations with the Japanese ceased on November 26th. There was a bare possibility that diplomatic conversations might continue, but they had virtually reached a conclusion, and the matter, therefore, was one for the armed services. He considered that there was no chance of getting a favorable reply from the Japanese (page 1074).

Ambassador Grew, on the other hand, did not think that negotiations with Japan had definitely ceased until Tojo saw him on December 7, 1941, after the attack (page 1046).

XVII. The War Warning of November 27th

A. THE WARNING

Captain Layton testified that he learned of the receipt by CinCPac, of the war warning message of 27 November 1941, in the mid-afternoon of that day on being shown a tape copy in the communications office. He stated that subsequently, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a paraphrase copy of the dispatch which was shown to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, therefore, thereafter, he (Layton) gave to Lieutenant Commander Burr, USNR, for delivery to General Short; that subsequently he checked with Lieutenant Commander Burr and ascertained that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short. (Page 189–190).

Captain Layton also testified that at the time he showed Admiral Kimmel his paraphrase copy of the war warning message a large conference in the Admiral's office had just been terminated, and that, while Admiral Kimmel was examining the paraphrase, Captain Earle, Chief of Staff to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, entered Admiral Kimmel's office stating he had a very urgent message which General Short had delivered to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and which was further to be delivered to the Commander-in-Chief. Captain Layton stated that Captain Earle delivered the message to which he referred to Admiral Kimmel, and that both of them remarked to the effect that it was the same dispatch in substance that they had just received. (Page 189).

On November 27th, after delivery of the State Department note of the 26th, but before receipt of the intercepted communications showing the reaction of the Japanese Government, the "war warning" was sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to CincPac and CincAF. It read:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavo inform British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"

Exhibit 8 is the November 27 dispatch by CNO to CincPac and CincAF. (p. 30)

B. PREPARATION OF THE WARNING

Admiral Turner said that he prepared the "war warning" after talking to Admiral Stark and that it meant just what it said. Admiral Ingersoll assisted in the drafting of this message (page 839). Admiral Stark testified that the working of the "war warning" dispatch had been carefully considered by him and by his advisers, and also by the Secretary of the Navy (page 54).

Concerning "M" Day, Captain Glover said, "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a war plan. In the case of WPL–46, "M" Day, unless otherwise designated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows: "Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of WPL–46, including acts of war. WPL–46 stated that all parts of the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken. (p. 177) Captain Glover said that possibly declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier would have been more effective in alerting our forces than the method actually used by the Navy Department. He said, however, that the plan did not lend itself very easily to being put into effect as a means of warning only but was based on war activities. (p. 177)

Captain Glover said that Rainbow 5 contemplated the commencement of hostilities after a declaration of war. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, he said, might have become effective on "M" Day or certain features of it might have been placed in effect before "M" Day and that plan stated that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war. This plan, therefore, could have been made effective on about November 27 if desirable. (p. 178)

Admiral Turner thought that the war warning was the proper way to advise the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet of the situation and that the war plans could not be partially executed because it would have been an involved situation and not as clear as the warning given. Moreover, it would not have been practicable to have declared a mobilization, in certain areas prior to the existence of the state of war. (p. 270)

Admiral Turner said that the preparation of the dispatches of November 24 and of November 27 was similar to that of the October 16 dispatch. He discussed the situation at the time of the preparation of the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"As I recall, we were informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of composing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from Intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South. It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the

dispatch we are discussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned, and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese traffic analyses were being made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I brought the subject up several times with the Director of Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was making proper traffic analyses. Japanese radio traffic analyses were under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept War Plans fully informed as to these deductions." p. 265).

Admiral Turner said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that to all intents and purposes the negotiations were over on November 27th, though he (Hull) was not going to close them. Mr. Hull, he stated, kept Admiral Stark well informed (page 995). This was the basis of the statement in the "warning" that negotiations had ceased.

Admiral Ingersoll believed that the "warning" was sent because the Secretary of State had delivered the note of November 26th to the Japanese (page 851).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the reason for sending the war warning of November 27 was indicated in the dispatch, referring to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval forces. He said that the reason why the dispatch referred to an aggressive move in the Western Pacific was that the character of the landing craft referred to in the dispatch were such that they could not have been used in any area other than in the far eastern area. (p. 425)

Admiral Brainard did not recall having had any part in the drafting of the October 16 dispatch or the November 24 dispatch or the war warning. He did not know definitely that a set of war warning dispatches were prepared and held in readiness for dispatch to merchant shipping and that for a period of two or three weeks prior to December 7, they were restraining entry of merchant vessels and vessels of the NTS service into the Western Pacific so as to avoid their being trapped. (p. 402)

C. THE FAILURE TO MENTION HAWAII

Admiral Stark said that he did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning" because he indicated, from the best intelligence which he had, where the blow was most likely to fall (page 793). It was agreed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, he testified, that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility but that the information available indicated that the Philippines, Guam and the Kra Peninsula would be attacked (page 797). Generally speaking, he and his advisers did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).

At the time of drafting the "war warning," Admiral Turner said, he expected that the Japanese would make some kind of an attack on Hawaii (page 995). He did not mention Hawaii in the "war warning," he said, because the places named were the strategic objectives and he did not believe that the Japanese would launch an amphibious attack on Hawaii (page 1020). He invited attention to the difference between the dispatch of November 24th, which had warned of the possibility of a "surprise aggressive movement," and this dispatch, which warned of "an amphibious expedition." The earlier dispatch, he said, was the result of deduction and covered any type of action by the Japanese. On November 27th, however, they knew that, as a fact, the Japanese were on the move (page 997).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he had made the insertion of "Thai" and "Continental districts" in the "war warning" (page 839). The breaking of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean war, he said. But, the information as to Japanese movements indicated action at Siam or Kra Peninsula and it was quite evident that if the Japanese made war on the United States, the Philippines were a probable objective and Guam would fall like a ripe plum. In the dispatch they mentioned southeast Asia as a probable Japanese objective because they had no information of an aggressive movement in any other direction. The intention of the war message was to state that war was imminent—on the other hand, there was the wish not to take any step which could provoke war with Japan (page 842). And, Admiral Kimmel never asked for any clarification of the "war warning." (page 842).

D. THE DIRECTION TO "EXECUTE AN APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE DEPLOYMENT"

Vice Admiral McMorris directed his attention to:

> *(a) the provisions of the Rainbow Five War Plan in respect of the initial task of the Pacific Fleet at times when Japanese were not in the war, including the maintaining of Fleet security and protecting the territory of the associated powers (which included Hawaii), and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with patrol planes and light forces and by the action of striking groups, and guarding "against a surprise attack by Japan."*

and

> *(b) the direction in the war warning message of November 27, 1941, to CinCPac, to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46,"*

and testified in the respect of what appropriate defensive deployment was executed, that, "there was no material change in the disposition and deployment of the fleet forces at that time other than the movements of certain aircraft to Midway and Wake and of the carriers, with their attendant cruisers and destroyers, to those locations to deliver aircraft." (Page 321–322).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the language in the war warning of 27 November 1941, with reference to the defensive deployment preparatory to carry-out the tasks assigned in WPL–46, "was a direction." (Page 322).
He stated further that he considered that the action taken constituted an appropriate defensive deployment, (page 322), that it was a major action in line with the measure to execute an appropriate defensive deployment, that the major portion of the fleet was disposed in Hawaiian waters and that reinforcements were sent to Midway and Wake; that it was likewise in accordance with the directive that the ships were maintained with a full supply of ammunition and a minimum quantity of fuel. (Page 323–324).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishing of an air patrol from Oahu to guard against a surprise attack by Japan would have been an appropriate act, "but no one act nor no one disposition can be examined independent of other requirements." (Page 324).
Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the establishment of long distance air patrol from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46. (Page 324).

The "war warning" directed the addressees to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46.

> **Admiral Bloch recalled a discussion between Admiral Kimmel and someone else in his presence discussing the directive to carry out a "defensive deployment." So far as Admiral Bloch knew, he had never encountered that terminology before. He doesn't recall what it meant to him at the time nor does he know whether or not Admiral Kimmel regarded the submarines at Midway and Wake as a "defensive deployment." (p. 22)**

Admiral Turner said that the things they expected CincPac to do were not communicated to CincPac in detail because the Navy Department's plan was to give broad discretion to commanders. They expected CincPac to take appropriate action on the "War Warning" dispatch (page 998).

> **The expectation in the Navy Department as to the "Defensive Deployment" that would be taken was summarized by Admiral Turner as follows: "It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment. We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic, the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deployment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readiness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to their deployment for defense of territory." (p. 265)**

Admiral Stark said that he had anticipated that full security measures would be taken, that the Army would set a condition of readiness for aircraft and the aircraft warning service, that Admiral Kimmel would invoke full readiness

measures, distant reconnaissance and A/S measures, and that the measures previously agreed on with the Army would be implemented. He did not require a report of the actions taken pursuant to this message (pages 54–62, 84). He considered that after this message Admiral Kimmel had a "free hand" (page 801).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he considered that the "war warning" put additional tasks on the Pacific Fleet of security of itself and readiness for any eventuality, but that the message was not to completely interrupt training (page 849). Training, however, should have been secondary after this message (page 821). The October 16th dispatch had directed CincPac to make certain dispositions; he had informed the Chief of Naval Operations and those had been considered satisfactory (page 849). After November 27th, any measures that were necessary to guard the security of a fleet were necessary in all fleets.

Admiral Pye said that as to the directives in the November 27 dispatch concerning deployment, it would have been necessary to recall the Task Forces which were at that time absent, in order to prepare them from a logistic point of view and consequently, there was no deployment that could be made immediately which would have better prepared Task Force One; Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some fighting planes and was not expected to return for over a week; there appeared to be no action to be taken by the Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress. Admiral Pye said that no change was made in the scheduled deployment of his task force after the November 27 dispatch. (p. 155)

Concerning the deployment referred to in the War Warning, Admiral Ingersoll said, "Again, this dispatch is addressed to both the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding the withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere, and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observation, the establishment of patrols, and the reenforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an earlier dispatch in October had warned both Commanders-in-Chief against taking action which would provoke war." (p. 426)

The reason why Admiral Kimmel was not called upon to report what he was doing after the War Warning was Admiral Ingersoll said, because they knew that submarines were out on observation missions, that reenforcement of Wake and Midway was contemplated and they believed that the routine air patrols around Oahu and search patrols which had been in effect for some time were being continued. They believed at that particular time that the air patrol was by no means as complete as it should have been. (p. 426 and p. 427).

XVIII. Repetition of Army Dispatch on November 28th

On November 28th, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a copy of a dispatch to CincPac for information (Exhibit 19) which repeated a dispatch which had been sent by the Army to Commander, Western Defense Command, as follows:

"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue x Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment x If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act x This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense x Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent x Report measures taken x a separate message is being sent to G–2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States x Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan x Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers"

The Navy dispatch continued that WPL–52 was not applicable to the Pacific area and would not be placed in effect in that area, except as then in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area, Panama Coastal Frontier. It stated further: "Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act x be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur"

Exhibit 9 is the November 28 dispatch from CNO to CincPac.

A. GENERAL MARSHALL

General Marshall thought that he had seen the Army dispatch which was repeated in the Navy dispatch of November 28th (page 864). However, General Gerow did not think that Marshall had seen it. The language made Marshall believe that he had seen it particularly because the instruction that Japan must commit the first overt act came from the President. He had no recollection that the warning not to alarm the civilian population came from the same source (page 865).

XIX. REINFORCEMENT OF MIDWAY AND WAKE

It will be recalled that on November 26th dispatches had been sent to CincPac by the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the proposed reinforcement of Midway and Wake with Army planes and personnel, and requesting that Admiral Kimmel confer with General Short about this and advise the Chief of Naval Operations as soon as practicable (supra, page 56).

Captain Wellborn said that he thought that the background of the Navy's desire to have the Army take over the defense at Midway and Wake was that the Navy felt that the defense of the islands was an Army responsibility and that the small amount of Marine personnel and aviation available should be reserved for amphibious work. One method of reducing overhead requirements of the Marines was to relieve the Marine Corps Units of their static defensive duties. (p. 386)

On November 28th, dispatch 280627 (Exhibit 76) was sent by CincPac to OPNAV. This advised that ground crews and material to operate one squadron of Marine planes were being discharged at Wake.

Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor with Task Force Two on November 28. (p. 291–293)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled clearly one conference on November 27 when it was decided to send fighting planes to Wake. He said that he was with Admiral Kimmel that day until about six in the evening. The discussion of the defense of Wake and the dispatch of fighter planes was participated in by General Short, General Martin and some other Army officers and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey. He said Marine planes were selected because the Army could not fly their fighters more than 15 miles from the coast. (p. 297)

Admiral Halsey said that he recalled that there was some prior discussion of sending Army units to outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked upon those bases as part of the Fleet and for that reason he wished to confine the forces ashore to Marine and Naval personnel. It soon became evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain bases were picked, he said, to be garrisoned by Army forces.

Admiral Halsey said that when he left to go to Wake Island, he asked Admiral Kimmel how far Admiral Kimmel wanted him to go and Admiral Kimmel said, "Use your common sense." (p. 298)

Admiral Smith said that before Admiral Halsey left in the ENTERPRISE to deliver Marine fighters to Wake, he asked Admiral Kimmel what he should do in case he met Japanese forces. Admiral Kimmel said that in that case he was to use his own discretion. And, Admiral Halsey replied, that those were the best orders he had received, to keep his movements secret and that if he found even a Japanese sampan he would sink it. (p. 43)

that similar items would be landed at Midway.

Admiral Newton said that he was at Pearl Harbor from November 27 until the morning of December 5 and was temporarily in command of a task force because Admiral Brown departed around December 4 for a cruise to Johnston and Palmyra Islands to investigate landing craft conditions. He received no particular information concerning the international situation. (p. 316)

Although Admiral Newton was commander of the most powerful unit under the Commander Scouting Force, he never saw the October 16 dispatch nor was he ever informed of the contents of it and recalled no warnings or instructions mentioning preparatory deployments which were given to him thereafter. (p. 317) Admiral Newton said that he never saw or heard of

the November 24, November 27 and December 3 dispatches. Except for what he read in the press, Admiral Newton during the period November 26 to December 5 did not learn anything indicating the increased danger of the situation with Japan. (p. 317)

When Admiral Newton left on December 5, he was directed to proceed to Midway to fly off a squadron of planes. He had the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, PORTLAND and five destroyers on that mission. He considered the mission solely one to reinforce Midway and attached no special significance to the mission. He considered that there might be more danger from submarines than in the past and zig-zagged his course and had scouring planes cover his advance. He gave no special orders regarding arming of planes or making preparation for war other than ordinary routine. (p. 318)

About November 26 or 27, Admiral Brown and his Task Force Three had returned to Pearl Harbor. They left Pearl Harbor on December 5.

Admiral Brown was of the view that the movement of the two task forces to the outlying islands after November 27, may have been in pursuance of the instructions contained in the dispatch regarding defensive deployment. (p. 141)

and that about December 1st ground material for temporary operation of twelve Army bombers would be sent, but that only six of such planes on Oahu were in operating condition. The dispatch also discussed the use of Army pursuit planes for insular defense and the need for additional, anti-aircraft guns; the fact that Army troop reinforcements were being made on outlying bases but that such use was considered not advisable as Marines were available; that twelve Marine fighters would leave November 28th in a carrier for Wake; that other Marine planes would be sent to Midway later; and that on December 1st, twelve patrol planes would be sent from Midway to Wake, and those at Midway would be replaced by planes from Pearl Harbor.

The Chief of Naval Operations replied on November 28th (Exhibit 75) in a dispatch stating that the steps described in CincPac's 280627 appeared to be the best that could be done under the circumstances. This also stated that the War Department would instruct the Commanding General to cooperate with the Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and troops in support of Marines, and would endeavor to expedite plans for increase of anti-aircraft defenses, but that it was doubtful if much improvement was possible soon. An immediate report on the effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in the immediate future was requested.

Admiral Brainard said that a dispatch recently examined by him showed that it was contemplated that a group of vessels under Admiral Halsey's command would leave around December 1, 1941, to land reinforcements on Wake but he found no indication of his having seen the dispatch at the time. The daily movement sheets, he said, from 21 November to 10 December showed movements of the WRIGHT, but no carrier movements between Pearl Harbor, Wake and Midway. (p. 401)

Admiral Ingersoll said that they received reports of ship movements which were plotted and that he thought that the movements to Wake and Midway in early December were known at the time in Washington but he is not certain. He said that in keeping track of the dispositions of Admiral Kimmel's ships they relied on the ship movements reports and in the quarterly schedules of employment. (p. 424)

In letters of December 2nd to Admiral Stark (post, pages 113–114), Admiral Kimmel further stated his views as to the desirability of using Army planes and personnel at Midway and Wake and his concern that the replacement of Marines would weaken the defense, would raise the question of unity of command, and that the increase in Army and Navy stations requiring Fleet support would interfere with offensive operations. (5)

Admiral Bloch discussed the various construction projects at Pearl Harbor and at the outlying islands. (p. 91–92)

Admiral Bloch said that the security of the outlying islands, such as Wake, Midway, Johnston and Palmyra, was a matter of some concern in November 1941; that the water capacity of the islands was small and that as a result of having civilian construction workers present there, the garrisons were small; he was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and Midway than on Oahu. (p. 94)

According to Admiral Delany, during the tense period preceding December 7, the outlying islands such as Midway, Guam and Wake were a matter of

great concern to the Commander in Chief's staff. (p. 81) The proposal to change from Marine to Army garrisons caused additional worry and concern and was a subject of many conferences out there. (p. 81)

Admiral Smith stated that he did not believe that the dispatch concerning the reinforcement of outlying islands by the Army was considered related to the war warning of November 27. He said that the discussions concerning the outlying islands lasted several days and, as a result, there was a decided mental preoccupation with this on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in Hawaii. (p. 63)

Captain Glover said that the decision to reinforce Wake had been made by the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and that Captain Glover and Captain Moore did not share the view that it should be done. They did believe that Midway should be fortified. (p. 176)

XX. Pearl Harbor—Estimates of the Situation

A. Admiral Kimmel

Admiral Kimmel testified that after receiving the "war warning" dispatch of November 27th, his estimate was that the Japanese would move within the next few days by amphibious expedition against the Philippines or Kra, or possibly Borneo, and that there was a good chance of a mass submarine attack at Oahu. He did not expect an air attack at Pearl Harbor, although an air attack was still a "remote possibility" because, he said, of the tenor of the dispatches sent to him, the other information which he had, the difficulties of making such an attack, and information received from the Navy Department and from other sources indicating that the greater portion of the Japanese carrier forces was in home waters. He thought that a primary cause for the "war warning" dispatch was the fact that diplomatic negotiations had ceased, and when the newspapers indicated that the negotiations were resumed, the warning lost much of its force. He further assumed that no ultimatum had been given to the Japanese because the Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the President that no ultimatum be given to them (page 301). He testified that the phrasing of the "war warning" dispatch and the phrasing of the dispatch of November 28th led him to believe that anything other than a submarine attack on Pearl Harbor was most improbable (page 302). In his testimony concerning the November 28th message, Admiral Kimmel stated that it furnished no new information and that it stressed that Japan should be permitted to commit the first overt act (page 325).

The "war warning," was discussed with ComFOURTEEN. A dawn fighter flight patrol was considered, but was not regarded as practical because of the limitations of the Army planes (page 303).

He considered that the action of the Navy Department in failing to make any change in his plans to send carriers to Midway and Wake indicated that the Navy Department expected no immediate activity in either the outlying areas (page 307) or in the Hawaiian area (page 309).

He further testified that the day after receipt of the "war warning" of November 27th, he had a conference with General Short, attended by members of their staffs.

Admiral Smith said that there was no set hour for a Staff conference, that Admiral Kimmel had a conference practically every day and would send for the people that he wanted; he would usually have over officers from the Fleet and very frequently would have Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye, at such conferences (p. 34).

He said that while he presently did not recall the incident that General Short testified to a statement made by McMorris at that conference, in response to a question by General Short, to the effect that there was no chance of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, he testified that the message of November 27th followed a pattern that he had been continuing for some time, and that he felt that before hostilities commenced he would receive additional information which would be more definite. When the attack came without this information, he was inclined to blame himself for not having been smarter, but when he found some time later that the information was in fact available in the Navy Department which would have changed the action taken by him had he known it, he felt differently about the matter. If he had had that information, he said, he would have thoroughly alerted all shore going activities, including the Army, and in all probability would have had the Fleet put to sea in an intercepting position, and would have instituted reconnaissance to the best of their ability.

Admiral Kimmel admitted, however, that during the entire period when he was CincPac, he maintained the same estimate as was set froth in his letter of February 18th (Exhibit 30), which stated that "a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility . . ."

B. ADMIRAL BLOCH

Admiral Bloch testified that he had estimated that if the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, it would be by (1) submarine attack, (2) blocking the channel, (3) laying mines, (4) sabotage. He believed that an aerial torpedo attack could not be successful and if there were an air attack it would be by bombs (page 409). He considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility (page 394). He saw the "war warning" dispatch, conferred with Admiral Kimmel and did not disagree with his conclusions.

On November 27, after the receipt of the "War Warning", the Chief of Staff brought over a paraphrase of the dispatch. Admiral Bloch saw Admiral Kimmel the next morning. There were others present but he does not recall who they were. There was a term in the dispatch concerning defense deployment. Just what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was Admiral Bloch did not know, but they had at that time two submarines at Midway and two at Wake. (p. 14)

The dispatch concerning the sending of planes to Midway and Wake (Exhibit 18) did not change his estimate (page 394). The part of the November 28th dispatch which impressed him was the desire that Japan should be allowed to commit the first overt act and that the public should not be alarmed (page 395)

Admiral Bloch said that after the War Warning of November 27, negotiations between Japan and the United States were resumed and that this had a very definite effect on his mind. Also, he said he had no feeling of impending hostilities in the Hawaiian area around the 7th of December. (pp. 15 and 16)

Admiral Bloch volunteered at the end of his testimony a statement that the Navy Department had more information than they had in Hawaii; that a number of warnings were sent to them; that the Navy Department had in the War Plans a means of putting into effect all of the plans prior to "M" day; that such action would have been more effective than the warnings sent out; and in this connection he referred to the State Department note of November 26 concerning which he had no knowledge until after December 7.

Admiral Bloch said that he had not seriously considered nor had he heard anybody else talk about the influence on public opinion in the United States which an attack on Pearl Harbor would produce. (p. 88)

Prior to December 7, Admiral Bloch was of the opinion that a carrier attack against Hawaii prior to a declaration of war was remote; one important consideration was his belief that a large body of surface vessels could not cross such a large expanse of water without the Navy having some knowledge. (p. 89)

Admiral Bloch said that although he could not recall that any officer had ever expressed the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was improbable, yet he was definitely of the opinion that such an attack was remote although he is unable to analyze that opinion and to determine the various factors which had caused him to reach that opinion. (pp. 89 and 90)

Captain Earle said that they had considered the estimate indicating that the most likely form of attack would be by air, but somehow or other they always felt that it couldn't happen here and that the Japanese would not take that chance. (p. 377)

C. ADMIRAL PYE

Admiral Pye testified that he saw the November 24th dispatch (warning of an aggressive move in any direction) on November 29th. He recalled no decisions made as a result of it (page 424)

Admiral Pye said that on November 29, he had a conference with Admiral Kimmel during which Admiral Kimmel showed him the November 24 message and called in his Intelligence Officer who explained the locations of the enemy forces, indicating no unusual activity in the Naval forces of the Japanese navy. They discussed possible action to be taken by Task Force 1 which was the only Task Force in port aside from the battleships of Task Force 3

and decided that there was no action that could be taken by that Task Force which would better prepare them for the possible action that might come. (p. 153)

Admiral Pye said that he was not present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and his staff or other senior officers. In his own discussions with Admiral Kimmel, there was no mention of the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. For some months there had been a feeling that a surprise attack by submarines might be possible. His feeling in this connection was based on the belief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof that it was enemy action but an air attack could not. In the absence of any protection by carriers it was felt that the Fleet in port with the presumed effectiveness of the Army air forces would be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea. Admiral Pye also saw the war warning message on the same day, i. e., on November 29. (p. 154)

Admiral Anderson said that the war warning was shown to a group of Flag officers including Admiral Anderson in the office of the Commander in Chief. Under the war plans in force, Admiral Anderson had no specific duties to perform. He said that he knew that there were two task forces at sea and knew that there was an excellent plan in existence for long distance daily air reconnaissance. He assumed that whatever was considered necessary to be done was being taken care of. (p. 393)

Admiral Anderson said that his ideas during early December were that he expected the Japanese would not attack farther east than the Philippines. He was influenced in all his thoughts as to security by the knowledge or what he thought was the knowledge that a long distance daily reconnaissance by air was being maintained. He assumed that such distant air reconnaissance was being maintained and said that he had read a very complete plan for such daily reconnaissance and knew that it had been placed into effect but did not know that it had been discontinued prior to December 7. (p. 394)

He felt that this dispatch indicated an attack on the Philippines or Guam. He saw the "War Warning" at the same time and discussed it with CincPac. It was sent to several addressees. The "War Warning" to him was nothing more than they had been receiving for some time (page 425). He did not see the November 28th message until after December 7th (page 427).

Admiral Pye testified first that he had not made any estimate of the situation during the period November 27th to December 7th (page 429). In response to the Court's questions he then stated that the maneuvers which he was on had not prevented him from making an estimate, but that he had made no written estimate (page 434). He kept a running mental estimate. He considered a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as a possibility but not a probability (page 435). He thought it a bad move because it was the one thing to unite the United States people in an all-out effort, and therefore that it was unlikely to be undertaken (page 435). He considered a submarine attack the most likely act in advance of war (page 436). Before the attack he felt the defense measures taken were consistent with the situation; they thought torpedoes could not be launched from the air in waters less than 75 feet deep (page 436); and a bombing attack alone would not have been profitable (page 437).

He thought an air attack on Pearl Harbor was remotely possible and did not consider that such an attack would be made before diplomatic relations were broken off (page 438).

Admiral Pye stated that WPL–46 required the Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, but there were no carriers in port and the Fleet at sea without carriers would be more vulnerable than in port; moreover, Intelligence had indicated that all major units of the Japanese fleet were in home ports. No additional security measures were taken in his command. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, the phrase "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment prior to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL–46" was meaningless, according to Admiral Pye (page 426).

He did not know if CincPac had made a direct estimate as to air attack (page 426).

Concerning his estimate of the probability of a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Pye said that a primary feature was that he felt that Japan could gain more by delaying our entry into the war than they could possibly gain by any damage that they could do at Pearl Harbor. He said further that the Secretary of the Navy when he came to Pearl Harbor after the 7th of December said that no one in Washington had stated to him that there was any possibility of an air attack at Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner who

was the most aggressive minded of all. Admiral Pye thought that the feeling in Honolulu was influenced by the attitude of the Department in the preceding months in taking forces from the Pacific and indicating that they considered the German situation more serious than the Japanese situation. He also said that they had not been adequately advised of the development of conditions as known in Washington.

Admiral Pye said that although an attack against the United States was not expected, they did expect the Japanese to proceed against the Dutch and British. Admiral Pye said that he thought that the general impression then had been that the Japanese naval air pilots were fairly good but that they did not think that these pilots were as good as they appeared to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. (p. 158) Admiral Pye said that they had had no information as to the torpedoes which had actually been developed by other nations. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that he did not think that any of them had felt that an attack would be made before a declaration of war, if ever. (p. 151)

Admiral Brown was not familiar with the security measures such as air search and other matters relating to the internal defense of Oahu except in a most general way. (p. 137)

Admiral Brown's Task Force had assigned to it the task of developing the technique and examining the materials for amphibious warfare and during the six months preceding the attack, his energies and the energies of his staff were devoted to that subject, The primary task was training. During the year preceding Pearl Harbor, it was his impression that there must have been at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break out with the Japanese and each time the question was discussed whether or not defensive measures should be taken or training continued. His feeling was that training should be continued until the moment that war developed. This is what happened to the Fleet. (p. 137)

During the last days of November, Admiral Brown participated in conferences with the Commander in Chief. His recollection was that the greatest concern had been as to the security of the outlying islands. They had all believed that Japanese submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when war came and had discussed the possibility of an air raid. His belief was that an air raid was possible but highly improbable; that dispositions should be made for the defense of the outlying islands and he believed that the greatest threat to Pearl Harbor was local sabotage. (p. 137) Admiral Brown believes that during the week preceding December 7, he was in almost daily conference with the Commander in Chief. Admiral Brown said he did not remember whether or not he saw the November 27 dispatch. It was his recollection that there was a prolonged discussion of that dispatch. (p. 139)

Admiral Brown said that during the last few days prior to December 7, he felt that the chance of an air attack was extremely remote because of his misunderstanding of Japanese air ability. He did not consider the air a menace and was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor. His own estimate in December was that the Japanese would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their first attack to one against the Dutch or the British. He probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation. (p. 145)

Admiral Brown's recollection of the conferences which were attended by Army representatives was vague. He believed that the conferences primarily were in connection with internal security on the island and with shortages in defense weapons and various forms of air craft. He recalled that in about November, somebody suggested that there might be a surprise air attack at Hawaii, that at the time Admiral Halsey was present that Admiral Brown expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were not capable of executing such a mission successfully and that if they did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive experiment. (p. 142)

Admiral Brown said that his erroneous belief at that time was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior to American fliers. (p. 142)

Admiral Halsey said that the war warning dispatch affected him very seriously. He thought that there was going to be a fight before he got back to Pearl Harbor. He said that when he left Pearl Harbor, he diverted the battleships, cruisers and destroyers and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area and then headed West with the remainder of his task force. He then issued orders to put in war heads in all torpedoes, to regard any submarine as hostile and to sink it, to arm the planes with bombs and to

shoot down any plane that was not identified. When they neared Wake, they went from Condition 3 to Condition 2. He tried to make full preparation for combat and he carried out morning and afternoon searches to 300 miles. Admiral Halsey said that he felt he might be attacked before he returned to Pearl Harbor and thought it might precipitate war. (p. 299)

Admiral Halsey said that he did not feel that they were informed on what the Japs were doing and felt that they were operating in the dark. He thought that a good deal more was known in Washington than was known in Pearl Harbor. (p. 300)

Admiral Halsey said that they thought the Japanese attack would take place in the Far East except by submarine and that they underestimated the Japanese ability to operate carriers or did not give it enough consideration. (p. 301)

Admiral Halsey said that the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor had been on everyone's mind but that he personally did not expect an air attack. He pointed out that anti-aircraft drills had been had on many occasions. (p. 302)

Admiral Halsey said his personal and official relations with Admiral Kimmel were very close and that they conferred every time he returned to port. He said that Admiral Kimmel was principally worried about materiel conditions, the very heavy turnover in personnel and the question of balancing training against security. (p. 294)

Admiral Halsey said that there was a continuous flow of messages crying "wolf" and consequently the senses tended to be dull but the possibility of the international situation was constantly before their minds. (p. 296)

Admiral Newton said that for several months preceding December 7, all hands had felt a tautening up of the situation and he believed that the majority were of the view that submarines were their greatest menace. (p. 332)

Admiral Leary said that after their return to port on November 28, 1941, the security conditions existing on the ship were the same as on the previous stay in port which had ended about November 21. Admiral Leary said that the question of training is always a paramount one and that it was not possible to carry out the required training and maintain entirely satisfactory security measures. (p. 365) Admiral Leary said that in the few weeks prior to December 7, he had thought in a general way of the possibility of a surprise attack, and that they all felt that the contingency was remote and that the Intelligence Services would give adequate warning. (p. 365) He said that his estimate was that a surprise attack would be an air attack. (p. 366) He recalls no specific discussion along that line.

Admiral Bunkley said that on October 15, the CALIFORNIA was at Long Beach and received orders to be ready to sail at 24 hours' notice. He received the drastic change of orders without being taken into the confidence of Admiral Pye as to any messages received which caused such a change in plans. (p. 415)

Admiral Bunkley had no idea of any warnings having been sent in November and December indicating that the situation was dangerous. His opinion at the time was that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He did think that an attack would come in the Philippines. (p. 415)

D. ADMIRAL SMITH

Admiral Smith testified that Admiral Kimmel kept him informed of everything (page 530). He saw the "War Warning," but though the press or radio learned that negotiations were resumed (page 531). Each day the War Plans Officer and the Fleet Intelligence Officer gave CincPac an estimate of what was happening. He remembered the November 28th message mainly because of the emphasis therein not to alarm the civilian population (page 531); but this did not affect his estimate.

It seemed odd to him to take Navy and Marine planes off Midway and Wake in accordance with the November 26th dispatch and to put Army planes there. The Army planes had to be transported by carrier (page 532). It would take two weeks to deliver these planes, and this meant the absence of carriers in the direction of Japan, and while not fully prepared for war (page 533). Admiral Smith testified that he considered this dispatch a directive, despite its language (page 543).

He said that the inference from Exhibits 15 and 17 was plain that the warning was directed against an attack on the Philippines or Guam (page 545). The

"in any direction" dispatch of November 24th may have intensified the action they were taking, but did not at all change their general estimate (page 546).

The "war warning" message, he said, would have been more effective if it had stopped with the word "warning" (page 534).

Admiral Smith stated that in the Pacific Fleet they were not thinking of the defense of Pearl Harbor, but about the Fleet and readiness of the Fleet. The ships were ready for anything, but they were thinking mostly of how soon they could get out into battle, not the defense of Pearl Harbor (page 548).

He stated that the Roberts' Report was correct in stating they were aware of the possibility of hostile action without declaration of war (page 556), but they expected that the Japanese might hit the Philippines, Midway, or Guam, but not Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Smith said that the basis for his estimate that a surprise air attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable was as follows (p. 374–375):

"There was a great deal of doubt in our minds that Japan would go to war with us unless Germany did so also. Our information from all sources, including the Navy Department, and our intelligence did not indicate that the Japanese fleet had any intentions or was on the way to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese fleet, as located, indicated no move in this direction, and, I believe, most important of all, we doubted whether the Japanese would dare send a large force as far to the eastward as Hawaii. The possibility that they might be located even by a neutral ship existed. They might have been located several times before their arrival there, in which case they would have been at a great disadvantage. I believe that all of these things existed in the back of our minds and it was for this reason that we did not fear an air attack."

They did regard a submarine attack in the Hawaiian area as a sure thing (page 557).

Admiral Smith said that they were very submarine conscious, and one reason for that was that they had had several sound contacts; perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, in the month of February 1941, they had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head which occurred again a month later. They never found out exactly what it was, but after investigation came to the conclusion that the contact was due to two different levels of water temperature although the destroyers had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Admiral Kimmel, about six o'clock in the morning, told him to issue orders to bomb this contact. Before the order went out, however, he canceled it and reported the fact to CNO saying that he had no authority to do this except within the three-mile limit around Pearl Harbor; a reply of the CNO was to the effect that it was a good thing that such orders had not been issued. So, Admiral Smith said, probably all of the contacts were false, but they were submarine conscious more than air conscious and everyone in the Fleet believed that if an attack came it would be by submarine rather than by aircraft. Admiral Smith believed that the officers of the Fleet felt that there was little danger of an air attack. (p. 42)

Admiral Smith said that the warnings sent to them mentioned attacks in the Far East, and this probably resulted in a state of mind where they did not believe that they would be subjected to an air attack on Pearl Harbor, although they did expect submarine attack. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that he thought there had been too much "crying wolf" and that such warnings had been received not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but also previously by Admiral Richardson. (p. 64)

Admiral Smith said that his thought was at the time, and still was, that they spent too much time in worrying about the outlying islands. They had large forces of civilians working on Wake and Midway, and the Commander-in-Chief spent a great deal of time, more than he should have spent, in efforts to complete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammunition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the Pacific War Plan would indicate. Looking back on it, Admiral Smith thinks that they probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough to the larger things. (p. 64)

E. ADMIRAL M'MORRIS

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November 1941 occasioned no surprise and did not convey any considerable amount of additional or startling information, because the situation with reference to Japan had been tense throughout the year of 1941 (p. 325).

Admiral McMorris said that he had thought that sabotage or a submarine attack was a distinct possibility (page 887). Up to the time of the attack he considered the possibility of an air torpedo attack very remote (page 888) and gave as reasons therefor: (a) increasing evidence of Japanese movements toward Kra Peninsula; (b) concentration of troops in South China Area; (c) movement of combatant ships from the Empire to the South; (d) Navy warnings indicated the possibility of hostilities in that area, attack on Philippines, or movement of Japanese forces in Halmahera; (e) distance involved and logistic problem; (f) despite British attack on Italian Fleet in southern Italy—here the depth of water and short distance for run of torpedo was important; (g) confidence in anti-aircraft defenses against torpedo planes.

*Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he considered sound the views expressed by the Secretary of the Navy in his letter of 24 January 1941 (Naval Court Exhibit 9), though he had not been completely in accord as to the elements of danger as listed in importance by the Secretary (p. 325–327).**

Vice Admiral McMorris further testified that he had considered an air attack possible but not probable and further than he considered the Fleet should not take as its sole object of existence the defending of itself against a surprise attack and that it should carry on other fundamental duties, including training and readying itself for operations (p. 327).

He felt that the attack would be on the Philippines with a possible raid on Wake and Midway, and Guam would be seriously endangered (page 889). He felt that a submarine attack on Hawaii was probable.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to his estimate of the situation and possible courses of enemy action during the period of 27 November to 6 December 1941, that substantially he estimated the Japanese were on the point of commencing a war against Great Britain by operations in Malaysia. His early estimate was that the Japanese would act with the expectation that the United States would not enter the war with Great Britain unless it was itself attacked, but later he came to the conclusion that the Japanese might be unwilling to leave the line of communications abreast the Philippines exposed to attack in which case the United States would come into the war, and therefore, he estimated that heavy attacks on the Philippines had become not only a distinct possibility but were probable.

He further estimated that the Japanese would seize Guam when they initiated the war, because of the negligible defenses there, and that, because the defense of Midway was stronger, with which the Japanese were probably familiar, it was initially a probability that Midway would be subjected to heavy raids but that it was less likely that there would be any Japanese effort towards seizing Midway.

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he further estimated that there were likely to be heavy Japanese submarine concentrations in the Hawaiian area and the approaches thereto; that submarine attacks would be directed primarily at our task forces operating at sea, and that there was a likelihood of attempts being made to sink a ship in the Pearl Harbor channel, in order to block ingress and egress. He also expected that there would be enemy submarine activity along the Pacific Coast. (Page 303–304.)

After receipt of the message of November 27th, a discussion was had as to whether or not any general message should be sent to the Fleet, particularly those in training and operating areas, and it was felt that the situation was already well in hand and it would, in effect, be a message to continue what they were doing: The only message was an injunction to be particularly alert for submarines (part 895).

---

*NOTE.—*This was the letter in which the Secretary envisioned the initiation of a Japanese war by a surprise attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and listed the dangers in order of importance as air bombing attack, air torpedo plane attack, sabotage, submarine attack, mining, and bombardment by gunfire. The Secretary further stated that the countermeasures to be considered, in order of importance, were the location and engagement of enemy carriers, and supporting vessels before an air attack could be launched, pointing out that these were largely functions of the Fleet, though perhaps not possible of being carried out in the event of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war (p. 326).

Admiral McMorris said that the dispatch of November 26th from the Chief of Naval Operations regarding the transfer of planes to Wake, of which CincPac was an addressee, probably influenced whatever ideas or views resulted from the series of dispatches, but the question of moving Army planes there was given extensive consideration and the determination was made to send defensive planes to Midway and Wake, preferably Marine, and they felt it imperative to have protective fighters there because they anticipated operating a number of patrol planes from Wake if war should start (page 891).

A squadron of patrol planes searched in advance of the carrier and was withdrawn after she had discharged the planes at Wake (page 892). When Halsey and "Newton" moved to Wake and Midway for delivery of Marine aircraft, they were well aware of the fact that hostilities might commence before they again entered port (page 894).

As Admiral McMorris recalled it, orders to depth bomb submarine contacts were issued after the war warning and orders given to Admirals Newton and Halsey to repel hostile planes. (p . 246)

The proposal to send Army troops and planes to Midway and Wake did not, so far as he was concerned, weaken the "war warning." He thought those places would be weakened in defense by such a change; that they were important; and might be subject to attack so that the time was inauspicious (page 896).

Admiral McMorris recalled that at not a great while before the commencement of war, there was a suggestion to replace the marines at outlying islands with Army forces and that this was discussed with General Short. It was concluded not to send them. They felt that the Washington proposal was badly timed. He did not feel that it vitiated the war warning dispatch. (p. 247)

Those dispatches (Exhibits 18, 40) were proposals and not directives and the recommendation was against the proposals and recommendation was accepted (page 896).

He believed from the limited knowledge he had that the danger from enemy aircraft was not great (page 896). He did not consider that the Japanese would make a surprise air attack; he felt that the only serious danger was sabotage or submarines (page 900).

With reference to testimony given by him in previous investigations to the effect that in his opinion the island defense was adequate and that the chances of an air attack inflicting damage were small, Vice Admiral McMorris testified generally that the bases of that opinion were as follows:

(a) That the anti-aircraft guns and the fighters would destroy a large proportion of attacking planes;

(b) That bombing by enemy planes would not be sufficiently accurate to obtain a large number of hits;

(c) That notwithstanding the success of the British air torpedo attack at Taranto, which he believed was attributable to peculiar conditions that existed at Taranto, he did not believe there was any serious hazard in an air torpedo attack at Pearl, because: (1) the attacking planes would have to fly very low, thereby exposing themselves to anti-aircraft fire and fighter interception, and (2) the shallowness of the water and the short distance available for torpedo runs would operate to reduce the effectiveness of this type of attack. He stated that manifestly his conclusions were entirely wrong, but that they had been reached by reading available information as to torpedo performance in our own Navy;

(d) He admitted that he did not have any knowledge as to whether the Army anti-aircraft defenses were actually alerted nor as to their condition of readiness, but he assumed that they were in a state of readiness. ". . . Perhaps I was remiss in not acquainting myself more fully as to what they were doing. We knew that our own establishment was fairly good. Actually they proved not to be as good as I felt. We were a bit too complacent there. . . . Nonetheless, I was not directly acquainted or indirectly acquainted with the actual state of readiness being maintained or the watches being kept" with respect to the aircraft defenses of Hawaii (p. 330–332).

Admiral McMorris said that he saw the November 28th dispatch and considered the directive for reconnaissance to mean search by aircraft for submarines or a raiding cruiser.

Admiral McMorris said that he did not believe that a surprise air attack was likely in the Hawaiian area although he did consider such an attack

possible in the Philippines and even against Midway or Wake. Probably he said, some discussions along those lines may have taken place but he had no specific recollection of such a discussion. (p. 236) He personally never considered an air attack as more than a remote possibility and he is certain that Admiral Kimmel was not anticipating such an attack.

Admiral McMorris said that the characteristics of the leaders of the Japanese Navy had been discussed from time to time between Admiral Kimmel, Admiral McMorris, and others, and the general impression was that they were rather capable and aggressive leaders. (p. 236)

The reasons why Admiral McMorris thought a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility were as follows:

"For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steaming long distance with probability of detection and then attack in the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from making such an effort against us. It also seemed hightly probable that more attractive targets could be found to the southward of Japan and that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island defenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite disproportionate to the damage they might inflict." (p. 237)

Admiral McMorris said that they did anticipate that mass submarine attacks in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor were quite possible. (p. 238)

Admiral McCormick who at the time was under McMorris, said that the courses open to the enemy, as the War Plans Officer saw them, were in the nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of air and submarine attacks and the seizure of all of our possessions in the western Pacific; it was considered most improbable that they would venture out of the western Pacific; an air attack on Pearl Harbor was listed as a possible course of Japanese action. Predominant attention was focused on the preparation for offensive movement, the countering of Japanese action against Wake and Midway, and protection of the Fleet against submarine attack. A very low degree of probability was assigned to air attack at Pearl Harbor. (p. 68) He said that he did not think that any of Admiral Kimmel's advisers had any real conception of how far the Japanese had come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they made.

Admiral McCormick said that in formulating estimates of the situation, the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders were not, so far as he knew, taken into consideration. (p. 70)

Admiral McCormick said that the term "defensive deployment" use in the war warning puzzled them. The further strengthening of the islands to the westward and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral Kimmel and his staff could derive from this directive.

Admiral McCormick said that he knew of not one person at Pearl Harbor who was not completely surprised by the Japanese air attack. (p. 71)

Admiral McCormick, at the end of his statement, said that Admiral Kimmel was whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingly devoted to getting the Fleet ready for war; that "There is no doubt about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real probability of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an approach, as has been proved many times by our carrier task forces in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind spot that I mentioned had not existed." (p. 72)

Captain Murphy said that he did not think that an attack, such as the attack that was made, would be made. He thought that it would be stupid for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and that they might have gone into Thailand, Malay and the Dutch East Indies without involving the United States. He thought they might attack the Philippines.

Captain Murphy said that he thought the presence of heavy ships in Pearl Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks involved in Rainbow 5. (p. 199) He was not sure whether the words defensive deployment in any way signified security measures, but interpreted the words as leaving the matter open to those in Pearl Harbor. (p. 200)

F. ADMIRAL DELANY

Admiral DeLany stated that he saw all of the messages from the Navy Department. He did not consider that CincPac had been furnished complete information on relations between the United States and Japan, because full information of the negotiations and discussions were not forwarded to CincPac (page 506).

The "War Warning" dispatch meant to him that Japan was on the move, but he did not interpret it as showing an immediate Japanese attack on the United States.

Admiral DeLany said that between November 27th and December 7th, he knew that Japan was on the move, but he thought they would go into the Malays or Thailand. He did not know what we would have done if this had included an overt act against the United States. The Pacific Fleet had not been given any clear-cut view of the attitude which the United States Government was assuming toward Japan. He had not thought that the Japanese would initiate a war by attacking the Pacific Fleet as such an attack would wake up the United States more than anything; also because they had reports that the Japanese fleet was primarily based in the Empire (page 497).

In his opinion, if there were an attack, it would be by submarine. He did not envisage an attack by air or surface ships (page 498).

Rear Admiral DeLany reaffirmed his belief, previously stated to the Roberts Commission, that there was no discussion between 27 November and 7 December by the staff as to the probability of an air attack of the nature of that which occurred. (p. 165)

Asked what consideration was given to possible directions of aggressive movements, warned against in the 24 November message from OpNav to CinCPac and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic, he replied that aircraft carriers were sent to deliver planes to Midway and Wake but that an attack farther to the eastward was not contemplated. (p. 170)

Following the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November conferences between the Army and Navy retained the concept previously held that the greatest danger to the Hawaiian area lay in the possibility of submarine attacks and sabotage. (p. 172)

Admiral DeLany stated that joint Army and Navy exercises relating to defense of the islands were handicapped by lack of equipment necessary to provide a Central air warning control post. This equipment, together with anti-aircraft weapons, communication facilities and planes, was declared not available although following the Pearl Harbor attack they were received almost immediately. (p. 174–176)

Adequate air reconnaissance was impossible, in his opinion, due to the small number of planes and crews, condition of the planes and the necessity for maintaining them in readiness for an emergency. (p. 181)

From the information which he had in November 1941, he did not think a torpedo plane attack in Pearl Harbor could be launched because of the depth of the water. This information had been sent in letters by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Concerning the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installations at Pearl Harbor, Admiral DeLany said that he did not and never would have expected that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor as they did; that everyone was of the opinion that the danger lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area; and that there might be sabotage on the island. The general concept of the defense of the island and the security of the base there was based on that idea. (p. 77)

Admiral DeLany said that nothing in the dispatches received by them indicated that hostilities would be started in the way in which they did in fact start. (p. 78)

Admiral DeLany said that the reasons why they regarded a surprise air attack at Pearl Harbor as improbable were that the last information which they had placed the Japanese Fleet in home waters; there was inherent danger for the Japanese in bringing their Fleet in for such an attack; and it was felt that the one single thing which would inflame Americans would be an attack upon their home territory. (p. 80)

Admiral DeLany thought that in formulating the opinion that an air attack was unlikely, consideration was given to the characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, an air expert. (p. 81)

G. ADMIRAL CALHOUN

Admiral Calhoun said that he had been present at Admiral Kimmel's conferences every morning and heard all the information that Admiral Kimmel discussed. He knew of the "war warning" dispatch and interpreted it to mean that war would start in the Philippines (page 935). Nobody had expected war immediately, he said, and Admiral Kimmel did not indicate any contrary view (page 938). When the "War Warning" was read, he had thought, and believed the others also had thought that it did not necessarily mean that war was imminent and that the Fleet should go on a war footing (page 939).

In his voluntary statement at the end of his testimony, Admiral Calhoun discussed the fact that he attended all of Admiral Kimmel's conferences and that neither he nor anyone else expected any immediate sneak attack by the Japanese at the time when it came. (p. 228)

H. CAPTAIN LAYTON

Captain Layton stated that he had seen the "War Warning" and had considered that it fitted into the picture that the Japanese were going to strike in Southeast Asia (page 911). He had no apprehension of an air attack on Hawaii. He at one time translated a Japanese novel which academically discussed an attack on Pearl Harbor. He showed this to Admiral Kimmel about three or four months prior to December 7, 1941 (page 911). From the "War Warning" message and other information he had at the time, he expected the Japanese to attack Thailand, and possibly the Philippines (page 912) and after our search planes from Manila had reported Japanese forces off Cameron Bay and in the Gulf of Siam, he reported this estimate to CincPac. This was in agreement with the "War Warning" (pages 912–3). Air attack on Pearl Harbor was a capability of the Japanese but he had considered it a remote possibility. Surprise attack was a Japanese characteristic (page 913).

Captain Layton knew Admiral Yamamoto personally and was familiar with his characteristics. He did not specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view of Admiral Yamamoto's characteristics a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor was likely (page 223). He said that on one occasion when he did discuss with Admiral Kimmel a book wherein a carrier raid on Oahu was mentioned and Admiral Kimmel asked him what he thought of the chances. He said "I only hope we can intercept them and I hope that the air search will find them in plenty of time." He also said that in the discussion in general regarding Japan's strength, he thought that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned, and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much in the first battle. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that he saw the war warning of November 27th and thought that it fitted in with the picture up to date as he saw it, namely, that the Japanese were moving to the South. His estimate was unclear as to whether or not the Japanese would attack the Philippines or would leave their flank unguarded and attempt to work some compromise deal through Kurusu and Nomura. (p. 224)

Captain Layton said that there was no discussion from November 27th to December 7th in his presence, "in higher authority" as to the importance of guarding against internal sabotage (page 914).

I. ADMIRAL BELLINGER

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor, of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Neither did he see or know of the CNO despatch of 28 November regarding possible hostile action by the Japanese. (P. 498–499)

Admiral Bellinger referred to Addendum I of Exhibit 53, which stated that an air attack from carriers at 300 miles was the most likely form of attack on Pearl Harbor. He anvisaged air attack as the most logical form for the greatest success (page 668). He expected a bombing, not a torpedo attack (page 669).

Admiral Bellinger said that he had not thought it probable that an attack would be made on Oahu as the opening event of the Japanese-United States war (page 688), and his estimate contained in the plans was in order to work out a defense of Pearl Harbor and not an estimate of the war plans of the Japanese (page 687).

During the five days preceding December 7, Admiral Bellinger was in bed with the "flu." His assistant, Captain Ramsey, conferred with him. (p. 122)

Admiral Bellinger said that late in November, 1941, he thought the most probable form of Japanese attack would be by submarine or by means of sabotage. (p. 123–124)

J. ADMIRAL KITTS

Admiral Kitts testified that he had thought an air torpedo attack was possible in Pearl Harbor, and antiaircraft measures such as nets and balloons had been considered (page 516).

Admiral Kitts did not attend staff conferences generally. He was not shown any warning dispatch but knew the general tenor of some of the warnings. (p. 185) Admiral Kitts said that he had considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a serious possibility and also a submarine attack or a combination of the two. (p. 186) Admiral Kitts said that he helped draft the Fleet Circular letter in February or March known as 2CL–41 which indicated that a surprise air attack was a definite possibility. (p. 186)

His feeling in this regard was minimized by two letters from the Chief of Naval Operations, stating that the water in Pearl Harbor was too shallow for a successful torpedo run. Nets had not been put in because they were a hindrance to ships' movements and because it was felt that the danger of torpedo attack was slight. Balloon barrages had not been put in because of interference with normal operations of our own aircraft (page 516). Nets had been placed at the entrance to Pearl Harbor (page 517).

The deepest water in Pearl Harbor was 42 feet, or 7 fathoms, and he recalled that the Navy Department had estimated that torpedoes could not be successfully launched in less than 10 fathoms (page 519).

K. ADMIRAL WITHERS

Admiral Withers said that he had seen the "War Warning" and had been present at a conference held on November 28, 1941. He said that he told Admiral Kimmel that he thought the dispatch meant war and that he would sink Japanese ships if they came within 500 miles of Hawaii and didn't turn back (page 1085). General Short was not at this conference (page 1086). He had no orders to take offensive action against enemy ships within the 500 mile area from Pearl Harbor (page 1086).

He had thought there would be an attack on Hawaii, but did not consider what kind of attack (page 1086). The "War Warning" message did mention the Philippines and he had felt that an attack might come anywhere but had thought that the chances were that it would be on the Philippines (page 1087).

Captain Curts said that he had been apprehensive for a long time prior to December 7 about the danger of the Japanese starting a war without a formal declaration and he feared particularly sabotage. (p. 108)

L. COLONEL PHILLIPS

Colonel Phillips testified that General Short received an Army dispatch, corresponding to Exhibit 19, on November 27th or November 28th, and that a conference was held with Admiral Kimmel (page 483). He said that at the time of receipt of the dispatch an estimate of the situation was made which resulted in the sabotage alert. He estimated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable, and that if there were an attack, it would be by air. He did not recall receiving any information additional to that message until the afternoon of December 7, 1941 (page 485). He did not recall having seen the Navy "War Warning" message (page 486).

He stated that his opinion that the enemy might attack by air had been his own personal opinion (page 493).

M. GENERAL SHORT

General Short said that at this time he considered sabotage the main danger at Pearl Harbor since the information they had indicated that the Japanese would move southward (page 239). He said that during a conference with Admiral Kimmel, McMorris had stated that there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there had been no disagreement by those present. He also knew

that Admiral Kimmel would have moved the ships out if he had thought an air attack likely.

XXI. Conferences Between Admiral Kimmel and General Short After November 27th

Admiral Smith said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect; Admiral Kimmel and General Short, he "estimates," conferred every day between November 27th and December 7th (page 546). He present at some of the staff conferences (page 547).

He said that the Roberts' Report was incorrect in stating that Admiral Kimmel did not inform himself of measures taken by General Short; Admiral Smith was present at most of the conferences, and had been early directed by Admiral Kimmel to cooperate with the Army (page 550); also, Short informed himself of Kimmel's actions (page 551).

He stated that within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the "war warning," Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. General Short had been promptly advised of this message (page 561).

> *Commander Harold S. Burr, then Naval Liaison Officer for the Commandant at the headquarters, Commanding General Hawaiian Department, while at CincPac Headquarters in the presence of Capt. Earle received from Lt. Commander Layton a copy of the "war warning" dispatch of 27 November (Exhibit 17, Naval Court of Inquiry) with instructions to deliver it to General Short. Commander Burr could not locate General Short or the Chief of Staff and left the dispatch with the Senior Officer Present, Lt. Col. William Donnegan, G–3, explaining its urgent nature. Commander Burr stated that on the following day Col. Donnegan told him that the dispatch had been delivered to General Short. (pages 377–8)*

He did not recall "the details" of that conference. He thought that the message was intended to put them on their toes and to get them ready to carry out the War Plan.

> **Admiral Kimmel, according to Admiral Smith, had a shock in the week preceding Pearl Harbor when orders were received from the Navy Department to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all of the Marines off of the outlying islands and Marine and Navy planes and replacing them with soldiers and with Army planes. As Admiral Smith remembered it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two staffs together. He said "the Army was undecided whether to put P–39's or P–40's on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then, they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke before-hand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands, I wouldn't be able to get a ship into one of the ports." or words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and submitted but never carried out." (p. 40–41)**
>
> **Concerning the "war warning", Admiral Smith said that it was received somewhere in the midafternoon on the 27th of November. General Short was immediately sent for and a conference was held. By six o'clock that evening, the Army was on the march, unfortunately what they did was to station men at the public utilities, the reservoirs, and the bridges. In other words, they alerted against sabotage because it was the consensus of opinion**

from this dispatch that attacks would be against the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and by the others sabotage on the Japanese population. The war warning, he said, was carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers so as to determine its exact meaning. He thought that the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except as to the danger of sabotage. The question of possible attack by air did not arise. Admiral Smith was not apprised of the contemplated action of the Army and did not believe that Admiral Kimmel had been advised. Admiral Bloch was at the conference, but Admiral Smith recalled no discussion of measures to be taken by Admiral Bloch's task force in light of the warning. Admiral Smith did not recall what condition of readiness was set for ships in port. He said the ships at sea were apprised of this warning.

Admiral Smith said that the operating schedule for ships which had been previously issued was not departed from except that the ENTERPRISE was sent to deliver planes to Wake. He said that as a result, at the time of the war warning, two of the three task forces were at sea; Admiral Pye's task force returned about the 5th of December, he thought, and also part of Admiral Halsey's task force; Admiral Brown's task force departed on the 4th of December, he had the LEXINGTON and some cruisers and destroyers, but no battleships; the net result of the adherence to the operating schedules previously issued was that there was a movement of ships inward to port rather than the deployment involving movement outward. Admiral Smith said that it might very well be that these plans had been known to the Japanese and that they chose their time to attack when two task forces were scheduled to be in port.

The war warning, Admiral Smith said, did not indicate to him that there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor. He knew that a greater part of the approaches to Pearl Harbor were not covered by any reconnaissance, but recalled no discussion at the conferences concerning this fact. (p. 50–53)

General Short stated that after a conference with Admiral Kimmel he placed his anti-sabotage alert into effect. According to Admiral Smith and Colonel Phillips, the Army went on the anti-sabotage alert on November 27th (pages 537, 479). General Short stated that he also conferred with Admiral Kimmel on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251), they talked over every phase of what they were doing (page 242).

Admiral McMorris recalled that at about this time a conference was held between Admiral Kimmel and General Short regarding utilization of Army aircraft to strengthen defenses at Midway and Wake (page 889).

Admiral Brown said that he had overheard Admiral Kimmel frequently question General Short as to the Army's adequacy to defend Pearl Harbor against enemy air attack and that General Short had replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.

Admiral Pye said that he personally attended no conferences in which the situation was discussed by the Army High command; his conferences with Admiral Kimmel were concerned with Fleet operations. (p. 149)

Captain Murphy said that after the receipt of the war warning he, Captain Smith, Captain McMorris, Captain DeLany, and Captain Layton, were called into Admiral Kimmel's office, and he read the dispatch and asked for their opinion. Admiral Kimmel said that he would have a further conference that afternoon. Captain Murphy said that he thought that at that conference the decision was mde to reinforce Wake and to send some planes to Midway. (p. 197)

Admiral Bellinger did not see the warning dispatches (Exhibits 15 and 17) before December 7th, and between November 27th and December 7th did not confer with the Army Air Force Commander regarding long range reconnaissance (page 672).

Admiral Bloch recalled no discussions concerning unity of command (page 395).

XXII. Action Taken by Admiral Kimmel—Extent of Reconnaissance

A. IN GENERAL

Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet from February, 1941, through 7 December 1941, testified that all Pacific Fleet task force commanders were notified of the receipt of the so-called war warning (p. 356).

In this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).

Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures (p. 373).

The direction contained in the war warning to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carry out the task assigned in WPL–46" was a new phrase, Admiral Kimmel testified. He thought it referred to measures of the type already taken by him (page 305).

As a result of the "war warning," he said, he continued the security measures already in effect (page 299). On November 27th, he issued orders to bomb unidentified submarines found in the operating areas around Oahu. He informed the Chief of Naval Operations of this. Full security measures were invoked for ships at sea, which were ordered to bomb submarine contacts (pages 299–300).

Admiral Bloch testified that no change was made in the condition of readiness, except that a Coast Guard patrol was started off Pearl Harbor and they began sweeping the Honolulu harbor channel and approaches (page 395).

Admiral Bloch said, "I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, No, it was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have told me they were alert No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1. Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80—they were the only four ships that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped with listening gear—and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war, would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the 27th of November." (p. 16)

Admiral Bloch said, "So far as I know, I advised no condition of readiness. I might say that I felt that I could not independently advise a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions of employment, that they had been in or were in and the future movements. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was informed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a different condition of readiness." (p. 16)

After the War Warning, Admiral Bloch knew of no additional aerial reconnaissance. Admiral Bloch did take one other step, namely, he directed the District Coast Guard Officer, who was the Port Commander of Honolulu, to put an inshore patrol in effect from Honolulu with three Coast Guard cutters. the same as Admiral Bloch conducted from Pearl Harbor with Destroyer Division 80. (p. 17)

Admiral McMorris said that on receipt of the "war warning," CincPac had a discussion with his staff. A determination was made that its directions were largely in effect already (page 888). Instructions were given to the forces at sea to be particularly alert and to bomb submarine contacts believed hostile (page 888). The practice was started of giving CincPac daily or every other day recommendations as to what was to be done if war broke out within twenty-

four hours. Consideration was given to getting combatant ships out of Pearl Harbor if war broke out, he said, but not to getting them out as a defensive measure.

Concerning the direction to take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.

Admiral McMorris outlined his understanding of the action taken as "preparatory deployment" at page 243.

Concerning the direction in the war warning to take "defensive deployment," Admiral McMorris said that they concluded that they should keep their forces in close proximity to Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move toward the Marshalls, and this was in agreement with the directive. (p. 245)

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that as a result of the war warning on November 27th, there occurred considerable discussion between Admiral Kimmel and the key members of his staff, and the following determinations or conclusions were reached:

(a) no material changes would be made within the Hawaiian area because the naval organization was already substantially on a war footing;

(b) it was essential that training continue until it became necessary to move the principal elements of the Fleet into offensive operations, and therefore, that there should be a continuation and no modification of the training schedules;

(c) that limitations in supplies and facilities, particularly defensive aircraft, had precluded stationing requisite defensive forces at Wake or Midway and other island outposts until it became virtually mandatory, and, accordingly, the only two aircraft carriers, accompanied by cruisers and destroyers were dispatched, one to Wake, the other to Midway, with fighter aircraft;

(d) that Midway and Wake, considering the personnel engaged in the preparation of defense, were not able to accommodate an increase in personnel, though possibly a small number of men and some specialized equipment were dispatched to Wake. (Page 304–305).

Admiral DeLany said that training conditions were maintained in the subordinate commands, and that no additional security measures were invoked upon receipt of the "war warning" (page 499).

Admiral DeLany said that he believed that everything possible was done, with the available forces, to secure early information of possible attack, within their concept that enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine and sabotage. (p. 78–9)

Concerning the instruction in the war warning to take "defensive deployment," Admiral DeLany said that as he recalled the island was alerted, the Commander-in-Chief put certain aspects of his security letter in effect with the forces afloat, and he pointed out, the actual deployment of the Fleet, in view of its organization into task forces for the accomplishment of offensive missions, existed.

Admiral DeLany also stated that the Commanding Officer of the aircraft had been given orders to accelerate the refitting of the planes which had come to them without self-sealing tanks and other offensive war equipment. (p. 79)

Admiral DeLany recalls that about this time, submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and at Wake. (p. 79)

Admiral Calhoun said that he did not know of any additional security measures which Admiral Kimmel could have taken (page 943); he considered the existing ComFOURTEEN security orders adequate (page 944).

Admiral Smith said that because, as the Court inquired, an attack on Pearl Harbor was held only a remote possibility, that additional precautions against such a possibility were unnecessary and unjustified (page 560).

Admiral Smith said that the intended raid to the Westward called for by the Pacific Fleet Operating Plan on the outbreak of hostilities was very much in the minds of Admirals Kimmel and Halsey. The question of the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was not seriously considered; the Fleet was ready to carry out its tasks at the outbreak of war; and the question of an attack before negotiations were completed was not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, seriously considered. (p. 58)

Admiral Smith said that the lack of premonition as to a carrier raid was not due to preoccupation concerning offensive movements. (p. 63)

Admiral McCormick said that consideration had been given to using Fleet units to augment the Army and local defense forces, and that the Fleet would constitute the backbone of any defense of its own security; the necessity for training for offensive missions naturally makes it impossible to keep the forces wholly employed in routine security measures. (pp. 69)

Admiral McCormick said that he did not think that it was true, to the state of imbalance, that the foremost thought in their minds was the offensive movements rather than the security angle, although they intended to make the maximum offensive use of the Fleet which its comparatively small size would permit. (p. 70)

B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE

Vice Admiral McMorris testified, with reference to the question of whether or not there had been any discussion by Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance from Oahu during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941, that it was not a practice to have formal conferences though there were numerous conferences and discussions, and that undoubtedly such question of reconnaissance was a matter that was discussed during that period, (p. 307); that "definitely" was subject matter discussed during that period between himself and others and Admiral Kimmel. (p. 308).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he was not able to state what Admiral Kimmel had to say concerning the discussion of reconnaissance from Oahu, "but", he continued to testify, "the conclusions that he (Admiral Kimmel) reached did not result in any distant search being maintained, but rather that the search at the time was against submarines in localized areas." (p. 308).

Admiral Kimmel stated that under the provisions of Exhibit 52, Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing TWO) was to provide a long range scouting force, conduct patrols into areas, and at times, ordered by CincPac to improve the security of the Fleet units and bases, and was to issue orders for and supervise the conduct of prescribed patrols. There were insufficient planes for complete reconnaissance. The schedules of employment of the planes were submitted to and approved by Admiral Kimmel, pursuant to Exhibit 52. Although Admiral Bloch had nothing suitable for reconnaissance, he could, Admiral Kimmel said, have asked for such planes.

Admiral Kimmel stated that the Navy patrol planes were under his direct operation (page 1125), and he assumed the direct responsibility of employing them but that Admiral Bloch was charged with the execution of that part of the plan which required the search, and he always had the right to request those planes for that purpose and did so on several occasions. However, Admiral Kimmel gave the orders to the planes (page 1125). He said that he was directly responsible for whether a distant reconnaissance with planes should be taken and that no subordinate had recommended such reconnaissance (page 374).

Admiral Kimmel said that he did not know that daily patrols were permanently flown prior to his command, as indicated by a question, over a certain arc from Honolulu. He did know that certain searches had been conducted but thought them ineffective (page 373). He had considered using part of the planes to search a probable area of enemy advance. Such search had been done previously for a few days on Admiral Bloch's suggestion, but had been discontinued after finding nothing (page 373).

To the best of Admiral Kimmel's recollection, reconnaissance patrol in certain areas was not in effect when he took command. A patrol covering the operating area was in effect, and he continued that patrol (page 1125). In any event, he thoroughly considered the question of running patrols and had to make a decision between training and running patrols. He was told by the commander of the patrol planes and by the Army of their training difficulties. In addition, they did not have a sufficient number to maintain an adequate patrol over a long period of time, and a patrol out to 300 miles is almost useless as a guard against an air raid. That was and is his opinion, although any patrol run has some value as far as surface ships are concerned.

Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion that any air attack on Oahu would come at dawn and considered at some time the placing of all available planes in the air each morning, but did not think the time had arrived to take any measures such as that (page 1131). The "emergencies" were continuing all the time and he did not have the personnel and material (page 1132). If he had put the Navy PBY's

in the air at all, he would have had them out on patrol (page 1132). Had he put all the planes in the air each morning at daylight, he said, it would have alarmed the civilian population (page 1134).

Admiral McMorris said that long range reconnaissance was considered at this time and earlier, but had to be considered along with the availability of patrol planes, the status of training of these planes, employments they might be called on to carry out, the offensive operation laid down in war plans, and the necessity of covering operating areas, and supplying personnel for new squadrons (page 890).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he had no specific recollection of any conference or conversation between him and Admiral Kimmel concerning reconnaissance from Oahu between the period of November 27 and December 7, 1941, but that such was "a matter" that was discussed between him and Admiral Kimmel and between the two of them with other members of the staffs and with other senior naval officers present in Pearl Harbor.

He stated that he no longer remembered the details but did recall the consideration that was in mind, in general, and the action determined upon. He stated that the situation as to equipment was that the number of patrol planes was small and certain of them were earmarked for Midway and Wake, and for reconnaissance of the Marshalls at an appropriate time.

He stated that the following matters were considered:

(a) that it was believed to be highly important to maintain anti-submarine patrols in the operating areas;

(b) that it was contemplated, in case war should start, that most of the fleet shore-based aircraft were to be moved to the Island outposts (Midway, Johnston, and Wake) but that some were to remain under the operational control of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Command since that command had no aircraft of its own;

(c) that, in order to have the patrol craft ready for prompt movement to Island outposts where the repair and upkeep facilities were negligible, it was considered highly important that there be no excessive use of such craft which would require engine overhaul and interfere with readiness for flight on short notice;

(d) that, because the Navy patrol wings as a whole were being increased, and the operating forces were in no small measure engaged in giving essential advanced operational training, that it was determined that such training should be continued as much as possible.

Considering these matters, that is, the requirements for antisubmarine patrols, readiness of patrol aircraft for distant service, and continuation of the training program, "it was determined that the arrangements that were actually in effect were the best that we could do. This in effect accepted a calculated risk. Subsequent events proved that the calculations weren't good." (page 305-306).

Admiral McMorris stated further in this connection that calculations made at this time showed that "only varied limited sectors could be continually patroled with the forces then available." (page 306).

He further stated "it may be remarked in passing that with the effectiveness of search that could have been maintained, it is doubtful that the approach of the Japanese carriers on the morning of 7 December would have been detected as the arc of their approach would quite possibly have been unguarded."

With reference to the extent of the sectors which could have been covered in a reconnaissance from Oahu by the patrol planes available during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the testimony of Admiral Pellinger, before the Naval Court of Inquiry, that continuous daily patrols for an undetermined number of days would have been flown during the period in question by dividing the combat crews into three groups and using twenty planes daily, which would have covered 144°, "wouldn't be far wrong." (page 309–310).

However, he testified, that the only consideration given in that statement is to the question of running a search, "but the Commander-in-Chief had not only that consideration to weigh, but also the matter of keeping planes ready for distant service and for training of personnel for new aircraft being built." (page 310).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that he could not state categorically the extent of the sector from Oahu which could have been covered by the patrol planes during the period in question. He stated that various combinations of diagrams, some drawn within the War Plans Section, some by the aviation officer, and some probably drawn by the Operations Division, were given consideration, though he was not able to testify as to the extent the diagrams were presented to Admiral Kimmel, neither was he able to state when and by whom any such diagrams were considered.

He testified that if any long distant searches were instituted, they undoubtedly would have been a compromise among the different features involved, "just as a compromise was actually reached in limiting the searches to the fleet operating areas." (page 309).

Previously searches of rotating narrow sectors had been made daily (page 890). After due consideration, it was decided not to make long range air reconnaissance as it would be of limited effectiveness and training would suffer heavily and the material readiness of the planes would be reduced. He recalled no formal conference on this matter with Admiral Kimmel, but it was probably discussed (pages 890–1).

His war plans group and he were of the opinion that a raid on Hawaii was unlikely and wanted to have the patrol planes ready to go to Midway and Wake to cover offensive operations (page 890).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that the patrol or aircraft reconnaissance being conducted from Midway and other outlying bases during the so-called critical period from 27 November 1941 onwards, were very limited. He stated that the aircraft at all outlying bases excepting Midway were entirely defensive, while those at Midway were partially defensive and partially for patrol. He stated that the patrols from Midway were limited because of the limitations there in the amount of gas and upkeep facilities, which required conservation in order that the engines might not be worn out "before a critical period arose" (p. 327–328).

He also testified that if a maximum search had been instituted from Pearl Harbor and from Midway after the warning of November 27th, there would have been a highly critical situation with regard to aircraft engines by the 7th of December (p. 328).

Exhibit 19 (repeat of Army dispatch) directing that operations be conducted so as not to alarm the civilian population, had no bearing on the action taken by him regarding reconnaissance or other war preparations (page 891).

Admiral Bloch stated that his sole connection with long range reconnaissance was that as ComFOURTEEN, he made a joint agreement with the Commanding General which would be placed in execution on "M" day or by order of the War and Navy Departments, or upon mutual agreement of the two local commanders of the Army and Navy; that then it would be the responsibility of the Navy to provide reconnaissance planes, the delivery of which was indefinite. Commander Patrol Wing Two was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and under Admiral Bloch's control to the extent that Admiral Bloch exercised control over naval shore based aircraft, and through him Admiral Bloch arranged to coordinate joint air effort. Admiral Bellinger was ComPatWing Two, ComTaskFor Nine, ComAir Scouting Force and ComNavBase Defense Air Force. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was like a voluntere fire department. When you sounded the air raid, they came; otherwise they were doing something else (page 398). Under 2CL–41, Admiral Bloch was not responsible for long distance reconnaissance (page 399). Admiral Bellinger was to do this, subject to orders from CincPac (page 400).

On November 27, CincPac decided to make no change in schedules; that included the long range reconnaissance (page 400).

Admiral Bloch stated that he could recall no request which he made for long distance reconnaissance other than the request in June 1940, and in the summer of 1941. He felt that while he could recommend such reconnaissance, the Commander-in-Chief did not depend on him to make such a recommendation before he ordered reconnaissance (page 1140). Admiral Bloch was Naval Base Defense Officer and Admiral Bellinger was Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (page 1141). Admiral Bloch had supervisory control and both he and the Commander-in-Chief could give Admiral Bellinger orders (page 1142). The planes were under Admiral Bellinger as Naval Base Defense Air Officer only when they were activated, and they were only activated while Admiral Bloch was there for drill (page 1143). The arrangement was a makeshift one, arising out of the fact that Admiral Bloch had no patrol planes with which to make reconnaissance; so Admiral Kimmel had a makeshift arrangement to furnish patrol planes to the Base Defense Air Force for reconnaissance in case of an air attack in order to locate carriers, and to supplement the deficiencies in Army fighters (page 1144). Admiral Bloch probably could have gotten planes temporarily by a request to Admiral Kimmel, but could not order a protracted daily reconnaissance without Admiral Kimmel's authority because of Admiral Kimmel's decision of November 27th that he would not make any distant reconnaissance (pages 1144–45).

Admiral Bloch said that he had discussed with Admiral Kimmel the fact that he had no planes for distant reconnaissance and had asked Admiral Kimmel if he would supply the planes for such reconnaissance; Admiral Kimmel said that he could not commit himself to that duty except insofar as it might be possible on any occasion and that he, Admiral Kimmel, might have to go away from the locality and take his own forces with him, and that the District should really have its own forces. It was Admiral Bloch's very definite understanding that in the absence of any planes of his own, any missions of reconnaissance to be performed would have to be performed by the Fleet planes and that Admiral Kimmel reserved to himself or to his echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for overseas work. Actually, he said, Admiral Bellinger was the officer who, as Commander of the Patrol Squadrons of the Fleet and as Commander of the Base Defense Air Force, did this. It was obvious that the Commandant of the District could not use patrol planes without the permission of the Fleet because the patrol planes were employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the Fleet, there was no confusion of thought as to this, and it was well understood that Admiral Kimmel actually would be the officer, or somebody delegated by him would be the officer to designate what reconnaissance was to be made. (p. 9)

Admiral Bloch said that on the occasions when he had asked Admiral Kimmel for patrol planes that Admiral Kimmel said that he would do what he could but could not make any commitments because in the event of hostilities parts of the Fleet would have to leave Pearl Harbor. But Admiral Bloch recalled no statement by Admiral Kimmel to the effect that he could not take any particular security measures because of his commitments for offensive movements. (p. 23–4)

Admiral Bellinger stated that CincPac made the final approval for naval aircraft operation. CincPac or ComFOURTEEN could vitalize Naval Base Defense Air Force. ComFOURTEEN worked under CincPac. Naval Base Defense Air Force was not composed of all aircraft, but of aircrqft reported available (page 665). Admiral Bellinger said that he would have looked to ComFOURTEEN or CincPac to direct reconnaissance (page 683).

Admiral Bellinger said that in the absence of definite information as to the probability of an attack, it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel to order long-range reconnaissance. (p. 125)

Captain Ramsey said that Admiral Bellinger was not a naval base defense officer insofar as planes were concerned, except in a drill or emergency, and he did not control fighting planes, radar, or anti-aircraft guns (page 593).

Captain Ramsey said that during the period November 27th to December 7th, there were approximately 83 Army and Navy planes available for patrol. Twelve of these were B–17's; the Army only reported six available to Navy Base Defense. The Navy patrol planes were either in Task Force Nine or associated with other task forces (page 599). All were operating on schedules approved by CincPac (page 600).

Admiral Bellinger, he said, had nothing to do with the daily employment schedules of planes and did not have authority to order them to discontinue training and institute long range reconnaissance on his own authority in absence of an immediate emergency (page 600).

Admiral Pye stated that it was not his job to advise as to patrols (page 439).

Colonel Phillips testified that distant reconnaissance was discussed but was not undertaken. The Navy, he said, was responsible for such reconnaissance (page 483).

C. READINESS OF AIRCRAFT AND DRILLS

Admiral Bloch said that in addtion to the 250 fighters that the Army had of their own, the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters ashore and available to the Army. Each morning at 8 o'clock, Admiral Bellinger would give the Army a list of the planes which were available to the Army and the Army was supposed to send to him at the same time a list of the Army bombers that were available to the Navy. (p. 10)

Admiral Bloch said that in the beginning they had an air raid and black-out drill once a week, and later on they could not have it that often. The Army did not always come in on the drills. There were some inteferences because the time that Admiral Bloch would choose for the drill was not always agreeable to the other forces. It interfered with the work of the

force commanders at sea and some of them complained. It was then decided, at about the time that 2CL was issued, to set the date two or three months ahead so that everyone would know that drills were going to happen on that date. (p. 10)

According to Admiral Bellinger, the condition of the planes as to readiness between November 27th and December 7th was the "normal" condition B–5 (50% on four hours notice) which was the normal condition of readiness (page 669); the Army was in Condition E–5 (in routine operation and could be made ready in four hours).

Captain Ramsey said that during the period prior to December 7, drills were held under the plans developed for the Naval Base Defense Air Force and defects were noted and corrected (page 593).

Colonel Phillips could not remember whether any reconnaissance drills were held by the Army and Navy from October 15th to December 7th (page 488).

Admiral Kimmel stated that air-raid drills had been held weekly, and later bi-weekly, for several months prior to December 7th (page 296).

D. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE

Admiral Kimmel stated (page 299) that he ordered one patrol squadron to Wake, and that the patrol squadron at Midway be replaced by a squadron from Pearl Harbor, and that the squadrons were to conduct reconnaissance en route. Daily searches were made by the squadron at Midway on the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th of December, and were to be made daily until further notice.

The ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake on November 28th, and landed planes at Wake on December 3rd. The ENTERPRISE conducted daily reconnaissance flights. The patrol squadron at Wake was withdrawn and conducted a reconnaissance sweep from Mdiway to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Halsey said that there was a plan which came out daily prior to December 7 showing the reconnaissance for that day. He recalled that the Fleet operating areas were searched daily and he thought that prior to December 7 there regular searches in certain sectors believed to be most dangerous. (p. 304)

The LEXINGTON was sent to Midway with a VMF squadron on December 5th and conducted reconnaissance en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway when war broke out.

Daily reconnaissance of operating areas was conducted with PBY planes based at Pearl Harbor. Two submarines were operating at Wake and two at Midway on patrol.

Admiral Delaney stated that all reconnaissance was conducted in conneciion with training flights (page 499).

Admiral Bellinger said that from 1 to 4 December 1941 scouting flights were conducted daily, covering an approximate 90 degree sector, to a distance of 300 miles, by one squadron per day for the sector. He emphasized that these flights were flown as part of Patrol Wing Tactical Exercises only; they were training flights and not directed fleet reconnaissance. He was unable to recall the sectors utilized (p. 494).

The operating areas were under constant patrol. No additional security measures were invoked upon receipt of Exhibit 17 (War Warning), primarily because of lack of sufficient planes and pilots, and for getting planes in operating condition so far as guns and bullet-proof tanks were concerned (page 499).

E. EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN:

Vice Admiral Bellinger said that although aircraft were lacking to enable a 360 degree search from Oahu, a partial aerial reconnaissance, covering certain selected sectors, was a possible and feasible operation (p. 477).

Any regular reconnaissance must, Admiral Bellinger said, have been adopted at the exense of the expansion training program then in effect. Had he received clear warning to search for an enemy force, all his planes would, of course, have been utilized, but no thorough 360 degree search was possible with the equipment at his disposal (p. 508–509).

If a limited search had been planned, it would have been of the northern approaches to Oahu, since these were considered the most dangerous. But no limited search was contemplated, according to Admiral Bellinger, who recalled no dis-

cussion of aerial reconnaissance with Admiral Kimmel in the days up to 7 December (p. 506–508).

Admiral Stark testified that the Navy did not have sufficient patrol planes and distribution was made of what he had. He was constantly trying to get more. Other obligations of the Navy under JAAN–35 generally were taken care of (pages 34–37). There were not sufficient forces for coastal work in Hawaii; forces for this purpose had to be drawn from the Pacific Fleet (page 37). Hawaii was, and Oahu was, on December 7th, in category "D", "subject to major attack," and under the agreement a stronger offshore patrol was required than under "C", and "long range air reconnaissance will be provided and plans made for use of GHQ air force." He was uncertain what "GHQ" air force meant, but believed it to be a mobile force subject to direct orders from the War Department, to be used to augment a local force (page 38). Admiral Stark also testified that the trip of the carrier to Wake did not impair CincPac's ability to carry out reconnaissance (page 803).

General Marshall stated that the status of "GHQ Air Force" mentioned in "Joint Action Army-Navy, 1935" as to long range reconnaissance planes was that there were no planes in that Air Force available for transfer to Hawaii in case of emergency. It was the air force in the continental United States, he said, and was being made available in pieces for overseas use all the time (page 859).

Admiral Kimmel testified that under the joint plan, the Army was to operate all pursuits and the Navy all bombers and patrol planes and that there were daily reports as to the availability of planes (page 296). He said that long range reconnaissance to be effective should cover a radius of 800 miles (page 304) and that it would take 84 patrol planes for one flight of 360° and two and a half to three times that number for continuous daily search. All sectors around Oahu are ones from which an attack could be expected, even though he had testified before the Robert's Commission that he thought North the most probable sector (page 305). If restricted, he would search the western 180° sector first (page 305).

He further stated that his firm conviction was that long range reconnaissance over a period of time would have put his planes out of commission. Thirty days of long range reconnaissance would have reduced his planes by 25%. Incidentally, if he had sent the planes out, and when he did so, he would have armed them, and did arm them (page 329).

Admiral Bellinger made reference to a report of a Joint Army and Navy Board, dated October 31, 1941, signed by Admiral Bellinger and his Army opposite; paragraph 4 indicated that as pertained to Army aviation, the problem confronting the Board, as stated by the Army, was that the Army's mission was to defend the naval base against all attacks by an enemy; that the Hawaiian Air Force was to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment, aviation; and to detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation (page 663). This report pointed out that 170 B–17's and two groups of 163 pursuit planes each would be assigned to fulfill that mission. There would be needed 84 naval patrol planes and 48 VSO planes to be directly under ComFOURTEEN, and to supplement or to replace the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings One and Two which might be ordered to advance bases on outlying islands.

He stated that both the Army and the Navy were in the process of receiving replacement of obsolescent planes (page 663), and there were the usual shakedown and maintenance problems. There was an absence of spare parts for PBY–5 planes, and the installation of leak-proof gasoline tanks was in progress. Also there was difficulty with cracking of engine nose sections and installation of modified sections was in progress (page 663).

The major effort of Patrol Wings One and Two, he said, was training in preparation for war (page 663). The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force on a functioning basis would have necessitated substantial cessation of training (page 664). Continued operation of all planes for scouting would have soon reduced their material readiness and fatigued the crews. Therefore, as stated in their estimate of the situation, advance intelligence of a possible attack within narrow limits was a prerequisite for starting long distance patrol (page 664).

Admiral Bellinger said that fifty planes per day would be required to cover 360° for 700 miles (page 672). Counting eight available Army bombers and about 54 Navy planes, there were 62 planes available for patrol. These Navy planes were in PatWing Two and PatWing One, which also included a squadron at Midway and a squadron which returned to Pearl Harbor on December 5th and needed maintenance work (page 676). There was scarcely more than one crew

per plane. Continuous daily patrol could be flown only by dividing combat crews into three groups, which means twenty planes daily which could cover 144°. This would be for an undetermined number of days, but would not be permanent. Spare parts were critically short (page 673). The 54 Navy planes were PBY–5's sent to replace obsolescent planes and had arrived, one squadron of 12, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 6, Oct. 28th; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd; one squadron of 12, Nov. 23rd. They were new and there were shakedown difficulties (page 673) and absence of spare parts. They had received some earlier vintage PBY–5's and had had trouble with cracking of engine nose sections. The practical range of PBY–5 was radius of 700 miles, of PBY–3's 600 miles (page 670).

Exhibit 59 (letter from CincPac to CNO of January 7, 1942. enclosing Bellinger's letter) contains data on planes needed for 360° patrol to 700 miles (page 675).

He commanded PatWing Two and had control of PatWing One (page 677). Task Force Nine included everything he had, so it included these planes. The general policy or plan as to employment schedules was set out by CincPac. Other than planes being overhauled and repaired, the balance of those planes were occupied each day in carrying out the routine schedule of operations (page 677), which schedules were matters between plane commanders and CincPac through regular channel of command.

All-out reconnaissance after November 27th would have completely disrupted training, he (Bellinger) said (page 679), and if all training had been stopped and a daily patrol commenced on October 17th, it would have affected the efficiency of the air force on December 7th; many planes would not have been in flight condition (page 680).

Admiral Bellinger testified that after October 28th, while there were 107 VP assigned to all units of Aircraft Scouting Force, only eighty-one were available Of these, fifty-four had just arrived and were the PPY–5 type, with limited available spare parts. The number of plane crews did not quite equal the number of planes available. If one could consider eighty-one planes available, and assuming that there would have been none lost because of breakdowns requiring spare parts, it would have been practicable to use one-third, about twenty-seven planes, for daily patrol. Each plane could cover a sector of eight degrees with a radius of 700 miles, totalling approximately 216 degrees daily. This, however, would have been the absolute maximum because of the lack of sufficient crews and spare parts. 144 degrees could have been covered daily based on the use of eighteen planes daily of the fifty-four new PPY–5's. Actually, on 7 December 1941 there were in all only sixty-one planes available at Oahu, one squadron of which had just returned from Midway and Wake and required overhaul. This left forty-nine planes actually available, one-third of which would have been able to cover 128 degrees (pages 480–483, 485–487, 502–504).

Admiral Bellinger further testified that if he had received a directive from Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941, to conduct 360 degrees reconnaissance with the available Navy planes, it would have been possible to maintain such reconnaissance for not more than four or five days. His estimate of the duration of the daily 128-degree search was that it could have been flown until the failure of planes and the lack of spare parts reduced the planes to such an extent that further reconnaissance was impossible. It appears that such reconnaissance could have been carried on for an indefinite period and Admiral Bellinger's "vague" estimate was that it could have been carried on for several weeks (pages 504–505).

Admiral Bellinger testified that he considered the northern sectors as the most dangerous sectors primarily because of the prevailing winds which would facilitate carrier-based plane operations in that sector. He stated that had the normal plan been carried out after the attack, on December 7th patrol planes would have searched the northern sector, and that some few planes did search that sector. But there had been searches made to the south because of information received from CincPac to the effect that a radio bearing indicated that the attacking force was to the south. (p. 506–07).

Admiral Bellinger said that when he arrived in Hawaii on October 30, 1940, he found they were operating on a shoestring (page 667), and he tried to point out to the Navy Department, via CincPac and Commander Scouting Force, the importance of remedying the existing deficiencies, but the emphasis seemed not to be on the Pacific. He was not satisfied with the supply of planes and the development of plane facilities in Hawaii up to December 1941, though there had been considerable improvement over the time he first reported (page 674) in 1940

Admiral Bellinger discussed the main effort during several months preceding the attack which consisted of training, maintenance difficulties, etc. (p. 116)

Admiral Bellinger said that prior to December 7, they were short of the allocated number of crews for patrol planes and the main training was expansion training so as to increase the number of crews. (p. 117)

Admiral Bellinger discussed the reasons why a 360° circumference could not have been maintained. He said that there was no hard and fixed decision as to the direction in which an attack might be launched although the wind direction indicated that the northern sector might be more desirable. The location of bases from which such an attack might come were in the southwesterly direction. (p. 118) Admiral Bellinger said that the 300 miles estimated as an enemy launching radius was a high estimate but had been selected as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.

Captain Ramsey stated that he believed a patrol of 800 miles was necessary for distant reconnaissance. One squadron of PBY–3 planes attached to PatWings One and Two could only fly a radius of 700 miles. Around November 27th it was decided to reenforce Wake with Marine fighter squadron, and one of the patrol squadrons, VP–21, which had been at Midway since October was transferred to Wake with orders to scout and cover the advance of Admiral Halsey's task force. A second patrol squadron was sent out from Pearl Harbor to Midway to scout and similarly cover Admiral Halsey's advance and retirement. VP–22 left Wake on December 3rd or 4th and arrived at Pearl Harbor on December 5th, which left just the one squadron, VP–21, at Midway (page 583). That squadron was of old, obsolete planes, PBY–3's, which were due for overhaul and to be replaced with PBY–5's.

With nine planes undergoing repair or out of commission for other reasons, they had 12 naval planes at Midway and about 60 at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe which could have been used for reconnaissance to the 700 mile point (page 583). There were also six Army B–17's which were available and which could go beyond 300 miles; they could go to 800 miles.

He, Capt. Ramsey, was asked whether, with these planes available from November 27th to December 7th, he could have complied with a directive to conduct long range reconnaissance through 360° (page 583). He stated: No. A single plane going to 700 miles could cover a sector of only 8°; only 50% of the 66 planes could be used continuously and therefore only 264° could be covered daily (page 583); 360° could be covered only one, or possibly two, days in an emergency but could not be maintained. Three weeks of intensive daily searches would have seen about a 75% reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit, placing planes out of commission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other going. The pilots could have kept going about six weeks but then would need a protracted rest (page 584). Daily long range reconnaissance could have been maintained indefinitely by using 30 planes each day until the exhaustion period was reached, provided they were permitted by higher authority to operate that many for search alone, because that would have left them entirely without a striking group except as remaining 36 were available (page 583). Without exhausting planes or personnel, and assuming the supply of critical parts, they could have safely and indefinitely operated a daily reconnaissance to 700 miles with 18 planes and could have covered 144° (pages 584–5).

He further stated that a 700 mile radius of search with 18 planes was based upon a 25-mile visibility. Such visibility did not ordinarily prevail in the Hawaiian Area for a distance of 700 miles; it was either very good or so bad that scouting was impracticable (page 590). Except in a case of a wide-spread weather front, a patrol to 700 miles in a 144° sector had a good chance of detecting any large number of vessels on any given day (page 590).

For the PBY–5's, which in the case of several squadrons had during October and November just replaced the PBY–1, 2, and 3 planes, there were substantially no spare parts. There was the usual shakedown difficulty with a new type plane; engine sections cracked and replacement program in effect; material for installing armor and leak-proof tanks in the PBY–5's just being received, and first planes were finished December 7th (page 591).

He, Capt. Ramsey, said that once at Pearl Harbor he saw forty PBY–5's going through to Australia, New Zealand, or Dutch East Indies. This was at a time when such planes were needed at Pearl Harbor (page 602).

He agreed with the Roberts' Report to the extent that the means for distant reconnaissance at their disposal would have provided a certain degree of security, but were not adequate for absolute security (page 595).

He said that there had been discussions of the most probable sector for an enemy attack and the northwest sector was considered the most likely line of approach (page 597). In drills for readiness the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was ordered to take up the sector from 315° to 00°, and for any single day he would have sent the planes to cover this sector. On a continental control, the sector would have to be varied, as if a single sector were flown every day the enemy would learn of this and easily avoid it (page 597).

Admiral Davis said that the entire 360° circumference was not of equal importance; that a considerable arc to the north and west and another arc to the south and west were the most important. He estimated that if there had been a coverage of 180° so divided established after receipt of the dispatch of November 27, the chances would have been fairly good, perhaps two out of three that the patrol would have intercepted the Japanese carriers; based on knowledge since acquired, he would be inclined to put the chances as no better than one out of two. The chances, he said, have always been good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. However, he felt that the Japanese had launched their attack at Pearl Harbor from a long distance in order to avoid detection and therefore, that the chances of sighting the Japanese by a previous day's search were less than one out of two.

Admiral Davis said that it was the Commander-in-Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue as long as possible with training and other Fleet improvements and that going into a defensive status would interfere with this work. Concerning the possibility of attack and precautions to be taken, Admiral Davis indicated that he only occasionally saw or heard of warnings given to the Commander in Chief; that he had stated that comprehensive air searchs were practicable and would very definitely interfere with progress in general in aviation training in the Fleet; he naturally expressed the opinion that a surprise air attack was possible and could only be prevented by the most extensive searches but he did not realize to what a high degree of proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. He is sure that Naval Intelligence did its best but is convinced that information on the subject was lacking.

Admiral Davis said that he did not believe that the Commander in Chief regarded the damage possibility that might result from a Japanese air raid as very great; that it was apparent that he felt that training and improvements of our own Fleet still had priority, particularly because he believed that there would not be at that time any overt action. Precautions to a certain degree had been taken. As December 7 approached, he was concerned about the general situation with respect to the outlying islands and stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection there. (p. 98–99)

Admiral Davis said that although there were not enough planes and pilots to have established and maintained a long-range 360° search indefinitely, there were enough to have made searches using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors and by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft. It could have been undertaken had it been considered essential but unless reinforcements arrived it could not have been maintained.

Admiral McMorris said that, in general, it was a Navy responsibility to obtain early information of the approach of any possible enemy and that forces available for such detection were in general the Fleet patrol planes of PatWingTwo and that the extent of any search that they might carry on was determined by the Commander in Chief. It was as a practical matter, impossible to maintain an effective patrol for anything but a brief period. (p. 240)

Admiral McMorris said that it was not contemplated to use ships for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii. (p. 240)

Admiral McMorris said that he thought that as of the time in question, the provisions made for obtaining early information of the approach of an enemy were the best that could reasonably be made consistent with the training and other demands on the part of the Fleet, although from hindsight the answer would be otherwise. (p. 241)

Admiral Calhoun said that after the warning of November 27th, CincPac ordered air patrol to the limit of endurance of planes and pilots (page 941). Admiral Smith testified that patrols were flown over operating areas, but there were not sufficient planes for a 360° search (page 538).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Bellinger maintained an air patrol of the operating areas only because he had insufficient planes for a more extensive patrol; however Admiral Bellinger based his position entirely on the shortages of planes and not on personnel fatigue. (p. 43)

Admiral Smith said that if CincPac had interpreted Exhibit 17 (War Warning) to mean an attack on Pearl Harbor, he could have put out a search with available aircraft, including Army and carrier-based planes, moved the Fleet westward, and advanced carriers to intercept the Japanese (page 557). Without Fleet movement, he could have searched, with the available planes, a radius of perhaps 600 miles, but not through 360° (pages 557–8). The destroyers were required to protect heavy ships in case of the expected submarine attack and could not be used for patrol.

Exhibit 59, a letter by Admiral Nimitz, dated January 7, 1942, was an urgent request for more patrol planes so as to conduct an effective daily search to about 800 miles, which would require about fifty planes daily—there being at the time of this letter a total of 109 (Army and Navy) long range planes available. It was said that this was inadequate for search, a striking force and special missions; a minimum of three times the number needed for one day was necessary. He described the extent of the search being made: 25 patrol planes and 12 B–17's were used daily for a 700-mile search, covering 290°; and relatively ineffectual planes, such as available VSO, VJ, and B–18's were used to cover the remaining sectors to about 200–300 miles. To this were annexed supporting and detailed memoranda, including a letter by Admiral Bellinger, dated December 30, 1941.

Until August, 1941, Captain George Vanduers was an assistant to Admiral Bellinger particularly in connection with arrangements for joint Army-Navy air command. (p. 290). He prepared the estimate of the situation dated March 31, 1941, which indicated that a surprise carrier raid appeared to be the most probable course of action for the enemy. (p. 290). Captain Vanduers stated that, in his opinion, search with 80 planes over a two-week period of the most probable sectors would have been about 40% effective.

Admiral Fitch, who preceded Admiral Bellinger and was Commander of Patrol Wing Two from June, 1940, until October, 1940, said that during the time when he was in command of Patrol Wing Two it was recognized that they had insufficient planes and efforts were made to increase the effectiveness of those they did have, to develop Western island bases and to increase the number of planes. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a routine from Pearl Harbor and varied as to the amount of searches conducted. (p. 228–9). Admiral Fitch said that assuming 80 planes, long range, available and employed over a two-week period and searching only the most probable sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be expected reasonably to be 50% effective in detecting an enemy attack. (p. 289)

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and it had met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by the means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack. The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector.

XXIII. Action Taken by General Short

General Short testified that Alert No. 1 against sabotage was put in effect. General Short considered sabotage as the main danger since the information received was that the Japanese would move Southward (page 239). He said that in a conference, in response to Admiral Kimmel's question, Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, had said there was no danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and that there was no disagreement. Also, he knew that Admiral Kimmel did not think an air attack likely or he would have moved the ships out. The dispatch which General Short had received put emphasis on not alarming the civilian population and there had been no indication as to what form hostilities might take. He pointed out that the Army sent in B–24's on photo mission

unarmed, and also on December 6th sent out twelve B–17's not in combat condition (page 240).

He said that although he had had conferences with Admiral Kimmel during this period, no request was made of him for planes for long distance reconnaissance (page 249).

He did not recall having seen the dispatch of November 24th, but did see the dispatch of November 28th, which had repeated the Army dispatch to him.

Captain Curts discussed the general procedure for delivering copies of Navy messages to the Army and the procedure handled in connection with the November 27 dispatch as follows:

"Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a paraphrase to the addressee's communication office, and have them ask the Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase and then to sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same. This particular dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dispatch was delivered to Admiral Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer with all copies thereof, and, upon my telling him that I had to deliver it to the Army, he informed me that he would take care of it by sending his Intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried to get him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton as to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it to the Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle, the Chief of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Shorts G–2 officer for delivery to General Short, and later Layton informed me that this officer, this G–2 officer, told him that he had given the dispatch to General Short personally in his bedroom that night. I was quite concerned, personally, about upsetting the system of receipts, but, in my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was delivered to both the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short, although I held no receipt." (p. 112)

In response to the direction contained in the Army dispatch, General Short advised the War Department of the action taken by him. The War Department did not reply. He received another telegram on November 28th which confirmed him in his belief that sabotage was considered the main danger (page 244). He replied on that day telling what he had done (page 245). He did not report on long range reconnaissance for that was the Navy's responsibility (page 246). He received no further information from the War Department and did not change his alert (page 243).

General Marshall said that after the Army dispatch of November 27th, no further warnings were sent by the Chief of Staff to General Short until December 7th (page 869). Two other messages warning against sabotage were sent by other parts of the War Department on November 28th, but General Marshall was not familiar with these until after December 7th (page 869).

General Marshall stated, concerning the dispatch in which General Short informed the War Department of the measures taken pursuant to the warning of November 27th, that so far as they could determine the reply from the Philippines and the reply from Hawaii came in together and were stapled together. General Marshall initialed the one from the Philippines, which was on top, but not the one from Hawaii (pages 880–1). He had no recollection one way or the other as to whether he had seen the one from Hawaii. He was away from November 26th–28th (page 880), and at other times up to December 7th, and had no recollection whether or not he knew of the precautions which General Short had taken (page 881).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall having been advised of General Short's reply until after December 7th (pages 151, 802).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of alert the Army had effective at this time, but he knew that they had some alert in effect (page 326).

XXIV. Japanese Espionage and United States Intelligence at Pearl Harbor—Japanese Military and Fleet Movements

A. JAPANESE ESPIONAGE

Admiral Bloch said that he had been advised by the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consulate who were spread over Oahu and who were not registered agents of the

Japanese Government. The Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict these men of being unregistered agents. Admiral Bloch wrote a ltter to the Chief of Naval Operations on this matter dated November 10, 1941, file S–A8–5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classified Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC) A8–5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both of the above-mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The Army would not agree to the indictment of these Japanese and the matter was referred to Washington where the War and Navy Departments agreed that they would not be brought to trial. (p. 15)

Captain Murphy said that there was a general impression that the Japanese could know anything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet. (p. 200)

Admiral Brown said that he thought it quite probable that the Japanese had a copy of the employment schedule setting forth the Fleet Movements. (p. 145)

Captain Mayfield pointed out that the topography of Pearl Harbor permitted easy observation of the ships there. Captain Mayfield was of the belief that there were about 350 Japanese societies which were active. He said that there were also 250 consular agents which he believed were used by the Japanese consulate for the purpose of getting information. (p. 311)

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of the domestic branch of ONI and the activities of the Counter-Espionage Section and conference with the F. B. I. and the Army set-up. (p. 284) Admiral Wilkinson also discussed the Navy's desire to have the Department of Justice prosecute various Japanese in Hawaii for being non-registered agents of a foreign government and said that the Commanding General had urged that prosecution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial relations between the Japanese and the Americans.

Captain Mayfield said that he had participated in conferences at Hawaii concerning the possible prosecution of the Japanese consular agents but that the Army had indicated that they did not want these men prosecuted. (p. 311–312)

Concerning the use of Japanese fishing boats and Intelligence work, Captain Mayfield said there never was definite proof of espionage in all of these boats but he believed that they were used for that purpose. (p. 312) Captain Mayfield said that he had no exact information indicating that amateur radio transmitters were used for Intelligence work or regular commercial braodcasts from Hawaii. (p. 312)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the Japanese consular agents of which there were about 240 and the fact that one of them in June 1940 had been proved to have been engaged in espionage. He discussed the correspondence relating to the prosecution of these consular agents which was resisted by General Short.

Lt. Stephenson discussed the sources of Japanese espionage information and the limitations on counter Intelligence due to limited personnel in ONI and to other reasons. (p. 326)

Lt. Stephenson discussed the measures taken to prevent the acquisition of information by visiting Japanese merchant crewmen, etc. (p. 327)

Lt. Stephenson discussed at some length the various sources of information open to Japanese and the inability of the Intelligence Section to prevent the acquisition and transmission of such information.

Lt. Stephenson referred to reports which he had written concerning the espionage problem in Hawaii dated February 9 and February 14, 1942 in the Kuehn case and a report dated April 20, 1943 in the Counter-Intelligence file of ONI. He said that it was known on the basis of information after the war that the consulate head used commercial communication facilities for the transmitting of vital Intelligence from and after December 3. (p. 331)

Lt. Stephenson said that no evidence had ever been found establishing that Japanese sampans had been used for espionage purposes but it was recognized that they were so used. (p. 332)

Concerning Japanese espionage, Admiral Smith said:

"I remember an incident a few months before the war where an American came from San Francisco; he had communicated with the Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of the Japanese and was sent

out by the Japanese by plane. The Intelligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who flew back to the West Coast, and, as the result of all this, a Japanese Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe of Charles Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Department intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was returned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Embassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick, who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made to deport one of these priests, but it was found nothing could be done because of an old agreement between the United States and Japan, based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man in the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake other activities, nothing could be done about it. I know that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when Admiral Richardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after and engaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Admiral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part of Japanese communications between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii, trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were Japanese agents working, but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet Intelligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them."

Captain McCollum said that it had been suspected for some time prior to December 7, 1941, that Japanese submarines were keeping our fleet based in Pearl Harbor under observation. He said that at various times during the last 6 months of 1941 U. S. destroyers had reported contacts with enemy subs in and around the Hawaiian group: Several of these contacts were considered well authenticated. Although most of the contacts were not in the immediate vicinity of Honolulu, he believed that one had been made in Molokai Channel—the approach to the drill grounds of the fleet. In July or August, 1941, it had actually been suggested that a search be made of a certain point to the north of Midway, where it was believed that a Jap provision ship and tanker might be rendezvousing with some of the Japanese reconnaissance subs (p. 23–24).

Vice Admiral Smith stated that there had been many reported submarine contacts prior to 7 December 1941 in the general vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but that in most cases these contacts had not been considered authentic. He did not recall any submarine contacts during the period October–December, 1941 (p. 340).

Captain John B. Earle, USN, in December, 1941, Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District, testified that in the several months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack there were ten to fifteen reports of submarines sighted around Pearl Harbor, most of the reports coming from sampans, occasionally from Army lookout posts, and now and then from planes (p. 451). Captain Earle recalled few of the details of these reports; he remembered none in the months of October and November, 1941, or in December prior to the 6th of that month (p. 451).

A search of the files of CinCPac by Admiral Hewitt's investigation resulted in locating dispatches that refer to three suspicious contacts during the five weeks preceding Pearl Harbor:

(1) On 3 November 1941 an oil slick area in latitude 20–10, longitude 157–41 was observed by a patrol plane and crossed by Task Force One. An air search of a fifteen mile area by the patrol plane, a sound search of an unspecified area by the USS WORDEN and an investigation by the USS DALE produced negative results (Exhibit 48; dispatches 031920, 032035, 032133, 032300, 040042).

(2) On 28 November 1941, after the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had issued an order requiring extreme vigilance against possible hostile submarines, restricting submerged submarine operations to certain areas, and providing that all submarine contacts in other areas suspected to be hostile were to be depth bombed, the USS HELENA reported that a radar operator, without knowledge of the CinCPac alert, was positive that a submarine was in a

restricted area (Exhibit 48; dispatch 280835). A search of part of the area by a task group of three destroyers was pursued from 1050 to 1845 on the 28th but produced no contacts (Exhibit 48; dispatches 281050, 281133, 281704, 281845).

(3) During the night of 2 December 1941, the USS GAMBLE reported a clear metallic echo in latitude 20–30, longitude 158–23, which was lost in a change of range; it was evaluated as probably not indicating the presence of a submarine (Exhibit 48; dispatch 022336). An investigation, ordered to be made by DesRon 4 (Exhibit 48; dispatch 030040), apparently was negative.

Lieutenant Woodrum said that over a period of years considerable information had been gathered by the Naval Intelligence Service concerning Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. He said, "There are voluminous reports available concerning the visits of Japanese tankers, Japanese training ships, Japanese training squadrons to the Island of Oahu and to other islands in the Hawaiian group. It is well known that officers attached to these groups made 'sightseeing trips' of the islands, including such vantage points as Aiea Heights." (P. 385.)

Admiral Pye stated that the Japanese had practically unlimited means of obtaining and transmitting information concerning United States ships at Oahu (page 429). Charts recovered after the attack, he said, indicated that the Japanese had planned to attack certain berths, expecting the ships to be in the position in which they had been berthed three weeks earlier (page 430).

Admiral DeLany stated that the enemy had unlimited opportunity for observation and for getting information out of Pearl Harbor. The operating schedule for the Fleet provided a varying length of time for ships to be in port and at sea (page 499). But, he had no specific information that the Japanese were endeavoring to keep currently informed of the location and movements of Units of the Fleet immediately preceding December 7, 1941 (page 500).

Commander Rochefort said that Japanese opportunities for espionage and for transmission of information were ample (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, there were no restrictions on the Japanese getting information out of Hawaii, but the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables (pages 909–910).

B. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE AT PEARL HARBOR

Captain Rochefort, officer-in-charge of the communications intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, siad that his immediate superior was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. In his relations with the District Intelligence Officer, he freely exchanged information and views, except for "ultra" information. The relationship with the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to "exchange all information available and to endeavor to obtain information as desired by him." A copy of the communication intelligence summary was sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer every morning. With regard to the FBI, Captain Rochefort met the agent-in-charge frequently and discussed the general situation, but did not discuss ultra matters. In turn, the FBI agent kept Captain Rochefort informed of what he was doing, "possibly with some limitation." Captain Rochefort's relationship with the Army was similar to that with the FBI. He said that between 27 November and 7 December 1941 he had several talks and exchanged opinions with Colonel Fielder, G–2 to General Short. However, he gave the Army no ultra information. He said that his relationship with the Army was entirely on a personal basis—i. e., there was no official system set up for joint operations. Captain Rochefort's relations with the Federal Communications Commission were limited to technical matters, such as direction finding and the location of unauthorized stations (p. 44–46, 65).

Captain Rochefort said that during the latter part of 1941 the communication intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor was assigned the tasks of attacking and exploiting Jap personnel code, administrative code, and the code in use in the Marshalls area. It was also to conduct research on all Japanese naval systems, except the "five-numbered system." The Washington center was charged with general control of all three units and in addition worked on Jap diplomatic systems and such others as were directed (p. 44).

Admiral Hewitt's examination brought out information not previously developed regarding the intelligence sources and activities of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.

In this connection, Commander Fabian said that he had been attached in November and December, 1941, to the radio intelligence unit at Corregidor. This unit had a number of personnel detailed to the decryption of Japanese radio traffic and operated a direction finder, twenty-six radio receivers, and other equipment necessary to intercept enemy transmissions. Its general mission was to

study Japanese communications with a view to keeping track of the Jap fleet, and in this connection the unit was attempting to break the enemy naval system JN–25 (p. 68–69, 73). The unit also intercepted Jap diplomatic codes and of these was assigned the task of reading the machine cipher "purple," machine cipher "red" and the code J–19. However, the exploitation of these codes was primarily for the purpose of obtaining local information: all purple traffic intercepted and certain other traffic in the red and J–19 codes were sent to Washington for complete analysis. The latter messages were not sent to the Pearl Harbor unit, since this unit was not performing any cryptanalysis of the diplomatic codes (p. 70–72). Commander Fabian said that from breaking the "purple" dispatches during the period 27 November to 7 December they knew that American-Japanese negotiations in Washington were not proceeding satisfactorily and would probalby be broken off (p. 72).

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer on the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, during 1941, said that a copy of all Jap diplomatic messages decrypted by the Corregidor radio intelligence unit was furnished daily to the Army. The Army was not given copies of dispatches sent out by CinCAF to CinCPac or to Washington dealing with purely naval matters. Captain Mason said, however, that he conferred quite frequently with the head of intelligence in the Philippine Army Department and quite often provided estimates as to the locations of the Jap fleet. Speaking generally, Captain Mason said that he was in close contact with the Army most of the time and that information was freely exchanged. He said that the Army did not have a radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, although they did have an intercept station which merely copied Japanese Army and diplomatic traffic (p. 70–71).

Captain Safford, chief of the Communications Security Section, Office of Naval Communications, Navy Department, during 1941, said that the Corregidor radio intelligence unit had been intercepting messages in the Japanese "purple" code and other diplomatic systems for several years, up to and including 7 December 1941. Main interest of this unit was on the local Asiatic circuits for the information of CinCAF, but late in November, 1941, they were given the additional duty of covering the Berlin-Tokyo circuit. These latter intercepts were forwarded to Washington and weren't touched locally (p. 98–99).

With respect to the exchange of information among the Corregidor, Pearl Harbor and Washington radio intelligence units, Captain Safford made the following statement (p. 99):

"If Corregidor translated a message which they thought important, they would encipher the translation and forward it to Washington. Everything they intercepted on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit was enciphered; that is, the intercept was enciphered and forwarded to Washington by radio. Corregidor also had liaison with the British unit at Singapore and anything of interest or importance received from Singapore was forwarded to Washington. In like manner, any translations of particular importance to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, were sent out from Washington. We also had a very free and continuous exchange of technical information between the two units, by which I mean the keys for the 'purple' machine and keys for another system which we called Jig–19, and any other information which would help either unit in its performance of duty.

"With regard to communications between the Navy Department and our unit at Pearl Harbor, there were comparatively few."

Captain Safford said further that there was a free exchange of intelligence information between the Corregidor and Pearl Harbor units "so far as it pertained to the projects they were assigned." However, since the dissemination of intelligence was considered a function of Naval Intelligence rather than Naval Communications, Captain Safford indicated that information regarding the Japanese fleet obtained by the Corregidor unit would not necessarily be passed to the Pearl Harbor unit. He said that such information would normally be passed to CinCAF or his Fleet Intelligence Officer, and further dissemination would be made by them (p. 100–101).

Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN, was District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, in December, 1941. The mission of his office comprised general intelligence matters in cooperation with other federal and local intelligence organizations, especially with respect to espionage and counter-espionage and any other intelligence functions as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations or the District Commandant. Lt. Col. Bicknell was the Army officer charged with local intelligence. The FBI official was Mr. Robert L. Shivers (p. 558).

Admiral Mayfield testified that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations prescribed complete cooperation between the District Intelligence Office and G–2 of the Army and the FBI. Admiral Mayfield stated that cooperation was full and whole-hearted, that all information possessed by his office was readily available to G–2 and the FBI, which were given copies of any material of interest (p. 559).

Admiral Mayfield stressed that despite free interchange of assistance between his office and the radio intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District, headed by Commander Rochefort, that unit was a separate organization and in no sense subordinate to the District Intelligence Office. Commander Rochefort's unit reported directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, in the opinion of Admiral Mayfield. As to the general nature of the work of Commander Rochefort's unit, Admiral Mayfield was unable to give definite information (p. 560).

Reports by Commander Rochefort's unit, concerning the location or movements of Japanese fleet units, were not routed to the District Intelligence Office, and Admiral Mayfield said he had no knowledge of them (p. 561).

Relations between the District Intelligence Office and the Fleet Intelligence Office were, according to Admiral Mayfield, cordial, close and cooperative. He was in "more or less constant" personal communication with Captain Layton (the Fleet Intelligence Officer), to whom he endeavored to furnish all information of interest (p. 560–561).

Admiral Mayfield recalled no conversations with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch, Captain Layton, or Commander Rochefort from November 27th to December 7, 1941, concerning the prospects of war between Japan and the United States. Admiral Mayfield said the only intelligence matters he discussed with Admiral Bloch and Captain Layton concerned counter-espionage measures. Admiral Mayfield added he was not advised of the receipt on November 27, 1941, of the so-called war warning (p. 574–575).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he neither saw, nor was aware of the receipt at Pearl Harbor of the so-called war warning of 27 November until after 7 December 1941. Admiral Bellinger added that not until after 7 December 1941 did he see or know of the CNO dispatch of 28 November stating that hostile action by the Japanese was possible. Nor, said Admiral Bellinger, did he see any of the daily communication intelligence summaries, 14 October to 5 December 1941, prepared by the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Captain Layton) for delivery to Admiral Kimmel (p. 498–499).

Admiral Bellinger did not remember having seen a memorandum of 1 December 1941 from Captain Layton to Admiral Kimmel on the subject of the location of the Japanese fleet (p. 499).

(1) *Sources and distribution:*

Admiral Kingman said that the details of administration of the investigative activities within the Fourteenth Naval District were left more to the direct control and supervision of the Commandant than was the case in those cases more closely connected with Washington. He recalled that the District Commandant was somewhat concerned about the investigative activities in the Fourteenth Naval District which were carried on by some of the inexperienced personnel on duty thereat, and thinks that this was mentioned in a personal letter from the Commandant to the Chief of Naval Operations which, however, the Examining Officer was unable subsequently to locate. (p. 336) Admiral Kingman could recall nothing relating to the activities of the so-called consular agents at Hawaii. (p. 336)

The facilities for obtaining intelligence of possible enemies were, according to Admiral Bloch, as follows: When Admiral Bloch arrived at Pearl Harbor, there were two units at Pearl Harbor composed of communicators and Intelligence people, Japanese language students. The information they secured by radio intelligence and such other information as they secured was transmitted to Cavite and to the Navy Department. That was Admiral Bloch's principal source of Japanese intelligence. They also received the intelligence that was collected at Cavite.

When Admiral Bloch arrived, he was dissatisfied with this organization and he organized it into one unit known as "Combat Intelligence," where they were under one hand. This unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors and all the other things they had, with one officer in charge. In the middle of July, 1941, this unit was placed in a secure place, one big room in the basement of the office building, with their own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direction finders. Admiral

Bloch always did his best to augment this force by getting more and better men. In addition to that unit, they had the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army Intelligence and the FBI and they also had such reports as were sent to them by the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. They kept in touch with the Commander-in-Chief as best they could and Admiral Bloch believed that they were getting everything that was pertinent although the Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that Admiral Bloch did not have. Admiral Bloch felt, however, that Admiral Kimmel conscientiously endeavored to give to him everything that Admiral Kimmel thought he should have. Admiral Bloch believed that the Navy Department had more knowledge about actual conditions than they did. (p. 12) All of the information received by the Combat Intelligence unit, he said, was always delivered to the Commander-in-Chief. (p. 13)

Admiral Smith said that they got very little Intelligence on Oahu except Fleet Intelligence which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on the war, but that they had radio intelligence and every time that one or more of the three Task Force Commanders were in port or the Type Commanders were in port, Admiral Kimmel would have them over and have the Intelligence Officer point out on his chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of the location of all units of the Japanese Fleet. Admiral Smith was present at all of such conferences. The War Plans Officer (then Captain now Rear Admiral McMorris), the Operations Officer then Captain now Rear Admiral De Lany), the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Comdr. Layton) and the Fleet Communications Officer, were always fully informed of all intelligence in this manner. (p. 33)

Captain Edwin T. Layton was Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, during 1941. He had studied in Japan and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translater. (p. 214)

The sources from which he obtained information concerning the Japanese Navy in 1941 were:

"The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various intelligence reports, estimates of fleet organizations position and Fleet Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl Harbor, and Washington, D. C.; also from Consular and State Department reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Consulate in Honolulu." (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he thought that our intelligence coverage was good, although always incomplete.

Captain Layton said that he felt that the State Department undoubtedly had information which was not supplied to the Commander in Chief and which would have been of value. (p. 215)

Captain Layton said that he intimately concerned himself with the results obtained by the Combat Intelligence Organizations. He said that the information obtained and made available to the Commander in Chief was principally from the unit at Cavite and the local unit in Pearl Harbor, that almost nothing came from Washington, and that he felt that the principal unit in Washington might have contributed more toward the intelligence picture. (p. 216)

Captain Layton said that he communicated the available intelligence concerning Japanese naval forces daily at about 8:15 in the morning, and if subsequent to that time important information was received, he would report it to Admiral Kimmel at the First opportunity. When he reported to Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions the War Plans Officer and senior Operations Officer were called in. When task force commanders would return to port, Admiral Kimmel would send for Layton and have him review the situation. (p. 216)

The discussions which he had with Admiral Kimmel were summarized generally as follows:

"The discussions were very general, generally starting with the Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other officers present, such as whether or not the

Japanese had radar, whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls the estimated air strength in the area the question as to whether sound contacts obtained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported presence of baby submarines—they were called 'submerged submarines'—off Molakai, were submarines or whether the report was true or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japanese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject of conversations and discussions." (p. 217)

Commander Rochefort had studied Japanese in Japan for three years from about September, 1929 until September, 1932, and qualified as a Japanese interpreter and translater. Commander Rochefort's source of information in addition to the work of his own Combat Intelligence Unit were the Washington headquarters, a unit similar to his attached to CincAF, and other government agencies such as the FBI, the Army and F. C. C. in Honolulu. The information furnished by these latter agencies, he said, was of no value prior to December 7, 1941. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort said that any message originating in one of the combat intelligence units was automatically sent to the other two units. (p. 208) Commander Rochefort reported the intelligence which came into his hands to Com-FOURTEEN personally and to the Commander-in-Chief, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Captain Mayfield said that the organization of the District Intelligence Office when he reported for duty consisted of about thirteen persons. He sought and obtained additional personnel but his opinion was that that organization did not reach a satisfactory degree of efficiency until some months after December 7. (p. 309) Captain Mayfield said that the cooperation between the FBI and the Army and Navy Intelligence at Hawaii was very good. (p. 309)

Captain Layton said that the Army's liaison with the Fleet was through Colonel Edward Railey and that he saw Colonel Railey almost every day. He did not receive from any Army source any information available. (p. 218)

In his statement at the end of his examination Lt. Stephenson said that there was a general feeling in the District Intelligence organization that Admiral Bloch was not sufficiently security conscious and not sufficiently mindful of the enemy espionage potential at Hawaii. This, however, he said could make him cite no casual connection between the Commandant's apparent attitude and the success of the Japanese attack.

Captain Earle said that he was generally familiar with the activities of the District Intelligence Office in the Fourteenth Naval District, and so far as he knew both he and Admiral Bloch were satisfied with the activities of that office. He could recall nothing of the results obtained by Commander Rochefort's unit. (p. 373-5)

Admiral McCormick remembered no instance where the War Plans Section received any intelligence derived from local sources, except one or two cases dealing with counter-espionage. (p. 70) Admiral McCormick said that he had no knowledge of any Japanese movements until they saw the dispatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo-China. He said that the War Plans Section, as a whole, was not furnished with daily or periodic reports by the Staff Intelligence or Fleet Intelligence. (p. 70)

Admiral Delany believed that the information furnished by Intelligence was the best that those sources could assemble but was aware that the sources were inadequate and believed that there was a general feeling that they were more or less operating in the dark not only from the information that they were able to collect in Pearl Harbor but also as to information furnished from other sources. This applied to information both as to the location of Japanese units and as to the probability of war. (p. 84)

Admiral Brown said that all senior officers received the Naval Intelligence bulletins. (p. 138)

Admiral Pye said that Admiral Kimmel in effect turned over to him the training program and in connection with that his consultations with Admiral Kimmel were frequent. Also, Admiral Kimmel customarily called in the

Intelligence Officer and had him explain the situation on the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known. (p. 148)

Concerning the intelligence available from the middle of October until the time of the attack, Admiral McMorris said that they felt that they would like to have known lots more than they did and that on the whole, they felt it was somewhat insufficient but did not see any probability of achieving improvement. (p. 241)

Admiral Kimmel testified that his Fleet Intelligence worked with ComFOURTEEN's Intelligence. He depended largely on units of the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence for information. The Intelligence units were satisfactory (page 280). Also he received intelligence from ComFOURTEEN, Navy Department, and forces afloat (page 280). Summaries of information were furnished him (page 281). The number of war plans officers were increased by him. Serving as such were McMorris, McCormick, Murphy, Colonel Pfeiffer, and a Lieutenant. All enemy intelligence went to war plans and estimates were drawn from day to day (page 281). Information was furnished to him, to his War Plans head, to his Chief of Staff, and to Captain DeLany (Operations). The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and he interexchanged intelligence (page 282). Prior to December 7th, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was informed of intelligence affecting Hawaii and other places where he had forces. He was not informed regarding plans for places distant from Hawaii (page 282). The Commanding General, Admiral Kimmel said, gave him all the information which he had (page 283).

Captain Layton said that, as Fleet Intelligence Officer, his main sources of information were from CNO and DONI, who forwarded reports from naval diplomatic sources, reports from observers, from the State Department, from the local intelligence officers, and liaison with the British secret intelligence, and reports from ComTWELVE, ComSIXTEEN, and ComTHIRTEEN (page 904). He was kept informed of FBI and Army Intelligence at the time (page 909). He passed information to CincPac by hand in its original form. If the information was a long report, he made a brief of it (page 904). He thought that local Army Intelligence was not getting the "highly secret" information from the Army; he informed them in general (page 908).

Admiral Bloch said that the intelligence unit of the Fourteenth Naval District was efficient, although not adequate in space and personnel, and kept him and CincPac informed (page 391). Intelligence was received from CincPac, the District Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence, and the FBI. He did not receive the intelligence bulletins from the Navy Department, his ONI probably did (page 392).

Commander Rochefort testified that he was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District from June through December, 1941 (page 471). Combat intelligence consisted of an interceptor unit, a direction finder unit, and a cryptographic or research group. Collaboration with the FBI, Army, and Federal Communications Commission was on a personal basis. They received, normally, reports from ONI at Washington, and the letters and dispatches in their own system, which were of a more technical nature. They would get all information of a technical nature from Washington, but all information available at ONI in Washington was not sent them as a matter of course (page 471). Only one or two bits of political or diplomatic information were sent to him (page 472). Military information would be sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer. Rochefort handled intelligence of Japanese ship movements. The information received was automatically passed to CNO. CincAsiatic, and to CincPac. Written summaries were sent to the Fleet Intelligence Officer (page 472).

The following information was contained in the ComFourteen Radio Intelligence Summaries and was made available to Admiral Kimmel (p. 193):

1. The November 27th Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary, delivered on November 28th, stated that in general traffic volume was a little below normal due to poor signals on certain frequencies and that the Tokyo-Takao circuit was unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic was heard, intercepted from carriers. Bako, Samo and Saigon were active as originators. The main Tokyo originator was the intelligence activity which sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The direction finder activity was very high. As to the Combined Fleet, it was said that there was still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff of the Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address; he had been fairly inactive as an originator. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, originated many messages to the Third

Fleet and other units. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated that there was nothing to indicate any movement. As to the Fourth Fleet Commander, it was said that he frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates, and also that there was no further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. The Commander Submarine Force, it was stated, was still in the Chichijima area. Concerning airforces in general, it was indicated that an air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU and that "Carriers are still located in home waters." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

2. The Com Fourteen radio intelligence summary of the 28th, delivered November 29th, stated generally that traffic volume was normal, communications to and from South China and between the Mandates and the Empire were heavy. No tactical traffic was seen. The suspected radio intelligence net was very active and was becoming more so. Much traffic was directed to the Tokyo direction finder command from various stations and this command also originated messages of high precedence to the major fleet commanders. It was said that "This activity is interpreted to indicate that the radio intelligence net is operating at full strength upon U. S. naval communications and IS GETTING RESULTS." As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that there was no indication of movement of any of its units. As to the Third Fleet, there was little activity from its units save for the Commander in Chief. The bulk of the Fourth Fleet was said to be still at Truk. The Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief, Second, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleets. There was little indication of submarine activity. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

3. The communication intelligence summary of the 29th of November, delivered the 30th, stated generally that traffic volume was above normal, and that the traffic to South China was still very high. A good share of the traffic was made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to major commanders, both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the major commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, Radio Yokusuka (near Tokyo) sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The direction finder net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. The Navy Minister originated his usual A1Nev, and the naval general staff addressed Commanders, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and the South China Unit. A unit which had been addressed as the 103rd air group originated one dispatch whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls and it was apparent that he had no navy call list. One address was "Eleventh Air Fleet." Since this had appeared before, it was evidence that the use of Kantai was intentional in making positively known the existence of an air fleet. Its composition was unknown. The dispatches indicated that various units were under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, including CarDiv 3, and the Third Fleet.

Associated with the Third Fleet were two battleships, but their assignment was not yet definite. Various messages were sent by the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, and he held extensive communication with the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Bako. The CinC Fourth Fleet was relatively inactive. He was still in the Truk area. There was some traffic for Commander Submarine Force, who was at Chichijima the previous day, and also some traffic from the Commander in Chief, China Fleet (Hew. Exhibit 22).

4. The communication intelligence summary for November 30th, delivered on December 1st, stated generally that traffic volume was less than for the past few days, and that the traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates. No reason could be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for the past few days had prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th was very small. The only tactical circuit heard was one with the carrier AKAGI and several MARU's As to the Combined Fleet and First Fleet, it was stated the Chiefs of Staff of those Fleets were in Kure. In the same message the Chief of Staff, Second Fleet, was not listed in any location. Other traffic indications were that he was at sea. The Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, sent one dispatch to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force, but also included the KONGO and HIYEI, which it was said placed them as members of his task force. (The HIYEI was actually en route to Pearl Harbor.) As to the Third Fleet, it was said, "No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief,

Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway." The Fourth Fleet was believed to be still in the Truk area. It was said that the continued association of Jaluit and Commander Submarine Force, plus the latter's known progress from the Empire to Chichijiam and Saipan made his destination obviously the Marshalls; that various facts indicated a submarine concentration in the Marshalls. "Every evidence points to a concentration, not only of the small Fourth Fleet submarines there, but also a good proprotion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force." It was also said that "the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed." This communication summary was initialled by Admiral Kimmel and Admiral McMorris, the War Plans Officer (Hew. Exhibit 22).

5. The communication intelligence summary for December 1st, delivered on December 2nd, stated generally that all service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicated an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appeared that the Japanese Navy was adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December, indicated than an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromise. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. It should be noted that the sentence in the above summary reading, "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale" was understood in red pencil commencing with the words "service calls." Captain Layton testified that to the best of his recollection this was underlined by Admiral Kimmel at the time.

The summary further stated, as to the First Fleet, "Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China"; Takao did not appear to play an important role in the traffic; consequently, the assumption was made that this fleet was passing up Takao. As to the Third Fleet, it was stated there was "nothing to report except that the same associations of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-China forces continued. As to Fourth Fleet, "No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area." As to Fifth Fleet, "Nothing to report." As to submarines, it was stated a large number of the Submarine Force was believed to be in the area eastward of Yokosuka—Chichijima and Saipan. As to Combined Air Force, it was stated, "No change." As to carriers, it was said, "No change." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

6. The communication intelligence summary delivered on December 3rd, covering the 2nd, stated generally that the most prominent factor in the traffic was the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it had appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. It was stated that ComSIXTEEN had reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area, and that Takao radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. The broadcast, it was said, was not uncovered at ComFOURTEEN and contrary to the location report, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. It was said that "Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units, has left Empire waters, but is either not close enough to Takao for good communications or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao." It was further stated, "The change of calls on December 1st has prevented this office from making definite statement as of this date of the units now in the southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai radio handled a considerable amount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area." Also it was pointed out generally that "There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo." As to the First Fleet, it was stated

that despite the lack of positive identifications, the First Fleet appeared relatively quiet and that "from inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal combined fleet staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routine indicates one combined fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets, and apparently in company while another combined fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets." As to the Second Fleet, it was stated, "No units have stood out prominently in the last two or three days. This is probably due to lack of new identifications, but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company." As to the Third Fleet, it said there was nothing to report. As to the Mandates, it was said that the association of submarine force and Fourth Fleet continued.

Concerning carriers, this summary stated, "Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

7. The communication intelligence summary of December 3rd, delivered on the 4th, under the heading "General," stated that traffic volume was normal with receiving conditions good. The present state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slowed up identification of even these units. Very few units had been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the Commanders in Chief, Combined, Second, and Third Fleets. Tokyo intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addresses. It was stated that the presence of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, in Taiwan waters was not revealed by radio traffic. It was stated that it was the impression that both the Second and Third Fleets were underway, but that this was not verified by radio intelligence means. It was also stated that there were some Fourth Fleet units in the Marshall Islands but their identity was not known. It was stated also that there was "no information on submarines or carriers." This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew Exhibit 22).

8. The communication intelligence summary of December 4th, delivered on the 5th, stated that in general traffic volume was normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao radio instituted a fleet broadcast system, using the prefix UTU in heading so that there were two fleet broadcasts now in operation. So far only a few messages had been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Tokyo intelligence originated messages to the Chiefs of Staff, China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force, and same. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated, "The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, and Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast, which CinC Second Fleet is still copying." As to the Fourth Fleet, it was stated that the Commander in Chief sent a message to various units and that no further check could be made on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls and that Jaluit appeared many times in the day's traffic, being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo radio and an oil tanker. As to South China, it was stated that Bako continued as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China commanders, all units in that area were quiet. This summary was initialed by Admiral Kimmel (Hew. Exhibit 22).

9. The radio intelligence summary for December 5th, which was delivered on the 6th, was the last summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel before the attack. It stated in general that traffic volume was heavy. All circuits were overloaded with Tokyo broadcasts going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operations. There were several new intercept schedules heard. It was noted that some traffic being broadcast was several days old, which indicated the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to be caused by the jammed condition

of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the captain of the OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao, probably for further relay, addressed to the Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau, saying, "In reference to the Far Eastern crisis what you have said is considered important at this end, but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."

As to the Combined Fleet, it was stated that neither the Second nor Third Fleet Commanders had originated any traffic. They were still frequently addressed but were receiving their traffic over broadcasts. It was stated that "They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force had been seen either."

There was no traffic from the Third Fleet, but some traffic to that fleet. There was also some traffic to the Fourth Fleet, addressed at Jaluit, strengthening the impression that the Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. As to South China, there was much traffic addressed to the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, by Sama. Bako continued as an active originator with many dispatches to the Second and Third Fleets. The Commander Combined Air Force appeared to be busy with the movement of air corps, several of which were moving probably to Indo-China (Hew. Exhibit 22).

Any time important information was received, he said, CincPac and ComFOURTEEN would come and discuss it.

General Marshall said that prior to December 7th, he thought that all pertinent Army intelligence was given to the Navy, but the Army did not then receive, as regular routine, intelligence from the Navy as to Japanese ship movements (page 864).

(2) *Interception of Japanese communications:*

Captain Rochefort said that certain communications with which the Japanese consul general in Honolulu was concerned (Exhibit 13) were received by him from the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, about 2 or 3 December 1941. He identified one of these as Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 3 December, number 245, and said that due to the difficulties inherent in the code it had not been deciphered until the night of 10 December. The message prescribed a set of signals indicating the types of American vessels in the Hawaiian area and their activities, and included arrangements for lights in houses, on beaches, from boats, want ads over Honolulu radio stations, and signals on Maui Island (p. 57). Captain Rochefort said that aside from this communication he did not receive prior to December 7, 1941, any other Japanese reports regarding American ships in Pearl Harbor or preparations in Pearl Harbor to meet attack (p. 58).

Captain Rochefort also read into the record two communications (part of Exhibit 13) which he did not recollect having seen before (p. 57–59). One of these referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives, the other to the lack of reconnaissance by the "fleet air arm" at Hawaii.

Admiral Mayfield said that the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Naval District had sent to the Chief of Naval Operations on February 9, 1942, a report (part of Exhibit 40) regarding a message sent by the Japanese consulate to Tokyo on 3 December 1941. A copy of this message had been delivered by Admiral Mayfield to Commander Rochefort's radio intelligence unit for decryption on 4 or 5 December, but Admiral Mayfield did not learn its contents until 11 December. The message transmitted to Tokyo a proposed system of signalling by lights and other methods for the purpose of reporting departures of U. S. naval units from Pearl Harbor. This system had been conceived and submitted to the Japanese Consulate by one Otto Kuehn, a German resident on Oahu, who was later tried, convicted, and sentenced to a long term of imprisonment. Admiral Mayfield stated that neither his office nor the Federal Bureau of Investigation found definite information that any part of the proposed signals had ever been used (p. 564–565).

Mr. William F. Friedman, Cryptanalyst and Director of Communications, Signal Security Agency, War Department, identified two Japanese messages from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated 6 December 1941, (Exhibit 13) as having been intercepted by the Army. They had been decoded by the Army on 8 December 1941. One of these messages referred to a "surprise attack" against Hawaiian objectives and the other pointed out the lack of reconnaissance being conducted by "the fleet air arm" at Hawaii (p. 522–523).

Captain Safford stated that the two messages referred to in the preceding paragraph (Exhibit 13) were in the Japanese PA–K2 code and could have been

decrypted by the Navy in one and a half to two hours. However, the Navy gave precedence to the processing of all "purple" and J–19 messages and would not have touched the PA–K2 communications as long as there were any J–19's on hand (p. 530–531).

Lt. Donald Woodrum, District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District, produced transcripts of telephone conversations obtained by tapping the lines of the Japanese Consul and Vice-Consul for the period 1 October 1941 to 2 December 1941, when the taps were removed by order of Capt. Mayfield. The transcripts (marked Exhibit 38) contain little, if any, information of military significance, being concerned largely with routine consular activities and those of the local Japanese population. (p. 379)

To Lt. Woodrum's knowledge, there were only 2 local telephone intercepts which may have had military significance. The first was in 1940 from Vice Consul Okuda to a Buddhist priest on the island of Maui advising the latter to keep the Consulate informed on any United States fleet movements that came to his attention. In 1941, the exact date not stated, a woman very much agitated called the Consulate to say the the USS NEW ORLEANS had just left the harbor, to which the person at the Consulate made no reply. (p. 383)

Wire tapping was discontinued on 2 December because, in the opinion of Lt. Woodrum, the secrecy of the activity was jeopardized by the accidental discovery of similar activity on the part of the FBI by employees of the telephone company. (p. 379–81)

With regard to his instruction of 2 December 1941, that tapping of the telephone wires of the Japanese Consul and Vice Consul by officers of the District Intelligence Office cease, Admiral Mayfield gave as his reasons: (a) that the telephone company had discovered the FBI was also tapping these wires and he feared that the resulting disclosure of this tapping would jeopardize the security of the tapping by the District Intelligence Office, and (b) the interceptions up through 2 December had revealed nothing of intelligence value. (p. 571)

Lt. Woodrum stated that prior to 1 December 1941, efforts to obtain copies of coded messages sent from the Jap Consulate to Japan and to the Japanese Embassy in Washington via commercial cable companies were unsuccessful. As of 1 December, however, in accordance with an agreement between Mr. David Sarnoff, of RCA, and Admiral Bloch, copies of all messages sent via RCA were available to the naval service and the first of these were received at the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December. It is Lt. Woodrum's understanding that these were sent immediately to Commander Rochefort's unit and, further, that they were not decoded until after the attack, it being necessary even then to use a Japanese code book that was found during a search of the Consulate on the 7th. Summaries of decoded copies of messages sent from 1 December to 6 December has been marked "Exhibit 40." (p. 383–5)

Admiral Mayfield said that Exhibit 40 contained the translation and digest of several messages sent by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to Tokyo via commercial cable companies on and after 3 December 1941. One of these messages, dated 3 December, reported the departure of the WYOMING and two seaplane tenders. A message, dated 4 December, reported the arrival of the HONOLULU. (p. 565) Copies of these two messages were received in the District Intelligence Office on the morning of 5 December (p. 566) and forwarded to Commander Rochefort's unit. Another Japanese consulate message, dated 5 December, reported the arrival of 3 battleships, their expected date of departure, the departure of the LEXINGTON, the departure of five heavy cruisers and other information. (p. 565) Admiral Mayfield did not know when this message had been received in his office. On 6 December, the Jap consulate filed two messages regarding U. S. ship movements and one regarding U. S. Army use of balloons. Admiral Mayfield believed that these probably did not reach his office until 7 December. (p. 566–567)

Vice Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in December 1941, testified that none of the intelligence material he received prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor included any information received from intercepted telephone conversation of the Japanese or from intercepted cable messages. None of these cable messages was seen by Admiral Smith until two days after the attack. (p. 360)

Mr. George Street, Honolulu District Manager for RCA Communications, Incorporated, testified that during the first week in December 1941, copies of all cable messages sent to Japan by the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu were turned over to the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer, (Admiral Mayfield) at his request. Mr. Street added that all the RCA copies of those messages had been

destroyed under authority of the Federal Communications Commission, because of lack of storage space. (p. 411–413)

Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA, Signal Officer in the Hawaiian Department in November and December 1941, testified that the Army radio intercepted unit at Fort Shafter made no decryption whatever of intercepted Japanese messages. The intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decryption. (p. 387–388)

Commander Rochefort said that the United States was handicapped because it could not censor Japanese communications (page 473). And, according to Captain Layton, the FBI was restricted by law from getting Japanese cables, but efforts were made to get those messages. However, they had no information concerning the messages which the Japanese consul was sending out (pages 909–910).

Admiral Wilkinson said that the District Intelligence Officer of Hawaii had endeavored to obtain copies of dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents from the local cable companies but had been advised that the law did not permit interference of such messages. (p. 285) He said that despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable messages, the District Intelligence Officer had arranged to tap the long distance telephone and kept a record of the telephone conversations with Japan. This, he said, was done only in the last few days before December 7. The conversations in general appeared to be innocuous. There was one suspicious telephone conversation on the afternoon of December 6. Concerning this, Admiral Wilkinson said, "This conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which we had not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some may have been correct." (p. 286)

Captain Mayfield said that messages transmitted by the Japanese Consulate General by cable or radio were not made available to him until after the visit of Mr. Sarnoff of RCA. He said that the Japanese Consulate General sent its traffic using the various communication companies alternately. The Mackay Radio Company handled the traffic during the month of November. Traffic was switched to RCA as of December 1 and thereafter Captain Mayfield was able to obtain all of his traffic from RCA. Since it was in code and he had no reading organization, it was necessary to submit it to another organization to be read. He learned the content of a various number of these messages after the attack and there was considerable information about movements of the Fleet and other military forces which he said was not entirely accurate. (p. 311) Captain Mayfield said that so far as he was aware, the telephone conversations of the Japanese were not recorded or censored. (p. 313)

Admiral Bloch said that they were not able to get any information based on dispatches being transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies did not and would not give them such dispatches. They all went by cable and so far as Admiral Bloch knew, none went by radio. (p. 15)

Admiral Smith said that they did not have access to the files in the Cable Office; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to get these files; that it was taken to Mr. MacKey of Postal Telegraph, being contrary to the United States law to divulge a telegraph cable message; at that time there were certain Japanese codes which they could break and the Intelligence Officer thought if he could get those messages, he might learn what was going on; that they did not get them until three days after the attack and never received any information from this source before the war. (p. 46)

Commander Rochefort said that he received from the Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, directly or otherwise copies of such communications in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was concerned—about December 1, 1941. These were about ten to fifteen messages and Commander Rochefort was asked to examine them, which he did. He succeeded in extracting some information from them within 12 hours, with the exception of two or three messages which he finished on the evening of December 10th. He said that the first messages did not contain any important information, but the latter two or three did contain important information. He said that

he had been unable to obtain that information at an earlier date because of the inherent difficulties in the task, and that the task had been made a matter of paramount importance and about 12 to 16 hours daily were devoted to that work alone. (p. 208–9)

Commander Rochefort said that the F. C. C. was monitoring radio traffic in the so-called "amateur" status, but that he never heard of their apprehending any communications from Japanese spies to Japan. (p. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that the Consulate General at Hawaii communicated with his superiors in Japan primarily by cable and occasionally by radio. (P. 209)

Commander Rochefort said that he had not been informed of any telephone communication between the Consulate General at Hawaii and Japan. (p. 209)

Concerning the receipt of communications of the Japanese Consulate General, Captain Layton said:

"26.Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any time around 1 December or after?

"A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochefort on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.

"27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to the attack?

"A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other source." (p. 218)

Captain Layton said that the District Intelligence Officer maintained certain monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreciation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view, but that he did not recall the details of this. (p. 218)

Admiral Turner said that he did not know what type of decrypting Pearl Harbor was doing, but that Naval Communications had told him that CincPac was getting as much of the Japanese communications as they were, and sooner (page 1001). He said that the Director of Naval Communications had informed him that CincPac had the decrypted Japanese messages, and that was why no information of this nature was sent to CincPac. He was similarly assured by Admiral Noyes, he said.

Admiral Noyes denied telling Admiral Turner that Pearl Harbor was intercepting the same Japanese traffic as Washington (page 1036). He said that Pearl Harbor had an intercept station specializing in certain codes but was not intercepting Japanese cable messages, and the so-called "purple" messages were usually sent by cable (pages 1037–38).

Admiral Redman said that CincPac did not have facilities for decoding "purple" intercepts; the problem was not assigned to him and all translations were accomplished in Washington (page 1106).

(3) *Surveillance of consulate*

Admiral Bloch stated that after the receipt of certain dispatches relating to the destruction of codes, which are later discussed, he had Intelligence arrange for a close surveillance of the Japanese Consulate. What, if any, surveillance was in effect before this does not appear.

C. INFORMATION CONCERNING JAPANESE MILITARY AND FLEET MOVEMENTS

Captain McCollum, who was Officer-in-Charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., during December, 1941, said that his duties consisted of evaluating and passing to the Director of Naval Intelligence all intelligence received concerning the Far East, including all information on the Jap Navy. (p. 10) Sources of intelligence available to his Section regarding the Jap Fleet were reports by our consular authorities and agents in Japan and on the Asiatic continent, reports by our merchant ships, reports on movements of Japanese merchant shipping, and radio intelligence supplied by Captain Safford's unit, Op–20–G. However, by the end of November, 1941, the Far Eastern Section had become almost wholly dependent upon radio intelligence for information concerning the location of Jap naval forces. This was due to the fact that U. S. embargoes against Japan had swept U. S. merchant shipping out of the north Pacific and also discouraged Japanese shipping to the Americas. In addition, increasingly strict Japanese security

measures made it almost impossible for agents in Japan to get timely information out of the country. (p. 10, 12, 13) As a result of this situation, a dispatch was sent out by Opnav on 24 November (GCT) to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, pointing out that information on the Jap fleet was unsatisfactory and requesting that every effort be made by use of radio intelligence methods to locate the Japanese naval forces. (Exhibit 8) Following this dispatch, estimates were received from ComFourteen and ComSixteen, dated 26 November (GCT). (Exhibit 8) These evaluations were virtually the same and estimated that two Jap task forces were being organized, one fairly well located in the Formosa-southern Japan area, another possibly located in the Mandated Islands. However, ComFourteen estimated that there was a strong concentration of submarines and at least one carrier division with the force in the Mandates, while ComSixteen could not confirm this. Greater reliance was placed on ComSixteen's dispatch because his radio organization was in a better position to intercept Japanese radio traffic and was stronger in numbers and continuity of operation. (p. 13–14)

Captain McCollum said that radio intelligence consisted of three distinct procedures: translations of the enemy's code dispatches, inferences drawn from the volume of enemy radio traffic, and a study of the call signs of enemy ships. (p. 12) He said that on about 1 December 1941 intelligence obtained from a study of the call signs of Japanese ships became considerably less valuable because there was a change in the call signs and frequency allocations of the Jap fleet: "In other words, presumably the communication plan of the Jap fleet was changed at that time, which meant that a period of time elapsed before we could build up identifications of specific naval units based on call signs, and so on . . . the actual radios were still going out, but we couldn't get anything out of them very much." (p. 15–16) Captain McCollum did not know of any general call sign change which had accompanied previous major movements of the Japanese. (p. 16) However, he said that taken in connection with the known regroupings of Jap naval forces and the fact that the Japanese fleet was believed ready for action the call sign change was interpreted as a "possible indication of action to come." He said that CincPac was as well informed as the Office of Naval Intelligence as to these changes in the call signs of the Jap fleet. (p. 17)

Other than the ONI bulletin of 1 December 1941, Captain McCollum was aware of no information sent out to the fleet from the Navy Department between 1 December and 7 December 1941 regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet. (p. 19)

Captain Mason, Fleet Intelligence Officer for CinCAF, and Commander Fabian, who was attached to the Corregidor radio intelligence unit, said that most of their information regarding the location and movements of the Jap fleet was obtained from the analysis of enemy radio traffic, rather than from the decryption of Jap messages. (p. 73–74) Other sources of information during the period 26 November to 7 December 1941 were reports from the Naval Attache, Shanghai, and a number of sighting reports obtained by reconnaissance planes. On 2 December a despatch was sent from CinCAF to OpNav reporting the sighting of nine submarines. On the same date, another despatch to OpNav reported 3 submarines, 21 transports and enemy patrol planes in the Camranh Bay area. On 6 December, a despatch reported a convoy in Camranh Bay. Twenty-four to forty-eight hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, a British report was received to the effect that heavy Japanese units were rounding Poulo Condore, French Indo China. During this period, it was believed that all known Jap carriers were in the Kure-Sasebo area. (p. 75–76)

Captain Rochefort stated that between 26 November and 7 December 1941 very little information was obtained regarding the location of the Jap fleet by radio intelligence means. The reason for this was that while the total volume of Jap radio traffic remained about the same or increased the traffic which contained as an addressee or originator one of the major vessels was almost non-existent. He said that the Japanese radio traffic which was received contained a certain amount of "padding or rejecting of messages," but that in his opinion there had been no attempt on the part of the Japanese to practice radio deception in any of its forms. (p. 53)

Admiral Wilkinson stated that the ONI summary of 1 December 1941 (Exhibit 9) represented the best of the knowledge and belief of the Office of Naval Intelligence at that time, and was based on the digest of all available information, radio intelligence, and sightings. He believed, but could not be certain, that a copy of the summary had been sent air mail to Pearl Harbor on or about the date of issue, 1 December 1941. (p. 395)

Admiral Wilkinson recalled seeing a digest, prepared by the Far Eastern Section of ONI of daily Communication Intelligence summaries issued at Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 22). He recalled noting in particular those for the period 1 December to 5 December, 1941, and being aware that a large part of the Japanese fleet appeared to have gone into radio silence. The Admiral believed that this fact appeared daily in reports issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and these reports drew the conclusion that an attack on Thailand and the Malay Peninsula was imminent, since the only movements picked up were in that direction (p. 396)

Admiral Smith said that based on the communication intelligence summaries during the period 27 November to 6 December 1941, he had estimated that the Japanese carriers during that period were "some in the Marshalls and the remainder in home areas." (p. 362) Referring further to the summaries, he said: (p. 363)

"Vice Admiral SMITH: Now, I see nothing very alarming in these dispatches up to Pearl Harbor. On one day the traffic will be very light, radio traffic, and on the next day it is very heavy right up to the 6th of December. The fact that you don't hear from the Second Fleet, he doesn't originate any message, doesn't necessarily mean that he is on the way to Pearl Harbor. Our own forces while at sea exercising maintained radio silence. We had a very large force, almost half of the Pacific Fleet, in May, 1941, proceed to the Atlantic and no traffic was heard from them for a period of some six weeks. So the absence of radio traffic from the forces at sea doesn't indicate anything to me.

"Mr. SONNETT. Does it indicate that they are at sea, Admiral?

"Vice Admiral SMITH. It indicates the probability that they are at sea, yes.

"Mr. SONNETT. And it is the fact that after December 1, 1941, there was no information from the Japanese carriers' radio traffic?

"Vice Admiral SMITH. No, except after saying there is no information, they usually wind up with, 'They are believed to be in home waters.' "

Admiral Smith said that he had not known about the change in call signs of the Jap Fleet which occurred on 1 December. (p. 364) He did not recall having discussed with Admiral Kimmel the lack of information on Japanese carriers indicated by the communication intelligence summaries after 1 December. (p. 365)

A fortnightly summary, issued by ONI on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57) stated concerning the Japanese military situation, that Japanese troops, supplies, and equipment were pouring into Indo-China during the past fifteen days. Units landed at Haiphong were sent south by rail to Saigon. Troops were moved quickly through Saigon towards the interior and the Thailand border. The arrival of reinforcements continued. Japanese army strength in Indo-China was believed to be about 25,000 in Tongking Province and between 70,000 and 100,000 in south Indo-China. Naval aircraft and craft also moved south. It was estimated that there were about 200 Japanese planes in Indo-China, and roughly the same number on Hainan Island.

Concerning the Japanese naval situation, the report stated that deployment of naval forces to the southward had indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities. At the same time, troop transports and freighters were pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Movements to the south appeared to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, then definitely indicated, would probably take sharper form in the following few days. To that date, this task force, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appeared to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constituted a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons; it asserted that although one division of battleships might be assigned, the major capital ship strength remained in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers. It also stated that the equipment being carried south was a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consisted not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

The record does not contain other ONI summaries. Admiral Stark, however, testified that the estimates as to the positions of Japanese carriers and battleships were conflicting and that the easternmost position estimated was the Mandates (pages 72–3).

Admiral Turner said that there had been a great deal of naval radio traffic which suddenly ceased, which meant that the Japanese fleet had put to sea (page 994). Admiral Turner also said that they did not know where the Japanese fleet was. Deductions were that there was to be a covering force in the Marshalls' area and that some forces would carry on missions in the China Sea. Available information as to the location of the Japanese fleet, although considerable, was incomplete (page 1002).

Admiral Ingersoll stated that it was difficult to get information on Japanese ships. Units in Cavite and Pearl Harbor for radio intelligence were practically the only sources (page 818). When there was a significant move reported, he knew about it.

Captain Smith-Hutton said that in November, 1941, he could obtain no information of Japanese military movements except one to Southeast Asia. Japanese military movements did not appear in the press (page 1077). No information reached him indicating an attack on Pearl Harbor. In the latter part of 1941, he felt sure that Japanese would make an aggressive move to relieve economic pressure exerted by the United States embargo, but he was not sure this would involve the United States in war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to him (page 1079).

Ambassador Grew had no information as to movement of a Japanese carrier force towards Pearl Harbor (page 1064).

Admiral Redman did not think that the December 1st ONI Bulletin was sent to CincPac by dispatch (pages 1107–8).

Captain Layton

Captain Layton testified with respect to the photostatic copies of the various dispatches in exhibit 8 that he thought CinCPac received the dispatch of 24 November 1941, from OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac and others, that the dispatch from Com14 dated 26 November 1941, time date group 260110, had been sent by the Fourteenth Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, and that Com16's dispatch of 26 November 1941, time date group 261331, was a reply to the Com14 dispatch 260110. (Page 190–191)

Captain Layton testified that the three dispatches referred to above (exhibit 8) summarized the intelligence available to Coms14, 16, CinCAF and CinCPac, concerning Japanese naval movements during the month preceding 26 November. (Page 191)

Captain Layton testified that he noted that the Com16 unit stated in the dispatch 261331, that it could not confirm the supposition: by Com14 that submarines and carriers in force were in the Mandates, and that Com16's best indications were that all First and Second Japanese Fleets were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. (Page 191)

Captain Layton considered that Com16's reference to First and Second Fleet carriers was made in relation to the Japanese naval organization as promulgated 29 July 1941; that the Japanese naval organization as stated by ONI at that time included information that there were attached to each of the First and Second Fleets, two carrier division, that is, CarDivs Three (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU) and Five (RYUJO, HOSHO) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the First Fleet; and that CarDiv One (AKAGI, KAGA) and CarDiv Two (SORYU, HIRYU) with destroyer plane guards, were attached to the Second Fleet; thus, Captain Layton explained, the ONI bulletin of July, 1941, stated that there were eight carriers assigned by the Japanese to the First and Second Fleets, with no other carriers listed as assigned to any other fleets.

Therefore, Captain Layton testified the Com16 dispatch 261331 stating that its best indications were that all known operating Japanese carriers were believed to be in the Kure-Sasebo area was understood by him to mean that all known operating Japanese carriers were in that area, and that Com14's estimate at that time differed from that of Com16, in that Com14 was of the opinion that there was at least one Japanese carrier in the Marshalls at that time. (Page 191–192) (also see Page 248–250)

said that in the latter part of November, he received information of two or more Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. He had reported to CincPac Japanese carriers at Truk and the Marshalls, in June, 1941 (page 912). On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire "4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home

area." This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as disposed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913). He knows now that there were certain decrypted messages in the Navy Department which by themselves might not mean much, but taken together would have warned of an attack against Hawaii more than the messages they received. This refers to ship movement messages later discussed. Some other messages in Exhibit 63 indicated war, he said, but did not specifically refer to Pearl Harbor (page 916).

Commander Rochefort said that no Japanese ships were reported closer than the Marshalls during the latter part of November, up until December 7th (page 472). No information was received which indicated a Japanese attack other than at Guam or the Philippines, of the United States possessions. Nothing east of Guam was indicated.

Admiral DeLany stated that CincPac had no information contrary to the ONI Bulletin of December 1, 1941 (page 503). He recalled information that there was a small carrier force, prior to December 7th, to the southward of the Philippines, but that the main Japanese strength was at Japan (page 87).

Admiral McMorris stated that he had had no information that Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls (page 899).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that he was familiar with the FOURTEENTH Naval District Communication Intelligence Summaries, particularly those for the period 27 November–5 December 1941 (Exhibit 22); that he recalled being familiar with the information contained in them and though he frequently did not himself read them, he either heard them read or orally presented by Captain Layton; that he certainly had access to all the material contained in those summaries (pages 310–311).

He, in many cases, identified his own and the initials of Admiral Kimmel appearing either on the Communication Intelligence Summaries (Exhibit 22) or on the Intelligence reports prepared and submitted by Captain Layton (p. 310–311).

He further testified that he had no independent recollection of having seen the ComFOURTEEN dispatch of 26 November 1941, and other dispatches attached thereto in Exhibit 8, nor the memorandum dated 1 December 1941 prepared by Lt. Comdr. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer. He considered it improbable, however, that he did not see the Layton memorandum of 1 December 1941 (p. 311–312).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that so far as he could recollect, he had believed the major elements of the Jap Fleet to be fairly well located on and after 1 December 1941. He remembered that on or about 1 December 1941 there was a change in the call signs of the Japanese fleet, and stated, with reference to the believed location of the Japanese carriers, that they were thought to be in home waters or towards Formosa (p. 312).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that offhand he could not recall the information on which his estimate as to the location of the Jap carriers was based, and that it would require a considerable number of quotations from Communication Intelligence Summaries (Ex. 22) to point out the source of such belief (p. 313).

Following this, Vice Admiral McMorris did refer to the Communication Intelligence Summaries, in an effort to show the basis for his belief that the carriers were in home waters or towards Formosa:

24 November: A statement that on the 23rd there were a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division 3 with CinC Third Fleet.

25 November: A statement that one or more of the carrier divisions were present in the Mandates.

26 November: Reference was made to general traffic intelligence involving CinCs Second and Third Fleets, the China Fleet, the Fourth Fleet, and the Combined Air Force, indicating a heavy traffic condition, but no reference was made to any part of the Summary which said anything about carriers.

27 November: Reference was made to information in the Summary concerning various Japanese fleets but not to information specifically referring to carriers or to the carrier fleet.

28 November: Vice Admiral McMorris referred to information in the Communication Intelligence Summary of this date to the effect that there were many high precedence messages involving the Combined Fleet and to information concerning the Third Fleet, but he did not point out any information concerning carriers (p. 314).

29 November: Reference was made to various items of information in this Intelligence Summary, but not to any involving the carriers.

30 November: Reference was made to information to the effect that there was a strong impression that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, was underway, and to the fact that one urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff of Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, and to the Combined Air Force.

1 December: No reference was made to any information concerning carriers (p. 315).

2 December: Reference was made to the paragraph in the Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on carriers and that carrier traffic was at a low ebb.

3 December: Reference was made to various items of information but none concerning carriers (p. 316).

4 December: Reference was made to the large number of urgent messages from Tokyo, to the lack of messages from CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet, and to the fact that the former was believed to be in the vicinity of Takao (p. 316–317).

5 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders, and that there was no traffic from the Commander of the carriers or from the Commander of the Submarine Force (p. 317).

6 December: Reference was made to the radio silence of the Second and Third Fleet Commanders and to the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had originated several messages to the carriers (p. 317).

After reviewing the above Summaries, Vice Admiral McMorris admitted that between December 1st and the time of the Japanese attack there was no Intelligence or information concerning the location or movements of a carrier fleet as such (p. 319). He stated, however, that it was his recollection that there had been one or two vague indications associating carriers with the Second and Third Fleets, and some possible associations with Palau and in at least one instance an association with the Marshalls (p. 320). Upon examination of the Fleet Intelligence Officer's memorandum of December 1st, Vice Admiral McMorris stated he could not find on it any reference to Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 (p. 320). He could not recall if there had been any conference between Admiral Kimmel and himself concerning the 1 December estimate of Captain Layton (p. 321).

He stated that he did not reach any conclusion that the carriers were operating independently of the rest of the Combined Fleet (p. 319).

Vice Admiral McMorris stated that during the period in question, the information available as to the locations of the Japanese Fleet units was not as specific as was desirable; that he did not recall the lack of information as to the carriers, and "taking into consideration the general situation and all other information at hand . . . we were extremely disturbed" (p. 321).

General Short testified that he had received no information indicating Japanese movements east of Guam (p. 265).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the information from his own Fleet Intelligence was principally as to the movements of ships and, he said, it gave no indication of a Japanese attack (p. 327).

Admiral Wilkinson discussed the organization of ONI and pointed out that there was no established or effective method for the dissemination of information of Combat Intelligence. (p. 280) Admiral Wilkinson said that for some time the Japanese section of the foreign branch of ONI had been preparing daily an analysis of the situation as to Japanese Fleet locations and as to Japanese-American relations. (p. 281) Admiral Wilkinson referred to the fortnight summary issued on December 1 and said that it had been discussed with Admirals Stark and Turner and had been sent out air mail on December 1.

According to Captain Safford, there were three main radio intelligence units—one in the Navy Department with subsidiary direction finder stations and intercept stations along the Atlantic seaboard and in the Atlantic Ocean; the second at Pearl Harbor with subsidiary intercept stations at Oahu, Mid-

way, Samoa, and Dutch Harbor; the third at Corregidor. There were also intercept stations from the West Coast of the United States which fed their traffic directly to Washington. The main station in Washington was concerned particularly with that branch of intelligence relating to naval operations in the Atlantic and to the plans and intentions of foreign governments. It was also used for training personnel. The station at Pearl Harbor was confined to that branch of intelligence dealing with the dispositions and plans of naval forces in the Pacific and surveillance over Japanese naval communications. These duties did not include surveillance over any diplomatic communications. The Asiatic unit at Corregidor was at the disposal of CinCAF to use as he saw fit. Up to early 1941, it was mostly concerned with diplomatic communications, but in October or November shifted its main attention to Japanese naval communications. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that the unit at Pearl Harbor was kept fully informed only of results obtained by the Washington unit as to operations of the Japanese Navy in the Pacific with one important exception, namely that on December 1, 1941, CinCPac and ComFOURTEEN were sent a copy of a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that the Japanese were planning a landing in Malaya. (p. 356)

Captain Safford said that on November 26, 1941, estimates were received from Pearl Harbor and from ComSIXTEEN relating to the organization and distribution of the Japanese Fleet, and that the estimates differed. ComSIXTEEN'S report place one carrier division as operating in the South China Sea and the remaining carriers in Japanese home waters, and further added that the evaluation was considered reliable. He said that in Washington they believed that the report from ComSIXTEEN was correct, but did not so advise the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that on November 24 ONI had sent a dispatch to CinCAF indicating that Sixteenth District's intercepts were considered most reliable and requesting that other reports be submitted from ComSIXTEEN to OpNav with copies to CinCPac for information. The basis for the belief that ComSIXTEEN's reports were better was the geographical location of ComSIXTEEN. (p. 357)

Captain Safford said, "Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station 'H'—in the 'Chronology' which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks." (p. 360–2)

"Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station 'H' 'Chronology' for December 1—December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communications Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination."

Admiral Brainard said that the "War Information Room" received information from sources such as O. N. I., Naval observers and what was made known to them through the communications system and plotted the movements of Naval units including Japanese. To the best of his knowledge, they were receiving all Japanese information available in the department. (p. 402).

Admiral Smith said that around the beginning of December 1941, the information he received from the Fleet Intelligence Officer was to the effect that one Japanese force was supposed to be at Truk and to the best of his recollection the main part of the Japanese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters; that they had no knowledge as to the Japanese carriers; that the Fleet Intelligence Officer had said that he did not know where the carriers were; and that Admiral Smith recalled no difference of opinion between the radio intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning the location of enemy carriers. (p. 47)

Admiral Smith said that the Pacific Fleet staff believed that the Japanese Navy was very efficient although they had little knowledge or information concerning the Japanese Navy; all of the information on the Japanese Fleet was by Radio Intelligence only, that is, as to the location of the Fleet. (p. 59)

Admiral Pye said that a rather high evaluation was placed upon the report of the Intelligence Officer concerning the Japanese Fleet inasmuch as no contrary or other information had been received. At the time, Admiral Pye

knew the sources upon which the Intelligence Officer was relying for his information.

Concerning information from October on as to the movements of units of the Japanese Fleet, Captain Layton said:

"Commencing in late October, many reports were received from China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources, of the movements of considerable number of Japanese transports and troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Saeki area; that the invasion was to follow the line of the German blitskreig of Holland and Belgium and that considerable air forces were being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The movements of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the early part of November. Recurring reports of movements of Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings of some of these transports—that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, railroad equipment, motorboats—led to a belief that amphibious operations were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of the Japanese surface-force task forces; concerned and associated with southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to the Hainan Islands—Southern Formosa region. These were more or less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations was noted and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied, 'Nothing yet.' He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the developments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive. This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general tenor as follows: That a task force under the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet (which includes the First and Second Base Forces and Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally to our amphibious forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command, the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to the South China area and associated with the French Indo-China, Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihoku and Takao, Formosa. It was noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were somewhat connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that perhaps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It was noted, also that there was a concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Division, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of Portuguese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accordingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of move-

ment, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The majority of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv 4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1 Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force, were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of November, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the 27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I believe that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in Washington had ended and that an aggressive move by the Japanese within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition was probably imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Department was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had returned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's paraphrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in G–3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information was received by the British Consul, locally, from a source usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isthmus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the message regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of war was also received; and from the State Department were reports of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to regarding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2 December, reports received from CincAF of Japanese submarines and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked previously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 December, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Exhibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Japanese Navy to be put into effect. On 6 December, a report from CincAF received stated CincChina had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and ten destroyers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different position, all on course West. Also that CincAF forces sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I prepared and submitted. It showed, briefly, that except for Battleships Divi-

sions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six—the latter was marked "May head for the Mandates?"—that all other important Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the Cinc Second Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers, one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelv e auxiliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary transports, and 140 planes, Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively identified in Japanese ports but were believed to be in Japanese waters, due to their past activity and lack of, or negative information.

"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one division?

"A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one division.

"35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total?

"A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions. At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Division One of the AKAGI and KAGA; Carrier Division Two of the SORYU and NIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and one unknown carrier; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGA and it was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.

"36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagreement between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts?

"A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance, that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were in the Marshalls.

"37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the number of carriers in home waters?

"A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement, as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judgment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the general picture from the reports produced. There may have been messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no knowledge.

"38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward, did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers striking at Hawaii?

"A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 November, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some time previous. This occurred in a discussion wherein Japanese potentialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda purposes and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concentrated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, including an occupation force; and (3) An attack on the American Mainland. The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the details thereof.

"39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up of forces as placed by your Intelligence toward the end of November, the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers sufficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii?

"A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, however, was my personal estimate; that with the allocation of forces to the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly in destroyers and

cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense; that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts' Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had expressed formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.

"40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you had because of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?

"A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the first of December, that I couldn't understand why Washington didn't give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander Rochefort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that week-end, although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer with Admiral Kimmel.

"41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days prior to 7 December, '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the Japanese Navy was, in itself, an ominous sign?

"A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement discussed previously." (p. 219–223)

Captain Layton said:

"I frequently took messages of secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturady morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CincAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message, but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down. Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning." (p. 225)

In view of its importance, the following is quoted directly from the examination of Commander Rochefort:

"32.Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chronologically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet, beginning on or about 1 October 1941.

"A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was to endeavor to obtain information from the specific types of traffic as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a study of radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And, thirdly, to obtain information by radio direction finder bearings. As of 1 October, the first mission mentioned was being only partially carried out due to inability on the part of the personnel concerned. The second and third missions were, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was not in any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks constant study an estimate was drawn up which was submitted to the Commandant, who

released a dispatch to Washington, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. To the best of my knowledge, this dispatch was sent out on 26 November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little information was obtained by means of radio intelligence. due to the lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal restrictions, was made available from the files of the communication companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General in Honolulu.

"33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate which you made about 26 November?

"A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main, of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of advance of the other force was not known. An additional force of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was placed definitely in the Marshalls area.

"34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?

"A. Two, sir.

"35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you getting along similar lines from the other two units?

"A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best of my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.

"36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers—do I understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the Marshall Islands or proceeding in that direction?

"A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers were in the Marshalls area.

"37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the southward of, say, Formosa?

"A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.

"38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East in agreement with your estimate?

"A. No, sir.

"39. Q. In what respect?

"A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Washington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general agreement except for the direction of movement and particularly the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.

"40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your estimate?

"A. I do not recall.

"41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch from Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

"A. Yes, sir; the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.

"42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the Commander-in-Chief?

"A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.

"43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplomatic negotiations were concerned?

"A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.

"44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a similar estimate from Washington, is that correct?

"A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating that several days after the dispatch of our estimate and the dispatch of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied together but there was no direct answer.

"45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from Washington?

"A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter within their purview.

"46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the most important units?

"A. Yes, sir.

"47. Q. Do you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not have a greater number of those ships located?

"A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the majority of the larger ships.

"48. Q. What particular type of Japanese man-o-war did you feel you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon their movements?

"A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.

"49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?

"A. No, sir.

"50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light?

"A. Yes, sir.

"51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as during that period?

"A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.

"52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might be presaging another offensive movement?

"A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another offensive movement.

"53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors to the importance of this lack of traffic?

"A. Yes, sir.

"54. Q. To whom did you represent that?

"A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. However, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands." (p. 210–212)

Commander Wright discussed the equipment which was available at the Fourteenth Naval District unit for the detection and location of enemy ships. (p. 379–80)

XXV. Intercepted Japanese Communications After the "War Warning" and Up to December 6, 1941

A. Failure to transmit to Admiral Kimmel

After November 27, 1941, when the "war warning" was sent to Admiral Kimmel, and prior to the Japanese attack, there were a number of highly significant Japanese coded communications intercepted, decoded and translated by the Navy and the Army in Washington. Both the State Department and the Navy Department believed, according to Admiral Schuirmann, that from November 27th to December 6th relations with the Japanese were constantly deteriorating (page 204).

It will be recalled that on November 28th, there were available in Washington the intercepted Japanese communications showing the reaction of the Japanese to the State Department note of November 26th; that it was regarded as a "humiliating proposal;" that with a report of the views of the Imperial Government to be sent in two or three days the negotiations would be de facto ruptured; but, that the Japanese emissaries were not to give the impression that the negotiations were broken off (supra, pages 60–63).

Except to the extent set forth in the following chapter, Admiral Kimmel was not advised of any of this information. The reasons for this action have been previously mentioned (supra, page 44). As Admiral Stark explained it, in part,

CincPac was not sent all of the information that was available in Washington; it was the job of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate that information; they tried to give CincPac the most useful information; and, they left it to him as to what to do after they gave him the picture as they saw it (page 800).

Admiral Stark testified that the procedure by which he received classified information was through his Flag Secretary or delivery to him personally by ONI. Comdr. Kramer normally brought information from Intelligence. Sometimes the information was evaluated and sometimes dispatches were brought in direct before evaluation. Intelligence and War Plans did the evaluations which were usually gone over by Admiral Ingersoll. A watch officer and duty officer in Operations received information after office hours and decided whether it should be sent to him at once. During the critical period from November 27th to December 7th, he felt that he was receiving all of the important information regarding Japanese-United States relations (page 774).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he was not sure that he had seen every document received through interception (page 833).

B. CONCERNING THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS AND SITUATION

On November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a message from Tokyo to the Japanese emissaries in Washington, dated November 29, 1941 (Document 19, Exhibit 63), requesting that they make one more attempt to discuss the situation with the United States, and to state that the United States had always taken a fair position in the past; that the Imperial Government could not understand why the United States was taking the attitude that the new Japanese proposals could not be the basis of discussion, but instead had made new proposals which ignored actual conditions in East Asia and which would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government; that the United States should be asked what had become of the basic objectives that the United States had made as the basis for negotiations for seven months; and that the United States should be asked to reflect on the matter. The emissaries were directed in carrying out this instruction to be careful that this did not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of this message but did not deliver it to Admiral Stark.

Also on November 30, 1941, there was a Navy translation of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation from Kurusu in Washington to Yamamoto in Tokyo, in which a telephone code was used (Document 20, Exhibit 63). This indicated that Kurusu expected a long message ("probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals"); that the President was returning apparently because of the speech of the Japanese Premier which Kurusu said was having strong repercussions here; that Kurusu said that unless the Premier and others used greater caution in speeches, it would put the Japanese emissaries here in a very difficult position; that care should be exercised, that Yamamoto said that they were being careful; that Kurusu wanted the Foreign Minister told that the emissaries here had expected to hear something different—some good word—but instead got this (the Premier's speech); that the Japanese-American negotiations were to continue; that Yamamoto wanted them to be stretched out; that Kurusu needed Yamamoto's help to do this, and that both the Premier and the Foreign Minister would need to change the tone of their speeches and that all would have to use some discretion; that Yamamoto said the real problem that the Japanese were up against was the effect of happenings in the South.

There were four significant Japanese communications intercepted on December 1, 1941, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 21, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"1 December 1941
"(Purple CA)
"#865 Re my #857

"1. The date set in my message #812 has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)

"2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

"3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall this, but it may have been discussed (page 778). He did not advise CincPac of this message since he did not consider that it added anything (page 779). Admiral Schuirmann said that he was aware of this message and the following one, but had not delivered them to Admiral Stark (pages 702–3). Admiral Ingersoll did not remember this (page 828).

2. Army translation—(Document 22, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Berlin
"November 30, 1941
"Purple
"#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

"1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

"2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

"Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

[*Part 2 of 2*]

"3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy."

3. The Navy report states that "on 1 December, 1941, the Navy Department intercepted a message from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin as follows:

" 'The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured.

Say very secretly to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anybody dreams. We will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being would prefer to refrain from any direct moves on the north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.' "

Commander Kramer said that the President was so interested "in the dispatch" to Berlin that Kramer was directed to prepare a special paraphrase for the President's retention; otherwise neither the State Department or White House were permitted to retain copies of the "super secret" dispatches (page 983).

4. Army translation—(Document 23, Exhibit 63)
"From: Washington (Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941
"Purple
"#1214 To be handled in Government Code.
"Re my #1190.

"So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.
"This we must carefully note."

In connection with the diplomatic situation,

Admiral Schuirmann said that the Navy Department had been kept fully informed of the progress of negotiations with Nomura and Kurusu. (p. 411) Reference was made to page 138 in "PEACE AND WAR" concerning which Admiral Schuirmann said that he did not recall the particular meetings mentioned on November 25 and November 28. Admiral Schuirmann did recall that on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull telephoned him and said that he wanted Admiral Schuirmann to know that he didn't seem to be able to do anything more with the Japanese and that they were liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone. Admiral Schuirmann assured Secretary Hull that a war warning had been sent out and reported the conversation to Admiral Stark. (p. 412 Admiral Schuirmann said that the general attitude of Admiral Stark and General Marshall was that any time that could be gained in the outbreak of hostilities was to the benefit of the United States. (p. 412)

it may be here noted that on December 2nd, Under Secretary of State Welles had a conversation with Nomura and Kurusu (page 311), which was summarized by Welles as follows:

"I have received reports during the past days of continuing Japanese troop movements to southern Indochina. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indochina. It was my clear understanding that by the terms of the agreement—and there is no present need to discuss the nature of that agreement—between Japan and the French Government at Vichy that the total number of Japanese forces permitted by the terms of that agreement to be stationed in Indochina was very considerably less than the total amount of forces already there. The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indochina would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for the purpose of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possible be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of the East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. Such new aggression would, of course, be additional to the acts of agression already undertaken against China, our attitude towards which is well known, and has been repeatedly stated to the Japanese Government. Please be good enough to request the Japanese Ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese Government what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken, and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese Government as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indochina. This Government has seen in the last few years in Europe a policy on the part of the German Government which has involved a constant and steady encroachment upon the territory and rights of free and

independent peoples through the utilization of military steps of the same character. It is for that reason and because of the broad problem of American defense that I should like to know the intention of the Japanese Government.

"The Japanese Ambassador said that he was not informed by the Japanese Government of its intentions and could not speak authoritatively on the matter but that of course he would communicate the statement immediately to his Government."

Admiral Schuirmann could not recall that information as to this note was given to Admiral Stark.

On December 3, 1941, there was available the Army translation of a report by Kurusu and Nomura to Tokyo, dated December 2, 1941 (Document 25, Exhibit 63) which stated:

"Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights or wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation. Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proferred on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand-In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinion that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary." I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233."

It may be noted that about December 3rd, according to Admiral Schuirmann, the State Department felt that although there might be some further discussions with the Japanese, it was inevitable that they would be unsuccessful. The Chief of Naval Operations, he said, was kept informed (page 203).

There were various intercepted Japanese communications of interest available on December 4, 1941, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 26, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Hainking
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#893

". . . In the event that Manchuria participates in the war . . . in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

"A summary follows:

"1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However, it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

"2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

"3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

"However, the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

"4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia."

2. Navy translation—(Document 27, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1227

"(This raised the question of the possibility of a conference between persons in whom the leaders have confidence to have them make one final effort to reach some agreement. The meeting to be held at some midway point, such as Honolulu . . . It was said that this last effort might facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.)"

3. Navy translation—(Document 29, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#875 Chief of Office routing.
"Re your #1232

"Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

"There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement."

4. Navy translation—(Document 31, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243

"If we continue to increase our forces in French Indo-China, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the consuls."

On December 5, 1941, there were available translations of additional intercepted Japanese communications dealing with the diplomatic negotiations, as follows:

1. Army translation—(Document 33, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1243

"Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand."

2. Navy translation—(Document 34, Exhibit 63)

"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"1 December 1941
"(Purple)
"#1225

"(This is a report of conversations held by Japanese representatives with Secretary Hull on December 1st, which referred to the Japanese Premier's speech, the President's return, Japanese troop movements, and apparent agreement as to the impossibility of reaching an agreement.)"

C. CONCERNING UNITED STATES SHIPS AND PLANES

On 4 December 1941, the Army translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated 20 November 1941, serial 7029, which stated: (Exhibit 13)

"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet—bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation."

Captain Safford said that to the best of his knowledge none of the Jap intercepts which were translated in the period immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and which showed interest in U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were sent to CinCPac. (p. 111) He added that so far as he knew the codes used by the Japanese for reports on U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were not being read by the radio intelligence unit there. (p. 116)

"In addition to the Japanese intercepts which were translated prior to 7 December 1941, a number of Jap messages regarding U. S. ships at Pearl Harbor were intercepted before that date but not translated until after the attack. (Exhibit 13)

"From: Tokyo (Togo)
"To: Honolulu
"November 28, 1941
"J19–K9

"Intelligence of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner.

"1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

"2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure." (Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"#253

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered for or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine tha

they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I image that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack, against these places.

"2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"PA-K2

"1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were—and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

"9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.)

"2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." (Translated by the Army 12/8/41.)

"From Honolulu
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941.
"J-19.

"Military report:

"(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet ?).

"(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are:—number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

"(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

"(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet ?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor." (Translated by the Army, 12/8/41.)

"From: Honolulu (Kita).
"To: Tokyo
"5 December 1941
"(PA-K2)

"(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here.

"(2) The LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

"(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

"8 battleships.
"3 light cruisers.
"16 destroyers.

"Four ships of the Honolulu class and . . . . were in dock." (Translated by the Navy, 12-10-41.)

(6) *"From: Honolulu (Kita).*
"To: Tokyo.
"1 December 1941
"(J19) Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

"1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

* * * * * * *

"2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week." (Translated by the Navy 12/10/41.)

(7) "*From: Honolulu (Kita).*
"*To: Tokyo.*
"*3 December 1941*
"*(PA–K2)*
"*From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.*
"*1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:*
"*I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:*

"Meaning		*Signal*
"Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units.	Preparing to sortie	1
A number of carriers	Preparing to sortie	2
Battleship divisions	All departed between 1st and 3rd	3
Carriers	Several departed between 1st and 3rd	4
Carriers	All departed between 1st and 3rd	5
Battleship division	All departed between 4th and 6th	6
Carriers	Several departed between 4th and 6th	7
Carriers	All departed between 4th and 6th	8"

"*2. Signals.*
"*I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:*

	Signal
"One light between 8 and 9 p. m	*1*
" " " 9 and 10 p. m	*2*
" " " 10 and 11 p. m	*3*
" " " 11 and 12 p. m	*4*
"II.	
"Two lights " 12 and 1 a. m	*5*
" " " 1 and 2 a. m	*6*
" " " 2 and 3 a. m	*7*
" " " 3 and 4 a. m	*8*

[*Part 2*]
"*III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight.*
"*If there is a 'star' on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals, 1, 2, 3, or 4.*
"*If there is a 'star' and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.*
"*IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:*

Times	*Signal*
"1900–2000	*3*
2000–2100	*4*
2100–2200	*5*
2200–2300	*6*
2300–2400	*7*
0000–0100	*8"*

"*V. K.G.M.B. *** Want ads.*
"*A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. Box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.*
"*B. CHIC . . CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.*
"*C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.*
"*3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium **** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40′ N., longitude 156° 19′ W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your signal is received:*

Time	*Signal*
From 7–8	*3 or 6*
From 8–9	*4 or 7*
From 9–10	*5 or 8*

**Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.*
***A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.*
****A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.*
*****At latitude 20–42–45 N., longitude 156–20–20 W."*

(*Translated by the Navy 12/11/41*)

"*From: Honolulu (Kita)*
"*To: Tokyo*
"*November 24, 1941.*
"*J–19.*

"*1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.*

"*2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaiana Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.*

"*3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas.*

"*4. The manner in which the fleet moves:*

"*Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of th island of Kahoolawe." (Translated by the Army 12/16/41.)*

Vice Admiral Wilkinson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, did not recall seeing translations of intercepted Japanese messages prior to the attack, relating to the presence of ships in Pearl Harbor. (Exhibit 13) (p. 406–7)

Asked whether it was his belief, prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941, that Japanese agents at Pearl Harbor were reporting United States ships there, Admiral Wilkinson replied that he believed such reports were being made; however, it was his belief that the Japanese were concerned about the presence of the fleet "with a view to its availability for distant operations rather than its susceptibility as a target." (p. 407)

On November 29th, there was an Army translation of a message from Manila to Tokyo, dated November 22, 1941 (Document 10, Exhibit 68), which reported on British and American ships at Mamila.

On December 3rd, the Navy translated an intercepted communication from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated November 15, 1941 (Doc. 24, Exhibit 63), which stated:

"As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not specifically recall this message, but may have seen it, as the Japanese were reporting a great mass of ship movement information, and he assumed they knew every move we made (page 781). He stated that it was routine for the Japanese to report ship movements and the fact that they reported such movements from Honolulu was not unusual (page 790).

To have gone the limit, he said, in tightening up on espionage and on Japanese facilities for getting information out might have precipitated the war which they were trying to delay. He pointed out that they did stop Japanese ships from using the Panama Canal and did reroute safely United States ships (page 795).

On December 4th the following intercepts were available:

1. Navy translation—(Document 12, Exhibit 68)

"From: Manila (Nihro)
"To: Tokyo
"25 November 1941
"(Purple)
"#790

"1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a comouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port. (Probably the U. S. HOLLAND of 8000 tons.)

"2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

"3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown."

2. Navy translation—(Document 14, Exhibit 68)

"From: Tokyo
"To: San Francisco
"29 November 1941
"(J19)
"Circular #2431

"Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

"Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed (or at which it arrived), and port of destination (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, on South China aeas."

On December 5th the following translations of intercepted communications were available:

1. Army translation—(Document 37, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo (Togo)
"To: Honolulu
"November 18, 1941
"J–19
"#113

"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, (Probably means Mamala Bay), and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy."

2. Navy translation—(Document 36, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Honolulu
"29 November 1941
"(J19)
"#122

"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements."

Admiral Stark testified that he may have seen these two messages, but that they did not change the situations as to which he had advised CincPac (page 781). Admiral Schuirmann did not remember seeing these (page 720).

3. Army translation—(Document 13, Exhibit 68)

"From Manila (Nihro)
"To: Tokyo
"November 28, 1941
"Purple
"#799

"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless, squalls come once a day."

On December 6, 1941, there was available in Washington an Army translation of an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18, 1941 (Document 40, Exhibit 63), reading as follows:

"1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219[a] (a—Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.) on that day.

"Area A[b]—(b—Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.) A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

"Area C[c]—(c—East Loch) 3 warships of the heavy cruiser classes were at anchor.

"2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, ENTERPRISE, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks 'KS.' 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D[d]—(d—Middle Loch).

"3. At 10:00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side."

Admiral Stark testified that he did not see this message (pages 781–2). Admiral Schuirmann similarly testified (page 719).

"It is of interest to note that a Japanese message from Tokyo to Honolulu, dated December 2, 1941, was intercepted, apparently on December 23rd, and translated by the Army on December 30th (Document 46, Exhibit 63), which read:

"(Secret outside the department)

"In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."

NOTE: This message was received here on December 23.

Also of interest is a similar message, dated December 6, 1941, translated by the Army, December 12, 1941 (Document 45, Exhibit 63), which directed that Honolulu wire immediately the movements of the fleet subsequent to December 4th.

Admiral J. R. Redman during the latter part of 1941 was Assistant Director of Naval Communications (page 1091). He said that the general tenor of Japanese traffic was a searching expedition all over the world, as to ship movement. This had been going on for a long time, but was intensified during the several months preceding December, 1941. There were about 700 dispatches in November 1941. In the last month prior to December 7th, diplomatic intercepts averaged 25 a day. September and October were heavy but there was an increase in November (page 1101).

Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (the location of ships in areas in Pearl Harbor) was more specific than the other ship movement dispatches (page 1104).

Admiral Turner did not specifically remember seeing the ships movements dispatches; they had been going on for a long time (page 1004).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not remember Documents 24, 36, and 37 of Exhibit 63 (ship movements reports). He would not have attached any significance to them as he presumed such reports were being made as a matter of routine; same as to Document 40 of Exhibit 63 (page 836). No record was kept of persons to whom these documents were shown at the time.

Commander Kramer said that he was generally familiar with Documents 24 and 36 in Exhibit 63 and stated that these would have been in daily folders submitted to the regular recipients of this class of information. As to ships movements, the Japanese were always reporting them, so that those were not unusual messages, but somewhat more emphatic (page 961).

Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 36 of Exhibit 63 (concerning reports even when there are no ship movements) on December 5th; Document 37 (requesting reports on certain areas at Pearl Harbor) on December 5th; Document 40 (giving the locations of ships at Pearl Harbor (about December 6th). Previously during the year similar intercepts were received, but Document 40 of Exhibit 63 was the first of the ship movement messages which had gone into detail as to the location of ships at Pearl Harbor at a specific time. It was received December 6, 1941 (page 974) (also page 976).

The inference he gathers from these is that the Japanese were concerned about the location of United States ships but they had also been concerned similarly about planes in the Philippines and all aspects of military establishments in the Netherlands East Indies (page 974). Moreover the inference was that since we were working with the British and Dutch, the Japanese were concerned about the action we were taking, and there was no indication from this material of overt intentions against the United States (page 975). This was, however, the first time the Japanese had asked for such detail (page 975).

XXVI. THE "WINDS" CODE AND MESSAGES

A. THE WINDS CODE

On November 28th, there was translated another intercepted Japanese communication establishing the "winds code," in addition to the previous message of November 26th, which in substance was as follows:

Navy translation—November 28, 1941 (Document 15, Exhibit 63):

"From: Tokyo

"To: Washington
"19 November 1941
"(J19)
"Circular #2353

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomtic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).

"(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (North wind cloudy).

"(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (West wind clear).

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

On December 5th, Alusna at Batavia advised OPNAV of a message "from Thorpe for Miles War Department" of a code intercept to the effect that Japan would notify her consuls of "war decision," by using the "winds code" words in Japanese weather broadcasts (See Documents 2 and 3, Exhibit 64).

B. MONITORING FOR THE CODE WORDS

Captain L. F. Safford testified that in 1941 he was in charge of the Security Section of Naval Communications, which collected information through intercepts (page 744). Document 15 of Exhibit 63 is the so-called "Winds Code," which was available to the Navy on November 28th. This was repeated by Documents 2 and 3 of Exhibit 64. There is no material difference in these messages (page 745). After receipt of these messages special effort was made to monitor for these messages. C. I. units at Pearl Harbor and Cairte were also monitoring (page 746).

Admiral Turner said that at the time when he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 he discussed it briefly with the Chief of Naval Operations and instructions were given to watch for the code words.

Commander Kramer said that he saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (Winds message) on November 28, 1941 (page 956). Arrangements were made to watch for any use of the Winds Code by the Japanese and to promptly notify senior officers who had cards showing the message.

C. ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF WINDS CODE

Admiral Kimmel was advised by a copy of a dispatch dated November 28th from CincAF to OPNAV (Exhibit 64), that according to an intercepted communication, if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed, certain words would be used in the Tokyo news broadcasts.

Captain Layton testified that he had not seen Document 15 of Exhibit 63, but had received the same information. Upon receipt of it special watches were set to intercept the execute of the winds code, but no execute was ever received (pages 905–6).

D. "WINDS" MESSAGES USING THE CODE WORDS FOR RUSSIA

On December 4, 1941, the Federal Communications Commission reported a Japanese radio broadcast apparently using the "winds code" words relating to Russia (Document 2, Exhibit 65), as follows:

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER

"KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS

"CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM"

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941

On December 5, 1941, the FCC reported another Japanese broadcast again apparently employing the "winds code" relating to Russia. The report (Document 3, Exhibit 65) was, in substance:

"TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH

(repeated 3 times)

"Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941"

Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood stated that he was watch officer in OP–20–G, Naval Communications (page 919A). He first saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (intercept establishing the Winds Code) about November 30, 1941 (page 920). On the evening of December 4, 1941, the FCC phoned an intercept to him. He did not remember the exact text, but it did not contain the words that he was looking for, which were the Japanese phrase: "Higashi No Kazeame." These to him would have indicated the severance of relations with the United States, and war.

The watch officers in Op–20–G had been instructed to telephone Admiral Noyes when an execute message was received (page 920). He telephoned Admiral

Noyes and thought that he again called the FCC (page 921). Admiral Noyes said to him, on receipt of the message, that "he thought the wind was blowing from a funny direction." He identified Document 2 of Exhibit 65 as apparently the message received from the FCC (page 921). This meant to him that there would be a break in diplomatic relations, not with the United States, but with Russia (page 921). He thinks that's why Admiral Noyes said to him that "the wind was blowing from a funny direction."

A pencil memo was the only written record of the above-described intercept. He did not know the disposition of this memo. He turned it over to the succeeding watch officer (page 922). He had no recollection of any confirmation of this message from the FCC (page 921). He did not know of any other intercept of an execute message of the Winds Code (page 923). He can account for the inability of the Navy to produce the message as recorded by him, or a confirmation of it, only from his own viewpoint: He had instructions to transmit the message orally, in view of its urgency. He, therefore, had to call Admiral Noyes at once. He did not think that they had been ordered to make any record of the message (page 925).

E. WAS THERE A "WINDS CODE" MESSAGE RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES?

In a statement before Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, Captain Safford testified concerning the "winds message" as follows:

He testified that in the Fall of 1943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. He realized that he would be one of the important witnesses and that his memory was vague. Accordingly, he began looking around to get information in order to prepare a written statement which he could use in his testimony. He noticed that in the Roberts report there was no reference to the "Winds Message" or to the dispatch which McCollum had drafted. Safford then began talking to everyone who had been around at the time to see what they could remember, and to see if they could give him leads so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. He talked the thing over with various of the Army people. (pages 112–114)

Captain Safford testified that he had written to Brotherhood and that Brotherhood had written back saying that he didn't care to tell Safford about the disposition of the copies of the "Winds Message," but when Brotherhood returned to the United States, Safford asked him about it and found out that there had been a misunderstanding. Brotherhood had been referring to the false "Winds Message" (Document 2 of Exhibit 65 of the Naval Court), which apparently related to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast (page 115).

Safford stated that he had information "third hand" concerning the Army's copies of the "Winds Message," and that he thought it might be confirmed in the testimony of Colonel Sadler before the Army investigation. He stated that his information from the Army came through W. F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst in the War Department, and that the information was that the copies of the "Winds Message" had been destroyed in the War Department by then Colonel Bissell on the direct orders of General Marshall. Safford also stated that Colonel Bratton of the War Department had had some question about the message and had asked Admiral Noyes by telephone for a copy of the original of the "Winds Message," but that Admiral Noyes had refused to comply on the grounds that the Navy translation was correct. This, he said, should appear in Colonel Bratton's testimony before the Army investigation. He also stated that a Captain Shukraft of the Army knew that the "Winds Message" had been received (pages 114–115).

Safford testified that he had talked with Kramer shortly before his testimony during this investigation, and that contrary to his earlier impression, Kramer told him that the "Winds Message" and various other intercepts relating to Japan had not been turned over to the Roberts Commission, but about 9 December 1941 had been collected and shown to Under Secretary Forrestal, during the absence of Secretary Knox. He also said that Kramer told him that he did not recall the "Winds Message" specifically. Safford also stated that the reference in McCollum's message to the "Winds Message" was very short and was the last item in McCollum's draft dispatch. (pages 117–118)

Safford testified that it now appears more likely that the "Winds Message" was received early in the morning of December 4th, Washington time, rather than the night before, because the watch officers who were on duty recollected only the false "Winds Message," and not the "True 'Winds Message'." The vagaries of high frequency radio, he said, resulted in the message being inter-

cepted only on the East Coast of the United States, and that such conditions were not unusual. He pointed out that they had to call on Corrigedor to cover the Tokyo-Berlin circuits because the combined efforts of intercept stations on the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than about fifty per cent coverage. Although he had no knowledge as to which Naval station allegedly intercepted the message, his first guess was the station at Cheltenham, Maryland, and his second guess was Winter Harbor, Maine. He stated that the logs of these stations and of the Navy Department had been destroyed during one of the numerous moves and no record had been kept. (pages 119–122)

Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4th (Exhibit 65, Naval Court), he said that this was the "false" message which appeared on the surface to use the "winds" code words relating to Russia, but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, he said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket. He said that that message was received twelve hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." (page 123)

Safford identified Document 4, Exhibit 65, as a true "winds" message relating to England, which was intercepted on 7 December 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor (page 124).

Safford testified that he had been advised that the Dutch had been monotoring for a "winds" execute message, but that prior to the attack they had intercepted no such message (page 540).

On being recalled for examination, Captain Safford testified that he never had a conversation with Colonel Sadler concerning the existence of a "winds" message. He stated that he could not recall distinctly whether or not he received a call from Brotherhood about December 4th in which Brotherhood advised of the receipt of a message apparently using the Russian "winds" code words. He had had a vague idea that there was another "winds" message, and, he said, the FCC intercept seemed to fill the bill. He said further, however, that until 1944 he did not recall having seen, or knowing of the FCC intercept in which the words relating to Russia were used (pages 538–539).

Captain Kramer said that he had testified previously conerning the "winds" message but wanted to go over that previous testimony in the light of thinking it over since that time. He said that he had had no recollection of a "winds" message at the time it was first mentioned to him, the spring of 1944, but after receiving from Safford some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, he did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, about the middle of the week, and did recall being shown such a message by the watch officer and walking with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while he turned it over to Captain Safford. Captain Kramer thought that that message had been a "winds" message, but did not recall the wording of it. He said it might have been one using the code words referring to the United States, as he previously testified, but he was less positive of that now than he had been at the time of his previous testimony. The reason for this revision of his view was that on thinking it over, he had a rather sharp recollection that in the latter part of the week preceding the attack there was still no specific mention of the United States in any of the Japanese traffic. For that reason he was under the impression when he testified during this investigation that the message referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too. He just didn't recall (pages 131–132).

Captain Kramer testified that on the morning of December 7th, a Japanese "hidden word" code message was received and was hurriedly translated by him as he was about to leave the Navy Department to deliver other messages. The message as translated by Kramer was, "Relations between Great Britain and Japan are not in accordance with expectations" (Exhibit 20). In his haste, Kramer overlooked the word "MINAMI" which was contained in the Japanese message and which referred to the United States. He testified that after he returned to the Navy Department and shortly before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he discovered his mistake and made a penciled correction on the file copy of the translation. He testified further that he believed that he made several telephone calls about fifteen minutes before the attack and advised the officer in charge of the Far Eastern Section of ONI and an officer of G–2 of the War Department. The copies of the translation in the Navy Department's files do not disclose any correction of the translation (Exhibit 20). Kramer testified concerning this that a number of copies of the translation were made at the time, and that undoubtedly his correction was made on another copy which has since been discarded (pages 133–135).

Captain Kramer also stated that he had been under the impression until he testified before this investigation that the "hidden word message" of 7 December 1941 had been a "Winds Message," but now recognized it as a "hidden word message." He stated that he thought that the "hidden word message," which he identified as having been received on 7 December, was among the group of messages shown to Mr. Forrestal about 9 December 1941, when he hastily reviewed a folder of that traffic for Mr. Forrestal. This was done, he said, because of the fact that previously Mr. Forrestal had not seen such material (pages 133–136).

Lieut. Comdr. Brotherhood testified that he was one of the four watch officers who were on watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week of December, 1941. He said that he had never received or seen an intercept or message wherein the "Winds Code" words relating to the United States were used. He said that about December 4th, he received a telephone message from the FCC in which the words apparently relating to Russia were used; that he called Admiral Noyes, who commented that the wind was blowing from a "funny" direction, and that he, Brotherhood, did not think at the time that it was an actual "Winds Message." Brotherhood stated that shortly before he testified in this investigation, he had had a conversation with Safford who stated that Brotherhood had called him about December 4th or 5th and had told him that such a message had arrived. Brotherhood said he did not recall the telephone conversation, but that as Captain Safford said he did make such a call, he (Brotherhood) believed, therefore, that he had called Captain Safford at that time (pages 144–147).

Lieut. Comdr. Linn testified that a 24-hour watch was maintained in Captain Safford's section; that he was senior officer of that watch, and was one of the four officers who stood that watch during the first week in December, 1941. Any intercept which had come into that section, he said, would have had to come through one of the four watch officers. He was familiar with the "Winds Code" and he never saw any intercept prior to 7 December 1941 in which the "winds" code words relating to the United States were useed (pages 140–142).

Lieut. Comdr. Pering's testimony was that he was one of the four watch officers standing watch during the first week of December, 1941, in Captain Safford's section. He knew of the existence of the "winds" code and he never saw any intercept using the code words relating to the United States or to any other nation (page 148).

Lieut. Comdr. Murray testified that he was one of the four watch officers standing a 24-hour watch in Captain Safford's section during the first week in December, 1941. He testified that no "winds" code execute relating to the United States ever came to his attention during that week. He said that after the attack, Linn had told him that a "winds" message had come in on 7 December 1941 (pages 433–441).

Lieut. Freeman testified that he was in a section which disseminated to ONI intelligence received from the field radio intelligence units; that his unit worked very closely with Captain Safford's unit, and that every effort was made to monitor for a "winds" message. Freeman was one of the officers mentioned by Captain Safford, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, as having personal knowledge of the receipt of a "winds" message relating to the United States. He testified that he never knew of or saw any intercept of a "winds" message relating to the United States (pages 149–150).

Captain McCollum testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that he had no knowledge of any message transmitted which contained the words relating to the United States; that the message which contained the words apparently relating to Russia had been received during the first week of December, 1941, but that in his opinion that was a bona fide weather report. He said further that during the first week of December, 1941, he drafted a dispatch summarizing the situation which he wanted to have sent out; that he remembered no reference to any "winds" message in that dispatch; and, that the dispatch was based on a memorandum of his dated 1 December 1941 which did not refer to a "winds" message (Exhibit 10). He did not know whether or not his draft dispatch had been sent out. It had been submitted to Admiral Wilkinson (pages 28–32).

Admiral Wilkinson testified that his only recollection of the "winds" code was that some time after the attack, some one, possibly Commander McCollum, had mentioned to him that a message using a "winds" code had been received. Possibly he said, it was the message received on the 7th using the words relating to England. He did not recall anything about the long dispatch which McCollum had drafted and which Captain Safford had testified Admiral Wilkinson had endeavored to have sent out (pages 398–401).

Captain Mason, who was Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander Fabian, who was in the Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor, both testified that intensive efforts had been made there to monitor for any Japanese broadcasts using the "winds" code, and that nothing was received wherein the words relating to the United States were used. In this connection, it should be noted that it was the view of the Navy Department that the unit at Corregidor because of its geographical location, was in a much better position to intercept Japanese radio broadcasts than were the units at Pearl Harbor or Washington (see Exhibit 8).

They also testified that close liaison was maintained with British Intelligence services in the Philippines, that the British had been monitoring for a "winds" message also, and that had such a message been received by the British, they most certainly would have been advised of its receipt, but that they received no information from the British as to the receipt of a "winds" message prior to the attack. (pages 73, 78)

Captain Layton, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, testified that he had been familiar with the "winds" code; that efforts were made to monitor for the use of that code; and all available Japanese language officers were placed on continuous watch on several circuits and were to cover all known news broadcasts emanating from Japan; that he checked up each day with Commander Rochefort and that no "winds intercept was received prior to 7 December 1941, nor did they receive any dispatch from any source stating that such an intercept had been heard.

Mr. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of the War Department, stated that prior to 7 December 1941 he had no information as to whether or not a "winds" message had been intercepted. He said that he had had several conversations with Captain Safford concerning the subject, the first one about a year and a half ago, and none later than six months prior to his testimony in this investigation. He said that Safford had indicated in the course of the early conversations that there had been a "winds" message, but that no copies could be found in the Navy's files, and that his theory was that it had been intercepted by a Navy East Coast station. Mr. Friedman also testified that about a year and a half ago he had a conversation with Colonel Sadler, who had indicated that a "winds" message had come in on the 4th or 5th of December; that he had been notified either directly or by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in; that there had been some question about the exact Japanese words which had been used, and that Sadler had not seen the message himself, and Mr. Friedman thought that Colonel Sadler also told him that they had tried to get a verification from Admiral Noyes but had not been successful, whereupon the G–2 authorities simply passed the matter over since there was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message. Mr. Friedman said that he had asked Sadler whether he had ever seen a copy of that message, and Colonel Sadler said that he had not, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Mr. Friedman testified that he regarded this as highly inconceivable, but that in conversation with Captain Safford he probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started, and that he had no idea that Safford would repeat that statement. Mr. Friedman had no knowledge, directly or indirectly, concerning the existence of a "winds" message relating to the United States, apart from his conversations with Captain Safford and Colonel Sadler (pages 515–520).

Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, testified that they monitored for any "winds" code message, covering all known broadcasts from Tokyo on a 24-hour basis, and that results were nil. He testified further that he had made an exhaustive search into all available Navy records and could find no trace of any "winds" message prior to 7 December 1941. (Pages 46–7.)

There was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether or not there had been any Japanese message using the "winds code" words relating to the United States:

(1) Witnesses who said that there was no such message or that they recalled no such message

Admiral Stark stated that he knew of no execute of the "winds message" (page 783).

Captain Wellborn said he knew of no "winds message" indicating that the Japanese were going to attack the United States. (p. 389)

General Marshall thought that he had been aware of the "Winds Code" (Document 15, Exhibit 63), but did not recall any execute message (page 872).

Admiral Noyes said no intercept of such an execute of the Winds Code was ever received in the Navy Department (page 1033. See pages 1047–8). The explanation of why such a "winds" message is missing from the Communications files is that no such message was ever received by naval means (page 1040).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he remembered the "winds" code (Document 15 of Exhibit 63), and probably saw it on November 29th. He recalled that there was some difference of opinion as to what it or the execution message meant. He did not know whether this was discussed with Admiral Stark, and did not remember what the doubt of the message was, but remembered that some message was received prior to December 7th (page 825). He did not know where the document, if any, showing a "winds" execute, was (page 826).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he knew of the "winds code" and that he recalled seeing on or about December 4th the Japanese broadcast directive indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States. He said that he did not know why this information had not been sent to Admiral Kimmel except that probably it had been supposed that the Hawaiian intercept station had also received that broadcast. He said it may have been because of this that a message in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes was sent. (p. 429)

Admiral Redman saw Document 15 of Exhibit 63 (winds code), but never saw any execute of it; he heard about it in discussions around December 6th or 7th, but doesn't remember where. He heard about it from Admiral Noyes and from Commander Kramer (page 1103).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he recalled that some broadcast had been intercepted, but that there was lack of agreement as to whether or not it constituted the "winds" message (page 723).

Lt. Comdr. Lynn and Lt. Comdr. Pering testified that they did not see any execute of the "winds" message (pages 740, 813).

Captain Layton said that the messages establishing the "winds code" signified that if the code word were sent it meant that diplomatic relations would be severed and anything could happen (page 907).

He did not know of the receipt by any unit of the Navy of any execute of the "winds" message (page 908). He asserted that if an execute of the "winds" message had been received, it would have been rapidly and aggressively acted upon (page 917); he believed that all personnel would have been recalled to their ships, an anti-submarine and distance patrol would have been started, and that a task force would have sortied (page 917). He did not think that the "war warning" message meant the same as the "winds code" for it concerned the cessation of negotiations but that did not necessarily mean the cessation of diplomatic relations or war (page 918).

(2) Witnesses who said that there was such a message, or some such message

Captain Safford stated that at 0800 on December 4, 1941, Lt. Murray, possibly Kramer, came in with a yellow teletype sheet and said, "Here it is." He thought that the message translated read: "War with America; War with England; Peace with Russia." He has not seen a copy of this since December 15, 1941. It came in from an East Coast station (page 746), but he can't determine what station. There was no confirmation of this intercept from other sources. He had a vague recollection of a second "winds" message, but was unable to find any trace until he testified before Admiral Hart. Since then he learned that the FCC had intercepted a "winds" message at Portland. He saw that message for the first time at the hearing and did not recognize it (page 747). He did not recall any of the messages in Exhibit 65 (FCC intercepts). They do not indicate a break with the United States.

He asserted that the "winds" message he saw on December 4th is not on file and cannot be found despite repeated search since November, 1943; that Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood had told him that he knew the disposition of them but did not care to tell him. The witness said he also knew what happened to the Army copies, through very "second-hand and devious sources" (pages 747–8).

He said that Document 15 of Exhibit 63 indicated that a "winds" message would be "a break of diplomatic relations;" the Dutch translation said it would mean "war." It was interpreted by DONI as meaning war and a signal for execution of Japanese war plans (page 748). Two sources said it meant a break in diplomatic relations; two said it meant war (page 748). The breaking of diplomatic relations and war were regarded by them, he said, as synonymous in Japanese-United States relations (page 754).

He was certain that an immediate distribution was made on December 4th of the "winds" message to CNO, DONI, Director of War Plans, Assistant CNO, State Department, White House, and War Department, and that Commander Kramer could tell about this (page 749). This information was not passed to CincPac, though McCullom wrote a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including this information, which dispatch was not sent. This draft dispatch had been given to Admiral Wilkinson, who wanted to sent it; Admiral Noyes said it was an "insult to intelligence of CincPac" (page 749). Admiral Wilkinson disagreed and went to the "front office" to try to get it released. He knew of no copy of this draft message now in existence (page 750).

In another lengthy statement at the close of the examination Captain Safford reviewed the McCollum dispatch and the "Winds" message as follows:

"On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the 'Winds Message', and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent. Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you think of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied, 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated, 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office.' Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this message of warning had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent. In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the 'Winds Message'. The 'Winds Message' was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia. We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-off from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State Department, War Department, and Navy Department. The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the 'Winds Message' when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corrigedor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard. All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone. The 'Winds Message' was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the 'Winds Message' was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not hearing the 'Winds Message' themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the 'Winds Message' had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in

Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the 'Winds Message' had been sent by Tokyo. The 'Winds Message' was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message' we had been looking for. The significant part of the 'Winds Message' read: 'HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI'. The literal translation of these phrases is: 'EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY'. The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: 'War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia.' I first saw the 'Winds Message' about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and piece of paper in his hand and said, 'Here it is!' as he handed me the 'Winds Message.' As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant 'Winds' underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department. As the direct result of the 'Winds Message.' I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station. As a direct result of the 'Winds Message', McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent. Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the 'Winds Message' as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent. We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest. The following officers recall having seen and having read the 'Winds Message': Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the 'Winds Message' had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The following officers should have some recollection of the 'Winds Message': U. S. Navy—Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army—Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft. The 'Winds Message' was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time." (p. 360–361)

Because his section knew the Japanese, he said, they considered them tricky and underhanded, and Japanese history showed that they began war without a declaration or the breaking of diplomatic relations (page 755).

Comander Kramer said that on December 3rd or 4th, he was shown a "winds" message by *CY watch officer* and took it immediately to Captain Safford, and Captain Safford took it to Admiral Noyes. Kramer did not handle this as it was a plain language message (page 956). The message received and shown him was "Higashi No Kazeame," translated as "East Wind Rain." This meant strained relations or a break in relations and possibly war with the United States. That message was on teletype paper when he saw it, which indicated that it had come through a USN Intercept Station. He has not seen this message since (page 957).

The different meanings he gave of the "winds" message are inherent in the nature of the Japanese language. He could not definitely interpret a message executing the code as meaning war (page 969).

The "winds" message did not necessarily mean war (page 987).

He has seen the messages in Exhibit 65, but he did not handle these (page 957). There is no question that the "important" documents in Exhibit 63 were in the folder delivered regularly to CNO (page 980). He was sure that the "winds" message was sent to the office of CNO (page 981).

Admiral Turner said that to his knowledge none of the code words were received prior to December 7, 1941. He changed his testimony and said that Admiral Noyes had called him on the telephone—the date he could not recall; he thought it was December 6th—and had said "the winds message has come in" (page 1004). He understood that Admiral Noyes had told CNO. He assumed that CincPac had the "winds" message. The "winds" message meant at least a break in diplomatic relations and probably war (page 1005).

(3) Testimony concerning the "McCollum Dispatch"

It will be recalled that Captain Safford testified that McCollum had drafted a long dispatch estimating the situation, and including information as to the "winds" message, which he and Admiral Wilkinson desired to send to Admiral Kimmel, and which Admiral Noyes opposed.

Admiral Noyes testified that he had discussed McCollum's dispatch with Admiral Wilkinson, and had thought that such estimates should come from CNO (page 1039).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall a draft dispatch prepared by Comdr. McCollum during this period which was not sent out (pages 154A, 780). Nor did he recall any conversations about this time concerning the sending of additional messages to Admiral Kimmel (page 165).

Admiral Turner said that he had known about the dispatch prepared by McCollum and had discussed it with McCollum. He did not know what happened to the dispatch, or whether it was transmitted. He thought he initialled it and gave it back to McCollum (page 998), but he "is not sure of it" (page 1004).

Commander Kramer heard, after December 7th, of a long draft dispatch which had been prepared by McCollum. He did not know how it had been handled (page 960).

Admirals Ingersoll and Redman did not recall the draft dispatch to CincPac which had been prepared by McCollum (pages 830, 1106).

XXVII. Information Sent to Admiral Kimmel After the "War Warning"

As of this time there was available to CincPac information of the organization of the Japanese fleets as follows:

(1) On 29 July 1941 the Office of Naval Intelligence issued a revised report, which had been prepared by Commander McCollum, dealing with the organization of the Japanese Navy. This report stated that as a result of information which had been received, it was possible to give a much more complete picture of the organization of the Japanese Navy. It stated that the Japanese naval forces afloat were organized into two main commands—the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The Combined Fleet included:

(a) First Fleet, or Battle Force.
(b) Second Fleet, or Scouting Force.
(c) Third Fleet, or Blockade and Shipping Control Force.
(d) Fourth Fleet, or Mandated Islands Defensive Force.
(e) Submarine Force (also called the Sixth Fleet).

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet, under the command of Admiral Yamamoto, consisted of various BatDivs, a CruDiv, three CarDivs and two destroyer squadrons. BatDiv 3 (KONGO, HIYEI, KIRISHIMA, HARUNA) was included. The carrier divisions were CarDiv 3 (ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU); CarDiv 5 (RYUJO, HOSHO); and CarDiv 7 (CHITOSE, CHIYODA, MIZUHO).

The Second Fleet, under the command of Vice Admiral Koga, included various cruiser divisions, two carrier divisions and two destroyer squadrons. CruDiv 8 (CHIKUMA and TONE) was included. The carrier divisions were: CarDiv 1 (AKAGI and KAGA); and CarDiv 2 (SORYU and HIRYU).

The Third Fleet included CarDiv 6 (NOTORO and KAMIKAWA MARU) and various minelayer and minesweeper divisions, a base force, and sub-chaser squadrons.

The composition of the Fourth Fleet or Mandates Fleet, and of the Submarine Fleet, and of the Japanese Naval Forces in China was also given (Hew. Exhibit 81; Hew. page 613).

(2) On 27 November 1941 (when the "war warning" was received) the Commander. in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, distributed Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin Number 45–41 (Exhibit 21). This bulletin dealt with the organization of the Japanese Navy and with Japanese forces and installations in the Mandated Islands. It was a revision of the ONI Bulletin above summarized and replaced that bulletin on the subject of the Japanese Fleet. This stated:

"The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below:

Major fleet commands

"I. Combined Fleet		
1. First Fleet	*(Battle Force)*	*3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons*
2. Second Fleet	*(Scouting Force)*	*4 Crudivs, 2 Desrons, etc.*
3. Third Fleet	*(Blockade & Transport Force)*	*Small Craft.*
4. Fourth Fleet	*(Mandate Defense Force)*	*1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units.*
5. Fifth Fleet		
6. Sixth Fleet	*(Submarine Fleet)*	*6 Subrons*
7. Carrier Fleet	*(Aircraft Carriers)*	*5 Cardivs*
8. Combined Air Force	*(Seaplane tenders, etc.)*	*4 Airrons, & shore based planes.*
"II. Japanese Naval Forces in China.	*(Staff Hdqrtrs.)*	*1 PG and 3 DD's*
1. First China Exped. Fleet	*(Central China)*	*Gunboats*
2. Second China Exped. Fleet	*(South China)*	*1 CA, 1 CL and small craft*
2. Third China Exped. Fleet	*(North China)*	*Torpedo Boats, etc.*
4. Southern Exped. Fleet	*(Saigon)*	*1 CL, transports and mine craft.*

"The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full war-time footing."

The Combined Fleet and First Fleet as listed in this bulletin included three BatDivs, among which was BatDiv 3 (HIYEI, KONGO, KIRISHIMA and HARUNA—as to the latter it was stated that it had been inactive during 1941 and was probably undergoing major repairs). Also included was a cruiser division and two destroyer squadrons.

The Second Fleet included four CruDivs and two destroyer squadrons. One of the CruDivs was CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA).

The composition of the Third, Fourth, and Sixth (Submarine) Fleets was given in some detail in this bulletin. As to a Fifth Fleet, it stated, "The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The flagship has been reported at Maizuru." (Exhibit 21; p. 185.)

Admiral McMorris stated that he did not know whether Washington kept CincPac fully informed but, he said, the information which was received was taken at its face value (page 899).

The "war warning," it will be recalled, had been sent to Admiral Kimmel on November 27th. On November 28th, the Army dispatch had been repeated to Admiral Kimmel, advising, among other things, that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. Also on November 28th, there had been sent to Admiral Kimmel a copy of CincAF's dispatch advising of the "winds code" to be used if diplomatic relations were on the verge of being severed. And, on the same day, he had been in communication with OPNAV concerning his plan for the reinforcement of Midway and Wake, and, in that connection there had been mention made of the shortage of anti-aircraft guns.

On November 30th, Admiral Kimmel sent a dispatch (Exhibit 77) urgently recommending the shipment of 37 mm. anti-aircraft guns and ammunition for familiarization and training.

On November 30, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch to CincAF for action and to CincPac for information (Exhibit 76), which advised in part:

"Indications that Japan about to attack points on KRA by overseas expedition X. Disire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt of this dispatch X.

A second similar dispatch was also sent on the same day (Exhibit 77) requesting a daily report from CincAF, even if there were no contacts and the information were all negative.

Exhibit 10 is a dispatch of November 30 from CNO to CinCAF, information CincPac.

Also on November 30th Admiral McMorris prepared, at the direction of Admiral Kimmel, a memorandum setting forth the steps which he recommended to be taken in the event of American-Japanese war within the ensuing twenty-four hours (Exhibit 69A). This was revised on December 5th and set forth the steps to be taken in the event of war within forty-eight hours (Exhibit 69B).

Vice Admiral McMorris testified that during the first week of December, 1941, he, and he was sure Admiral Kimmel, had in mind constantly the "war warning," the fact that the Japaese forces were, according to Intelligence, on the move, the fact that the Japanese were destroying codes, and that the Japanese in the past had attacked without declaration of war (p. 328).

He stated further that during that time he was also considering the tasks set forth in Phase IA of the Pacific Fleet Plan, and that daily or on alternate days he furnished Admiral Kimmel with an informal memorandum as to the action that should be taken by important elements of the Fleet if war were initiated within twenty-four hours. He stated that typical of such memoranda were Naval Court of Inquiry Exhibits 69A and 69B, which were dated 30 November and 5 December 1941, respectively (p. 328–329).

With reference to the Phase IA task of maintaining air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and the fact that no provision was made for carrying out that task, Vice Admiral McMorris testified that submarines were considered to be the greatest element of danger. He said that anti-submarine patrols had been placed in effect (p. 329).

At about this time, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel also received information concerning the estimated position of the Japanese Fleet. As Captain Layton expressed it:

Captain Layton testified that in accordance with the request of Admiral Kimmel, he prepared a memorandum for the Admiral, dealing with the location of the Japanese Fleet. This was prepared, according to Layton, on the evening of December 1st and was submitted by him to Admiral Kimmel on 2 December 1941. The original memorandum bears certain notations in red pencil which, Layton testified, were inserted by him on December 2nd prior to submission of the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel and which reflected the later information received after preparation of the memorandum on the night of December 1st–2nd. It also bears certain lead pencil notations which Layton identified as the handwriting of Admiral Kimmel. This memorandum, according to Layton, summarized his best estimate of the location of the Japanese Fleet, based on all information available to him and to Admiral Kimmel up to and including 1 December 1941.

Layton's estimate stated that from the best available information, units of the Orange (Japanese) fleet were "thought" to be located as listed in the memorandum. In the Kure-Sasebo area he listed the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, First Fleet, with six battleships, "(?)" and other units. He listed the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet, at Nagara initially and then corrected it in red to indicate that it was at Takao. Also in the Kure-Sasebo area he located Cruiser Division 8.

In the Shanghai area, Layton's estimate located the Commander in Chief, China Fleet, the Shanghai Base Force, and an air group.

In the Bako-Takao area, Layton listed Third Fleet submarine squadrons and various destroyers and the Commander of the Combined Air Force, with numerous air groups, and the KASUGA MARU (thought to be a converted carrier with 36 planes). He estimated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, had been en route to Takao (this he corrected in red pencil to indicate that he was at Takao) with a cruiser division, destroyers, and with "Csrdiv 4—two CV and four DD; Cardiv 3—two CV and 3 DD; Batdiv 3 less HARUNA—3 BB (maybe 2 BB)" and, he added in red pencil, certain cruisers and Destroyer Division 2.

In the Hainan-Canton area, Layton located the Commander in Chief of the South China Fleet and various cruisers and destroyers and transports. In the

French Indo-China Area, he located the Commander in Chief of an Expeditionary Fleet with various ships, including 21 transports and some base forces, among others. In the Mandates area, he located at Palao an air group and base force; at Truk, the Commander in Chief of the Fourth Fleet with cruisers and destroyers, and a base force and an air group. At Saipan he located the Commander in Chief of the Submarine Force with possibly submarines and various air groups and a base force. In the Marshalls area, he located various air groups and the carrier "KORYU? plus plane guards," and several submarine squadrons and base force (Hew. Es. 23).

Layton's memorandum did not make any reference to the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2 of the Japanese Fleet (which in fact were en route to attack Pearl Harbor). According to Layton, on 2 December 1941, during his conference with Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noticed and commented on the absence of information concerning Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. In his testimony, he described the conversation on this point as follows:

"Mr. SONNETT: Will you state the substance of what he said and what you said, as best you recall it?

"Captain LAYTON: As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of those units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect. . . . (P. 212–213)

"Mr. SONNETT: Your testimony, Captain, was not quite clear to me, arising out of your description of Admiral Kimmel's twinkle in his eye when he spoke. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the discussion about the absence of information concerning Cardivs 1 and 2 a serious jocular one?

"Captain LAYTON: His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardive 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head? or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location.

"Mr. SONNETT: He was conscious, therefore, of your lack of information about those carriers?

"Captain LAYTON: This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location" (P. 255–256).

On December 1, 1941, he submitted to Admiral Kimmel, on request, his estimate of the locations of all major units of the Japanese Navy (page 913). After this was typed, more recent information caused it to be changed, in red; it showed available in the Empire—4 aircraft carriers, 6 battleships, with a question mark after them, 4 heavy cruisers, with a question mark after them, and 12 destroyers—available for use in the home area. This was a portion of the entire Japanese Navy, the majority of which was shown as dispsed to the south and implicated in the impending moves, from their sources of information. The witness referred to his translation of a book ("a novel published in Tokyo to inflame public opinion toward larger armament money"—page 911), which stated that it would be very dangerous for Japan to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor using carriers, battleships, and cruisers; with Japan staking its existence on the move to the south it could not afford to gamble its defenses by sending some of this force on a raid which would denude the Empire of vessels. That was generally his reasoning (page 913).

Captain Layton further testified that there were delivered to him, for presentation to Admiral Kimmel, daily communication intelligence summaries, during the period of time subsequent to the sending and receipt of the dispatches of 26 November. (Page 192). Captain Layton identified such summaries for the period 14 October to 14 December 1941, (Exhibit 22), and pointed out that the initials appearing in the lower right hand corner of these documents reading HEK, appeared on the original and were the initials of Admiral Kimmel (Page 193–194).

Captain Layton stated further that on certain of the originals of the communication intelligence summaries there appeared underscoring of certain portions, and that certain of the underscores were performed by Admiral Kimmel while certain other marks appearing on the summaries, including marks as to direction finder bearings and positions of ships were made by he, himself (Captain Layton). (Page 193).

Captain Layton summarized and made reference in his testimony to what he considered to be the significant parts of the Communications Intelligence Summaries dated from 27 November to 6 December 1941, and of the dispatches received and sent during the same period, (Pages 194, 237, 244, 245), including his 1 December 1941 estimate as to the location of the Japanese Fleet Units, (pages 244, 245, 252, 253), and to the comments made on 2 December 1941 by Admiral Kimmel when, in discussing the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate, Admiral Kimmel noted and commented on the absence of the information concerning the location of two Japanese carrier divisions. (Pages 212, 213, 255, 256). This intelligence, as summarized by him, particularly concerning the locations of Japanese carriers, but not entirely confined to them, was briefly, as follows:

A. 27 November 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary Information of 27 November, delivered 28 November, was: Some tactical traffic from carriers. Four enciphered addressees were noted, indicating a new command and a newly formed unit became active in an operational or maneuverable stage and not in an administrative or routine role. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates; it was stated that carriers were still located in home waters. The commander of the submarine forces was located in the Chichijima area and this was of significance. (Page 194–196).

(2) The term, "home waters" as used in the summary, with reference to the location of the carriers, meant Japanese home waters, that is, the drill grounds of the Inland Sea and the approaches to Kyushu, the coastal offshore area, the Isei Bay area, and, in general, the waters surrounding Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. The term, "home waters" did not include Etorofu, since places in northern Japan, including Hokkaido and the Kuriles, were referred to as the high north area. The area east of Japan that would be included in the term, "home waters", would embrace perhaps 40 to 60 miles or more; it would be about the same distance that the United States Fleet operations would take us west of San Clemente, San Pedro or San Diego. The definition of the term, "home waters", as indicated above, was understood by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 198).

(b) (1) The Naval Attache at Shanghai in dispatch number 270855, reported sightings between Hong Kong and Shanghai, of many transports that were proceeding south, and that military wharves at Shanghai were abnormally empty. (Page 196).

(2) OpNav dispatch to CinCPac and CinCAF, information CinCLant, number 272337, was received. This was the war warning message. It directed an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46. (Page 196–197).

B. 28 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 28 November, delivered 29 November, it was noted that Tokyo originators were sending a considerably high precedence traffic to the Commander-in-Chief, Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. It was further noted that no movements of Combined Fleet Units were detected. Communications noted between the Army Commander on Formosa and the Commander, Amphibious Force, were considered a sure sign of amphibious operations. No submarine traffic was observed. (Page 198–200).

(b) (1) The following dispatch traffic occurred:

a. Com14 to OpNav, information CinCAF, stating the British consul advised the Japanese would attack Krakow Isthmus on 1 December without an ultimatum. (Page 200–201).

b. CinCAF to OpNav, CinCPac, Com14, Com16, establishing the winds code in two variations, one from Tokyo to the diplomatic net, the other from Japanese language foreign broadcasts. (Page 201).

c. Com16 to CinCAF, OpNav, CinCPac and Com14, advising that an unidentified ship had relieved the KASHII and was in the Camranh Bay-Saigon area. (Page 201).

d. OpNav to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Com16 and Com14, dispatch number 281633, advising of information received from the State Department of

various reports from sources in Asia concerning the movement of Japanese forces southward. (Page 201–202).

C. 29 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 29 November, delivered 30 November, it was noted that eleven messages from Tokyo intelligence, and four long messages from Tokyo radio intelligence were sent to major commanders. The Jaluit radio dirction finder station included the Commander, Submarines as an information addressee, which indicated that he was in the approaches to, or about to enter the Mandated Islands, likely the Marshalls.

It was noted that there was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, who was in charge of the south invasion forces, Carrier Division 3, along with 2 cruiser divisions, 2 destroyer squadrons, 2 submarine squadrons, the Third Fleet or Amphibious Forces, and the French-Indo-China Forces. The Commander of the Submarine Forces had his traffic routed through Saipan, though on the previous day, it had been routed through Chichijima, indicating a southerly or southeastern movement. (Page 202–204).

(2) The only reference to carriers appearing in the Communications Intelligence Summary of this date was that CarDiv 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet; and there was no other information on that date relating to Japanese carriers. (Page 205–206).

(3) It was believed that CarDiv 3 was composed of the RYUJO and Hosho. (Page 205).

(b) (1) The Communications Intelligence Unit at Cavite sent a dispatch noting general radio intelligence obtained by it on the previous two days. It referred, in dispatch number 261331, to new Japanese ship arrivals in the Takao area. (Page 204).

(2) There was received OpNav dispatch number 290110, addressed to Commander Northern Pacific Naval Frontier, Commander South Pacific Naval Frontier, information CinCPac and Commander Panama Naval Coastal Frontier, advising that the Army had sent a war warning dispatch to the Western Defense Command, and quoting that dispatch, which advised of the termination of the negotiations with the Japanese, stated hostile action possible at any moment, directed the undertaking of reconnaissance and preparations to carry out WPL-46. (Page 204–205).

D. 30 November 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 30 November, delivered 1 December, it was noted that general radio traffic was less than usual, and that the only tactical circuit was between the AKAGI and several MARU's. The significance of the term, "tactical circuit" is that the vessel itself, that is, the AKAGI, was using its own radio to call up and work directly the other vessels rather than work them through shore stations via the broadcast method which was the common practice in Japanese communications. The working of the AKAGI with the Marus, indicated that she was making arrangements for fuel or some administrative function, since a carrier would rarely address a Maru. (Page 206).

(2) It was noted further that the battleships KONGO and HIYEI were placed as units in the CinC, Second's task force. Captain Layton explained that while it was a mistake to place the HIYEI as a member of the second fleet's task force, as it is now known that the HIYEI was one of the battleships that attacked Pearl Harbor, and that it was, on 30 November 1941, on the high seas enroute to Pearl Harbor. This mistake was an error in fact but not an error in substance and arose from a bad identification of a ship similar to the HIYEI, that is, the HARUNA, which, in fact, did take part in the second expedition under the CinC, Second Fleet. (Page 207–208).

(3) It was further noted that there was a strong impression that the CinC, Third Fleet was on its way, and that there was a continued association of the Commander, Submarine Forces with Jaluit, which, along with his known progress through the Chichijima area to the Sapian zone, made his destination obviously the Marshalls. Consequently, the communication intelligence summary pointed out that this bore out Com14's previous contention that there was a submarine concentration in the Marshalls, not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines, but also a good portion of the submarines of the Submarine Force. (Page 208).

(4) It was also noted that there was in the Marshalls, a unit of plane guard destroyers, indicating the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although that fact was not confirmed. (Page 209).

(5) There were other indications of air-submarine operations from the Marshalls, following from the fact that Naval Air Squadron 24 plus the Yokohama Naval Air Corps were located there. (Page 208–209).

(6) The Communication Intelligence Summary of this date was initialed by Admiral (then Captain) McMorris, War Plans Officer. (Page 209).

(b) (1) CinCPac received from Com16 a dispatch addressed to OpNav, information CinCAF, CinCPac and Com14, to the effect that a reassignment of all Japanese naval calls had occurred at midnight, that they followed the same garble pattern as before, and that the shore addressees' call signs had not been changed. (Page 210).

(2) OpNav dispatch number 301709, addressed to CinCAF, information CinCPac, was received. It requested CinCAF to report daily as to whether any contacts were made in the air search being conducted between Manila and Camranh Bay, and that such reports should be made even though the results were negative. This search was being made by CinCAF in pursuant of the directive by OpNav in its dispatch number 300419. (Page 210).

E. 1 December 1941:

(a) (1) In the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 1 December, delivered 2 December, it was confirmed that all service radio calls of the Japanese naval forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 1 December, minus nine time. (Page 213).

(2) This change in service calls was of particular significance since it was the Japanese custom ordinarily not to change their radio calls until after the same had been in use for a period of six months or more. The last change in calls had occurred on 1 November 1941, so that the discontinued service calls had been used for only one month. This indicated a progressive step toward preparing for active operations on a large scale. (P. 213).

(3) Captain Layton testified that the underlining in red on the original of the communication intelligence summary of the words that the change in calls indicated a progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale was, to the best of his recollection, made by Admiral Kimmel. (Page 213–214).

(4) It was further noted in the communication intelligence summary that the Japanese were adopting more and more security provisions in handling their radio traffic. (Page 213–214).

(5) No change was noted as to the location of the Submarine Force, which was believed to be eastward of the line between Yokosuka-Chichijima-Saipan, and under "carriers", it was stated that there was no change. This, Capt. Layton explained, meant that there was no change in the previous report as to the location of carriers. The last report as to carriers, he stated, was that they were in the Empire area with the exception of Car-Div 3, and with the further exception that there was possibly 1 carrier in the Mandates. (Page 215).

(6) The Communications Intelligence Summary noted further that there was nothing to report concerning the Fifth Fleet. (Page 215).

(7) Captain Layton explained that the Fifth Fleet was on organization of which little or nothing was known but there that were indications in the past that it was a force assembled for operations in the Northern waters. (Page 216).

(b) The following dispatches were handled:

(1) OpNav to CinCAF and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14, referring to an intrigue in Thailand, intended to draw the British and Japanese into war over that country. (Page 217).

(2) Com 16 to CinCAF, information CinCPac, Com14 and OpNav, advising that Japanese station JVJ in closing at 1700 hours, presumably minus nine time, stated that all listeners should be sure to tune in at 0700 tomorrow morning since there may be important news. Com16 suggested several radio frequencies that might be used. (Page 217).

(3) Com16 advised of the results of its radio intelligence activity which included the obtaining of information of Jap ship arrivals in the Takao area, which were under the command of the CinC, Third Fleet, and that the ATAGO had shifted from the Kure to the Sasebo communication zone and was apparently enroute to South China waters. (Page 217–218).

It also advised that there was an impression that the broadcast scheduled by the Japanese radio station JVJ, indicated above, would be an execute winds code message. Captain Layton testified that as a result of receiving this dispatch, the monitors were put on a double alert but nothing came of it. (Page 218).

F. 2 December 1941:

(a) (1) On this day there was presented by Captain (then Lieutenant Commander) Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the 1 December 1941 Layton estimate

of the location of the Japanese Fleet Unit. Admiral Kimmel directed Layton to prepare the estimate late on the afternoon of Sunday, 30 November 1941, directing that it be prepared as of 1 December. (Page 210).

(2) The memorandum was prepared by Layton and dated 1 December, and, afterwards, Layton obtained certain substantiating and additional information from the officer who prepared the daily communication intelligence summaries. When the 1 December estimate was shown by Layton to Admiral Kimmel, the Admiral noted that it contained a typographical error on page 4, which he corrected in his handwriting. (The error consisted of a reference to "20 CL", which should have read, and was corrected by Admiral Kimmel to read "2 OCL". The 1 December Layton estimate is exhibit 23. (Page 211).

(3) Admiral Kimmel discused this estimate with Layton and noted that it did not contain any information as to the locations of the Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers, though it did list Carrier Divisions 3 and 4, and the KASUGA MARU, 1 XCV, as being located in the Bako-Takao area, and the KORYU, 1 CV, in the Marshalls. It was in connection with the absence of reliable information on which to base an estimate as to the locations of CarDivs 1 and 2 that Admiral Kimmel addressed to Layton the question whether they might be rounding Diamond Head at that moment or words to that effect, to which Layton replied that he hoped that in such case they would be sighted before now. (Page 211–212–213).

(b) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary of 2 December, delivered 3 December, that the Japanese were having difficulty in routing their radio traffic, which arose from their change in call signs, which was probably due to the unfamiliarity of the operators with the new calls and with the location of the units affected. The summary noted that Com16 reported the Second and Third Fleets to be in the Takao area, but the Communication Intelligence Unit in Hawaii noted that there was one indication that the two fleets were not close to Takao and it expressed a belief that a large fleet, made up of First, Second Third Fleet Units, had left Empire waters and was proceeding on a course that was not close to Takao. (Page 218).

(2) The First Fleet appeared to remain relatively quiet. The association of the Submarine Force with the Mandates Fleet continued. Under "carriers" it was stated, "almost a complete blank on information of the carriers today." It was stated further that though over 200 service calls had been partially identified since the 1st of December, yet not one carrier call had been recovered since that date, causing it to be evident that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page 219).

(3) Captain Layton stated that Admiral Kimmel read the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary with reference to carriers, and the failure to identify carrier call signs, as well as the information that carrier traffic was at a low ebb. (Page 220).

(4) Captain Layton explained the difference between the reference in the Communication Intelligence Summary that there was almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, and the reference in this summary in connection with the Second Fleet that a lack of new identification contributed to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet was underway in company, as follows:

a. There was no radio silence insofar as the Second Fleet was concerned.

b. The Second Fleet was using its radio and was on the air on known frequencies;

c. That Fleet was handling a normal pattern of traffic; there was a normal number of calls in its circuits though a number of them were not identified.

The lack of identification was due to the change in call signs. However, the normal amount of the traffic, associated with the lack of identification, caused it to be believed that the Second Fleet was at sea. However, with reference to carriers, there was a complete blank of information, meaning that the carrier circuits were definitely not up to normal use. This would have meant either that the carriers were under radio silence wherever located or operating, or else that they were operating so close to home that they were using a broadcast frequency which could not be heard far away. (Page 220–225).

(5) Captain Layton in his testimony, however, insisted that the statement in the Communication Intelligence Summary that carrier traffic was at a low ebb did not signify anything unusual to him at that time, (page 225), since it was sometimes the custom of the Japanese to take their carriers into the Inland Sea area where they would not be heard from for a considerable period of time. (Page 225–226).

(6) He stated that he could not recall whether he had any discussions with Admiral Kimmel concerning the lack of carrier traffic. (Page 226).

(c) (1) Com16 advised OpNav, CinCPac, CinCAF and Com14 that the CinC, Second and Third Fleets were in the Takao area, and stated further that the Japanese Ambassador at Bangkok has requested permission to destroy all but a limited number of codes. (Page 226).

(2) CinCAF dispatch number 020345 to OpNav, Information CinCPac advised that a patrol plane had spotted nine submarines on a southerly course. (Page 226).

(3) CinCAF dispatch number 020730 to OpNav, information CinCPac, reported further sightings of Japanese submarines and some ships in Comranh Bay. (Page 226–227).

(4) Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai to OpNav, information CinCPac, advised of Japanese troop movements in the vicinity of Shanghai. (Page 227).

G. 3 December 1941:

(a) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 3 December, delivered 4 December, that though the volume of traffic was normal, the state of call recovery did not permit much detailed information to be obtained. It was noted that there was an extensive use of alternate calls by major commands which slowed up identification. It was stated "no information on Japanese submarines or carriers." (Page 227–228).

(b) (1) On this day, OpNav addressed a dispatch to CinCAF and Com16, information CinCPac and Com14 that Tokyo had ordered its embassies to destroy its purple machine. (Page 228). Captain Layton obtained information as to what the purple machine was and at Admiral Kimmel's request, advised him of that information. (Page 228–229). Admiral Kimmel was also advised that the Japanese consul in Hawaii was burning papers. (Page 229).

(2) OpNav in dispatch number 031850 advised that Japanese diplomatic and consular posts were destroying their codes and important papers. (Page 230).

(3) The Naval Attache in Singapore in dispatch number 020335 stated that the Cinc, China Fleet had restricted the movement of Allied ships in China waters. (Page 230).

H. 4 December 1941:

(a) (1) It was noted in the Communication Intelligence Summary information of 4 December, delivered 5 December, that an important move had been made by the Takao radio in inaugurating a Fleet broadcast using the same prefix indicator that was used by the Tokyo radio, showing that Takao had now assumed the position of handling major fleet traffic on high speed circuits. Many urgent messages were also noted, being addressed by Tokyo to major commanders and among these was a seven part Tokyo intelligence dispatch. The outstanding item of the day was the lack of messages originating from the CinC, Second and Third Fleets, who previously had been very talkative and now very quiet. (Page 230–231).

(2) There was no traffic which enabled any check to be made on the presence of the Fourth Fleet Units in the Marshalls. The impression obtained from the fact that the previously talkative commanders were silent, though still prominent as addressees, especially of intelligence dispatches, was that they were at sea and maintaining radio silence though still receiving. Captain Layton explained that as of that time the Japanese had not learned how to use the American trick of putting out messages without indicating who was the originator. (Page 232).

(b) (1) The dispatches handled on this day referred to Japanese troop and ship movements of China and Indo-China, and other general information, obtained from the Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai, dispatch numbers 020704, and 020702, and Naval Attache, Tokyo, dispatch number 030630. (Page 232–233).

I. 5 December 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 5 December, delivered 6 December, noted that the traffic volume was extremely heavy and that all circuits were overloaded. There were many messages of high precedence which appeared to cause a jammed condition on all circuits. Neither the CinC, Third or Second Fleets originated any traffic although they were still frequently addressed, and it is believed that they were undoubtedly in the Takao area or further south. (Page 233–234).

(2) It was noted that a number of Marus had addressed the CinC, Third Fleet, and there was traffic strengthening the impression that the CinC, Fourth Fleet, was in the Marshalls. There was no traffic from the Commanders of the Carrier or Submarine Forces. (Page 233–235).

J. 6 December 1941:

(a) (1) The Communication Intelligence Summary of 6 December was not delivered until after the attack on 7 December. (Page 235).

(b) (1) Certain dispatches were also received on the 7th, which Captain Layton thought were received after the attack. (Page 235–237).

The information sent to Admiral Kimmel.

(ii) Vice Admiral McMorris testified that in advising Admiral Kimmel during the critical period of 1941, he considered the negative as well as the positive information available concerning the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers, and that such negative information included the Intelligence that there was no information as to the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers (page 330).

during this period, as previously noted, included the fortnightly summary of current national situations, prepared by ONI and issued on December 1, 1941 (Exhibit 57). In addition to the military and naval information furnished, this stated, concerning the Japanese diplomatic situation, that unless the Japanese requested a continuance of the conversations, the Japanese-American negotiations would have virtually broken down; the Japanese government and press were proclaiming loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work of building the greater East Asia sphere; the press was also criticising Thailand severely; strong indications pointed to an early Japanese advance against Thailand; and, relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.

On December 2, 1941, Admiral Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark (Exhibit 50) and advised that Admiral Halsey's advance in the ENTERPRISE to Wake had been covered by two patrol squadrons operating from Johnston, Midway, and Wake, and that upon completion of the movement, Admiral Kimmel planned to return one squadron to Pearl Harbor and leave the other at Midway and awaiting developments. The letter discussed the difficulty of supply and defense of the outlying islands. The letter also stated that consideration was being given to the dispatches concerning the use of Army personnel in outlying islands; and, that Admiral Kimmel had frequently called Admiral Stark's attention to the inadequacy of Army anti-aircraft defense in the Pearl Harbor area, with particular reference to the shortage of anti-aircraft guns. So far, he said, very little had been done to improve this situation. It was pointed out that because of the Army's lack of equipment, Admiral Kimmel was unable to understand the dispatches directing that the Army be utilized in the defense of the outlying islands.

A postscript to this letter stated, "You will note that I have issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to depth bomb all submarine contacts in the Oahu operating area." It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he took no exception to this (page 153).

In connection with the Army's development of airfields in Fiji and New Caledonia, Admiral Kimmel stated in a further postscript to his letter that the Navy was bound to be involved in the protection of shipping and of the fields. He said, "I fear we may become so much concerned with defensive roles, that we may become unable to take the offensive. Too much diversion of effort for defense will leave us an inadequate force with which to take the offensive."

Also on December 2nd, Admiral Kimmel sent an official letter to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the defense of outlying islands and referring, among other things, to the November 28th dispatches in this connection. After some discussion, this letter concluded that Marine armament could be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very limited extent; that, if the Marines were replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking equipment, would be valueless as a defense battalion; that replacing the Marines would very materially weaken the defense because of less proficient personnel; and, that considering all aspects, Marine planes were more valuable in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.

It was also stated that the presence of Army forces on outlying bases would inevitably bring up the question of command; that Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra were Navy bases; that unity of command would be necessary; and, that command would have to be vested in the Navy's commanding officer at each station.

This letter also said that Admiral Kimmel had conferred with General Short on the matter and that arrangements were in progress looking toward the organization of three Army defense battalions, the training of such units with available equipment, the obtaining by the Army of requisite equipment, the Army organization of three pursuit plane squadrons to be kept in expeditionary status, and bringing said units to a satisfactory state of readiness and keeping them available to support or replace Marines or for use on other islands not manned by Marines.

Admiral Kimmel stated also that the major point was that the Advanced Bases were "going concerns;" that "the international situation is such that active

defense against hostile forces may be required on extremely short notice;" and, that any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if there were compelling necessity therefor.

In his letter Admiral Kimmel also expressed "growing concern" over the increase in the Army and Navy stations that might require support from the Fleet; that such involvement "may seriously interfere with offensive operations of the Fleet;" that this should be curtailed; and, that the Fleet in a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific could not contribute very much toward victory over a power thousands of miles to the westward.

Admiral Kimmel's letter closed with various recommendations consistent with the views expressed in his letter.

Admiral Smith, during recross examination by Admiral Stark, said that Admiral Kimmel had regularly reported to Admiral Stark the action he took, but not after the "war warning" message (page 552). On recross by Admiral Kimmel, he stated that Exhibit 50, the December 2nd letter, did report what Admiral Kimmel was doing. Admiral Stark's lawyer contended this was not a reply to that message but to the earlier one about plane movements; the witness finally characterized the letter as a "routine weekly report" (pages 533–534). He remembered no dispatch which reported the action taken by Admiral Kimmel after the "war warning" (page 554), but said "probably there was" (page 555).

In addition to the December 2nd letter, it will be recalled, Admiral Kimmel had sent a dispatch on November 28th, concerning the same subject.

On December 3, 1941, OPNAV sent two dispatches advising of Japanese instructions to destroy codes, as follows:

1. A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, ComSIXTEEN for action, and to CinPac and ComFOURTEEN for information which advised that Tokyo ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy Purple machine and the Batavia machine already had been sent to Tokyo; Washington also had been directed to destroy the Purple and all but one copy of other systems, and all secret documents; also, that the British Admiralty had reported that the Embassy at London had complied (Exhibit 66).

> **Captain Safford referred to OpNav secret dispatch Ø31855 which he said he prepared on December 3, and to a similar dispatch released by Admiral Wilkinson. He then said:**
>
> **"Before drafting my message, I called Commander McCollum on the telephone and asked him, 'Are you people in Naval Intelligence doing *anything* to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet?' McCollum emphasized both 'we's' . . . McCollum replied, '*We* are doing everything *we* can to get the news out to the Fleet.' In sending this information, I was overstepping the bounds as established by approved war plans and joint agreement between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence, but I did it because I thought McCollum had been unable to get his message released. OpNav Ø31855 was addressed to CinCAF and Com 16 for action, but was routed to CinCPac and Com 14 for information. It was written in highly technical language and only one officer present at Pearl Harbor, the late Lieutenant H. M. Coleman, U. S. N., on CinCPac's Staff, could have explained its significance." (p. 359–360)**
>
> **Captain Safford said that the unit in the Fourteenth Naval District did not have any material from which they could have gained this information through their own efforts. (p. 360)**

2. A dispatch from OPNAV to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, for action:

"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important and confidential and secret documents" (Exhibit 20)

> **Admiral Pye said that he saw the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes and discussed it with the Commander in Chief, that it seemed perfectly evident that such action could precede war by many days and it did not indicate immediate action. They were unaware of the source of this information and as it had appeared in the newspapers it probably did not mean as much as it would have meant had they known the source. Admiral Pye felt that at Oahu they were pretty much operating in the dark so far as the international situation was concerned. (p. 157)**

Exhibit 11 is the December 3 dispatch by CNO to CinCAF, CinCPac and others.

Concerning the code destruction messages, Admiral Turner said that it was impossible for him to understand how anyone could believe that because of the messages the war was coming in the Western Pacific and would not involve Oahu. He pointed out that both Washington and Manila had been included in the dispatch.

Admiral McMorris said that the December 3rd dispatch concerning codes was the best indication, in his opinion, that the United States would be involved in war with Japan. He did not recall Admiral Kimmel's view. (p. 247)

Admiral Anderson said that he had not precise knowledge but he thought that there had been a proper dissemination of information among the officers of the higher command. He saw the Commander in Chief at least weekly. Admiral Anderson did not think that he had seen nor had he been told about the October 16 dispatch. (p. 392). Admiral Anderson could not recall the November 24 dispatch or the November 30 dispatch to CinCAF with copy to CinCPac for information. He did remember having seen the war warning and believed that he had seen the December 3 dispatch.

As a matter of interest, it may be noted that a sentence appearing at the end of this copy of the dispatch, which was released by T. S. Wilkinson, was stricken out in pencil. That sentence read: "From foregoing infer that Orange plans early action in Southeast Asia."

On December 4, 1941, OPNAV sent a dispatch (Exhibit 21) to NavStaGuam for action, and to CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, and ComSIXTEEN for information stating:

"Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified mat matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CincAF, CincPac, ComFOURTEEN, ComSIXTEEN, and OpNav X Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained"

On December 6, 1941, a dispatch (Exhibit 22) bearing time-date stamp 061743 was sent by OPNAV to CincPac for action, and to CincAF for information. This stated:

"In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment"

Commander Kramer drafted Exhibit 66, the December 3rd dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of the "purple" machine. This was sent on the "Kopek" Channel, which was a channel for technical traffic between the Navy Department, Pearl Harbor and the Asiatic Station (page 971). It indicated, he said, a break in diplomatic relations. Exhibit 20, sent out by OPNAV on the same day as Exhibit 66, was the interpretive dispatch of Exhibit 66 (page 960).

Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 21 (dispatch to Guam of December 4th, directing the destruction of codes) was prepared by him and motivated by the growing feeling that war in the Pacific was imminent (page 1031). It was released by Admiral Ingersoll.

Admiral Noyes said that Exhibit 22 (authorizing destruction of codes on outlying islands, dated December 6, 1941) was prepared by him and treated as priority dispatch, despite the lack of priority shown on its face (pages 1040, 1042).

Admiral Stark testified that the code destruction message was sent to Guam because he felt that Guam was in the most danger; he did not similarly advise ComFOURTEEN because he did not think Hawaii was in as much danger as was Guam (page 69). At this time, Admiral Stark testified, he believed that war was imminent. Of particular significance, he felt, was the information relating the destruction of codes (pages 165–6). He also knew that the Japanese consuls were advising the evacuation of Japanese nationals from Malay, the Philippines, Hawaii, the United States, etc. (page 157). Admiral Ingersoll stated that the dispatch concerning Japanese destruction of codes strengthened the "war warning" (page 835).

Admiral Turner said that on Friday, December 5, 1941, there was a discussion between Admiral Stark, Admiral Ingersoll and himself concerning the general situation, and they all felt that all necessary orders had been issued to all echelons of command preparatory to war and that nothing further was necessary (page

1006). They did send some other messages about destruction of codes, both Japanese and our own (page 1007).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he regarded the dispatches concerning Japanese destruction of codes as indicating that the Japanese were going to take steps to prevent the seizure of their codes upon the breaking off of diplomatic negotiations, and regarded the dispatch directing Guam to destroy classified matter as a general precautionary measure (page 327). He "presumed" that he received the December 6th dispatch prior to the attack (page 327).

Admiral Smith testified that he saw the dispatches relating to the destruction of codes but that this meant little to him as CincPac was prepared to destroy codes (page 533). At this time, he said, war was inevitable (page 534).

About December 3rd, Admiral Smith said, after receipt of the dispatch of that date, and information from the Asiatic Fleet to the effect that heavy Japanese movements were on the way to the Southward, he believed that the Japanese were going to attack Malay Peninsula and possibly the Philippines; he thinks that the reaction of others at Admiral Kimmel's headquarters was the same.

Admiral Pye testified that he saw Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) on December 4th, but that this information was published in the newspapers (page 427). Admiral Pye testified that he had not seen Exhibits 21 and 22 (Page 428).

Commander Rochefort, who was in charge of combat intelligence of the Fourteenth Naval District, stated that during this period the Japanese Consulate was burning or destroying various papers (page 474).

Captain Layton said that the messages concerning Japanese code destruction meant to him only that the Japanese were destroying a cipher machine; he knew "purple" designated it as a diplomatic code (pages 904–5) and that the "purple" cipher was a high class cipher (page 908).

On December 5, 1941, he said, they received word from the Naval Observer at Wellington that the Japanese were destroying codes. This was given to CincPac and was considered along with other information received at that time (page 906). At that time, they received messages from the British and from Washington stating that highly secret and reliable information indicated a Japanese attack on the Kra Peninsula; this seemed to dovetail with the other information which they had (page 906).

There was a discussion concerning the significance of the code destruction messages; they seemed to indicate to Layton that Japan was preparing for all eventualities. He presumed that when it was discussed by Admiral Kimmel with the War Plans Officer and others, it was a matter of discussion (page 906).

Admiral McMorris said that he felt that Exhibit 20 (Japanese destroying codes) indicated strongly that there would be war with Japan. He did not recall whether this opinion was prevalent on CincPac's staff, but believed it was thought by CincPac that war was then extremely possible (page 895).

It may be noted that although Admiral Kimmel stated that he had kept General Short informed, he did not personally direct that General Short be given the dispatches concerning codes destruction (Exhibits 20, 21, 22) and did not know whether they were given to him (page 327).

The only action that Admiral Bloch recalled as a result of the December 3 dispatch concerning the destruction of codes was the security measures already prescribed, the additional inshore patrol in Honolulu, a warning that was given to the Destroyer captains, and his belief the Army was on a full alert. (p. 18)

Admiral Bloch did not believe that the Army had been informed of these warning (code) messages. The messages, he said, were secret and they had been admonished to keep them secret to prevent alarming people, and one thing and another, Admiral Bloch's War Plans Officer would know about them. Admiral Bloch said that since General Short and he saw one another very frequently and Admiral Kimmel and he saw one another practically every day, it is hard to believe that anything of importance could take place or that anything could be received of even small importance that was not discussed because it is only fair to assume that they discussed everything. (p. 18)

General Short, he said, had an Army Colonel as a liaison officer in Admiral Bloch's office and Admiral Bloch had in the General's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve as a liaison officer and these men were supposed to be kept informed. Admiral Bloch's liaison officer did not know of the dis-

patches that had been received because Admiral Bloch did not consider that it was proper to tell him; he was quite inexperienced. Nor was Admiral Bloch sure that the Army's liaison officer knew of the messages, but he said they were in close touch through these liaison officers and felt that they knew what was going on. He said that it was indicated that there were some things which they were not correctly informed about. (p. 18)

Neither General Short nor his Chief of Staff recalled having seen these messages prior to the attack (pages 255, 486).

XXVIII. The "Mori" Conversation; Japanese Burning Papers

General Short testified that about December 5th or 6th, he received intelligence reports to the effect that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers.

Admiral Bloch said that after the receipt of information to the effect that the Japanese were burning papers, he didn't know whether or not that was something that was really filled with meaning; he believed that so long as there were negotiations going on in Washington, there was a possibility of the period of waiting being extended; he had a very definite feeling that we were going to have war sometime in the future but just how far in the future he was unable to predict. (p. 17)

Lt. Stephenson discussed in some detail the Mori telephone conversation intercepted on December 6, 1941 and stated his conclusion that he believed it unlikely that this was a calculated transmission of information from Honolulu to Japan.

On December 6th, he received a report of a long telephone conversation between a person named "Mori" and someone in Japan, in which references were made to the weather, ships at Pearl Harbor, and the local attitude toward the Japanese (page 233).

The Mori conversation was as follows:

(*Exhibit 39*)

IC (J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present.
Are airplanes flying daily?
(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes?
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren't so many now. There were more in the beginning part of this year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
(H) I do not know why this is so, but appears that there are very few sailors here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?
(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don't the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. Alll races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying here from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That's fine.
(H) Yes, it's fine, but we feel a bit amazed.

(J) *Has there been any increase in . . ? . . of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.*

(H) *There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.*

(J) *What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?*

(H) *Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and plumbers. Students at the High School and University have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.*

(J) *Are there many big factories there?*

(H) *No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.*

(J) *Is that so?*

(H) *It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.*

(J) *How large is the population?*

(H) *The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.*

(J) *What is the population?*

(H) *About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.*

(J) *What about night time?*

(H) *There seem to be precautionary measures taken.*

(J) *What about searchlights?*

(H) *Well, not much to talk about.*

(J) *Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?*

(H) *No.*

(J) *What about the Honolulu newspapers?*

(H) *The comments by the papers are pretty bad They are opposite to the atmosphere pervading the city. I don't know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.*

(J) *What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?*

(H) *A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.*

(J) *Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?*

(H) *There are almost none wishing to do that.*

(J) *What is the climate there now?*

(H) *These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly a very unusual climate.*

(J) *Is that so?*

(H) *Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.*

(J) *Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?*

(H) *No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.*

(J) *Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.*

(H) *Yes.*

(J) *What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?*

(H) *A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.*

(J) *Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?*

(H) *Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.*

(J) *Do you know anything about the United States fleet?*

(H) *No, I don't know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don't know whether all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.*

(J) *Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?*

(H) *Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now.*

*(J) *does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn't know.*

(J) *Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?*

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.

(J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

**(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masamuno"; that a person named Takogishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Taiyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roe for this year's New Year's celebration.*

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the Army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

(H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Thank you.

(J) Off phone.

XXIX. The Likelihood of a Japanese Attack at Hawaii as Estimated Washington December 6, 1941

A. NAVY ESTIMATES

Admiral Stark testified that as of December 6, 1941, he considered that a United States and Japanese war was imminent and that there was a strong probability that Japan would strike. He thought that the Philippines and Guam were the most likely targets, of United States territory. He considered that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was possible but, he said, he thought that there was a good chance that any attack there would be detected in time to intercept it or to reduce its effectiveness (pages 73, 165). However, he had no information indicating that such an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable (pages 105, 792). Generally speaking, he said, he and his advisors did not expect a raid on Hawaii (page 798).

Captain Wellborn said that there were various individuals in the Navy Department who felt that an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable—such as Admiral Turner, and there were others who felt that it was less probable, although possible, such as Admirals Ingersoll and Stark.

Admiral Turner, on the other hand, testified that he had expected a landing in Southeast Asia, attacks on the Philippines and some form of attack on Hawaii

(page 1002). He had thought that an aerial torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor was not only possible (page 997) but that it was a probability, and he was not surprised when it was made (page 1021).

Captain Glover said that a daily short strategic summary of the international military and political situation had been prepared by Commander Ansel in collaboration with Captain Wright and submitted to Admiral Turner. These are contained in a notebook entitled "Daily Information Summary—Op12" filed with the Combat Intelligence Section. Captain Glover said that he did not believe that it had generally been felt by officers in the Plans Division that the Japanese would strike as they did. (p. 176)

Admiral Turner said that he had always been of the view that a torpedo plane attack on ships in Pearl Harbor was possible and pointed out that the Bureau of Ordnance had modified its earlier letters indicating that still 75" depth was necessary.

Admiral Turner said that the Chief of Naval Operations shared his view as to the possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor and that they felt that Admiral Kimmel also had the same views. (p. 261)

Admiral Turner said that generally he thought our Intelligence regarding Japanese intentions and activities was quite good. He said that he had anticipated that the Japanese would attack the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies at the end of November 1941. The attack of December 7 came as no surprise to him whatsoever nor, he said, was it a surprise to the Chief of Naval Operations. He was not surprised by the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor and pointed out that he had originated the Secretary of the Navy's letter of January 1941, pointing out that just such an attack was the most probable form that the initiation of war by Japan would take. (p. 259)

Admiral Wilkinson recalled no specific evaluation as to the capability of the Japanese to launch an attack such as the attack which was made. (p. 287) Admiral Wilkinson said that he was not surprised by the fact that the Japanese did venture a carrier raid, but was surprised by the force of the raid, and by the fact that the attack had come in without detection. (p. 287–8)

Admiral Ingersoll stated that he had considered that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility (page 821) but he had not thought that an air attack on Oahu was probable. He had thought that when war came there would be numerous Japanese submarines around Pearl Harbor and he expected raids against outlying islands in the Fourteenth Naval District and that any attack on Hawaii would be by submarines or surface forces (page 847). (3)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he thought the dispatches concerning the reenforcement of Midway and Wake should have accentuated the idea that there was a danger of raids in the area rather than allay suspicion as to the probability of attack in the Hawaiian area. (p. 427)

Admiral Ingersoll said that the December 3 dispatch indicated that war was imminent and a matter of a few days or hours and that it was believed in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations that such war would include the United States as indicated by the reference to Washington in that dispatch. (p. 428)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he recalled no discussion in late November or early December regarding the probability of an air attack on Hawaii. They did anticipate possible attacks by submarines and possible raids either by light forces or by submarines at Wake, Midway and Johnston. (p. 426)

Admiral Ingersoll said that he expected that the Japanese attack against the United States would be on the Philippines and Guam with possible raiding attacks on our outlying islands to the westward of Hawaii and submarine attacks against shipping around Hawaii and generally between the west coast and the United States. He said that he did not recall anyone in operations reporting to Admiral Stark that the war would be precipitated by an air attack on Pearl Harbor. (p. 430)

Captain Heard testified that they had no information which indicated or would lead to an obvious conclusion that there was an impending attack on Hawaii. He was quite convinced that war would start in Southeast Asia (page 468).

Admiral Wilkinson said that for a month preceding 7 December 1941 there were no discussions in which he participated regarding the likelihood of a Japanese move on Pearl Harbor. He stated further that during the first week in

December, 1941, he remembered no discussions concerning the question of whether or not aerial reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu (p. 396).

According to Commander Kramer, from the information he saw there was not the slightest indication of Japanese overt intention to attack the United States. The information of this type was known to be incomplete and CNO knew this (page 985).

B. Army Estimate

General Marshall said that he had felt that a Japanese attack would come in the Western Pacific, also possibly against the Panama Canal, which was then closed to the Japanese (page 861). The Japanese movements pointed to a move into Thailand, action to cut off the Burma Road, and a threat to the Malay-Kra Peninsula. They had no indications of Japanese plans for assault on Hawaii (page 860–1). He always was in fear of a surprise attack on United States territory but the probabilities pointed to the Panama Canal and the Philippines before Hawaii; there were no specific indications in the possession of the Army and no reports from the Navy showing a threat against Hawaii (page 863). The attack on Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to General Marshall (page 882). It had appeared to him, as set forth in his letter in February 1941, that the possibility in Hawaii in the way of attack was combined air and sabotage. There was a strong probability—really a certainty—that there was an evil intent in the Far East. The question was when it would explode and to what extent it would be on an infiltration basis. As to probability, Siam, the Malaya Peninsula, and the Panama Canal took priority, in his opinion, to Hawaii.

C. State Department Estimates

Ambassador Grew said that he had received no report from the Korean underground that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor and Mr. Hamilton said that he had felt that the Japanese would move to the southward, but that he had not excluded from his estimates an attack on United States possessions (page 1075).

XXX. Japanese Message Advising of Fourteen Part Reply and First Thirteen Parts

A. MESSAGE ADVISING OF FOURTEEN PART REPLY

On December 6, 1941, the Army translated an intercepted Japanese communication (document 38, Exhibit 63), as follows:

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 6, 1941
"Purple
"#909 Re my #644 (a).

"1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

"2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

"3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions."

B. THE FIRST THIRTEEN PARTS OF THE REPLY

Also on December 6, 1941, the Navy translated the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply (Document 39, Exhibit 63), which had been sent from Tokyo to Washington in the Japanese diplomatic code. It may be noted that the translations of parts 8 and 9 of the reply which were originally indicated as Navy

(a) See S. I. S. #25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured, Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

translations were corrected so as to indicate that they were translated by the Army. These 13 parts which are not set forth here, but particularly part 13 disclosed that the Japanese were of the view that the American proposal, viewed in its entirety, could not be accepted by the Japanese as a basis of negotiations.

C. DELIVERY OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE ABOVE MESSAGES

Captain Heard testified that he did not know what information was available on the evening of 6 December 1941, but that a 24-hour watch, headed by a senior officer, had been maintained in ONI since 27 May 1941 (page 467). Also a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section had been commenced on 4 December 1941 (page 467), and ONI had a direct wire to Secretary Hull (page 468).

Lieutenant Commander George W. Lynn in December, 1941, was Senior Watch Officer in Op20–G, which handled the decoding of Japanese diplomatic cryptographs (page 734). He was familiar in general with Exhibit 63, the file of intercepts. The Army and Navy cooperated to get this material; each maintained interception stations (page 734). The Army intercepts were cleared through the Navy and vice versa. The division made on the basis of dates; the Army was responsible for even dates; the Navy odd (page 735). Documents were noted as to time of translation; the dates at the top were the dates of interception (page 735).

He said that Document 39 (14 part dispatch) was received in the Navy Department from station as follows: (all times Washington time)

Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 received 1149, 12–6–41:

Parts 9, 10 received between 1149 and 1451, 12–6–41

Parts 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13 received at 1451, 12–6–41.

These first 13 parts were processed and given to Commander Kramer between 2100 and 2200, 12–6–41.

Commander Kramer said that the fourteen part message was received by him (Document 39, Exhibit 63) and he got the first 13 parts broken down and translated by 2105, December 6th. He called Admiral Wilkinson, who confirmed his plan of distribution. He went to the White House and gave a folder to one of Admiral Beardall's assistants, which contained the 13 parts of the Japanese reply, with instructions to get it to the President right away. The President was entertaining. He then went to Secretary Knox's house and waited while the Secretary read the message, and had a brief discussion of it. When he delivered the messages to Secretary Knox, Secretary Knox did not comment as his wife and a business associate were present (page 972). Later Kramer and the Secretary privately discussed some of the points of the 13 parts of the reply. Secretary Knox called Secretaries Stimson and Hull, and these calls indicated a meeting of the three Secretaries at 1000, December 7th. Kramer was instructed to be there with this and any other material which came in. He then took the translations to Admiral Wilkinson, in his quarters. He thought that Admiral Wilkinson called Admirals Turner and Stark, but is not certain (page 982). He arrived back in the Navy Department at 0030. He then secured and went home, but could be reached by telephone at any time.

Document 38 of Exhibit 63, advising that the time of delivery of the 14 part reply would be directed by a separate dispatch, was received and delivered by Kramer on December 6th along with the 13 parts (page 971).

Captain Safford said that on the week-end of December 6, 1941, his unit handled three times the normal traffic for a busy day (page 756). Thirteen parts of the 14-part message came in and were distributed by Kramer between 2100 and 2400 on December 6th. The Army advised that it had informed Secretary Hull by 2230.

Apparently based on conversations with Kramer, Captain Safford stated that Kramer distributed the messages to the White House and to Admiral Wilkinson; that he believed that Admiral Wilkinson telephoned Admiral Stark; and that Kramer returned to Navy Department at 1 a. m., then went home, and left instructions for a call when part 14 came in, as he had instructions to deliver all of the message to Admiral Stark at 0900, December 7, 1941.

According to Admiral Ingersoll, he saw the first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply on the night of December 6th–7th. This, he said, indicated that the situation was very tense (page 828). He did not remember the other message (Document 38).

Admiral Turner remembered Document 38, but he did not remember when he saw it (page 999).

Admiral Stark testified that he did not recall the above translations or any information delivered to him at his home by office messenger on the evening of

December 6th nor any conversation with Secretary Knox or Admiral Wilkinson (pages 780, 166).*

XXXI. December 7, 1941, in Washington

A. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE"

Captain Safford said that an intercepted Japanese message in the shape of a circular telegram from Tokyo, using the "hidden word" code, dated 7 December 1941, (Exhibit 20), was received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, shortly before 11 o'clock in the morning of 7 December. Three of the words in this message had a secondary or hidden meaning, constituting the actual message. Captain Safford said that this message was translated in such a hurry on Sunday morning, 7 December, that only two of the three key words were given their hidden value. As a result, the message was translated (p. 125–126):

"Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Safford said that if the third and omitted key word had been given its hidden meaning, the message would have read (p. 126, 609–610):

"Relations between Japan and England and United States are not in accordance with expectation."

Captain Kramer made the following statement with regard to his translation of the "hidden word" message of 7 December 1941, referred to in the preceding paragraphs (p. 133–135):

"I do recall on that that after my return from the State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the fourteen-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the embassy staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text, a code word referring to estranged relations or breaking relations. As I recall it now, I dictated to a chief yeoman the sense of the message, glancing through the entire message, spotting another code word referring to England, and then two minutes after that was on my way. It wasn't until I returned to the office approximately an hour later and was looking over the morning's traffic again that I again examined more closely this particular plain language message, which was one of many in the traffic that morning, and noted the omission referring to the United States. . . .

". . . My recollection is not clear cut as to the time when the discrepancy was noted. I do, however, have a rather vague recollection of making two or more phone calls at the time the discrepancy was noted, which, if correct, would indicate that that discrepancy was noted perhaps a quarter of one or 1 o'clock. I do definitely recall, however, that no retranslation of that message was made for distribution because of the fact that before it could be delivered to the recipients of this traffic, who had left meetings respectively in the State Department and Chief of Naval Operations' office for lunch, that it would be well after the time of delivery, 1 o'clock, about which there had been so much excitement late in the morning. I might further add that when the attack was first learned, I recall definitely feeling that there was no point in making the delivery at that time. That was perhaps 1:30."

Captain Kramer further stated that when he returned to his office at around noon on 7 December and noted the omission in the "hidden word" message of reference to the United States, he attempted to telephone all persons who had received the translation. However, he was able to contact only two of them, he thought these two were Captain McCollum and Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer believed that he had made the telephone calls at about 12:30 (p. 595–596).

* It will be recalled that on December 6th there was also available in Washington an intercepted Japanese communication from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated November 18th, describing ships, and the courses of ships in Pearl Harbor (Document 40, Exhibit 63).

On December 7, 1941, there were three Japanese communications intercepted and translated by the Army in addition to part fourteen of the Japanese reply and the "1 p. m. message." These were:

1.
"From: Washington (Nomura)
"To: Tokyo
"December 3, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1256. Re your #875 [a].

"I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to—even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once."

2.
"From: Washington
"To: Tokyo
"December 6, 1941
"Purple (Urgent)
"#1272

"In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential (because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret). Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President is his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 26th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us . . . (Message incomplete).

3.
"From: Budapest
"To: Tokyo
"December 7, 1941
"LA
"#104 Re my #103.

"On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

"Relayed to Berlin."

B. PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE"

Also on December 7, 1941, the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply, and the Japanese instruction to the emissaries in Washington to deliver the reply at one p. m. on the 7th of December were translated, as follows:

1. Navy translation—(Document 39, Exhibit 63)

---

[a] See S. I. S. #25725—Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"7 December 1941
"(Purple-Eng)
"#902 Part 14 of 14

(NOTE: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."

2. Army translation (Document 41, Exhibit 63)

"From: Tokyo
"To: Washington
"December 7, 1941
"Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
"#907 To be handled in government code.
"Re my #902(a).

"Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time."

C. DELIVERY OF PART FOURTEEN AND THE "1 P. M. MESSAGE" AND ACTION TAKEN

Captain McCollum said that he arrived in the Navy Department at about 0730 on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, to assume a special watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI. Shortly after his arrival Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, sent for him and a discussion was had concerning the situation in the Far East. A little before 8:30 both Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum went down to talk to Admiral Stark. At about 9 o'clock Captain McCollum received word that one of his officers wished to see him urgently. He stepped outside and Lieutenant Commander Kramer delivered to him the last part of the Japanese "Fourteen Part Reply," together with the instructions directing its presentation to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock, Washington time (p. 34–35). At that time Captain McCollum had a short talk with Lieutenant Commander Kramer as to the significance of the instructions and the latter pointed out that 1 p. m. Washington time would mean about 7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time, and about 2 o'clock in the morning out in the Philippines; that the exact significance of this was not known, but that if an attack were coming it looked as if it were timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii (p. 33, 36). Captain McCollum said that he took the message and instructions in to Admiral Stark and pointed out to him the possible significance of the time in conjunction with the note (p. 36). Captain McCollum stated: "We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the ambassadors, we felt there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out . . . to Admiral Stark. . . ." (p. 33–34).

Referring to the Japanese instructions to deliver the "Fourteen Part Reply" to the U. S. Secretary of State at 1 p. m., Washington time, on 7 December, Captain Kramer said that he had been impressed by the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was several hours before sunrise in the Kra Peninsula area, where he knew that the Japanese had been contemplating an attack on Kota Baru with the connivance of the Thai Chief of Staff. Consequently, when he delivered the "1 p. m. message" to Mr. Hull's private secretary, he pointed this fact out to the latter and to Colonel Bratton, who was also in Mr. Hull's outer office. He also mentioned the fact that 1 p. m. in Washington was 7:30 at Pearl Harbor (p. 137).

(a—S. I. S. #25843—text of Japanese reply.)

Captain Kramer said that in all he had pointed out the significance of the delivery time of the "Fourteen Part Reply" to perhaps eight or ten different people, including Commander McCollum, several people in the State Department, Colonel Bratton, possibly Admiral Wilkinson, and probably Captain Safford. He did not remember whether he had mentioned the matter when delivering the "1 p. m. message" to CNO's office (p. 137–138).

Lieutenant Commander Brotherhood said that the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply was received while he was on watch between midnight and 7 a. m., December 7, 1941 (page 925). Also a further dispatch was received during the watch, concerning the time of delivery of the long diplomatic message. The first dispatch, the long diplomatic message, was in English (part 14 of Exhibit 63). He thinks he delivered this to the Army. The second was in Japanese (page 926), and required translation which he thinks was done by an Army translator (part 41 of Exhibit 63). He left the dispatches for Kramer and left around seven before Kramer came in. He can't remember whether the translated message was back before he left the office at 7 a. m. (page 926).

Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering testified that on 7 December 1941 he was on duty in Op20–G of Naval Communications, beginning at 0700 (page 812). He said that Part 14 of the Japanese reply was processed and ready for delivery at 0700 and was delivered to Kramer on his arrival between 0900 and 1000; the "1 p. m. message" was received from an Army translator at about 0715 and was held until Kramer arrived and then was delivered to him (p. 813).

Lieutenant Commander Lynn testified that Part 14 of the Japanese reply did not require translation into English; it was received between 0305 and 0700 on December 7th, and, he thought, it was handed to Kramer at about 0900–1000. He said that the "1 p. m. message" arrived between 0305 and 0700, 12–7–41 and was processed and in the Army's hands for translation at 0700, 12–7–41.

According to Captain Safford Part 14 came in and was decoded and ready at 0700, 12–7–41 (page 757). The "1 p. m. message" came in and was sent to the Army for translation from the Japanese, and came back about 1000, December 7 (page 758).

Kramer, he said, went to Admiral Stark's office, gave it to him personally or to an aide, then to Admiral Beardall at the White House, and then to the State Department with the 14th part at about 1000, where Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson were (page 758). (The Court here refused to sustain the Judge Advocate's objection to testimony by the witness as to what was told to him (page 748)).

Captain Safford continued, stating that Kramer came back and found the translation of the message instructing delivery at one p. m. There also was a message "in the hidden-word code" which had been translated hurriedly and said, "relations in England not in accordance with expectation." In Kramer's haste they left out a word and the message should have read—(the witness was here interrupted). He then said that Kramer immediately redistributed the two messages; went to CNO and gave them to an aide, Admiral Stark being in conference; to the White House, there to an aide; to the State Department about 11 and gave copies to the Secretaries of War, State and Navy. He then said that to the copy which Kramer gave to the Secretary of the Navy was a note saying that this was sunrise at Honolulu and midnight at Manila and undoubtedly meant a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in a few hours. (On Admiral Stark's motion this was stricken out by the court since the witness had no personal knowledge.)

Captain Safford summarized the information which he said indicated the objectives which the Japanese were preparing to attack, as follows:

"Going back to the late Spring of 1941, on May 22, we received positive proof of Japanese plans for the conquest of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific. On July 24, a high authority in Japan directed the withdrawal of merchant shipping from the Northeast Pacific, Southwest Pacific, and Indian Ocean. On September 4, we received information indicating Japan's determination to carry out her program of southward expansion and to expell the United States and England from China, Southeast Asia, and the Southwest Pacific. On October 15, we received unexpected confirmation of Japan's plans and intentions of the conquest of Southeastern Asia. In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government

had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the dead-line for negotiations then being conducted between the Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. At one time, when it looked as if Moscow would fall, there were indications from several sources that Japan would invade Siberia. On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operations of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain, but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p. m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States, at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable, and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally, at 10:15 a. m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service (War Department) that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p. m. (Washington time) that date. 1:00 p. m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S. I. S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy. I do not know whether or not a copy of this note was appended to the paper given to Admiral Stark. At this same time, information was also received indicating that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the British Empire. This information was sent over to S. I. S. immediately." (p. 357–8)

Captain Safford then discussed the distribution of information within the Navy Department and to the President and State Department, etc. His statement of the distribution by Commander Kramer from December 1 on was based, he said, on what Commander Kramer told him verbally.

Commander Kramer said that he received no phone call on the night of December 6th–7th and came in at 0900 on December 7th, received the 14th part of the reply and took it and the first 13 parts to Admiral Stark's office about 0900 where there apparently was a meeting. He was not certain who was in Admiral Stark's office. He was in a hurry. Admiral Wilkinson was there (page 973). He then left the Navy Department at 0930 to make delivery to the White House, and was at the State Department at 0950 waiting for Secretary Knox in order to deliver this additional material.

This delivery did not include the message setting 1 p. m. as the time for delivery of the reply. He did not get that until he returned to the Navy Department at about 1020. He then found that a message had been received which directed delivery of the reply to the Secretary of State at 1300, and also other messages which directed destruction of Japanese codes still on hand, and one which thanked the Ambassador for his services. This material was delivered to Admiral Stark at about 1030. He handed the "1 p. m. message" to Admiral Stark's aide at 10:30 or 10:45 and saw him take it in to Admiral Stark's desk. Document 41 of Exhibit 63 is the "1 p. m. message", which had been translated by Army. He then left to deliver this new material to the White House and the State Department. He handed the material to a State Department official, who customarily received such material for the Secretary of State, and who was to deliver it to Secretary Knox.

He invited attention, verbally, to the time involved (page 965); that is, that this was 7:30 in Honolulu and a few hours before sunrise at Koto Bharu. He did not tell the naval officers this as he figured they would know it. The remarks he made were not to Secretary Knox himself but to the State Department official who handled this material for Secretary Hull and who was to deliver it to Secretary

Knox. He did not advise the official in the State Department to tell the Secretary of the Navy that 1300 Washington time meant dawn in Pearl Harbor and that it might mean an attack on Pearl Harbor (page 985). And, he said, Captain Safford never stated to him or in his presence that the message concerning the delivery of the note indicated a dawn attack on Pearl Harbor (page 986).

Captain Heard, who was in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI, stated that information about the Japanese reply was available in the Navy Department at 0900, 7 December 1941 (page 464). Sometime between 0900 and 1000 DONI took the Chief of the Far East Section, Commander McCollum, with him to CNO to present this information. This statement, he said, was based on official records, a report from McCollum, and an official statement of DONI made very shortly after the event (page 465). Lieutenant Commander Watts relieved McCollum at 0800, 7 December (page 466).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that on the morning of December 7, 1941, he knew that the Japanese Ambassadors would present a note to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m. He knew the general tenor of the note that would be presented (page 204). The note was in the nature of an ultimatum. He was in Admiral Stark's office in the morning of December 7th, and Admiral Stark had the information which he had. Admiral Stark talked to General Marshall on the telephone. The Japanese asking for an appointment at 1 p. m. on a Sunday was quite unusual and out of the known routine of the foreign service (page 205). Admiral Stark concurred in a dispatch to be sent by General Marshall. The State Department was not advised of this dispatch (page 205).

He also testified that information concerning delivery of the Japanese note at 1 p. m. was available to him between 0900 and 0930 on the morning of December 7th. He does not know when it got to the Navy Department (page 213).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that he was aware of the contents of the Japanese message stating that a fourteen-part reply would be sent, of the fourteen-part reply, and of the "1 p. m. message." As to the "1 p. m. message," he repeated that he had this information at 0930 on December 7th, and believed that Admiral Stark received this information about that time (page 715). He talked to Admiral Stark about 1000 (page 214). General Marshall telephoned about 1030 (page 216).

Admiral Schuirmann testified that Commander Kramer delivered this type of material and that no record was kept of time of delivery. He discussed the situation with Admiral Stark but not specific messages. When he went to Admiral Stark's office on December 7th, he recalled, he waited a while for Stark to come in at about 0930 (page 729). He then knew of the prospective 1 o'clock delivery of the "sharply worded" Japanese note and that it was a reply to the United States note of November 26th, and so informed Admiral Stark. Admiral Stark knew of this when General Marshall telephoned. He believes that Stark had delivered to him that morning "the book" containing the messages received the previous night. He is positive that the Army had the same information the Navy had (page 730). He personally did not think Japan was going to attack us (page 732).

Admiral Stark testified that the outstanding thing in his mind concerning the evening of December 6th and the morning of December 7th was the "one p. m. message", which he learned about on the morning of December 7th. He did not remember the "14 part message" in reply to the State Department note of November 26th. Admiral Schuirmann, he said, may have given him a full picture on the morning of December 7th, and it is reasonable to assume that he did so (pages 789–790).

He stated that he had no information about the "14 part" reply or the "1 p. m. message" until he arrived at his office on December 7th (pages 790–791). He said that on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, he received information that the Japanese Ambassador would deliver a message to Secretary Hull at exactly 1300. He was talking to Admiral Schuirmann when General Marshall called and asked if he had this information. He first told General Marshall he did not think this information should be sent out, but instantly changed his mind and called General Marshall back, asking him to have the Army authorities inform the Navy. He asked General Marshall if he could get the message out quickly and offered to send it via Navy communications. General Marshall said he could get it out quickly.

Admiral Stark recalled discussing with Admiral Schuirmann "the time element" in connection with the "one p. m. message" (page 170), but recalled no suggestion made to him that this looked like a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor. He did not recall what information he had about the Japanese message to be delivered at 1300, December 7, 1941, except the hour of delivery (page 172).

Admiral Stark stated that he had not called Admiral Kimmel on the Trans-Pacific telephone before December 7th (page 190). He stated that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply and regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel on December 7th concerning this (pages 113, 793), and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (page 799).

General Marshall said that he first saw the "14 part message" and the "1 p. m. message" sometime Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 (page 873). He 'phoned Admiral Stark, and at first Admiral Stark did not think that any message to Hawaii was necessary because the recipients might be confused by too many messages. Admiral Stark 'phoned back in a few minutes, asking that the naval authorities be advised.

General Marshall was informed, after sending some of his men back two and three times to the message center, that his message would be received within 30 minutes after dispatch. It was in the message center at 1150 and sent by radio to all points except Hawaii; they were unable to raise the Hawaiian station and therefore sent it by wire. General Marshall did not know this until afterwards (pages 873–4).

General Marshall estimated that he arrived at 10:30 a. m., Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, and first saw the "14 part message" and "1 p. m. message" shortly thereafter (pages 878–9).

He said that Admiral Stark did not inquire as to the rapidity of War Department communications in connection with dispatching the Army message of December 7, 1941 (page 879).

Admiral Ingersoll said that he arrived at the office about 0900, December 7th. He did not recall any discussion with Admiral Stark about the fourteen part message or delivery thereof until Admiral Stark told him of his conversation with General Marshall (page 837). He stated that on the morning of December 7th, he knew that the Japanese Ambassador had requested an interview with Secretary Hull in the afternoon. At the same time, Admiral Stark told him that this had been discussed with General Marshall (page 831). Admiral Ingersoll said that there was no discussion on the morning of December 7th of the fact that 1 o'clock in Washington was sunrise at Pearl Harbor and midnight in Manila.

Admiral Ingersoll said that he did not recall when he saw the thirteen or fourteen part Japanese reply. (p. 429)

Admiral Turner said that he came to the Navy Department about 1030 or 1100 on December 7th. Admiral Stark called him and showed him a decrypted Japanese dispatch which required the Japanese Ambassador to present the Japanese reply on the 7th. Admiral Stark said he had talked to General Marshall, who said he had sent a dispatch on the matter to Hawaii. Admiral Stark said that he thought Admiral Kimmel already had intercepted and decrypted the Japanese message; they thought that he had the 14 part reply and "1 p. m. message" (page 1000).

He first recalled the time of delivery as 10:30 and corrected this to 1 p. m. He said that Secretary Hull had told Admiral Stark that he could not give the Japanese an appointment until 2:30 p. m. Admiral Turner thought from this dispatch that an attack on the United States or Britain was coming that day or the next (page 1000). They had been warned, he said, that the scrambler telephone was not secure and so the Navy Department did not use it for secret matters (page 1001).

Admiral Noyes said he did not see the 14-part message or delivery instruction prior to 7 December 1941 (page 1035, 1036); that there was no direct or convenient telephone circuit between CincPac and CNO on 7 December 1941 (page 1038) and that a Navy message from CNO, which had been designated for the fastest possible transmission, would be in CincPac's hands in a maximum of an hour (page 1044).

According to Admiral Smith, CincPac was not kept well informed of developments by the Navy Department (page 565). He testified regarding Secretary Knox's visit to Pearl Harbor, after the attack, and statements made by him there (page 556–57). He said that at lunch he joined Secretary Knox, Kimmel, Pye, Bloch, Short, Beatty (Aide to Secretary), and that the Secretary said: "Did you not get a warning on the 6th of December?" They said, "No," and the Secretary then continued: "We learned surreptitiously on the 6th of December that Nomura and Kurusu had orders to hold their last conference with Secretary Hull at 1 p. m. on Sunday, the 7th. I know that information was sent to Admiral Hart, and I thought, of course, it was sent to you." They never got that information (page

566). The Secretary also said, "Frankly, I know of no one in the War Department or in the Navy Department, not even Kelly Turner, who expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor" (page 567). Admiral Smith said that it is easy to deduce from the 1 o'clock delivery dispatch, which they received after the attack, that Pearl Harbor was a logical place of attack as the time indicated was sunrise there.

XXXII. Conditions at Pearl Harbor Prior to Attack

A. THE SHIPS IN PORT

Admiral Hewitt's investigation developed that at the time of the attack, the forces of the Pacific Fleet were, according to Admiral Kimmel (Exhibit 73), disposed partly in port and partly at sea as follows:

(1) In Pearl Harbor:

(a) Task Force One, Vice Admiral Pye commanding (less one battleship, one light cruiser and one destroyer) comprising five battleships, four light cruisers, seventeen destroyers, two light cruisers, and four mine layers.

(b) Task Force Two (under the command of Vice Admiral Halsey, who was at sea with units thereof constituting a separate task force—Task Force Eight) comprising three battleships, eight destroyers, one light cruiser, and four mine layers.

(c) Task Force Three (less detached units under command of Vice Admiral Brown at sea, and less a separate task force—Task Force Twelve—which was at sea under Rear Admiral Newton's command) comprising two heavy cruisers, and four mine layers which were under overhaul.

(d) Five submarines and the submarine tender PELIAS of Task Force Seven.

(e) The TANGIER, HULBERT, CURTIS, and THORNTON, and Patrol Squadrons (VP 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, and 24—a total of about sixty planes) of Task Force Nine.

(f) Marine Air Squadrons VMSB 232 and VMJ 252 (a total of twenty planes) at Ewa, Oahu.

(g) Two destroyer tenders and the Base Force, consisting of the ARGONNE, plus auxiliaries and repair vessels, and planes of Base Force Aircraft Squadrons VJ–1, VJ–2, and VJ–3, as follows: 19 J2F, 9 JRS, 2 PBY–1, 1 J2V.

(2) At sea:

(a) Task Force Eight (Vice Admiral Halsey commanding) consisting of one aircraft carrier (ENTERPRISE), three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, located 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor, standing to eastward, was returning to Pearl Harbor after landing a Marine Air Squadron at Wake Island.

(b) Task Force Three (Vice Admiral Brown commanding), less units in port, consisting of one heavy cruiser and one mine laying squadron, less two of its divisions, was exercising with landing boats at Johnston Island.

(c) Task Force Twelve (Rear Admiral Newton commanding), ordinarily a component of Task Force Three, consisting of one aircraft carrier (LEXINGTON), three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, located about 425 miles southeast of Midway, was proceeding on a westerly course to land a Marine Air Squadron on Midway Island.

(d) One heavy cruiser and one mine laying division, ordinarily a part of Task Force Three, were engaged in "normal operations" at sea southwest of Oahu.

(e) Four submarines of Task Force Seven, somewhere at sea en route to Pearl Harbor.

(3) At other places:

(a) At Midway Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and Patrol Squadron VP–21 (consisting of twelve planes) of Task Force Twelve.

(b) At Wake Island, two submarines of Task Force Seven and a Marine Air Squadron.

(c) At Johnston Island (in addition to Task Force Three, undergoing exercise), two Base Force PBY–1 planes.

(d) At Mare Island, five submarines of Task Force Seven.

(e) At San Diego, four submarines of Task Force Seven.

To sum up: At Pearl Harbor, there were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, two old light cruisers, one old cruiser mine layer, eight destroyers, five submarines, twelve mine layers, two destroyer tenders, one submarine tender, four aircraft tenders, various auxiliary and repair ships, and 111 aircraft of various types, of which nine were under overhaul. At sea, there were two aircraft carriers, eight heavy cruisers, fourtecn destroyers, four submarines,

and one mine layer squadron less one division. At other places, there were thirteen submarines, fourteen Navy patrol planes and one Marine Air Squadron.

Except as to Task Forces Eight and Twelve, which were on special missions to reenforce Wake and Midway Islands, the dispositions of Pacific Fleet Units as noted above were in accordance with a previously worked out fleet employment schedule (Ex. 73; Hew. page 605).

Admiral DeLany stated that the ships were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in accordance with the operating schedule of the Fleet; the principal mission in late 1941 was training, and they had no orders from Washington to discontinue (page 507).

Admiral Smith said that after the reorganization of the Pacific Fleet to three task forces, one task force was always at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against one another; sometimes all three task forces would be at sea at the same time. (p. 35)

As Operations Officer, one of Admiral DeLany's duties was the preparation of "Schedules of Employment." These were originally prepared on a quarterly basis about six weeks before the end of the quarter, and a considerable number of these were printed and widely distributed. (p. 83) The schedules provided for patrol of the operating areas and for air patrol coverage, entrances and sorties, primarily because they felt that the possibility of a submarine attack in the operating areas was something that they had to guard against and also to prevent any blocking of the channel in and out of Pearl Harbor (p. 84).

On December 7, Commander Paul C. Crosley was Flag Secretary on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. He produced a copy of the Pacific Fleet employment schedule, dated August 13, 1941, which was incomplete since Enclosure A was missing. Enclosure A was a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout of the schedule as written in the letter. (p. 179) Commander Crosley also produced a proposed employment schedule dated November 10, 1941. (p. 180). Commander Crosley produced copies of the employment schedules for Task Forces 1, 2 and 3 for the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942, and discussed the method of printing and distributing same. (p. 181).

Admiral Brainard did not recall any changes which had been made in the employment schedules for the last quarter of 1941 which had been submitted by the Pacific Fleet. He said that a rather general freedom of action was given to the Fleet Commanders as to changes in the operating schedules. He recalled that about the middle of 1941, the schedules were changed from type schedules to task force schedules after the Commander-in-Chief had established a task force organization. (p. 401)

Admiral Pye stated that the task forces rotated days at sea and in port; the days and dates varied. A task force could be figured to stay in port for nine to fourteen days (page 430). His task force, Task Force One, was in Pearl Harbor from November 27th until December 7th (page 418).

Admiral Pye said that it did not occur to him at any time between November 27 and December 7 to take the ships to sea because of the Army's inadequacy since it was his confirmed opinion that the greatest danger was from submarines (p. 169)

On December 7, 1941, Task Force One was in port, except for the SARATOGA, which was on the West Coast. Task Force Two was at sea; the ENTERPRISE was delivering planes to Wake; Bat. Div. One of Admiral Halsey's Task Force Two was in port. Task Force Three was conducting operations at sea, and Task Force Three's carrier, the LEXINGTON, had gone to Midway to deliver planes (page 539). The COLORADO was on the West Coast, and the PENNSYLVANIA was in drydock at Pearl Harbor (page 540).

Admiral McMorris said that one of the considerations that prompted leaving the battleships of Task Force Two when the ENTERPRISE was sent to Wake with Marine planes, was the possibility of a clash with some Japanese ships and they did not want to handicap the carrier and its light forces with the slower battleships (pages 891–2). The Fleet, he said, was operating under a schedule, but no directive had been received to keep the Fleet in Pearl Harbor at that particular time (page 893).

Admiral Kimmel testified that about two-thirds of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, because Task Force One and Task Force Two overlapped in schedule for a few days (page 369).

The location of the various ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th was set forth on a map, which is Exhibit 60. From the summary annexed to that map, it appears that there were in port 8 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 6 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, 8 destroyer minelayers, 4 destroyer minesweepers, 5 submarines, 1 floating drydock, 1 hospital ship, and 21 auxiliaries. It also appears that the MARYLAND and OKLAHOMA were double berthed near Ford Island, as were the TENNESSEE and WEST VIRGINIA, and the ARIZONA and VESTAL.

Admiral Bloch said that the berthing of ships so as to develop maximum anti-aircraft fire was the responsibility of the senior officer embarked; the double battleships were unavoidable (page 400).

(3) **Admiral Bloch said that on December 7 all of the available battleships were in Pearl Harbor—8 battleships—and that those most severely damaged were the double-berthed battleships in the outer positions at the moorings; however, he did not think that the double berthing could have been avoided since there were no other berths available. (p. 28)**

Admiral Anderson said that air torpedo attack was the most damaging to his battleships. The planes, he said, came from an easterly direction. As the ships were berthed, there was a considerable number of the ship's guns so placed that they could have borne upon the attacking torpedo planes. Admiral Anderson said that assuming that at least one-fourth of the anti-aircraft guns had been ready for opening fire and free to fire at will upon the approaching planes, his estimate would be that those guns could not have defeated nor seriously diminished the attack. (p. 397) Admiral Anderson said that there wasn't any choice as to what the Commander Battleships could do in assigning specific ships to specific berths. There were just about as many berths designated available to him as there were ships. (p. 398)

Admiral Smith said that the ships were anchored in four sections because the Army did not have enough anti-aircraft guns and it was necessary to locate the ships so that the fire from the ships' guns would be effective. "We" knew that the only guns that cold be fired in defense of Pearl Harbor probably were the Navy guns (page 552).

Admiral Smith said that they had thought at the time that the Army and Navy operating through the local defense forces were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack but that he now realized that they were not. (p. 42)

Admiral Brown said that knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, he thought that the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon their own anti-aircraft for their own defense both at Pearl Harbor and at sea. (p. 144)

B. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS

Admiral Turner discussed the knowledge in the Navy Department of the Army's condition of readiness as to anti-aircraft equipment, radar and the like at page 260.

Admiral Kimmel testified that there were no naval guns ashore except a Marine battery (page 283). Admiral Kitts said that the statement in the Roberts' Report about Navy shore batteries, at page 20, is inaccurate although there may have been a Marine battery (pages 518, 521).

Admiral Bloch said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was one Marine battalion which had some anti-aircraft weapons. (p. 88)

Admiral Halsey said that during the months preceding December 7, he had been of the view that the Army did not have enough equipment or the proper equipment to defend Pearl Harbor, particularly as to anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes. (p. 303)

Admiral Kitts stated that the Army had charge of the shore-based anti-aircraft batteries. In the area immediately around Pearl Harbor, the only anti-aircraft fire on December 7th was from the ships and the fleet marine school at Palua. The greatest strength of Army anti-aircraft guns was in mobile batteries of 3″ caliber, which had not been emplaced on December 7th and did not get in position until after noon on December 7th. He estimated that the Army had 32 to 48 3″ guns and one battery of 90 mm. guns (page 516).

He said that the Army anti-aircraft guns at Kamehameha were in action in about 25 minutes after the attack. These were fixed position guns (page 522). The main Army anti-aircraft guns were mobile batteries which were not in place

except one battery. He was informed that the Army's mobile anti-aircraft was first in place at noon (page 522). The fixed guns may have been in operation earlier.

Admiral Kitts discussed the readiness of personnel and ammunition on shipboard and anti-aircraft batteries. (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that the Fleet had its full allowance of ammunition and in general its mobilization allowance aboard at the time of the attack. (p. 192) Admiral Kitts discussed the gunnery training which had been given prior to Pearl Harbor. (p. 193) Admiral Kitts discussed the anti-aircraft guns at Pearl Harbor, (p. 189) and the anti-aircraft armament on ships in the Harbor. (p. 190)

The number and location of the Army's guns were, according to Admiral Bloch (page 413) as follows:

"To my best belief and knowledge, the Army had about 80 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, about 20 37-millimeter guns, and about 100 50-calibre machine guns—all of these for anti-aircraft use. Of the 3-inch guns, it is my recollection that about 30 were in fixed emplacements, always mounted, and about one-half or two-thirds of this 30 were located at forts in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. All of the other 3-inch guns, I believe, were mobile 3-inch guns; all of the 37-millimeter guns and 50-calibre guns were mobile. I cannot state with any great degree of accuracy that none of the mobile guns were in place, but I think it is a fair statement to make that most of them were not in place, in their designated locations. In addition to the Army guns, there were some marine guns, which were to be used in conjunction with the Army guns. I believe that there were in the neighborhood of 12 in Pearl Harbor on December 7. They were not mounted and not on their sites, because they had not received their orders from the Army."

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army planned the mounting of the anti-aircraft guns; he did not consider mounting anti-aircraft or machine guns on buildings in Pearl Harbor, nor did he ask the Army to install guns in such places (page 416). The Army, he said, had insufficient guns to carry out its assigned tasks under JCD–42 (page 387).

According to Admiral DeLany, Admiral Kimmel was familiar with the terribly weak defenses of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the Fleet. (p. 78) Admiral McMorris said that although he personally felt the Army's preparations for the defense of Oahu were adequate that he thought Admiral Kimmel had been concerned over the anti-aircraft defenses and had talked with the Commanding General on the subject.

Colonel Phillips testified that he did not consider the material condition of readiness of the Army adequate to defend Pearl Harbor (page 494). There was, he said, a shortage of anti-aircraft guns (page 479).

General Marshall said that for Hawaii—110 30-mm., 144 37-mm., and 516 50-calibre AA guns had been ordered; on December 7, 1941, four-fifths of the 30-mm were complete, and one-fifth of the lesser calibres (page 855).

Admiral Pye testified that there was no system of coordinating the fire between ship and shore batteries; Sector Commanders took command of fire control and so notified ships in their sectors (page 418).

Colonel Phillips could not recall whether there had been any plan for coordinating the Army gunfire with the Navy gunfire (page 481). The Local Joint Army-Navy Committee made various plans, but he did not recall when they had met last prior to December 7th (page 481).

General Short testified that no plans had been made for coordinating the gunfire from the ships in the harbor with the Army's fire (page 228).

Admiral Kimmel testified that ComFOURTEEN had had many drills for coordinating the fire of the ships in harbor with the shore fire (page 365).

C. ARMY AND NAVY CONDITIONS OF READINESS

General Short testified that the Army had three alerts—the first against sabotage; the second the additional threat of submarine, surface or aircraft attack; and the third an "all-out" alert. The alert in effect on December 7, 1941 was Army Alert No. 1—the anti-sabotage alert (page 228).

Admiral Bloch said that with the exception of one or two isolated cases, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor. Those cases involved disgruntled sailors. There was no sabotage on the 7th of December. (p. 88)

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did not know what kind of an Army alert was in effect although he did know that they had some kind of an alert effective (page 326). He did not make specific inquiries of General Short as to the nature of the alert which the Army was maintaining (page 343).

Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy condition of readiness in effect was condition No. 3 as set forth in 2CL–41 and an order requiring two 5-inch guns and two 50-caliber guns on each battleship, which amounted to one-fourth of their anti-aircraft to be manned at all times (page 278). He said that he considered condition 3 and the measures which he had in force sufficient under the circumstances (page 279).

Admiral Kimmel stated that on December 7, 1941, Vice Admiral Pye was the Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Kimmel's headquarters were at the submarine base, and the PENNSYLVANIA was his Flagship to which he could move on short notice (page 278). He testified that ComFOURTEEN was to advise the Senior Officer Present Afloat of the condition of readiness to maintain and that the Senior Officer Present Afloat was charged with the duty of setting the condition of readiness for ships (page 365). He did not know whether Admiral Bloch advised Admiral Pye of the condition of readiness to maintain (page 279).

The condition of readiness of the Fleet, Admiral Kimmel testified, was not changed after November 27th because full security measures for ships at sea were already in effect (page 303).

The court wanted to know whether if Admiral Kimmel had increased the alert would it have done any more than man a few anti-aircraft guns (page 1124). He said, at best, it might have done so and it might have enabled the intercepting fighters to come into action a little better.

Admiral Bloch stated that Condition 3 was, and for several months had been, in effect for the Fleet; the condition of readiness for Navy shore establishments and aircraft was determined by each commanding officer, but there was none in effect on December 7th, except normal day to day routine for training (page 390).

Admiral Pye stated that there was no condition of readiness set for ships in port. His testimony before Admiral Hart that condition 3 was in effect and that he so informed Admiral Kimmel was erroneous (page 419).

Admiral Pye said that the defenses of the Fleet were largely in the hands of the Army and the condition of readiness was not set by the Fleet itself, but was set by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. (p. 158)

Admiral Pye said that Condition 3 was in effect for the ships in the Harbor on December 7, and had been prescribed previous to the last entry on the understanding that that condition would be in effect unless other notice was given. He did not receive any advice from the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as to the necessity for a higher condition of readiness. (p. 164–5).

However, each battleship had two 5″ anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned in addition to the anti-aircraft control (page 419). This condition was in excess of that required by condition 3. Gun crews for manned guns were required to be on deck near their guns with communications, including anti-aircraft control, manned (page 422). The anti-aircraft control (director room) was the only battle lookout. The officers and men required to remain aboard were sufficient to man all anti-aircraft guns.

Admiral Anderson said that none of the three specific conditions of readiness set forth in sub-heading G of 2CL–41 were maintained by the Fleet while it was in Pearl Harbor during November and December. He said that he was very clear that none of these conditions was in effect at the time of the attack because be gave close personal attention to matters of gun and ammunition readiness and on his own initiative he had increased the degree of gun and ammunition readiness in the battleships. He had established 24-hour watches on two of the eight .50 calibre guns on each battleship, and two of the 5″ anti-aircraft guns on each ship were to be told off each day as ready guns. (p. 396) Admiral Anderson said that the anti-aircraft batteries aboard the battleships were, generally speaking, eight 5″ anti-aircraft guns .25 calibre, and eight .50 calibre machine guns. Also most of the ships had either four guns of three inch .50 calibre or four quads of 1″1. (p. 397)

Admiral Bunkley said that in October, 1941, while his ship was in port, they were not under any condition of readiness, i. e., under conditions one, two or three. They had two machine guns manned at all times and am-

munition ready for two 5" guns with the crews of those guns standing by. They were operating under the Fleet security letter issued prior to October and a security order for the CALIFORNIA which was designated to prevent sabotage by requiring a security patrol. There were no changes ordered prior to December 7 that he could remember. (p. 413–4)

While at sea, Admiral Bunkley said the battleships did maintain conditions of readiness and it was his opinion that these precautions were carried out both for training and because of the danger of a submarine attack. (p. 415)

Admiral Pye said that: He was at sea on November 24th and received a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel and from then on until the task force entered Pearl Harbor, all possible measures against submarine and aircraft attack were taken (page 433). He said that Admiral Bloch only had the duty to inform him as Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor of the necessity for a condition of readiness (page 420). He did not do so (page 420).

Admiral Kitts testified that Condition 3 was in effect at sea and its equivalent in effect in port (page 513). He said that the condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was equal to or better than that laid down in 2CL–41, dealing with Port Security (page 523).

Admiral Smith said that despite the Robert's Report, the state of readiness was adequate to meet the emergency (page 548).

Admiral Delaney said that the condition of readiness was as set forth in 2CL–41 (page 498). He felt that this was satisfactory.

D. NUMBER AND CONDITION OF THE MEN

Admiral Bloch stated that the Army had insufficient and "green" personnel (page 387). According to General Short, on December 7, 1941, he had 57,000 troops. He had asked for 71,500 (page 257).

As to Navy personnel, Admiral Smith said that in his opinion (which the Court did not seem to share), the withdrawal of men from the Fleet for the purpose of filling complements and new construction had not materially decreased the efficiency of the Fleet (page 560). The ship did have the crews that they had normally held, "say a year before Pearl Harbor" (page 560) on the 85 per cent basis. He commented that several days after Pearl Harbor they received a letter written shortly before Pearl Harbor from the Bureau of Personnel, refusing to give them further men, and stating that the war was in the Atlantic.

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel had constantly asked for additional equipment of men for the Pacific Fleet, but he adverted to a letter received shortly after Pearl Harbor from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, dated November 25, 1941, File No. FF12/MM-(55), (Secret-Confidential File Room Bureau of Personnel) advising that the war was in the Atlantic. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the personnel and materiel shortages did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet; he had always felt that the complements were unnecessarily large; the Fleet was adequately manned; he considered the ships very efficient; the efficiency of the Fleet was not harmed by the shortages; but the Commander-in-Chief was looking into the future when he would have to send these men home for new construction. (p. 38)

Admiral Smith said that the materiel conditions of the Fleet was all right and was satisfactory to the Commander-in-Chief. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the program of alterations, as laid down by the Materiel Bureaus of the Navy Department, did not interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that the morale and health of the Fleet was excellent. (p. 39)

Admiral Smith said that, in his opinion, the efficiency of the Fleet did not suffer from too frequent changes of personnel. (p. 63)

Admiral Halsey said that one of his most vivid recollections of the period prior to the attack was the constant effort on the part of Admiral Kimmel and his subordinate commanders to get additional personnel and materiel. (p. 307)

Admiral Kimmel testified that regular liberty was granted the night of December 6th–7th, i. e. three-fourths of the officers and one-half of the men had liberty. The ones who remained were required to be trained and capable of manning anti-aircraft guns. At the time of the attack there were 90 per cent of the men and 70 per cent of the officers aboard. There was no evidence of consequential indulgence in liquor (page 330).

General Short testified that he knew of no unusual intoxication on the night of December 6th, and that no effects of overindulgence were apparent on the morning of the 7th (page 269).

Admiral Delaney testified that morale in the fleet was high. The fleet had been intensively trained under warlike conditions. Joint training with Army had been conducted (page 496).

Admiral Kitts, who was in charge of training, stated that in his opinion the efficiency of the ships and gunnery on December 7, 1941, was in the highest state ever reached in time of peace (page 512). He stated that a shortage of 50-calibre ammunition had affected the target practice of the ships. (In this connection, the Court took judicial notice of the Robert's Report.) (page 518). He said, however, that the Fleet's training and efficiency were of the highest; subject to manpower and some ammunition shortages (page 525).

Admiral Kitts said that he was ashore on the night of December 6th–7th, and saw nothing out of line as to behavior or sobriety. The officers and men of the ships were fit for duty on December 7, 1941. The high state of readiness of personnel for combat was the result of intensive training during 1941 (page 526).

Admiral Pye testified that from the viewpoint of sobriety the conduct of the men and officers on the 6th and 7th of December was satisfactory (page 443). Their behavior during the attack was superb (page 445). He considered that the state of training was the highest he ever saw in the Fleet, despite shortages of material (page 444).

Admiral Pye said that in his opinion on December 7, the Fleet was in the highest state of efficiency that it had ever attained. (p. 149)

Admiral Calhoun said that there was no unusual or excessive drinking on the night of December 6th, and no evidence of drunkenness on the morning of December 7th. (p. 226) Admiral Calhoun discussed the liberty provisions over the week-end. (p. 226)

No instances of men being unfit for duty came to the attention of Admiral Bloch (page 411). Admiral DeLany stated that in his opinion the men were fit for duty and they performed their duty well (page 508). According to Captain Ramsey, all men were fit for duty and were efficient (page 607). Commander Rochefort testified that the deportment of the officers and men was excellent (page 476). Colonel Phillips stated that the condition of officers and men as to sobriety was normal on December 6th–7th. All the men he came in contact with on December 7th were fit for duty and on the job (pages 494–5).

E. THE AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

General Short testified that the aircraft warning service was in the course of preparation and was being operated for training which had started in October, 1941. The system was not completely installed and the personnel were not expert. In October, 1941, he had sent fifteen men to sea with the Navy for training and the system could be counted on to do a fairly satisfactory job (pages 223–225). In addition to the radar system, they maintained 100 coast artillery stations as lookout stations. These were not continuously manned, and were not manned on December 7th because of the alert then in effect (page 225). No civilian lookouts were maintained because the distances at Oahu were so small as to make them valueless (page 227).

General Short said that the radar stations were supposed to be effective at ranges of from 75 to 100 miles, and that they might have been more effective if higher station locations had been completed (page 227). On December 7th, the aircraft warning service was being operated from 0400 to 0700 daily (page 228). The system was operated after 0700 for training, if the personnel wished to do so (page 263). The radar system was operated from 0400 to 0700 because he estimated that that was the best time for the enemy to attack, if the enemy were going to attack (page 265). The Interceptor Command was functioning after November 27th on a 4:00 a. m. to 7:00 a. m. basis daily, although the Interceptor Command was not established by written order until December 17th.

General Short testified that a request had been made for a Navy liaison officer in the Information Center of the Aircraft warning system in August, and on November 24th the Navy took steps to set up liaison officers. He does not recall whether they were actually there on December 7th (page 226). He said that Admiral Kimmel assigned Commander Curtis as Liaison Officer the day after the request was made, but General Short felt that Admiral Kimmel did not understand that he wanted a liaison officer actually working in the Information Center and not a general liaison officer. Lt. Comdr. Taylor was sent to help with the aircraft warning system (pages 261–2).

Colonel Phillips said that the Interceptor Command was barely in the first stage of organization on December 7th; there were no permanent stations, but a mobile station was operating (page 487). Ultimately this command included an information center, but he isn't sure whether it was set up on December 7th. The Aircraft Warning System was operating for training from November 27th until December 7th. He did not remember the hours they were working (page 487), but it was in the morning.

General Marshall said that in connection with the installation of the aircraft warning service, the plans were for six fixed and six mobile stations (page 857).

Admiral Kimmel testified that he did everything he could to assist the Army on the radar set-up. He sent officers to work with the Army. Army personnel had been taken to sea for radar training. He knew that the Army radar system was in operation and that it was far from perfect (pages 289–290). He said that he did not know that the radar system was not to be operated after 0700 (page 290). He did not know the details of the progress of construction on the radar system but knew that the Navy had continued pressure on the Army to get something done on this line (page 294). The Army's radar crews, he said, were green and untrained; the equipment was not adequate; and the warning net needed polishing in order to make it effective (page 304).

Admiral Smith said that Admiral Kimmel knew that the Army radar station had not been functioning; it had just been completed; it had been operating on the morning of December 7, but Admiral Kimmel hadn't known it. (p. 41)

Admiral Smith said that he knew the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning of a Japanese carrier raid. (p. 44)

Admiral Kimmel testified that he was quite certain that in many conversations which he had with General Short, he stressed the necessity for an aircraft warning system as well as for other elements of defense (page 1128); General Short never requested him to supply any naval operators to be used in the operation of Army radar on Oahu, and so far as Kimmel is concerned, he made no request of the Commandant (page 1129). General Short did ask for a liaison officer in July, who was furnished. Admiral Kimmel was informed that General Short did not in fact request the Commandant for "watch officers;" they would have been supplied, had he asked (page 1129). Admiral Kimmel did send Commander Taylor to assist the Army (page 1130). Admiral Bloch was the proper person to handle radar matters with the Army.

Admiral Bloch stated that the Navy liason officer who was supposed to be supplied to the Army Interceptor Command was only one of a number to be supplied as well by the Army (page 1146). A Navy liason officer was not there on December 7th beause the Army had not even sent watch officers, nor had they asked the Navy to send a watch officer. The Army Warning Service was not actually established until December 7th (page 1147). A Navy liaison officer for the Army Interceptor Command, for the evaluation and relay of information, was not sent until after December 7th, as the system was not set up before then, although the agreement had required this.

Admiral Bloch said that when General Short arrived in February, he and Admiral Bloch talked about the Army's radar system and as the net progressed to completion General Short, about September or October, told Admiral Bloch that he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train operators and he wanted to know if there was anything Admiral Bloch could do to help him. Admiral Bloch requested the Commander-in-Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea for training which was done. As of December, Admiral Bloch thought that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not yet all out of it and they were still training operators and could not be depended upon, but Admiral Bloch had no knowledge as to whether they were standing any regular watches and early in December there was no means developed for controlling aircraft so as to differentiate by means of radar between friendly and other planes. (p. 11–12)

As to communications, Admiral Bloch said the communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to all ships and points. All ships and stations were required to listen at all times on that frequency. There were teletypes between the Army Headquarters and Admiral Bloch's Headquarters with a branch in Admiral Kimmel's office. There was telephonic communication

between Admiral Bloch's Headquarters and General Short's "Message Center". Admiral Bloch also had such communication from the Harbor Control and Command Posts, both at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor to the the gates. There was also telephonic communication between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters. There were, Admiral Bloch said, means for rapid communication including communication from the "Interceptor Command" to Admiral Bloch's Headquarters. (p. 19)

Admiral Bloch said that there was no naval officer specifically detailed at the Army Interceptor Command. After December 7, that Command was staffed by calling in a lot of young women from Honolulu and training them at that time, the Army asked for watch officers to communicate with the Navy, although Admiral Bloch said it had been his plan that the communications would be sent by Army people to the Navy. Nevertheless, Navy people were sent there on December 7. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said he did not recall that the Army radar net had ever been used in any tactical operation. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army was having a great deal of trouble getting the radar system to work; there was trouble with the electronics and the Army came to Admiral Bloch for assistance; the Army was referred to the Commander in Chief and an officer by the name of Taylor was sent to help the Army in an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going; he was not sent there with any orders as liaison and Admiral Bloch thought that he was there only in the capacity as an expert to assist the Army with their electrical and mechanical difficulties. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch had no confidence in the Army radar system because he knew that it was not completely set up; the operators were not completely trained; and there was no way so that friendly or hostile planes could be identified there being no IFF equipment. Admiral Bloch said that there was a standard procedure for aircraft approach to and departure from Oahu for Army and Navy planes and that in addition to Army and Navy planes, there were various commercial companies operating aircraft there. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the Army had a number of observation posts on Oahu and adjacent islands, but that these were not manned unless there was a full alert and that not all of such posts had means of rapid communications with headquarters. (p. 20)

Admiral Bloch said that the only arrangement the Navy had for obtaining information with respect to approaching aircraft or ships by visual observation was the signal tower. (p. 21)

Captain Ramsey stated that about a week or ten days before December 7th, General Davidson asked Admiral Bellinger whether the Navy could furnish officer personnel to help man the radar system for 24-hour operation and said that if the Navy did not supply the men, he could operate only in the critical hours of the morning and evening. The final decision was that the Navy could not supply the officers required at that time on a permanent basis. He did not know the reason (page 601).

Admiral Bellinger stated that he was only slightly informed as to the Army radar system (page 686).

Admiral Bellinger said that the Army Interceptor Command was not ready to perform its part in the protection of Pearl Harbor from the viewpoint of the radar installations and of their ability to control their fighter groups, the number of planes they had, and the general quality of their pilots. (p. 131)

Commander W. G. Taylor testified that between October 1st and December 7th, he was assigned to temporary duty, Commander Airforce, Pacific Fleet (page 609). He was loaned to the Army Interceptor Command in an advisory capacity to aid in setting up the air warning system. (3)

Admiral Halsey said that he had sent his communication officer to work with the Army on the Army's radar system and that that officer had reported to him that the radar system was very backward as to its state of readiness. (p. 302)

He had had experience with the British air warning system and was familiar with radar development at the time. In working with the Army, he worked mainly on liaison between the air warning systems and the commands; he worked in an advisory capacity (page 611). He had been detailed to the job at the direction of Admiral Kimmel around the middle of November, at the request of the Army (page 622).

He first reported to the Army as an advisor about the second week in November and called a conference at which he submitted a memorandum which was prepared because of the difficulty in getting the Information Center set up. (4)

Commander William E. G. Taylor completed a naval flight course and was commissioned an Ensign in 1926; after a year's service, he resigned his commission and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. He served as an instructor specializing in fighter aircraft, and was placed on inactive duty as a Captain in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1934. He then had various jobs as a pilot, and was commissioned a Sub-Lieutenant in the British Naval Reserve Force in September, 1939, and thereafter engaged in various combat operations with the British. (p. 338–340) He said that the British fighter operations were very effectively directed while the planes were in the air. The general assumption was that the direction was employing a system of advanced electronics for interception of enemy aircraft. (p. 341)

Commander Taylor, while serving with the British, made reports to United States Naval representatives and endeavored to get as much information as he could on the methods of fire control used by the British. (p. 342) Commander Taylor returned to the United States in an effort to get from the British faster fighter craft which could be used by the Fleet and the Fleet air arm. (p. 342) Commander Taylor was next transferred to the British Royal Air Force on October 2, 1940, and was assigned to an R. A. F. squadron known as 242 in order to get operational experience before taking over his own squadron. He said that it was generally accepted that the major reason for the success of the R. A. F. fighter during the so-called Battle of Britain was the magnificent fighter direction control which the British had. (p. 343)

During this period of service with the Royal Air Force, Commander Taylor became more interested in the patrol system used by the British and continued to make reports to the American Naval Attache. Commander Taylor said that both the American Army and the American Navy had a large number of observers who were studying the Royal Air Force system, and that his impression that all of the information was made available to them, but that it did not appear that these observers brought back the full importance of the method used by the British. (p. 343–4) Commander Taylor said that he had made a full report to various officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics and particularly sought out the officer who was at that time in charge of radar development. Commander Taylor could arouse no interest in the use of this radar for fighter direction. (p. 344)

In July, 1941, after having had his own squadron for six months, Commander Taylor was advised by the British that because of his age they were going to make him a Wing Commander in charge of a fighter operational unit. He asked to be allowed to go back either to the British Navy or to be returned to the American Navy. He was commissioned in the American Navy in July, 1941, given a special assignment to visit several radar stations, and reported to the Bureau of Aeronautics in August of 1941. (p. 345)

Commander Taylor was given various lecturing assignments to ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and he arrived at Pearl Harbor in October, 1941, where he spoke to Admirals Halsey and Kimmel, among others. He lectured to the Army fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field and lectured to the pilots of the SARATOGA and ENTERPRISE. He found that the ENTERPRISE' fighter direction was considerably behind the British methods but had progressed much further than any other ship. He found that the ENTERPRISE had had their radar equipment for some time, the SARATOGA had no radar, and the LEXINGTON had recently acquired radar. In all ships equipped with radar, all hands were going through a training period. Commander Taylor was recalled by a dispatch from Admiral Kimmel which stated that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, desired Commander Taylor's assistance for technical purposes. (p. 347)

The conditions found by Commander Taylor about November 1, 1941, as to the Army warning system, which he reported to both the Army and the Navy prior to November 15, 1941, were as follows:

"During the first week in November, we inspected all of the installations and plans for the air warning system and I found these facts to be true; (1) Construction and maintenance of the air warning system was a Signal Corps function directly under the cognizance of the Chief Signal Officer, Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This Command

appeared to have little conception of the vast function of the air warning system and exhibited very little interest in expediting its installation. At no time before December 7, 1941, did this Command furnish either the authority or impetus badly needed to get the work or organization properly started. 2 The actual operation of the air warning system—that is, the evaluation and dissemination of radar information and the control of fighter defense—was under the Interceptor Command. The Interceptor Command fully realized the importance of the air warning system. Although the officers concerned were not fully informed of its complicated functions, they were willing and eager to take advice and lend all assistance in their power to help complete its installations. They seemed relatively impotent, however, in getting assistance needed from the Commanding General's Staff. 3, One Captain of the Air Corps and one Captain of the Signal Corps had been through the Air Warning School at Mitchell Field, New York. It was with these two officers that I worked. Both were capable and energetic. They worked twelve to fifteen hours a day, seven days a week, in an attempt to speed up completion of the air warning system. (4, The air warning equipment and communications system were largely field or mobile equipment and the entire system was temporary. However, with the exception of the ground-to-air and air-to-ground radio equipment, the system was adequate to serve its purpose as was later proved. (5, There were only five Army mobile radar equipments in the Hawaiian area. These equipments had been in Oahu about three months. The five sets were installed and, in my opinion, as well sited as terrain would permit and were the absolute minimum needed to cover the entire seaward search for the Island. The radar equipment itself was inferior to any I had seen before. The deficiency in the equipment, however, was due to crude mechanical construction rather than to any electronic fault. This made the operation of the equipment difficult and slow, with the result that the reported azimuth readings were frequently very inaccurate and the reports were slow in coming in. The equipment had a reliable range of eighty to one hundred miles. A "dead" area existed through a fifteen miles radius from the equipment. It was, therrfore, impossible to pick up aircraft plots within the first fifteen miles off shore. At each radar station, there was at least one officer or sergeant well trained to operate and maintain the equipment. In addition, there were seven or eight other enlisted operators under instruction at each station. All stations were under-manned for twenty-four operation. At the time of my inspection, either commercial or Signal Corps field telephone lines had been installed between the radar stations and the Information Center. (6) The Information Center itself had been planned on an Area Command scale similar to the Boston ar New York Information Centers and was too large in scope to effectively handle raids on the small Island of Oahu. The building was a temporary, wooden building and had been just been completed at the time of my inspection. The communications equipment was mostly field telephone equipment of the type developed during the last war. Positions had beegn provided for controllers and liaison officers, but liaison command lines had not been installed. These were not installed, primarily, because the activities at which the liaison command lines were to terminate were uninformed as to the purpose concerning the air warning system and because the Commanding General had not taken the steps to coordinate these activities with the air warning system. The Signal Corps had furnished sufficient plotters to man two watches only. These were just starting their training at the time of my inspection. There were no controllers or liaison officers available at this time and no provisions had been made to provide them. (7) The anti-aircraft batteries had installed a command post but no liaison had been established between the anti-aircraft command and the Information Center. (8) No attempt had been made to secure control of the anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor. (9) No liaison had been established between the searchlights and the Information Center. (10) No attempt had been made to disperse the fighter squadrons at Wheeler Field. (11) No automatic aircraft recognition system was installed which would identify all types of aircraft. (12) No aircraft approach lane system had been planned. (13) No system for identifying aircraft approaching Oahu by reports from parent aviation activities had been organized. (14) No visual observers reporting system had been organized. . . ."

"By December 7, 1941, all telephone communication lines had been installed with the exception of the Civilian Air Raid Precaution Command lines, and

the command lines from the Information Center to five fighter squadron dispersal points at Wheeler Field. Direct command lines were installed from Liaison positions in the Information Center to the various Army and Navy commands and activities. The civilian line had not been completed due to the fact no air raid center had been set up in Honolulu. The command lines to the fighter dispersal points were not completed, due to switchboard complications at Wheeler Field. Two fighter squadrons were dispersed, one at Bellows Field and one at Haliena Field. The dispersal of the remaining fighter squadrons was awaiting installation of command lines. An excellent liaison had been established between the Army anti-aircraft batteries three and five inch) and searchlights. About 15 November, I was instructed by CinCPac's Staff to request control of anti-aircraft guns of ships in harbor from Com 14. This request was refused by Com 14 on the grounds that 'No Army organization would control guns on any naval vessel. If anything comes over, we will shoot it down.' However, this control was voluntarily turned over to the Information Center on December 9, after ships' guns had shot down USS ENTERPRISE aircraft. At the same time, I was also instructed by CinCPac to request naval liaison officers for the Information Center from Com 14. His Chief of Staff informed me that these liaison officers should come from the Fleet. I was referred to Commander, Patrol Wing Two. I was told by Commander, Patrol Wing Two, that no liaison officers were available in that Command. I returned to CinCPac and reported my failure to obtain naval liaison officers. CinCPac's Operations Officer informed me that he would take steps to find some. These officers did not report to the Information Center until December 8. I was further instructed by CinCPac to confer with Commander, Patrol Wing Two, in order to establish an aircraft identification system and aircraft approach lanes to Oahu. A conference was held at the Information Center, between November 15 and 20, at which officers from all flying activities were present to discuss these matters. It was decided by the aviation activities concerned that these systems would not be put into effect until war was declared, because it was felt that activating these systems prior to that time would complicate crowded flying conditions and hinder flying training. The Army stated that movements of aircraft from the United States to the Southwest Pacific were secret, and it was, therefore, not desirable to report those movements at that time. It should be noted that without an aircraft movement reporting system to the Information Center, it was impossible for the Information Center to determine whether radar reports were of friendly or of hostile aircraft. CinCPac's Operations Officer stated, however, that their Operations Office was prepared to report the movements of aircraft under their cognizance at any time this information was requested. Some doubt existed as to whether the Signal Corp's (Hawaiian Department) or Interceptor Command should furnish controllers. As no controllers seemed to be forthcoming from the Hawaiian Department, Interceptor Command decided to use Squadron Commanders as controllers at the Information Center. These officers were heavily occupied with training their squadrons and were seldom available for controller training. However, no other source of controllers seemed to exist. Bomber Command, G. H. Q., and G–2 liaison officers were not made available until several days after December 7, when their importance at the Information Center was finally realized. Interceptor Command had taken the initiative in the training of Information Center plotters. This training was progressing satisfactorily when, during the last week in November, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that the radar stations would operate only between 0400 and 0700. I was informed that the decision to limit the operating hours was made to prevent breakdown of the radar equipment from prolonged operation. Training which had been conducted from 0800 to 1700 daily only, due to the shortage of radar operators and plotters, was necessarily limited to the hours of 0400–0700 by the order. The Information Center, therefore, virtually ceased to function except during those hours. I informed CinCPac's Operations Officer of the situation as it existed on about 1 December and was told that in view of the failure of the responsible commanders to take action to provide necessary personnel and to activate the Information Center on a twenty-four basis, he would initiate a letter requesting the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to take action immediately. I do not know whether this letter was ever written, or not. However, no action was taken up to December 7." (P. 350–351)

Commander Taylor said that there was a 15-mile dead area around Oahu in which the Army radar would not function. Prior to December 7 there was no visual system to supplement that weakness. (p. 351)

Commander Taylor said that the Army's radar operators and maintenance men at radar stations were insufficient in number and were not fully trained even up to December 7. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said that he had asked the Navy for six liaison officers for the Information Center, and on December 8 he received ten who were survivors from the CALIFORNIA. He had also asked ComFOURTEEN to whom he was directed by the Commander in Chief's Staff, that control of the anti-aircraft guns on naval vessels in the harbor should be held by the Information Center; also that some action be taken to identify aircraft approaching Oahu; and that a letter be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to expedite putting the Information Center on a 24-hour basis. (p. 352)

Commander Taylor said he made full reports to the Staff of the Commander in Chief as to the inadequacy of the Army Air warning system. (p. 352) He was quite sure that the Commander in Chief's Staff fully realized the situation.

His recommendation in regard to the Army air warning system was made on November 24, 1941. The memorandum containing his recommendation was introduced in evidence, marked Exhibit 62, and read to the Court. This covered a meeting held for the purpose of determining how quickly the Information Center could be made fully operative on a wartime basis; attended by Army and Navy officers who agreed as to the importance of the Center and as to the necessity for liaison watch officers from each activity to transmit information; information was to be drawn from various sources including naval aircraft; the system was being operated 0700 to 1130 but should be on a full-time basis; ComFOURTEEN should be approached with a view of obtaining naval liaison officers; confusion during exercises due to the number of planes could be controlled (1) by having all flights reported by parent units; (2) by enforcing aircraft approach procedure; (3) by requiring approaching planes to report at least 60 miles before coming in (CincUS had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises, this was to be discussed for a decision as to its value); IFF was not available; the question of gun control of ships in port was to be discussed with CincUS; also it was decided to investigate the possibility of using naval radar to supplement land radar in an emergency.

Very little was done as a result of this memorandum, he said, because they were unable to get more personnel. It was the Army's duty to supply personnel, with the exception of the Navy liaison officers (page 619). He personally requested CincPac's, ComFOURTEEN's Chief of Staff and Admiral Bellinger to supply liaison officers and was told that they were not available, but would be ordered to report to the Information Center as soon as possible. Liaison officers were essential to the proper dissemination of information (page 620). Their absence here, however, actually made little difference so far as the Navy liaison was concerned.

Commander Taylor said that the air warning system could have been made operative sooner if there had been some impetus behind it with enough power to get the things needed (page 621). This impetus should have come from the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army. He ramained with the Army for one month after December 7th, and at the end of seven days the Information Center was running smoothly. The war made it easier to get liaison officers (page 621).

Even if information from the radar were properly plotted, it would have been impossible to tell if planes were Japanese or whether they were United States planes; without some method of identification, radar cannot tell friend from foe. The Information Center is for the purpose of determining what friendly planes are in the air so that if a radar track is picked up that does not correspond to the course of the friendly planes it is presumed that it is the track of enemy planes.

The radar equipment of the Army, he said, was adequate to do a fair job in the morning. Communication between the air warning system and the other organizations was in, except for some of fighter dispersal areas and the lines to the civilian air warning. Communications between fighter director officers and fighter aircraft were inadequate to control fighters more than five miles off shore. The Army radar operators were well trained. For some time prior to December 7th, the radar had been operated from 0800 to 1630 in the afternoon, but shortly before December 7th, General Short gave orders to close down the radar stations

except between the hours of 4:00 a. m. and 7:00 a. m. (page 611). He understood the change was made to save the equipment.

On December 7th, there were no permanent radar installations on Oahu; there were five mobile sets (page 624). The permanent equipment was there, but it would take some time to put it in (page 624).

He stated that the Information Center of the air warning system was not adequately set up prior to December 7th, and they were in the process of teaching controllers (page 612).

At no time were there sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel to operate the radar station even partially (page 625). The Robert's Report is incorrect in stating that there were sufficient partially trained personnel on November 27th to operate the system twenty-four hours a day (page 626). There were insufficient well-trained personnel to operate even partially at any time. They could get fairly good 360° coverage, and he believed that in no case could a large raid come in undetected (page 626).

The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, was in charge of the radar, and the Navy assisted in setting up an air warning system, except that they had not furnished liaison officers (page 615). The radar was entirely under the control of the Army; his duties were advisory (page 616). At the time he came in contact with the Army, the Information Center was being organized by two junior Army officers who worked hard to get the system into operation but did not have enough force to get what they needed from various commands to get the station operating (page 627).

There was not sufficient personnel to operate the radars twenty-four hours a day, although he felt that the station should be operated twenty-four hours a day, fully manned. There were just enough sets to cover the area of Oahu. If any one set had gone out, it would have meant the loss of that coverage. (page 617)

Concerning the Army radar system, Admiral DeLany said that they did not rely upon it for any information because the radar itself had just been installed and was being used for training operators. (p. 80)

Captain Curts discussed his connection with the development of radar from 1936 to 1938 and the disclosure of the Navy's developments to the Army in about 1937. (p. 110) Captain Curts discussed the status of the Army radar in November 1941 at Pearl Harbor. He did not know what delayed the Army generally in securing radar. The Army's problem in connection with radar was much simpler than the Navy's; he informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar was not in an operational but was merely in an instruction status prior to December 7. (p. 111)

Admiral Anderson said that it was the Army's mission primarily to defend Pearl Harbor and that he had no exact knowledge as to the readiness to repel air attack; he was not familiar with the state of readiness of the air warning net.

F. SHIPS' RADAR

Admiral Kimmel testified that some of the ships in Pearl Harbor on December 7th were equipped with radar, but it was not manned because it was ineffective due to the surrounding hills (page 331).

Admiral Pye said that the PENNSYLVANIA and CALIFORNIA were equipped with radar (page 422). The efficiency of this radar was good. The ships' radar could not be used in port because of the surrounding hills and buildings.

Admiral Pye said that after the beginning of the war, the PENNSYLVANIA while at sea had picked up planes with radar and tracked them for a distance of 85 miles. (p. 168)

Admiral Smith said that the ships' radar was of no use in port (page 559). He stated that two carriers which were outside had radar, but picked up nothing, and that Admiral Halsey on his trip to Midway and return had an air search to a radius of 300 miles and picked up nothing (page 559). To have stationed a ship clear of Pearl Harbor with radar would have been ineffective due to the 65-mile range of the radar, and to station a cordon for that purpose would have been ineffective and very dangerous because of the risk of attack on the ships (page 559). However, he did not recall consideration of this at the time.

Captain Ramsey stated that the CURTIS, from her berth in Pearl Harbor, could cover the 150°–160° arc to southward with her radar for a distance depending on the altitude of the target (page 603).

Commander Taylor said that the radar equipment in the Navy was excellent prior to December 7, 1941, but the operators of radar were, in general, inex-

perienced (page 610). In a land-locked harbor with mountains around it, performance of radar equipment aboard ship was not good (page 614). In Pearl Harbor, the ships' radar might work, and again—it might not. It would be affected by mountains to the north as to performance to the south (page 614).

G. STEPS TAKEN BY COMMANDER LOCAL NAVAL DEFENSE FORCE

Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch's performance of duty as Naval Base Defense Officer was satisfactory (page 285). He was to advise of the condition of readiness, but this did not relieve the Senior Officer Present Afloat from fixing the condition of readiness (page 286).

Admiral Bloch, he said, was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer and was to command the Naval forces in the event of an attack, and also for necessary drills (page 289). Admiral Kimmel testified that Admiral Bloch had nothing suitable for reconnaissance (page 356), and that planes were available to Admiral Bloch only for drill or in an emergency (page 354), but that he should have asked for planes if he considered them necessary for long range reconnaissance, and could have asked for submarines or surface ships for such use (pages 354–5). He said that Admiral Bloch had available four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three coast guard cutters, and the SACRAMENTO (page 361).

Admiral Bloch testified that the forces assigned to him as a local defense force were four old destroyers, four small minesweepers, three Coast Guard cutters, the SACRAMENTO, one net vessel, one gate vessel, two self-propelled oil lighters, and a few small tugs and small craft. This force was not adequate to perform the Navy's task under JCD–42 (page 386). He had no surface or aircraft for offshore patrol and had no attack force.

Admiral Bloch said that CincPac was his immediate superior in command (page 388). He stated his responsibility under 2CL–41 and what steps had been taken so as to discharge this responsibility. These were an agreement which had been made with the Army regarding the use of planes, and drills held pursuant thereto, marine anti-aircraft had been made available to the Army, arrangements had been made at Navy installations to emplace Army guns (which were not emplaced prior to the attack) and to take care of those gun crews; about twenty-six 3″ anti-aircraft guns had been emplaced by the Army near Pearl Harbor; air control had been arranged for through Commander Patrol Wing Two; in drills the Senior Officer Present Afloat had been advised of what condition of readiness to maintain and this was Admiral Bloch's responsibility; bi-weekly drills had been held with the Army during the Autumn and up to December 7th; a Communications plan, including air raid alarm signal, had been planned and executed in drills (page 390).

On the 7th of December, 1941, certain features of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan for the Hawaiian Department plan were in effect, Admiral Bloch said:

"Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy in paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent character, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie. (c) and (d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting planes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to the Army. (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in active operation. (f), which was installation and operation of an underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys. I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation. (h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day. (i) distant reconnaissance: the district had no forces capable of performing that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Admiral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and

taking its forces with it. (k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective. (l): with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked on and largely effective. (m): all preparations had been made to assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censorship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack. (o): supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that."

Captain Curts said in substance that the communications between Headquarters and the ships were the same as they would have been if Headquarters had been maintained aboard the PENNSYLVANIA. Captain Curts discussed communications arrangements with the Army and with aircraft and with the air station at Kaneohe Bay. (pp. 105–107)

General Short testified that he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol during the period from October 16th to December 7th, and that harbor patrol posts were established and the channel was being swept (page 234). (2)

Admiral Bloch said that he gave General Short no reason for believing that the Navy forces at sea would give adequate warning against a hostile attack. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch stated that there was no inner air patrol on the morning of December 7, 1941. He had asked the Navy Department for four observation sea planes for this purpose (page 407). He had no planes under his direct command.

H. ARMY AIRCRAFT

General Short testified that his aircraft defenses were very inadequate and that he had on December 7th, twelve B–17's, only six of which were in commission. In addition to the six available B–17's, he had ten A–20's, and 50 B–18's, which he characterized as death traps against a modern plane, only twenty-four of which were in commission. He had asked the War Department for more planes (pages 223, 224, 231).

On December 7th, General Short testified, the Army pursuit planes were in a state of routine training except for the alert against sabotage (page 228). Not being alerted for combat, it required 55 minutes for the Army aircraft to get into action on December 7th (page 229). General Short testified that on December 7th, the Army maintained no inshore patrol except as incidental to training. One squadron of planes, he said, did have ammunition right next to the planes (page 229). The long range bombers which he had were available for cooperation with the Navy. The B–17's were good for a 1200 mile radius if they carried bomb loads.

Colonel Phillips testified that on December 7th, the Army had about twelve planes sendable for distant reconnaissance (page 484), and a squadron of small reconnaissance planes (page 485). He said that there was a shortage of Army planes (page 479).

General Marshall said that for the Hawaiian project 148 pursuit planes were scheduled: there were 99 P–40's and 46 P–36's there on December 7th. The commander had asked for 180 long range bombers but shortages prevented reaching this figure. There were 12 B–17's there on December 7th (page 855).

Admiral Kimmel testified that during his tour of duty, the effective Army pursuit planes had been increased from none to 100 and that only six Army B–17's were available on December 7th (page 289). He said that in November, 1941, the War Department had ordered the transfer of certain B–17's from Oahu to the Philippines, which left only twelve at Oahu, six of which were available for use (page 290).

Admiral Kimmel stated that the best defense the Army had against an attack such as the attack which in fact was made, was pursuit planes, and that the Army did not have sufficient planes or crews (page 331). He estimated that on December 7th the Army needed three times the number of pursuit planes they had at Oahu (page 371).

Admiral Bloch said that in his opinion the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse their fighters on; their main fighter field was Wheeler Field; they had another at Bellows Field and an improvised field in the neighborhood of Haleiwa; and Admiral Bloch had recommended that the Navy release a field at Kahuku Point. (p. 21)

Admiral Bloch believed that on December 7 the LEXINGTON, the ENTERPRISE, the SARATOGA and the YORKTOWN were away from Pearl

Harbor and had their planes with them so that there were only about 70 Marine fighting planes at Pearl Harbor at the time. How many were available that morning, he did not know. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch said that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin, had told him that he only had three planes available for inshore air patrol; he could not use the Army bombers because they could not see, and he could not use the fighters because they couldn't carry bombs and could not see very well either; Admiral Bloch believed that one of the three planes cracked up before December 7. (p. 25)

Admiral Bloch's recollection of the number of Army bombers available on December is set forth on page 25.

Admiral Smith said that they did not have a very high regard for the ability of the Army fighter and bomber pilots; that they considered, apart from anti-aircraft gunfire, that the most efficacious defense against air attack would be from the Navy's own carrier planes; since the carriers were away with their planes, he said, he would have sensed, if he had realized the danger of an air raid, that there was no security for Pearl Harbor aside from the anti-aircraft gunfire. (p. 44)

The Army aircraft, Admiral McCormick said, were insufficient in number and limited in usefulness because they lacked some navigational equipment and had some weakness in radio. The comparative efficiency of personnel, was not in his mind at the time. (p. 72)

During his discussion of the Army aircraft, Admiral Davis said that provisions for command in the air were still only of a general nature and there had been no real development along that line by drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for this: first, that the air warning net and radar system had not been actually placed in operation and secondly, that the Hawaiian area had not been placed on the basis of unity of command so that, human nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills was slower that it might have been. (p. 100)

Admiral Pye said that it was definitely known that the air forces available to the Army and the aircraft installations were below those which were considered necessary for proper defense. (p. 163)

Commander Taylor said that, in his opinion, there were sufficient numbers of fighter aircraft at Oahu to repel a number of aircraft that actually attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, and that the quality of the fighter aircraft was such as not to outperform the Japanese fighters, but the performance was sufficient, he believed, to have been able to break up, to a large extent, a raid of the sort which came in. Commander Taylor said that about 50 percent of the fighter pilots of the Interceptor Command were well trained: the other percent were green. (p. 353)

I. THE SUBMARINES

Rear Admiral Withers, Commander Submarines, stated that the submarines were engaged in training for war. They were assigned to task forces for training and trained with other ships.

He considered his force mobilized on December 7th, and the condition of the personnel was excellent (page 1087). The submarines were ready for war but there was no particular condition of readiness in effect.

He generally kept about one-third of the submarines at Pearl Harbor (page 1085). The total number of submarines which he had was 32, 18 of which were based at Hawaii. Some of these were on the West Coast for overhaul (page 108). Twelve submarines had gone to Manila early in November, 1941 for observation, and to be in position should war come (page 1084). On December 7th two submarines were off Midway and two off Wake. There was no line of submarines out to cover the area surrounding Hawaii (page 1084). Only five submarines were at Pearl Harbor (pages 1088–9). Five submarines were inadequate to throw a scouting force around Hawaii (page 1089).

J. RECONNAISSANCE AIRPLANES AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE

The responsibility for long range reconnaissance, the readiness of aircraft and drills, the extent of the actual reconnaissance and the extent of reconnaissance which could have been undertaken during the period November 27th to December 7th have been discussed at pages 77–85, supra.

The court inquired whether Admiral Kimmel's reason for not using planes for distant reconnaissance was not that the presence of foreign carriers was neither

known nor suspected. He agreed (page 380). There were no inner air patrol flown on December 7, 1941, stated Admiral Kimmel (page 375). As to distant reconnaissance, he said that the planes available to the Army and Navy had been lumped for defense but there were not enough to perform distant reconnaissance effectively. A total of 81 patrol planes and twelve B–17's were in the area. Of this number, 61 patrol planes and six B–17's were available on Oahu immediately prior to the attack. There were twelve patrol planes operating from Midway. The number was not sufficient "on a requirement of 84 planes" for 360° patrol based on 15 mile visibility. The inadequacy had been reported and more planes asked for; they did the best they could. He thought that there were a number of planes searching on December 7th in the operating areas and some engaged in maneuvers with our own submarines—he was told that there were about a dozen in the air (page 374). Midway was running a reconnaissance, as much as they could with 12 planes. He estimated that not more than 50 patrol planes on Oahu were in flying condition on December 7th.

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 1941, the actual situation of the planes was as follows: There were 7 planes in the air conducting search between 120°–170° to a distance of 450 miles from Midway; there were four planes on the surface of Midway armed with two 500-pound bombs, and on ten-minute notice; at Oahu, there were 12 planes of Vp–11 ready for flight on four hours notice; VP–12 had six planes ready for flight in 30 minutes notice, and 5 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP–14 had 3 in the air on security patrol, 3 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice, and 4 ready on 4 hours notice; VP–22 had 12 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP–23 had 11 ready for flight on 4 hours notice; VP–24 had 4 planes in the air conducting tactics with submarines, and 1 ready for flight on 30 minutes notice (page 684).

Admiral Bellinger described his duties on December 7. Planes normally under his command consisted of a total of 81 planes on December 7. (p. 115). On December 7, he said, there were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl and 12 at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned on December 5 from an extensive tour of duty at Midway and Wake. They had been sent there about October 17. He did not believe that any of the patrol planes were dispatched to the outlying islands after November 27 except in connection with sending Marine planes by carrier to Wake where one squadron was sent. (p. 116).

Admiral Bellinger said that on December 7, 58 of the 81 planes were in commission, nine were under repair and fourteen were in the air. (p. 117).

Admiral Bellinger discussed the conditions of readiness of the airplanes and the report of availability of Army and Navy planes on December 5 and 6. (pp. 125 and 126).

Admiral Bellinger said that after the attack, the Army communicated with the Army planes and the Navy communicated with the Navy planes. He also discussed the communication difficulties between Pearl Harbor and the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe. (p. 123).

There was no inner patrol around the entrances of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th (page 685), and there were no planes available to him, either Army or Navy for that purpose (page 685).

Captain Ramsey said that units of the Army bombardment division and of Marine bombardment aviation reported daily planes available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, when functioning. The Base Defense Air Force only came into existence in an emergency or for drill purposes. ComFOURTEEN or CincPac could vitalize this Base Defense Air Force (pages 574–6). Some order by officer senior to Admiral Bellinger was necessary (page 576). PatWings One and Two were under Admiral Bellinger's command, of course.

Exhibit 53 was the basic operations plan of Naval Base Defense Force and was in effect on December 7th (page 576). Annex B to Operations Plan No. 1–41 was issued pursuant to this plan, and Addendum 1 to Operating Plan No. 1A–41 was an estimate of the situation prepared by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin, covering the situation at the end of March, 1941 (page 577). (Paragraph 3(b) of this addendum stated that an air attack was the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu, etc.). He considered this estimate sound, and that if any attack came on Oahu, it would come by air, which would be the only effective way to attack (pages 578–9).

The general condition of readiness of aircraft was "Baker 5," 50% available on four hours notice, between November 27th and December 7th, but many units were in a higher condition and some airplanes were actually in the air (page 579).

He had no records from which he could refresh his memory as to the condition of readiness but gave isolated examples (page 580); PatWing Fourteen was in the air, conducting search of the operating area on December 7th, he did not remember whether there were three or four; there were about six planes of PatWing Two in the air, conducting tactics with the submarines in the "sanctuary over that island." (page 585). There was a ready squadron, planes lined up and presumably ready to take the air in 30 minutes, which was to be relieved at 8 o'clock by another from Kaneohe (page 580).

The readiness question was one in fact decided by higher authority (page 581). He could not say whether directly by CincPac or Commander Naval Base Defense Force. In ordinary drill practice the drill message placing the organization on an activated status came from the latter; then they would send a dispatch to all units making aircraft available to Naval Base Defense Air Force, and start issuing drill orders. Planes in the air were to be sent immediately to search sectors. At the end they would send a message, "Resume normal condition of readiness." At least once in a while he was on that job (it appears he was there at least as early as November 1, 1941, but may have been there earlier, see page 575) the condition of readiness was changed to a higher degree. He could not recall who sent the message, but it was some higher authority and the change was from "Cast" to "Baker" (page 581).

Under normal operating conditions the planes available for the Naval Base Defense Air Forces were under different commanders.

The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force never had planes assembled under his command except for drill or emergency and, therefore, except in these cases, he had no opportunity to set the condition of readiness (page 582).

He also said that aside from the ready squadron at Ford Island, the other patrol craft there were in various position: some were ready for launching, some being repaired, some in hangers for long repair or modification (page 585).

On the morning of December 7th, six planes at Midway were scouting to cover task forces there and six on the water fully manned and loaded with live bombs (page 585).

He stated that dispersal of patrol planes was impracticable on land or in harbor (page 585).

According to Captain Hamsey, on the morning of the 7th, patrol planes covering operating areas were under orders to depth bomb submerged submarines outside the sanctuary without a close escort. He said that for several months prior to December 7th, the planes of PatWing Two flew armed. All planes on search of operating areas, by order of CincPac, carried live depth charges (page 604). The Army planes were usually armed (page 604).

He said that before December 7th, he had only one officer assistant; after, he had 42 officer assistants (page 608). They were available later because their ships had been sunk.

General Short testified that one of the most important things the Navy was supposed to do was long range reconnaissance (page 228). He said that from October 16th to December 7th, he thought the Navy was operating an inshore patrol and was sending out task forces on offshore patrol, harbor patrol, posts were established and channels were being swept. There was a plan for Navy long distance reconnaissance and drills were held once a week (page 234). He said the joint air plan was effective March 1941 (page 234).

General Short testified that he did not know what Admiral Bloch did with respect to distant reconnaissance. Under the agreement, if the Navy planes were insufficient for such reconnaissance, the Navy could have asked the Army for planes (page 237). The Navy made no request of General Short for planes for distant reconnaissance, although General Short conferred with the Navy on December 1st, 2nd and 3rd (page 251).

General Marshall said that heavy Army bombers had been delayed because of delay at the manufacturing plants and, after delivery, unexpectedly strong winds, adverse to Hawaii, kept the planes at the West Coast for three weeks. The initial squadron arrived in the middle of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (pages 681–2).

XXXIII. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor

This investigation developed the following evidence regarding the sighting of Jap submarines in and around Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Exhibits 18, 75, 76):

At 0342, 7 December 1941, the USS CONDOR, a minesweeper, sighted a submarine periscope off the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. This was in a defensive

sea area where American submarines had been restricted from operating submerged. When sighted, the submarine was proceeding toward the entrance buoys. It was about 100 feet from and on a collision course with the CONDOR, but turned sharply to port. The CONDOR simultaneously turned to starboard.

The CONDOR reported the incident by blinker to the USS WARD between 0350 and 0358. The WARD was a destroyer of the Inshore Patrol then engaged in patrol duty off the entrance to the harbor. The CONDOR then continued on its assigned mission. The message to the WARD read:

"Sighted submerged submarine on westerly course speed 9 knots"

After receiving this visual, signal, the WARD made a sonar search for about an hour and a half, without result. It then communicated by radio with the CONDOR, asking:

"What was the approximate distance and course of the submarine that you sighted?"

At 0520 the CONDOR replied:

"The course was about what we were steering at the time 020 magnetic and about 1000 yards from the entrance apparently heading for the entrance"

In response to further inquiries made by the WARD between 0521 and 0536, the CONDOR advised again that the last time it had sighted the submarine it was at about 0350 and that it was apparently headed for the entrance. On receiving the message giving the submarine's course as about 020 magnetic, the captain of the WARD realized that his search had been in the wrong direction. He then continued searching, but again without result.

The CONDOR made no report of the incident, except to the WARD. The captain considered that the identification at that time was not positive enough to make a report to other than the Senior Officer Present Afloat. The Senior Officer Present Afloat, Lieutenant Commander Outerbridge, who commanded the WARD, made no report to higher authority. The captain of the WARD thought that the CONDOR might have been mistaken in concluding that he had seen a submarine (p. 87–92, 428–429).

The radio conversation between the WARD and CONDOR was overheard and transcribed in the log of the Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, a radio station then under the jurisdiction of the Commander, Inshore Patrol, 14th N. D. (Ex. 18.) Since the conversation was solely between the ships and was not addressed to the Section Base and no request was made that it be relayed, the Bishop's Point Radio Station did not relay or report it to higher authority. The loudspeaker watch on the same frequency, which was maintained in the Communications Office, 14th N. D., did not overhear or intercept the WARD-CONDOR conversation.

At the entrance to Pearl Harbor there was stationed a gate vessel charged with opening and closing the net at the entrance. The instructions of the Captain of the Yard were that the net should be kept closed from sunset to sunrise and opened only on orders from him, from the Assistant Captain of the Yard, or from the Yard Duty Officer, who could be reached via the signal tower (Exhibit 43). The log of the gate vessel indicates that the net was opened and closed a number of times during the night of December 6–7. At 0458 on the 7th the gate was opened and the CROSSBILL and the CONDOR stood in. It was not until 0846 that the gate was closed. The Commanding Officer of the CONDOR, now Lieutenant Commander M. H. Hubbell, testified that at 0532, when the CONDOR came in, conditions of visibility were very good and were "approaching daylight conditions" (Exhibits 44, 45).

The log of the signal tower for December 6–7, 1941, records the closing of the gate at 2250 on 6 December, which was followed by an entry at 0600 that the ANTARES was reported off the harbor (Ex. 46).

The USS ANTARES, with a 500-ton steel barge in tow, arrived off Pearl Harbor from Canton and Palmyra at about 0605, when it exchanged calls with the WARD. At 0630 the ANTARES sighted a suspicious object, which appeared to be a small submarine, about 1500 yards on its starboard quarter. The ANTARES notified the WARD and asked it to investigate, and several minutes later, at about 0633, observed a Navy patrol plane circle and drop two smoke pots near the object (Exhibit 73).

The WARD complied and at 0640 sighted an unidentified submarine one point off its starboard bow, apparently following the ANTARES into Pearl Harbor. General Quarters were sounded and all engines ordered full ahead, increasing the WARD's speed from five to twenty-five knots. At 0645 she opened

fire with guns 1 and 3, firing one shot from each gun. The attack lasted only one or two minutes. The first shot, at a range of approximately 100 yards, passed directly over the conning tower; the second, from No. 3 gun, at fifty yards or less, hit the submarine at the waterline junction of the hull and conning tower. At about this time, the ANTARES, observing the fire of the WARD, also noted that the Navy patrol plane appeared to drop bombs or depth charges at the submarine. The submarine keeled over to starboard and started to sink. The WARD ceased firing and then dropped depth charges. A large amount of oil appeared on the surface. The submarine went down in 1,200 feet of water (Exhibit 74).

At 0651 the WARD sent a radio message to the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District (Exhibit 18):

> *"We have dropped depth charges upon subs operating in defensive sea area."*

The captain of the WARD, after reflecting that this message might not be interpreted as showing a surface submarine contact, at 0653 sent the following supplementary message:

> *"We have attacked fired upon and dropped depth charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area (Exhibit 18)."*

This message was received by the Bishop's Point Radio Station, relayed to the Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Inshore Patrol, and delivered by the Communications Watch Officer, FOURTEENTH Naval District, to the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer. The Duty Officer notified the ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff at 0712 and, at the latter's direction, the Duty Officer of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at 0715.

The ComFOURTEEN Chief of Staff informed Admiral Bloch. Because of numerous previous reports of submarine contacts, their reaction was that the WARD had probably been mistaken, but that if it were not a mistake, the WARD and the relief ready duty destroyer MONAGHAN, which was dispatched, could take care of the situation, while the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to whom they had referred the information, had the power to take any other action which might be desired (pages 414–416, 452–469).

A. JAPANESE SUBMARINES

Captain Smedberg said that the sum of the information on the midget subs used by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was that they were carried and launched from mother submarines, were about 41 feet in length, and had a maximum cruising range of 175–180 miles at the most economical cruising speed of 4–6 knots. They were probably not equipped with radio (p. 8–9). Complete information on Jap midget subs is available in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 20 October 1944, Volume 1, number 15 (Exhibit 5), and Office of Naval Intelligence Publication "ONI 220–J, Japanese Submarines" (Exhibit 6).

NOTE: The latest Office of Naval Intelligence publication referring to Jap midget submarines ("ONI 222–J, The Japanese Navy") establishes that the Japanese midget submarines used at Pearl Harbor were actually about 80 feet long, rather than 41 feet long as stated by Captain Smedberg. They carried two 18-inch torpedoes, had a top speed of 12 knots, and could dive to a depth of 100 feet.

Captain Ramsey said that at 0730 on December 7, 1941, he received a call from the Staff Duty Officer to the effect that they had sunk a submarine one mile off the Pearl Harbor entrance (page 586).

Captain Earle said that at about 0710 on December 7, he learned of the submarine attack off Pearl Harbor; that this did not indicate to him that an air attack might be imminent; that his reaction was that the enemy had decided to be a little more active with his submarine campaign of war; that the WARD was making another mistake. He pointed out that they had had on the average of ten or fifteen reports of submarine sighted in that area in the several months preceding the attack. When he received word of this attack, he told the Watch Officer to be sure and get the dispatch verified, to notify the Commander in Chief's Watch Officer immediately, to advise ComFOURTEEN's Operations Officer, and then he called Admiral Bloch and discussed the matter with him. As the matter had been referred to the Commander in Chief, they decided that they would wait for further develop-

ments. They did not discuss the fact that the presence of the submarine might indicate an air attack. (p. 376)

Admiral Bellinger read an excerpt from a report prepared by him as follows: "0700 Patrol Plane 14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735 Message decoded and information received by Staff Duty Officer. 0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750 Search plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' 0800 Search plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the planes in the air at 0805." (p. 129)

Admiral Bellinger knew of no attempt at his command headquarters to relay the information of the attack on the submarine to Army headquarters.

He requested authentication; reported it to the Staff Duty Officer of CincPac, and drew up a search dispatch (page 586).

Concerning the submarine attack on the morning of December 7th, Admiral Smith said that he had received no report of that attack, the report was received by the Staff Duty Officer, who was Commander V. R. Murphy, who delivered the message to Admiral Bellinger, and he believed to Admiral Kimmel. He said:

"My recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of the Navy a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at 7:15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANTARES, the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor, and as she turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface. He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the submarine, and the WARD informed the singal tower, unfortunately by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secretary of the Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself. But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack. I received no message before that about the submarine. You must also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate between the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate with the Army. It had to go through several stations."

Captain Murphy said that no specific information was furnished to him concerning the international situation when he went on watch as Staff Duty Officer; he had a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving him the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet and instructions as to action to be taken in the event of war. (p. 196)

Captain Murphy said that he was not familiar with the Army's condition of readiness on December 7th. (p. 198) He did not know whether or not the Army radar system was operating that day.

Captain Murphy said that as Staff Duty Officer if anything unusual occurred during his tour of duty, he would have advised ComFOURTEEN, who in turn would have advised the Army since ComFOURTEEN was charged with dealings with the Army. (p. 201)

Captain Murphy said that about 7:20 or 7:25 in the morning of December 7th, he received a report to the effect that a submarine had been sunk by the WARD. He described his actions as follows:

"At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, 'Did he say what he was doing about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?' And he said, 'No.' I said, 'While I'm finishing dressing, call him and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral Bloch.' I finished dressing, Black

came back and said he had dialed and dialed and the line was busy. I then dialed the operator—it was a local dial system—and told him to tell the Duty Officer to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the phone and it was Ramsey—now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from PatWingTwo. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, 'I have just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on,' and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone. He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered the ready-duty destroyer out to assist the WARD and to investigate, and had ordered the stand-by destroyer to get up steam. I said, 'Had you any previous details or any more details of this attack?' He said, 'The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of preliminary search or chase of any kind.' I then called Admiral Kimmel and gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and of the ready-destroyer being ordered out and of the stand-by destroyer getting up steam. He said, 'I will be right down.' About that time, and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, 'No,' but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes available in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone rang again; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District. He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and requesting a Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel and gave him that message. Before I finished that message, the yeoman came in, said, 'There's a message from the signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this is no drill.' I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel, either directly on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communications Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our forces at sea: 'JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL.' I then called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available'—no, I'll correct that: I told the yeoman to call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey and said, 'How many planes have you got available?' He said, 'I don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for search.' I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief; some I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself. By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or followed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information. From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who had the immediate direction of events."

Captain Murphy said that that contact was about the third or fourth of a series of such contacts; that all previous ones had, insofar as actual proof was concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, he thought, might be the real thing but he wanted some further information as to why the WARD thought that it sunk a submarine so that he could formulate an opinion whether or not there was a submarine sunk. In the previous contacts, they had never been able to establish definitely that there had been a submarine involved. He had less doubt about the authenticity of this than he had had about some of the others. He did not interpret this submarine as possibly being accompanied by an air attack (p. 202) .

Admiral Bloch stated that at 0715 on December 7, 1941, he received a telephone message from the Chief of Staff that the WARD had attacked a submarine off Pearl Harbor and was escorting a sampan in.

Commander Granville C. Briant was Aviation Aide to ComFourteen in 1941. (p. 229). During November and December, 1941, Commander Briant was one of the District Watch Officers. There were about eight to ten of such officers. Commander Briant discussed the instructions given to

Watch Officers and qualifications of those on the Watch Officers list. (p. 230). He also discussed the functions of the Harbor Control Post. (p. 232). Commander Briant said that to his mind the Watch Officers had not been advised of the seriousness of the situation and specifically they were not advised of the war warning. (p. 233)

Admiral Bloch said that, "on the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine was sighted by USS WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the USS ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the ANTARES. I did receive at 7:12 a. m. a telephone message from the Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been attacked and was counter-attacking a submarine at the entrance to the channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff gave me this message. I asked him what it was; is it a real submarine or is it a report? We had had a number of false reports in the past and he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight contact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately to headquarters; dispatched another destroyer and tried to get information from the WARD. Before we got the information straightened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed—at least his operations Watch Officer was informed about the entire matter just at the same time we were." (pp. 21 and 22)

Admiral Bloch did not think that the Army had been advised on the morning of December 7 of the dispatch from the WARD concerning the submarine attack. (p. 22)

The Staff Duty Officer at CincPac was given the same information. They were not sure whether this was a true report. The ready duty destroyer was ordered out. Before the report was clarified, the air attack had started. The first submarine contacted was one mile outside the entrance buoy (page 401). He learned after December 7th that a patrol plane had also seen this submarine or another, attacked it with depth bombs and sunk it. This was a midget (page 403).

A midget submarine was later sunk inside the harbor. When it was later recovered, it was found that both its torpedoes were missing (page 403). It had fired at the CURTISS and missed.

No anti-submarine nets had been installed, but anti-torpedo nets had been installed to keep a submarine outside from firing torpedoes into the harbor. If the anti-torpedo net had been closed, a midget submarine would probably have become fouled in the net. Practice required the net gates to be open all day and closed all night except when ships were passing them. At 0445, December 7, 1941, some minesweepers came in and the gate was not closed until after 0800 when it was ordered closed by Headquarters (page 404). The deepest part of the channel was 72 feet; the depth of the net was 45 feet (page 405). From keel to conning tower the submarine was about 20 feet.

Also, a midget submarine ran aground on a reef off Bellows Field and was recovered by the Army (page 406).

Admiral Kimmel testified that on December 7th his headquarters were at the submarine base at Pearl Harbor, his Flagship, the PENNSYLVANIA, was nearby and he could move to it on short notice. By moving his headquarters to shore, he did not intend to supplant Admiral Bloch (page 278). There was nothing irregular in his establishing his headquarters ashore since this in no way changed his responsibilities (pages 363–4).

Between 0730 and 0740, Admiral Kimmel had a report of a submarine attack off Pearl Harbor and he was waiting for an amplification of this report. Between November 27th and that time, he had had about a half-dozen such reports. While waiting for amplification, the air attack started (page 332). He said that the officer reporting the sinking of the submarine should, under 2CL–41, have broadcast in plain language, but sent it in code which resulted in delay.

Admiral Kimmel said that the one submarine which did attempt to attack in Pearl Harbor was stopped before accomplishing anything (page 373).

He also said that he had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack (page 1124).

Admiral Calhoun said that on December 7, 1941 he had no warning that a submarine was in Pearl Harbor until the MEDUSA and CURTISS informed

him that they had sunk a midget submarine on the other side of Ford Island (page 945).

Captain Layton testified that a submarine entered Pearl Harbor and fired both of its torpedoes, one passing between the RALEIGH and CURTISS, the other burying itself in the mud near the berth of the UTAH. This submarine was sunk and was so thoroughly destroyed that no intelligence material was obtained from it. (Page 285–286)

Another Japanese midget submarine which was beached off Bellows Field, Oahu, was captured on December 8th along with its commanding officer. This submarine contained various documents which were captured, including a chart of Pearl Harbor on which was laid a course into the harbor, around Ford Island, and out of the harbor, as well as indications of positions of various ships in the harbor. (Exhibit 32A, 33A)

Captain Layton also testified that the midget submarine beached off Bellows Field bore the designation I–18 which was the apparent designation of its "mother submarine." He pointed out that the chart of Pearl Harbor which was recovered from the "I–18" contained notations in pencil along both sides of the entrance channel to Pear lHarbor, reading "I–16", "I–20", "I–22", "I–18", and "I–24". He testified that from intelligcnce subsequently received it was known that such were the designations of the Japanese mother submarines that carried the five midget submarines believed to have been present outside Pearl Harbor on 7 December. (Page 284).

Captain Layton further testified that the times shown on the track map of Pearl Harbor that was recovered from the Japanese submarine off Bellows Field was, in accordance with Japanese naval custom, Tokyo time, minus nine, and that all dates indicated were east longitude or Tokyo dates, regardless of the fact that the 180th meridian may have been crossed. Therefore, he said, that the "times in these logs and memoranda and notebooks will always remain as minus nine, four and a half hours earlier than Pearl Harbor." (Page 279).

Captain Layton examined the original Japanese map which contained the track around Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 32A), and stated it to be his professional opinion as a seaman that the track shown on the map was a projected track and not an actual logged track by bearings and distances indicated thereon. He stated that "it is too exact to be an exact track and the figures are written a little too carefully and meticulously to have been performed by the captain of this midget submarine, who had to control trim, use his periscope, and maneuver the submarine without assistance. The second member of the submarine was the machinist's mate, who closed and opencd switches, cut in and out the CO_2 absorbent material, and in general performed the duties of chief engineer and auxiliary gang." (Page 281–282).

Captain Layton also testified that the notations on the chart under the time 0450 did not indicate that the captain of the midget submarine recorded that he, himself, had sunk an enemy ship. Captain Layton pointed out that the submarine still had both of its torpedoes aboard, which was its full complement. He pointed out also that the track in question was carefully laid out both by course and distance, with the course in degrees and distance in meters, and the time in minutes and seconds; and that the latter indicated that the speed of the submarine was to be varied from point to point so as to make its arrival at the several points at a predetermined time. He pointed out that the time indicated, 0450, which was Tokyo time, would be 0920 Pearl Harbor time, and that at 0920 Honolulu time, the attack was still taking place and there was a tremendous amount of activity in the area indicated on the map. Accordingly, Captain Layton gave it as his opinion that he doubted if the captain of the midget submarine would have been able to so meticulously follow his course all around the harbor and at the same time make notations from point to point. (Page 283).

The notations on the Japanese chart indicated also that the submarine commander had received intelligence reports as late as December 5th. (Exhibit 32–32A).

The Japanese submarine commander who was captured, upon being interrogated, admitted that he had failed in his mission. (Page 16).

With reference to the language appearing on the Japanese map, which is variously interpreted as "sink enemy ship," and "enemy ship sunk," Captain McCollum testified that it was not possible to infer whether the past tense or the future tense was in the mind of the person who made the notations, because there were no kana symbols attached showing the tense of the verb. (Page 25–26)

NOTE: It is to be noted that the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board that Japanese midget submarines must have been in the harbor

a few days before the attack and evidently moved in and out of the harbor at will ('RAPHB', Page 155) is based wholly on the captured Japanese maps and on the testimony of Robert L. Shivers. FBI agent in charge at Honolulu, 7 December 1941, which in turn is based solely on those maps. In this connection, it is pointed out that Admiral Hewitt made a thorough study of the question (Hewitt Report, Page 146–148) which caused him to conclude that there was no evidence warranting the belief that any Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. (Hewitt Report, Page 157).

B. DETECTION OF PLANES BY THE ARMY RADAR SYSTEM

J. L. Locard, First Lieutenant, U. S. Army, and Sergeant George E. Elliott, U. S. Army, who were privates on December 7, 1941, testified that they were on duty that morning from 0400 to 0700 on a mobile radar unit on the northern part of Oahu at a site called Opana (page 628).

There were supposed to be three men on the shift, but the men arranged, and Sergeant Murphy approved, only two, it being a Sunday morning (pages 637–8). The station had been set up in November, about Thanksgiving (page 639).

Locard stated (page 641) that his station worked 0400 to 0700 on Sundays and holidays and 0700 to 1700 on weekdays. The Robert's Report states that on November 27, 1941, the Army ordered the radar system operated each day from 0400 to 0700, but Locard had no knowledge of such order (page 643), and his station operated those hours on Sunday.

Elliott understood that the station had been operated from 0400 to 0700 before December 7th according to schedules (page 652).

The radar set which they were operating could cover 180° from northeast to west. They were instructed to track for flights, intercept them and report them to the Information Center (page 629). Locard was in charge of the station. They had telephonic communication with the Information Center.

Locard had been operating these radar sets since August, when they were put in operation (page 630). The set was of rather crude construction at that time. It would pick up one plane at 100 miles and sometimes not pick up three or four (page 631).

They had no information prior to 0800 of the movement of friendly aircraft. Radar could not distinguish friend from foe.

On the morning of December 7th, they continued to operate after 0700 as the truck had not come for them, in order to give Elliott training in radar operation (page 631). He was not regarded by Locard as a qualified operator (page 633).

At about 0702 they discovered an unusually large response in a northerly direction at 136 miles. Locard checked the equipment to make sure, and when the planes came in to 132 miles they decided to call the Information Center (page 633). Elliott first talked to the switchboard operator at the Information Center (page 633).

Elliott testified that he had wanted to send the information in right away, but that Locard had laughed at him and finally told him to send it in if he liked. After a short time, they did (page 648).

Locard then got the switchboard operator to call the Army officer on duty and then he reported the information to him. The officer thanked him. They continued to track the planes in to 20 miles, when they lost them because of distortion.

They left the unit and became aware of the attack at 0830 and went back on duty at their unit at 0910. Their equipment meanwhile was being operated by others who had relieved them (page 636).

Elliott had no information concerning an expected flight of B–17's (page 646). This, incidentally, was the first time Elliott had this 0400 to 0700 duty; previously he had worked in the late mornings or afternoons (page 646). He thought that other units had also picked up the flight and reported it, but had no knowledge to that effect (page 657).

Lt. Col. K. A. Tyler, U. S. Army, who was then a first lieutenant, was at the Army Information Center on the morning of December 7, 1941. He was there for training as an assistant controller. He was the only officer present and had been on duty there only once before (pages 446–7). Five or six plotters were on duty, who plotted radar reports (page 448). In all, five radar stations were in operation.

He received no information or instructions before going on watch, nor did he relieve any one. Watch was 0400 to 0800 (page 449). He understood the mechanics of radar, but he had never seen one in operation.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, at 0715, he received a call from the radar station at Opana, stating that the operator had a report of a large number of

planes at 130 miles. Private Lockard was the operator he talked to (page 457). He thought about the report for a minute, thanked the operator, and did nothing about it.

He was looking for a flight of B–17's, but had no official notice that they were coming in. A bomber pilot friend had told him that when there was a flight of B–17's en route, the radio stations played Hawaiian music all night. That night and morning they did. He thought B–17's were coming in because Hawaiian music was playing on the radio, which was an arrangement made for homing planes (page 458). He did not suspect enemy planes and made no effort to contact his superiors (page 459).

There was no means of distinguishing friend from foe. He thought the planes were either B–17's, due from San Francisco on a northeast course, or some Navy carrier planes. He thinks now that the large plot report at 0715 were the Japanese planes (page 460).

The only information he had of Japanese-United States relations was what he had read in newspapers.

He learned of the attack by phone call at 0800. He called all forces back. Major Berquist and Major Tindall came and took over (page 452). A naval officer reported to the Information Center shortly after the attack began (page 453).

Commander Taylor said that on the morning of December 7th, he got to the Information Center between 0830 and 0900 (page 612). Upon his arrival, the Information Center was in great confusion. Plots were made of everything reported, but there was no way of determining what planes were Japanese or American (page 613).

Captain Ramsay said that during the day, they called Army radar and requested that they track the Japanese planes in retiring and advise, but got no information (page 601).

It is not clear whether the Navy had been advised of the expected arrival of the Army planes on December 7th. Admiral McMorris stated that several senior members of CincPac's staff certainly were aware that some large bombers were flying from California to Oahu at that time, December 6th (page 900). Admiral Smith thought that they did not know of the prospective arrival of Army planes on December 7th (page 563). He said, incidentally, that the Army B–17's arrived that morning without ammunition (pages 569–72). Captain Ramsey stated that prior to 0755 on December 7th, he had no information as to the scheduled arrival of Army planes (page 587).

C. THE AIR ATTACK

Captain Smedberg said that a Chief Yeoman in the Japanese Navy who had formerly been attached to the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Jap Combined Fleet, and who had been captured during the Marianas campaign, had furnished what is believed to be an accurate account of the composition and movements of the enemy forces which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This information is presented in summarized form in Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, dated 8 December 1944, vol. 2, number 22 (Exhibit 3; p. 4–5).

The high points of the prisoner's account were as follows: The secret operation order upon which the Pearl Harbor attack was based was dated 1 November 1941 and specified that: (1) "War will be declared on X-Day," and (2) "This order will become effective on Y-Day." A second operation order, dated 5 November, fixed Y-Day as 23 November 1941 (22 November, Pearl Harbor time), and a third operation order, dated 10 November, set X-Day as 8 December 1941 (7 December, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 5–6).

The Japanese plan called for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by a carrier "Striking Force," with a "Surprise Attack Force" of submarines delivering a coordinated blow. The submarine force was to carry out reconnaissance in advance of the attack by the Jap carrier planes and was to attack U. S. warships which escaped from Pearl Harbor. If the opportunity became available, it was also to launch attacks with midget subs after the plane attacks (p. 6–7).

The striking force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nagumo, consisted of three of Japan's five carrier divisions: The KAGA and AKAGI (CarDiv 1); HIRYU and SORYU (CarDiv 2); SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU (somctimes referred to as CarDiv 3, sometimes as CarDiv 4 and sometimes as CarDiv 5); the HIYEI and KIRISHIMA (two of the battleships of BatDiv 3); the TONE and CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA, and destroyers, including elements of DesRon 1 (Exhibit 3; p. 6).

The "Surprise Attack Force" included about twenty fleet-type submarines, some of which carried midget subs. This constituted a large part of the Japanese Sixth (Submarine) Fleet.

The Japanese operation order specified that the carrier force was to leave Japan about X minus 16 Day (21 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) and proceed by way of Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles, for Pearl Harbor. Most of the submarines of the "Surprise Attack Force" wereto leave the Inland Sea on X minus 20 Day (17 November 1941, Pearl Harbor time) (p. 6–7).

The Japanese striking force actually left Saiki Anchorage near the Bongo Channel some time between November 19 and November 21, 1941, Pearl Harbor Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, where it assembled and fueled. Departure was taken on or about 27 November 1941, under cover of a heavy front. The force proceeded in an easterly direction, heading on course about 085° to a point in longitude about 170° W; then turned southesat on course about 135° and proceeded to a point due north of, and approximately 200 miles from, the island of Oahu, where it arrived early in the morning of 7 December 1941, Pearl Harbor Time. From that position the Pearl Harbor attack wqs launched. Following the attack, the striking force retired initially to the northwest on a heading of about 300° to a point about longitude 170° E, thence to the southwest, irregularly on varying headings to a point near 140° E, and thence northwest to Kyushu (Exhibit 3, page 16).

General Short testified that he heard the first bomb of the attack; the Chief of Staff told him it was the "real thing." He immediately ordered an all-out alert (No. 3). His narrative of the attack appears at pages 254–255 of the Record. He had no notice of a submarine having been sunk near Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.

Admiral Kimmel testified that he became aware of the attack by a telephone message from the Staff Duty Officer (pages 332–333). He reached his headquarters at 0805.

Admiral Bloch said that he knew of the attack at 0755; he heard bombs and saw a Japanese plane; he went to headquarters, sent dispatches to Washington, Philippines, Guam and to ships at sea advising that Oahu had been attacked; called all Navy Yard workers and Naval personnel to duty, flooded dry docks and took other local measures (page 400). He said that ample personnel reported (page 401). When the Japanese attacked, a visual signal was given and the air raid alarm was given. Insofar as other measures planned, including air search for the enemy, were possible after the attack, they were carried out.

Admiral Pye testified that on the morning of December 7th, he was in the Halikulani Hotel (page 418). He learned of the attack at 0755 and proceeded to Pearl Harbor in an automobile with Admiral Leary (page 423). His Chief of Staff took action to carry out 2CL–41 as he was not aboard at the time of the attack (page 421).

Concerning the sortie of ships on December 7, Admiral Pye said:

"I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board, my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him. That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived, about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately afterwards; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, because all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present; no heavy ships could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except alongside the dock under overhaul." (p. 166)

Admiral Bellinger said that, on December 7, 1941, the Naval Base Defense Force immediately assumed a functioning status without orders from higher authority (page 664).

Captain Ramsey saw the bombing on Ford Island; had a radio message broadcast of the raid; ordered planes in the air to search 315° to 360° from Pearl Harbor to the maximum distance, and assigned searches of other sectors (page 587).

After the attack he ordered the planes in the air to search 315° to 360° because they always thought that the likely direction of approach (page 597). To the best of his belief, the Japanese attack came from the northwest and subsequent information indicated that the planes had been launched from carriers about 325 miles from Oahu bearing 325° (page 598).

Shortly after December 7, Admiral Davis saw a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which indicated that the planes had been launched from a point about 250 miles north of Oahu. (p. 103–104)

Captain Ramsey reviewed what he did on the morning of December 7th (page 605). After he issued search orders and Admiral Bellinger approve, there were a stream of requests for information; the first order he received was from CincPac to "locate and destroy enemy," but all possible action was already taken; communications were disrupted by the raid and smoke; all planes available were told to take off immediately; various orders were received during the day, including some from CincPac to search specific sectors (page 606).

Captain Ramsey said that they received some information during the morning concerning a chart from a shot-down plane in which the purported rendezvous was to the southwest of Hawaii (page 602).

Various Army planes did go northward that day—they went out to 150 miles but had to return because B–17's could go no further without protection of A–20's, which had no longer range (page 602).

Admiral Smith stated that he did not get information as to the probable location from which the Japanese carriers launched the attack—for some two days. There was a great deal of confusion; false reports from civilians of troop and parachute landings; a false report from one of our planes of an enemy carrier to the south; a squadron of our seaplanes returning from Midway to Pearl Harbor on that afternoon dropped two bombs on what the pilot said was a camouflaged Japanese carrier south of Pearl Harbor, but seems to have been the PORTLAND. A chart showing the position of Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7th, but was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon (page 564). Planes left to the north, but this was not known by the Navy until two days after the attack. Visibility was good at Oahu on December 7th, but fog could usually be found to the north.

Admiral Kitts said that about 175 to 250 Japanese planes came in from carriers to attack from west-northwest, a distance of some 200 miles (page 524).

Admiral Kitts said that no orders in regard to fire control were issued on December 7 other than by the ships' commanding officers and one by the Commander in Chief were issued to stop firing on friendly planes. (p. 191) Admiral Kitts said that, as he recalled it, 28 planes were shot down by the Fleet. (p. 193)

He testified that on December 8th, after the attack, he was in conference with General Davidson and was shown a radar plot showing planes coming in from about 150 miles and going out again. The plot coming in might have been interpreted as friendly planes, but after a two-hour attack on Pearl Harbor, the outgoing plot must have been the enemy. This plot was not reported to the Navy until he saw it on December 8th (page 520).

Colonel Phillips said that on December 7, 1941 he received a telephone message of the attack and ordered the all-out alert. Some Army pursuit planes took off but he did not know when or how many (page 389). He did not know whether any bombers took off. He said that there was on December 7th, a radar track of planes which turned out to be Japanese, but he cannot remember whether it was incoming or outgoing or either (page 488). He saw this track after December 7, 1941, but did not remember where or what it showed (page 489).

Admiral Smith was not familiar with the Army radar system (page 558). He stated that after the attack, Colonel Davidson told him the radar track had been reconstructed from the bearings, but on Sunday that they were not convinced that that was the direction from which the attack came (page 558). This is "obviously correct, because we searched to the south rather than to the north" (page 588).

Commander Taylor described the confusion which existed on December 7 at the Information Center. He said, among other things, that there were a number of plots prepared of the course of aircraft that morning which were studied in an attempt to determine exactly where the raids had come from and what direction they had returned; that about 48 hours after the raids they completed the construction of an estimated plot, and that it was his understanding that during the subsequent visit of the Secretary of the Navy, this plot was shown to him as evidence that all information received by the Information Center had been received in an orderly manner. (p. 351)

At the time of the attack, Commander Wright was having breakfast with Commander Williams, who, he said, had been handling the traffic analyses end of the job. He directed Williams to go over to the Communication Intelligence Unit, find out as much as he could about the composition and location of the attacking forces and telephone the information. He said that, in general, the information coming over indicated that there were at least four carriers, including the two by identified radio calls. The bearings obtained on this force seemed to indicate that they were nearly due South at an estimated distance of 250 to 300 miles. Conflicting reports were coming in from other sources. One bearing which was obtained from Lualualei, was in direct conflict with the other bearings, and indicated that the attacking force was almost exactly due North. (p. 380–1). Commander Wright said that he believed that an early arbitrary assumption that the surface forces were actually to the Southward affected all of the subsequent reports. He said that the report from Lualualei was transmitted by him to the Fleet Intelligence Officer, then Lt. Comdr. Layton, and he assumed that he passed it on to higher authority. (p. 381)

Captain Rochefort said that when the attack commenced, the communications unit at Pearl Harbor lost all contact with the direction finder stations, one of which was located at Lualualei and the other at Aiea and that consequently no bearings on the attacking Jap force were received by his unit. He added that the failure of communications was not due to sabotage but was an accident caused by Army personnel setting up certain new circuits. He said that the Lualualei direction finder, being unable to deliver its bearings, finally broadcast by radio a bearing obtained on one of the attacking units. He had heard that this bearing was received by CinCPac as an alternate bearing, either 357 true or 178 true, but was subsequently informed by the direction finder station that it had actually transmitted the beraing as 357. He said that the Lualualei direction finder was capable of obtaining a unilateral bearing. (p. 63–64)

D. THE ARRIVAL OF THE ARMY'S MESSAGE

It will be recalled that on the morning of December 7th, General Marshall sent a message which indicated that the Japanese were presenting a note at 1 p. m., Washington time, which corresponds to dawn at Hawaii.

General Short testified that the December 7th dispatch from the Chief of Staff (Exhibit 48) was received by the Signal Officer at 1145, and decoded by 1428, well after the Japanese attack (page 251).

That dispatch, as set forth in Exhibit 48, was as follows:

"Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

"Subject: Far East Situation.

"The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East: Commanding General, Carribean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication."

Admiral Kimmel testified that a copy of the December 7th disptach of the Chief of Staff to Short was received by him on the afternoon of December 7th, too late. He considered this information as news of a Japanese ultimatum and, as it stated that a note was to be delivered at 1 p. m. Washington time which was sunrise in Hawaii and midnight in Manila, he felt that it would have indicated a Japanese attack at Oahu (page 328).

E. THE FAILURE TO TELEPHONE ON DECEMBER 7TH

Colonel Phillips said that at about 0822 Hawaiian time on December 7th, he telephoned General Marshall, that it took about five minutes to get the call through, and the connection was excellent. General Marshall asked if he had got the message. He replied, "What message?" General Marshall said, "The message I sent yesterday" or "last night." He replied, "No." (page 490). He got the dispatch from General Marshall at 1530, December 7, 1941. He did not know the time at which it had been sent or when it got to RCA in Honolulu.

Admiral Smith said that communications on December 7, 1941 could be established with Washington in thirty minutes by radio; they had no telephone (page 549).

Admiral Bloch stated that the only telephone connection he had with Washington was the regular commercial, not scrambler, phone (page 410).

Admiral Ingersoll said that the Navy Department had no scrambler telephone connection to Pearl Harbor; the Army had one; that the scrambler telephone is not secure against an expert and that the Navy Department did not use the scrambler phone until 1942 (page 843).

It will be recalled that Admiral Stark testified that he may have been derelict in not advising Admiral Kimmel of the prospective delivery of the Japanese reply; that he regretted not having telephoned to Admiral Kimmel about this, and also regretted not having paralleled the Army message on the Navy radio (pages 113, 793, 797).

F. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IF THERE HAD BEEN ADVANCE NOTICE

General Short testified that if he had had two hours notice on December 7th, he could have been completely ready for an air attack. He thought that he would have alerted against an air attack if he had the information contained in the Chief of Staff's December 7th dispatch two hours before the attack (page 256). He stated, however, that he could not have prevented a torpedo attack on the battleships even with two hours warning since any aircraft attack once launched can be driven in (pages 265–6).

Admiral Kimmel testified that if he had received Exhibit 48 prior to the attack he would have assumed the highest condition of readiness (page 329). He also testified that in the event of an attack together with submarines, and he had reason to believe that there were a great many submarines in the area at the time of the attack, it is well within the realm of possibility that had he taken the Fleet to sea, the losses would have been greater (page 1124). However, that presupposes that they would have found the Fleet and would have been able to deliver an attack. Had the Fleet gone to sea, the Japanese might not have attacked at that time at all. However, he thought that he would have taken the Fleet to sea.

In his closing testimony, Admiral Brown made a statement to the effect that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl Harbor on December 7 might have been, we were bound to suffer great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed more Japanese planes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu were almost free to pick the date and hour of attack. On December 7, the Japanese risked an attack only because they had complete information about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and report the state of our defenses and their so-called diplomatic agents were able to direct the moment of attack. Admiral Brown then said: "I wish to go on record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operating base from which considerable portions of our naval and air forces can be observed."

Admiral Bloch said that had the Fleet left Pearl Harbor on December 7, there was a serious question in his mind as to whether or not the entire Fleet would have been destroyed in view of the powerful forces that the Japanese had in the area. Also, he said, had the Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and the ships of the Fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific loss of life. He pointed out that the oil storage was in tanks above the ground or visible from the air. (p. 94)

Admiral Kimmel said that if he had a reconnaissance in effect at 700 miles, and had it met a strange force, he had no way of stopping that force from delivering an attack except by means already mentioned (page 1126). The court said that as they understood it, he did not have a surface striking force available which could have gone to the location and supported a carrier attack (page 1126). Admiral Kimmel said, however, that he had two carriers where they could have been very useful—one, 400 miles southeast of Midway, and the other 200 miles west of Pearl Harbor; and had he known the location of the enemy, they probably could have delivered a very effective attack.

Admiral Halsey said that at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they were 150 to 175 miles from the entrance to Pearl Harbor. He had flown off some of his planes and some of them on arrival at Pearl Harbor shot down Japanese planes and some were shot down. A number of his planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire. (p. 305)

On the morning of December 7, Admiral Newton was about 300 odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. He thought that he would receive orders to intercept the enemy which he felt must be to the Northward of Oahu and signaled the LEXINGTON that the flight to Midway was cancelled because presumably Midway had also been attacked. He reported his position to the Commander in Chief and told him that he had cancelled the Midway flight. Sometime during that morning, he received a dispatch from the Commander in Chief to report to Admiral Halsey but he did not know where Admiral Halsey's task force was or where it had been. He sent a dispatch advising Admiral Halsey of his position and Admiral Halsey directed him to join him in the vicinity of Oahu. He set a course for Oahu and about ten or eleven that morning received a message from Admiral Halsey that he was to assume enemy carriers about 200 miles south of Oahu and was to intercept and destroy those carriers. He changed course and sent search planes. The search for the enemy was called off in that vicinity as the authorities at Pearl had received information indicating that the attack had been from carriers located to the north, not to the south. They returned to Pearl Harbor around the 13th or 14th, meanwhile continuing air patrol. The PORTLAND was bombed by one of our own planes. (p. 319)

Admiral Newton said that he had assumed that the Japanese carriers attacked from the north because they had a better chance for coming in from that direction without being observed and because of the fact all shipping had been diverted to the southward and the training grounds of the Fleet were also to the southward. He felt sure that the Japanese were cognizant of this and consequently was greatly surprised when he was told that the Japanese carriers were to be assumed to be south of Oahu.

The court stated, and Admiral Kimmel agreed, that it was a military fact that in order to detect a carrier raid one must know in advance that the carrier is on its way (page 1126), and within narrow limits of its time of arrival and sector. If he had detected an attack by the Japanese naval force 700 miles from Oahu, he would have violated his orders just as he did when he gave the orders to bomb the submarines; he does not know what he would have done, but thinks he would have found some way to handle the situation (page 1127).

Admiral McMorris said that if he had known a few days before that an attacking force was coming, he would have had the Fleet out, regardless of defense, so they could attack the enemy forces (page 897). His action (getting the Fleet out if he knew that a hostile force was approaching) would have been the same if a state of war had or had not existed (page 898). He would have informed the Navy Department if we had not been at war. To have deferred action would certainly have been unwise, even under our Constitution (page 898). Even if long range reconnaissance to 700 miles had been in effect, the attack could not have been prevented. He might have sent ships out to intercept the enemy and diverted carriers for this purpose. However, he thought the losses might have been greater if this had been done (page 898). However, the Army planes would have been alerted too and undoubtedly would have done some damage, principally to enemy planes. He doubted that the enemy carriers would have suffered very seriously (page 899).

Admiral McMorris said that had they foreseen the Japanese carrier raid, they would not have had the American battleships in port. He said, however, that actually the most profitable target for the Japanese would have been the oil tankers at Pearl Harbor. If they had destroyed them and the shops and dry docks, our capabilities would have been nullified for a very long time. (p. 248)

Admiral Bellinger agreed with the Court's view that it is a historical fact that carrier borne planes must be caught before they are launched in order to successfully repel a carrier attack. He stated that he doubted very seriously that even with advance warning of this attack, he could have taken steps to save a great many planes which might have been destroyed otherwise, because of the difficulty of dispersion of patrol planes (page 686).

Admiral Turner thought that the Fleet could have been kept at sea after the orders for defensive deployment (page 1021). Admiral Stark knew that CincPac had his fleet divided in three parts and that an operating schedule provided for the time each part was to be in Pearl Harbor (page 1022). This seemed satisfactory.

He did not think that the Japanese attack could have been averted. Its destructive effect could have been lessened and more Japanese planes destroyed. If some ships had been deployed to northward, there would have been a better chance of detecting the enemy and bringing out shore based planes and carriers to attack them (page 1024). It was well recognized by people who concerned themselves with the defense of Oahu that the northern flank is a very weak place (page 1024).

Admiral Smith said that if Exhibit 48 (the Army dispatch of 1 p. m. meeting, had reached them between 0500 and 0600 Hawaiian time, effective measures could have been taken against the Japanese (pages 549–50), and perhaps we would not have been damaged so much and the Japanese more. The destroyers could have gotten out and probably the cruisers; Army and Navy aircraft alerted, and oil tankers sent out to the carriers; but, the battleships probably could not have gotten out, and, if they did, would have been sunk outside (page 550). The Robert's Report, he said, is incorrect in saying that prompt receipt of that message would still have been too late to be of any substantial use (pages 549–50).

Admiral Smith later said that if they had known, they would have given Condition I, sent the Fleet to sea, alerted all aircraft and sent carriers to the north to try to locate the enemy (page 569). It was true, he said, that if the Fleet had sortied from Pearl Harbor shortly before the attack and were within enemy range, they would have been sunk, but had they been two or three hundred miles to the west, it is very unlikely that the heavy ships would have been attacked. The battleships, therefore, could have been used as a support force since their speed was about 15 knots (page 568). Getting the Army planes aloft before sunrise would not, in Admiral Smith's opinion, have diverted the attack but would have decreased our damage and increased the damage to the Japanese. "There is no question but that the Fleet in Pearl Harbor would have been damaged even if we had been alert" (page 568). He agreed with the court that the only method by which the attack could have been completely diverted would have been to locate the carriers before they got within launching range.

G. THE CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE

The personnel casualties were summarized by Lt. Comdr. Robert D. Powers, Jr., USNR, as follows:

"These reports, examined by me in the office of the Bureau of Personnel, give in detail the names of ships and stations of the killed and wounded as a result of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. These reports are very voluminous. From this examination, I obtained a calculation of the total of the killed and wounded. This calculation shows that the total killed, including those who died of wounds and those missing and declared dead, was 3067, and those wounded, 896."

The damage to ships, as described by CinPac on February 16, 1942 (Exhibit 61), was as follows:

"(a) Battleships:

"ARIZONA sank at her berth as a result of one or more aircraft torpedoes and about eight heavy bomb hits. One of the bomb hits (estimated as 2,000 pounds) exploded the forward magazines. The ship is considered to be a total wreck except for material which can be salvaged and reassigned. A considerable amount of ordnance material has already been removed, and work is underway in removing the 12-inch guns from turrets three and four.

"CALIFORNIA sank at her berth as a result of hits by two aircraft torpedoes and one or more near bomb misses. Also received one large bomb hit on starboard upper deck abreast of foremast, which caused a serious 5-inch powder fire. It sank gradually for about three or four days and is now resting rather solidly on a mud bottom. The quarterdeck is under about twelve feet of water, and the port side of forecastle is under about three feet of water.

"NEVADA struck by one or more aircraft torpedoes and by at least five bombs and two near misses. Each of the near misses caused rupturing of the hull on the port and starboard bows, respectively. One bomb hit in way of foremast caused explosion and fire damage which wrecked the vertical area extending from the second deck to the bridge. Several bomb hits wrecked the forecastle from side to side forward of No. 1 turret, and this damage extended down to the second deck. Fragments from a bomb hit amidships caused considerable local damage to the mainmast, stack, and other structure, and caused many casualties to 5-inch gun crews.

"OKLAHOMA capsized at her berth within eight to eleven minutes after receiving three or more hits by aircraft torpedoes. The hull is 20° to 30° to being up-side down, with a considerable portion of the bottom and starboard side above water.

"PENNSYLVANIA one bomb hit in way of after 5-inch gun starboard side. The vessel was in drydock No. 1. The damage from bomb explosion was considerable but not of a vital nature, although there were a large number of casualties and one gun was put out of commission. The damage did not extend below the second deck.

"MARYLAND two bomb hits on forecastle. One small bomb (probably 100 pounds) passed through the forecastle deck forward of the chain pipes and exploded on the maindeck causing only a small amount of damage. The second bomb (probably 500 pounds) passed through port side of the ship about twelve feet under water and exploded in the C&R storeroom. This explosion wrecked flats and bulkheads in that area, and fragments caused numerous leaks through the sides and bottom. These leaks were temporarily patched without going into drydock.

"TENNESSEE two bomb hits (probably 15-inch shell type). One of the bombs struck the center gun of No. 2 turret causing a large crack which necessitated replacement of the gun. This bomb exploded and did considerable local fragment damage. Another similar bomb struck the top of No. 3 turret and penetrated same in way of a riveted joint. This bomb was a dud and did no serious damage except for putting one rammer out of commission. The TENNESSEE suffered serious damage aft in officers' quarters due to fire resulting from the great heat caused by the oil fire starting from the ARIZONA. The shell plates around the stern were somewhat buckled and joints broken.

"WEST VIRGINIA sank at her berth as a result of four or five aircraft torpedo hits and at least two bomb hits. The vessel rests on a hard bottom with all spaces flooded up to two or three feet below the main deck. Most of the damage from torpedoes is in the midship area, which is badly wrecked both below water and above water. A large bomb passed through the foretop and the boat deck and apparently exploded near the port side of the main or second deck. This explosion caused considerable wreckage and a terrific powder and oil fire, which burned out the whole area and extended to the foremast structure up to and including the bridge. A second bomb hit hit the top of turret III and passed through the 6-inch top. The nature of the penetration indicated defective material. This bomb did not explode but caused damage to the slide of the left gun. Recently another torpedo hole, and parts of the torpedo, have been located aft under the counter. The steering engine room appears to be wrecked and the rudder is lying on the bottom.

"(b) Cruisers:

"HELENA hit at frame 80 starboard side by aircraft torpedo causing the flooding of No. 1 and 2 firerooms and the forward engineroom. The starboard engine was found to be seriously damaged. Temporary repairs to hull were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H., and the vessel has proceeded to Mare Island under two shafts to await permanent repairs.

"HONOLULU damaged by near miss of large bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through dock and exploded fifteen or twenty feet from the port side at frame 40. This explosion caused considerable damage to the hull and resulted in the flooding of storerooms and magazines in that area, and also drowned out the electric power cables of turret II. Most of the flooding resulted from rupture of a magazine flood seachest; the hull of the ship was not opened up but leaked some due to pulled joints and rivets. Permanent repairs were completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H.

"RALEIGH hit by one aircraft torpedo amidships on port side which flooded out the forward half of the machinery plant. The ship was also hit by one bomb (probably 500 pounds) which passed through three decks and out the ship's side, and finally exploded about fifty feet away. The damage from the explosion was not extensive, but together with the hole made in the side, caused serious

flooding on the port side aft. This flooding was out of all proportion to the extent of damage and resulted from inability to close armored hatches tightly against the water head. The bomb struck only a few feet abaft the gasoline stowage. Permanent repairs to the hull are being completed at Pearl Harbor, T. H. The vessel will return to Mare Island about the middle of February for permanent repairs to machinery and power leads, this being necessitated primarily by replacement of one boiler and the cast iron turbine casings of engine No. 4.

"(c) Destroyers:

"SHAW hit by one bomb while docked on floating drydock; also hit by many fragments from another bomb which struck the drydock. The serious fire following bomb hits resulted in blowing up of forward magazine and heat damage to shell plating in the forward areas. The after part of the ship was not seriously damaged. The SHAW was re-docked on the same drydock on January 26, 1942, for installation of a false bow at about frame 50. The vessel will be ready to proceed to Mare Island under her own power between 10 and 15 February.

"CASSIN and DOWNES: CASSIN was struck by one bomb and DOWNES by two (probably 500 pounds). These vessels were in drydock No. 1 ahead of the PENNSYLVANIA. One bomb explosion aft between the two vessels apparently knocked the CASSIN partly off the drydock blocking and caused her to fall over on the DOWNES when the dock was being flooded during the raid. This caused a serious structural failure amidships and considerable local damage in way of the bridge. The torpedo warheads in the starboard tube of the DOWNES were set-off and blew out the maindeck and starboard side of the vessel in that area. This caused some damage to boilers and engines. A serious oil fire followed the explosion and caused extensive damage to the hull of both vessels. Fragments and explosions have caused over 200 holes in the hull of the CASSIN and probably well over 400 in the hull of the DOWNES.

"Most of the machinery of both ships has been removed for examination and re-conditioning, and it now appears that the machinery of the CASSIN is 98% good and the DOWNES about 95% good. Permanent and temporary repairs have been made on the hull of the CASSIN to permit her re-floating about February 5, and similar work is proceeding on the DOWNES.

"At present it appears inadvisable to count on the recommissioning of these two vessels as first-line destroyers, but it is likely that repairs can be effected within two to four months which will make the vessels entirely suitable for escort vessels, thus releasing two first-line destroyers for this duty. The Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., is working up sketch plans covering suitable arrangements for deck houses, bridge, armament, etc., adequate for an escort vessel. It is generally believed that although the hull of the vessels have been considerably weakened, they will be entirely adequate to carry the considerable reduced load in armament and other topside weights required for an escort vessel.

"(d) Auxiliary vessels:

"OGLALA sunk by one aircraft torpedo which passed under the ship from the starboard side and exploded against the starboard side of the HELENA. Vessel sank slowly at ten-ten dock, capsized against the dock about 1½ hours after being struck. This vessel is probably not worth salvaging but plans are being made to remove her from the berth that she now occupies.

"CURTISS struck on kingpost starboard crane by Japanese airplane out of control. This resulted in some wreckage and damage due to fire. Machinery of the crane was seriously damaged and the radio antennae were put out of commission. One bomb (probably 500 pounds) struck the forward end of the hangar on the port side off the center line, exploding on the second deck. The explosion and resulting fire caused a great amount of wreckage and loss of material. Temporary repairs have been completed and permanent repairs await availability of the ship at the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor.

"VESTAL struck by two bombs (probably 500 pounds). One bomb hit forward and exploded in the steel shape storage, which stopped a large part of the fragments and minimized damage considerably. The other bomb struck aft and exploded in the hold, causing a large number of fragment holes through the shell. Flooding aft caused the after part of the vessel to submerge almost to the main deck. The vessel was alongside the ARIZONA when the raid commenced and was beached at Aeia to prevent further sinkage. Temporary repairs have been completed during a short stay in drydock, and permanent work will be completed when a dock is available.

"UTAH struck by two, and possibly three, aerial torpedoes capsized at berth. Ship is within a few degrees of being exactly upside down."

The damage to airplanes, as reported on February 15, 1942 (Exhibit 61) was:

"Extracts from Columns	2	5	6
Type	Number present Dec. 7	Number on hand after raid	Number usable after raid
Patrol planes	69	45	11
Inshore patrol planes	0	0	0
Fighters	24	15	0
Scout bombers	60	29	14
Torpedo bombers	2	2	0
Battleship and cruiser planes	92	82	11
Utility and transport planes (non-combatant)	54	48	16
Total	301	221	52"

List of Witnesses

Witness	*Title*
Admiral H. R. Stark	Chief of Naval Operations.
Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann	Director Central Division; Liaison with State Dept. for CNO.
Major General W. C. Short	Commanding General Hawaiian Dept.
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel	CincPac and CincUS.
Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch	Com14; Comdr. Local Defense Forces; Comdr. Hawaiian Sea Frontier; Comdt. Navy Yard Pearl Harbor; Naval Base Defense Officer under 2CL–41 Comdr. Task Force Four.
Vice Admiral W. S. Pye	Comdr. Battle Force; Comdr. Task Force One; Senior Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor.
Lt. Colonel K. A. Tyler	Army radar.
Captain W. A. Heard	In charge of Foreign Branch, ONI.
Commander J. J. Rochefort	In charge of combat intelligence 14th Naval District.
Colonel W. C. Phillips	Chief of Staff (for General Short).
Rear Admiral W. S. Delaney	Chief of Staff for Operations (for Admiral Kimmel).
Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III	Fleet Gunnery Officer (on Admiral Kimmel's staff).
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith	Chief of Staff to CincPac.
Captain L. C. Ramsey	Operations officer to Adm. Bellinger (Adm. Bellinger in command of Pat Wing 2 and PatWing's Hawaiian Area); Comdr. Task Force Nine; aviation liaison officer to cooperate with Com14; Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force.
Commander W. G. Taylor	Advisor to Army on radar.
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger	Commander Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings and Comdr. Patrol Wing Two; Comdr. Task Force Nine; Comdr. Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor; Liaison with Com14; Comdr. Naval Base Defense Air Force.
1st Lieut. J. L. Locard, USA	Army radar.
Sergeant G. E. Elliott, USA	Army radar.
Lt. Commander G. W. Lynn	Senior Watch Officer, Op20–G decoding Japanese diplomatic cryptographs.
Captain L. F. Safford	Charge of Security Section of Naval Communications, intercepts.
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck	Special Assistant to Secretary of State.
Lt. Commander A. V. Pering	On duty in Op20–G of Naval Communications.
Admiral R. E. Ingersoll	Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
General George C. Marshall	Chief of Staff, Army.
Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris	War Plans Officer for CincPac.

LIST OF WITNESSES—Continued

Witness	*Title*
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood	Watch Officer in Op20–G, Naval Communications.
Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun	Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.
Admiral C. W. Nimitz	Chief of Bureau of Navigation.
Commander A. D. Kramer	Head of translation section of communication security in Op20–G Naval Communications.
Vice Admiral R. K. Turner	Director of War Plans in office of CNO.
Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes	Director of Naval Communications.
Admiral J. O. Richardson	CincUS prior to Admiral Kimmel.
Joseph C. Grew	Ambassador to Japan.
Maxwell M. Hamilton	Chief of Division of Far Eastern Affairs in State Department.
Captain H. H. Smith-Hutton	Naval Attache in Tokyo.
Rear Admiral Thomas Withers	Commander Submarines, Pacific.
Admiral J. R. Redman	Assistant Director of Naval Communications.

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HART

Witness	*Title*
1. Admiral Claude C. Bloch, USN, (Retired).	Commandant 14th Naval District; Commandant Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor; Commander Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
2. Commander Benjamin Katz, USN	Charge of Code Room, Navy Department.
3. Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, USN	Chief of Staff of Pacific Fleet.
4. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick	Assistant War Plans Officer to CincPac.
5. Rear Admiral W. S. DeLany, USN	Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for CincPac.
6. Rear Admiral A. C. Davis, USN	Fleet Aviation Officer for Pacific Fleet.
7. Captain M. E. Curts, USN	Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.
8. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, USN.	Commander PatWing Two; also controlled PatWing One; Commander, Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island; Commander, Task Force Nine; Liaison with Commandant 14th Naval District in connection with aviation facilities at outlying islands; Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.
9. Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN	In command of Task Force Three.
10. Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, USN	Commander, Task Force One.
11. Captain R. O. Glover, USN	Assigned to Plans Division of Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
12. Commander P. C. Crosley, USN	Flag Secretary on Staff of CincPac.
13. Rear Admiral W. A. Kitts, III, USN.	Fleet Gunnery Officer.
14. Captain V. R. Murphy, USN	Assistant to War Plans Officer.
15. Commander J. J. Rochefort, USN	Assistant Operations Officer; Force Intelligence Officer for Scouting Force Commander; Officer in Charge of Combat Intelligence attached to ComFOURTEEN.
16. Captain E. T. Layton, USN	Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
17. Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, USN	Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet.
18. Commander G. C. Briant, A–(V)G, USNR.	Aviation Aide to ComFOURTEEN.
19. Rear Admiral C. H. McMorris, USN.	Operations Officer on staff of Commander Scouting Force; War Plans Officer for Adm. Kimmel.
20. Vice Admiral R. K. Turner, USN	War Plans Officer for Chief of Naval Operations.
21. Captain J. L. McCrea, USN	Aide to Admiral Stark.
22. Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, USN.	Command of the MISSISSIPPI; Director of Naval Intelligence.

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HART—Continued

Witness	*Title*
23. Vice Admiral A. W. Fitch, USN	Preceded Adm. Bellinger as Commander, PatWing Two.
24. Captain George Vandeurs, USN	Assistant to Adm. Bellinger in connection with joint Army-Navy air command.
25. Admiral Wm. F. Halsey, USN	Commander Aircraft Patrol Force; Commander, Task Force Two.
26. Captain I. H. Mayfield, USN	District Intelligence Officer of 14th Naval District.
27. Vice Admiral J. H. Newton, USN	Command of Cruisers Scouting Force.
28. Lieut. W. B. Stephenson, USNR	Head of Counter-espionage Desk of District Intelligence Office of 14th Naval District.
29. Rear Admiral H. F. Kingman, USN	Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch of ONI; Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence.
30. Commander W. E. G. Taylor, A-V(T), USNR.	Special assignments on radar.
31. Captain L. F. Safford, USN	Charge of Communications Security Section of Naval Communications.
32. Vice Admiral H. F. Leary, USN	Commander, Cruisers Battle Force.
33. Captain J. B. Earle, USN	Commander, Destroyer Squadron Five; Chief of Staff 14th Naval District.
34. Commander W. A. Wright, USN	Assistant Communications Officer on Adm. Kimmel's staff.
35. Captain C. Wellborn, Jr., USN	Administrative Aide to Chief of Naval Operations.
36. Rear Admiral W. S. Anderson, USN.	Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.
37. Vice Admiral R. M. Brainard, USN	Director of Ship Movements Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations.
38. Rear Admiral R. E. Schuirmann, USN.	Director of Central Division of Chief of Naval Operations Office.
39. Rear Admiral J. W. Bunkley, USN (Retired).	Commanding Officer of U. S. S. CALIFORNIA (Admiral Pye's Flagship).
40. Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, USN	Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HEWITT

A. AT PEARL HARBOR IN 1941

Witness	*Title*
1. Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN	Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet. (R. 182).
2. Captain Joesph J. Rochefort, USN	In charge of Communications Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District. (R. 43; R. 541).
3. Vice Admiral William W. Smith, USN	Chief of Staff, CincPac. (R. 335).
4. Vice Admiral Charles H. McMorris, USN.	War Plans Officer, CincPac. (R. 293).
5. Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, USN	Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, CincPac. (R. 163).
6. Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, USN.	Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wings; Commander, Patrol Wing Two; Commander, Task Force Nine; Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. (R. 471).
7. Captain John B. Earle, USN	Chief of Staff, 14th N. D. (R. 451).
8. Mr. George Street	Manager, RCA, Honolulu. (R. 411).
9. Rear Admiral Irving H. Mayfield, USN	District Intelligence Officer, 14th N. D. (R. 554).
10. Captain Thomas H. Dyer, USN	Cryptanalytical and Decrypting Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 418).

LIST OF WITNESSES BEFORE ADMIRAL HEWITT—Continued

A. AT PEARL HARBOR IN 1941—continued

Witness	*Title*
11. Captain Joseph Finnegan, USN	Translator, Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific Fleet. (R. 424).
12. Commander Wesley A. Wright, USN	Assistant Communications Officer, CincPac, on temporary duty with Com 14 Communications Intelligence Unit. (R. 442).
13. Lieutenant (jg) Farnsley C. Woodward, USN.	Cryptanalyst, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R. 541).
14. Colonel Alva B. Laswell, USMC	Translator, Communications Intelligence Unit, 14th N. D. (R.541).
15. Captain William W. Outerbridge, USN	Commanding Officer, USS WARD. (R. 87).
16. Lieutenant Commander Monroe H. Hubbell, USNR.	Commanding Officer, USS CONDOR. (R. 428).
17. Richard W. Humphrey, RM3c, USNR	Bishop's Point Radio Station.
18. Lieutenant Oliver H. Underkofler, USNR.	Communications Office, 14th N. D. (R. 465).
19. Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, USNR	District Intelligence Office, 14th N. D. (R. 376).
20. Commander Harold S. Burr, USNR	Com 14 Liaison Officer at General Short's Headquarters. (R. 376).
21. Brigadier General Carroll A. Powell, USA.	Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department. (R. 387).

B. AT THE PHILIPPINES IN 1941

22. Captain Redfield Mason, USN	Fleet Intelligence Officer, Asiatic Fleet. (R. 68).
23. Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, USN	Officer in Charge, Radio Intelligence Unit, Corregidor. (R. 68).

C. AT WASHINGTON, D. C. IN 1941

24. Vice Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, USN.	Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence. (R. 389).
25. Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN	In charge of Far Eastern Section, Foreign Branch, ONI. (R. 10).
26. Captain Laurence F. Safford, USN	Communications Security Section. (R. 97; R. 529).
27. Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN	ONI and Communications Security Section. (R. 128).
28. Mrs. Dorothy Edgers	Research Analyst, ONI. (R. 511)
29. Lieutenant Commander Francis M. Brotherhood, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 143).
30. Lieutenant Frederick L. Freeman, USN	Communications Security Section. (R. 149).
31. Lieutenant Commander Allan A. Murray, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 433).
32. Lieutenant Commander George W. Linn, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 140).
33. Lieutenant Commander Alfred V. Pering, USNR.	Communications Security Section. (R. 148).

C. OTHER WITNESSES

34. Captain William R. Smedberg, III, USN.	Now Assistant Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Cominch. (R. 4).
35. Lieutenant Commander Leo Reierstad, USNR.	Now in charge of a translating unit in Op–16–FE. (R. 158).
36. Lieutenant (jg) Joseph M. Conant, USNR.	Translation sub-section head in Op–16–FE. (R. 158).
37. Commander Walter Karig, USNR 38. Lieutenant Welbourn Kelley, USNR	Authors of "Battle Report." (R. 80).
39. Lieutenant Commander Gilbert E. Boone, USNR.	Head of Op–20–GL. (R. 554; R. 607).

ADDENDUM ONE—FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

1. The basic war plans and the local defense plans were sound and were designed to meet, with the available means, various types of attack, including an attack such as the one which was delivered. The basic war plans and the local air defense plans were not operative in time to meet that attack. The Rainbow Five war plans presupposed the existence of a state of war. The local air defense plans presupposed agreement between the local commanders that an attack was imminent. Neither of these was the case prior to the attack.

2. The system of command in effect in the Hawaiian area was that of mutual cooperation and not unity of command. Cooperation between the local Army and Navy commanders required agreement as to the imminence of attack, which presupposed the possession and exchange of information concerning Japanese intentions and movements of Japanese naval forces.

3. A full exchange of information is necessary to the effective exercise of Joint Command. While there was a considerable exchange of information between various Army and Navy intelligence agencies there was no organized system to ensure such exchange.

4. Current and detailed information which was obtained by the Japanese as to the location and movements of American naval forces and as to the preparations being made for defense against an attack on Pearl Harbor contributed to the success of their attack.

5. Information was promptly and efficiently obtained by the United States Navy and Army intelligence organizations in Washington, concerning the Japanese Government's actual views as to the diplomatic negotiations and its intention to wage war, by means of interception, decryption, and translation of Japanese diplomatic messages.

6. The information which was obtained in Washington by the War and Navy Departments from Japanese diplomatic messages was fully exchanged. The information which was obtained by the Navy Department as to Japanese naval movements was available to intelligence officers of the War Department in Washington. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

7. Although the Japanese Government established in their diplomatic messages a code, known as the "winds" code, to be used in radio broadcasts in order to convey information to its representatives as to the status of relations between Japan and other countries, no message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States.

8. The information obtained by the Navy Department from intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately disseminated within the Navy Department.

9. Although Admiral Kimmel some months before had made requests that he be kept fully informed on subjects of interest to the Fleet and as to all important developments, the Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. In particular, the failure to transmit the State Department message of November 26th and to send, by telephone or other expeditious means, information of the "1 p. m." message and its possible import, were unfortunate.

10. Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless, did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious, and that important developments with respect to the outbreak of war were imminent. This included the "war warning" message and similar important messages which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations.

11. The available information in the possession of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as to the existing situation, particularly the "war warning" message, was not disseminated to all of his important subordinate commanders whose cognizance thereof was desirable. Thus Admiral Bellinger, who commanded the patrol planes, and Admiral Newton, who was at sea with a carrier and other units, were not informed of this and other important messages.

12. Despite the fact that prior to the attack the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu were tapped and that various of his cable messages were secured at Honolulu, no information was obtained prior to December 7th which indicated the likelihood of a Japanese attack. The legal restrictions which denied access to such cable messages were a definite handicap to the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian area.

13. Although various messages of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which indicated Japanese interest in specific locations of ships in Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by radio intercept stations of the Army and Navy and decrypted prior to the attack, this information was not transmitted by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. Certain other messages which were intercepted by the Army prior to 7 December 1941, indicated the likelihood of attack on Pearl Harbor but were not decrypted or brought to the attention of the Navy prior to the attack, apparently because the Army did not have sufficient personnel for such work.

14. The only practicable sources from which Admiral Kimmel could have secured information, after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the approach of the attacking force, were the aircraft warning service, traffic analyses of Japanese naval communications, and distant air reconnaissance from Oahu.

15. The aircraft warning system was being operated by the Army during certain periods of the day primarily for training purposes, and, although not fully developed, could have served to give some warning of the approach of Japanese aircraft.

16. The principal basis for estimates of the location of Japanese naval forces was the intelligence obtained by the Navy from traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications.

17. A carrier attack could not, with certainty, have been prevented, for the following reasons:

(a) Certain prevention of such an attack requires interception and destruction of the carriers before attack planes can be launched.

(b) The forces necessary to insure such interception and destruction, anywhere in the vast area which would have had to be covered, were not available, and could not have been expected to be available.

(c) If the Japanese task force had been detected at nightfall, the probability of its successful interception and destruction prior to the following dawn would have been small.

18. Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, for the following reasons:

(a) Ships' anti-aircraft batteries would have been fully manned and ready. It is to be noted that the anti-aircraft fire was more effective against the subsequent attacks than the initial air attack.

(b) Enemy character of the approaching planes would have been immediately appreciated and they would have been engaged at once.

(c) The maximum condition of damage control readiness would have been set, thus facilitating the isolation of damage received.

(d) Many planes could have been in the air, in readiness.

(e) Ground dispersal of planes could have been improved.

19. The only adequate means of assuring detection of an approaching carrier attack was by 360 degree distant air search from Oahu. Sufficient planes were not available to carry out an all-round distant air reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

20. A thorough appreciation of the danger, the capabilities of the available planes, and the importance of the defense of Pearl Harbor might have justified the allotment by the Chief of Naval Operations of additional patrol planes to the Pacific Fleet. Although the additional planes, if assigned, would not have been sufficient for a 360 degree daily search, they would have increased the area which could have been effectively covered and might have acted as an inducement to such employment. Admittedly, in making over-all plane assignments, it was necessary for the Chief of Naval Operation to weigh the prospective needs of the Pacific and the Atlantic, where hostilities with Axis submarines were already in progress.

21. Partial air reconnaissance, covering a sector of some 120 degrees, could have been maintained daily from Oahu for a considerable period of time with the Fleet patrol planes controlled by Admiral Kimmel and could have been designed to cover the most probable approach bearings from which an attack might have been expected. Such reconnaissance would have had a reasonable chance of success.

22. Neither the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, nor the key members of the latter's staff, seem to have given serious consideration after 27 November 1941 to the possibility or probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor or of its possible effect.

23. The information as to Japanese naval forces which was available to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, emphasizing the movement of forces to the southward, tended to concentrate his attention on the probability of Japanese attacks on the Philippines and Malaysia. The information which was received by Admiral Kimmel during the first week of December, 1941 indicated, however, that on December 1st there was an unusual change in Japanese radio call signs; that, on the basis of all information up to December 2nd, no reliable estimate could be made of the whereabouts of four of Japan's ten carriers, and that there was no information as to any of the carriers thereafter. The absence of positive information as to the location of the Japanese carriers, a study of the movement which was possible to them, under radio silence, through the unguarded areas of the Pacific, and a due appreciation of the possible effects of an air attack should have induced Admiral Kimmel to take all practicable precautions to reduce the effectiveness of such an attack. The measures which reasonably were open to him were:

(a) Establishment of long distance air reconnaissance, covering the most probable approach sectors to the extent possible, on a reasonably permanent basis, with available planes and crews.

(b) Establishment of a higher condition of anti-aircraft readiness, at least during the dangerous dawn hours.

(c) Establishment of a higher degree of damage control readiness by ships in port, particularly during the dangerous dawn hours.

(d) Installation of anti-torpedo nets to protect the larger vessels in port.

(e) Maintenance of a striking force at sea in readiness to intercept possible attack forces.

(f) Maintenance of the maximum force of the Fleet at sea, with entry into port at irregular intervals.

(g) Checking with Army as to readiness of anti-aircraft defense and aircraft warning installations.

24. Admiral Kimmel's estimate as to the probability of submarine attack in the Hawaiian area was justified.

25. Throughout his incumbency as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful, and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war. In considering the action which he could have taken, it should be noted that:

(a) Establishment of the maximum plane reconnaissance would have meant the stoppage of aircraft training which was of great importance to the naval expansion program, and might have resulted in wear and tear on planes and crews which would have reduced their later effectiveness.

(b) Higher conditions of readiness would have interfered with the rest and relaxation desirable in port for the maintenance of personnel efficiency.

(c) Failure to install anti-torpedo nets was influenced (i) by information from CNO which made it appear that effective drops of aircraft torpedoes with the depths of water and length of run available in Pearl Harbor were not probable; (ii) the interference such nets would have caused in harbor operations due to crowded conditions.

(d) The presence of two carrier task forces at sea at the time on necessary ferry trips did, in a way, provide striking forces and some reconnaissance.

(e) In view of the submarine menace and the concentration of anti-aircraft batteries, it was questionable whether ships were safer in port or at sea.

26. The attempt to obtain confirmation of the reported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was proper, although it should have been effected in plain language. Adequate naval action was taken in sending out the ready destroyer. This information was of no immediate interest to the Army unless it in fact indicated imminency of an air attack, an assumption which was not necessarily logical. In any event, confirmation was not received until the air attack had commenced.

27. More effective action would have been taken both before and after the attack on Pearl Harbor had there been in existence in the Hawaiian area a suitable operating agency for the adequate exercise of joint command functions. This omission was the fault of no one person, but of the existing system.

28. War experience has shown that:

(a) The responsibility for final major decisions must devolve on one person; that is, there must be "unity of command."

(b) In planning and executing joint operations, responsible commanders of the different services, who are to act jointly, and the principal members of their staffs, must be in close physical touch, and not entirely dependent on telephonic, radio, or similar communications. In no other way can a full exchange of information and ideas be assured nor the possibility of misunderstanding be prevented.

(c) Command organizations which are to function effectively in an emergency must be in active operation prior to such emergency.

29. Based on the foregoing, military command of outlying stations, such as Hawaii, should, even in peacetime, be established under the principle of "Unity of Command." The commander exercising such joint command should be assisted by a joint staff, capable of advising him in the functions of both services concerned.

Findings

1. The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan.

2. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet, including the capture of positions in the Marshalls and raids on enemy sea communications and positions, and various defensive tasks, including the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area and preventing the extension of enemy military power into the Eastern Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions.

3. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned to the Fleet various initial tasks, including the maintenance of fleet security at the bases, at anchorages, and at sea, the protection of the communications and territory of the Associated Powers by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, the establishment of defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway, and guarding against surprise attack by Japan.

4. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) and annexes included among the initial tasks to be performed by the patrol planes the maintenance of the maximum patrol plane search practicable in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.

5. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan was to be put into effect on W-day, which, it was stated, might or might not coincide with the day that hositlities opened with Japan. W-day was not fixed prior to the attack.

6. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, was based on the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans. It constituted the basis of subsidiary peace and war projects, joint operating plans, and mobilization plans. The method of coordination under the plan was to be by mutual cooperation until and unless unity of command were invoked.

7. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the Army's task was to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the naval forces. The Navy's task was to patrol the coastal zone (which included Oahu and such adjacent land and sea areas as were required for the defense of Oahu), and to patrol and protect shipping therein, and to support the Army forces.

8. One of the specific tasks assigned to the Navy in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was that the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, should provide for distant reconnaissance.

9. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was placed in effect on 11 April 1941 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and by the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District.

10. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was an agreement between the Commandant, FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, as to joint defensive measures for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war.

11. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided, among other things, for joint air operations and provided that when naval forces were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and Army aircraft were made available, the latter would be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

12. Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan also provided that the Army was to expedite the installation of its aircraft warning service, and that prior to the completion of that service, the Navy, through the use of radar and other appropriate means, would endeavor to give such warning of hostile attacks as might be practicable.

13. Annex VII, Section VI, of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that when the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander would take steps to make available to the other the air forces at his disposal, in order that joint operations might be conducted in accordance with the plan.

14. The Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN did not effect any agreement prior to the attack that the threat of a hostile raid or attack was sufficiently imminent to warrant placing Annex VII, Section VI, in operation.

15. The Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan provided, among other things, for a Base Defense Air Force in conjunction with the Army. One of the assumptions was that it was possible that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, that it was probable that there might be a surprise submarine attack on ships in the base area, and that a combination of both forms of attack was possible.

16. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin stated, among other things, that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack that would most likely be launched from carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. The estimate also stated that any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of considerable undiscovered surface forces, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. This Estimate came to the attention of Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

17. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan was prepared by Admiral Bellinger and approved by Admiral Bloch. This plan, which was designated Annex "Baker" to the Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan, made specific provision for joint air operations by the Army and Navy. The plan was effective upon receipt. It was to become operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack, or might be made operative by dispatch. In the meantime, conditions of readiness for aircraft were to be as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for Army units, and by ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, for Navy units.

18. The Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas, which was reissued by Admiral Kimmel in revised form on 14 October 1941, provided that the Fleet's security was predicated on several assumptions, one of which was that a declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, or a combination of the two. This letter also stated that single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

19. The Pacific Fleet security letter prescribed security measures, including provisions for defense against air attack. It provided, among other things, that ComFOURTEEN, as Naval Base Defense Officer, should exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack and that he should take other action, including supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, and arrange through the Commander of Patrol Wing Two for coordination of the joint air effort by the Army and the Navy.

20. Under the Pacific Fleet security letter, the security measures were to include intermittent patrols to consist of a destroyer offshore patrol, and an air patrol. The air patrol was to consist of daily search of fleet operating areas as directed by Aircraft Scouting Force, one covering the entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and one during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

21. The only local defense plans in effect and operative prior to the attack of 7 December 1941 were the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under which the Navy was obliged to provide distant reconnaissance, and the Pacific Fleet security letter, under which the only aircraft patrol from Oahu was a daily search of fleet operating areas, a search during entry or sortie of a fleet or task force, and during the entry or departure of a heavy ship at other times.

22. The Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five), approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, in estimating probable enemy (Japanese) action, visualized that one of the enemy defensive efforts would be "destruction of *threatening* naval forces"; that initial action would include "possible raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway, and *other outlying* United States *positions*"; and that the initial Japanese deployment would include "raiding and observation forces *widely distributed in the Pacific*, and that *submarines* in the *Hawaiian* area * * * ." (Italics supplied.) The possibility of an attack on Hawaii was, therefore, included but in no way emphasized.

23. Admiral Kimmel was of the opinion, throughout his tenure of command of the Pacific Fleet, that a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was a *possibility.* Neither he nor the key members of his staff appear to have considered it as a serious *probability.*

24. The method of command established in the local plans was that of "mutual cooperation." The relations between the responsible commanders were cordial. However, there was not in existence, prior to the attack, any permanent operating setup which could insure the constant and timely exchange of information, decisions, and intended courses of action so essential to the efficient conduct of joint operations, particularly in an emergency. A recent proposal looking to the establishment of a Joint Command Center had been the subject of adverse recommendations by the responsible local commanders, both Army and Navy.

25. In accordance with "Joint Action," unity of command for the defense of Oahu could have been placed in effect by local agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the FOURTEENTH Naval District. The latter, however, would naturally not make such an agreement without the approval of his immediate superior, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The question of unity of command for outlying islands was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and General Short in connection with a proposal for reenforcement of Wake and Midway by Army planes. General Short's position was that if Army forces were involved, the command must be his. Admiral Kimmel maintained that the command of naval bases must remain with the Navy. The islands were reenforced with Marine planes.

26. Japanese espionage at Pearl Harbor was effective and, particularly during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941, resulted in the frequent transmission to Japan of information of great importance concerning the Pacific Fleet, the movements and locations of ships, and defense preparations.

27. Certain reports sent by the Japanese Consul General via a commercial communications company at Honolulu in the week preceding the attack indicated the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.

28. It will appear subsequently that various coded messages sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, which did not indicate the likelihood of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, were intercepted by Army and Navy radio intercept stations and were decoded in Washington, D. C. prior to the attack; that others which were obtained at Honolulu by Naval Intelligence prior to the attack were, with the exception of a few unimportant messages, in a code which could not be decrypted there before December 7th; and, that three messages intercepted by Army radio intercept stations at Hawaii and at San Francisco, which indicated the likelihood of an air attack, were forwarded to the War Department for decryption but were either not received there prior to the attack or were not decrypted prior to the attack. If the United States intelligence services had been able to obtain and to decode and translate promptly all of the espionage reports sent by the Japanese Consul General during the period 27 November to 7 December 1941, the information so obtained would have been of inestimable value.

29. Naval Intelligence was effectively organized to acquire information from coded diplomatic messages between the Japanese Government and its representatives. Through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages and their decryption and translation in Washington, D. C., prior to the attack, knowledge was obtained of the Japanese Government's actual views concerning the diplomatic situation, of the Japanese Government's intention to wage war, and of the fact that hostilities were impending and imminent.

30. The information acquired in Washington through the interception of Japanese diplomatic messages was adequately and promptly disseminated at Washington by Naval and Military Intelligence to the Chief of Naval Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, to the State Department, and to the President.

31. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, had to rely upon the Chief of Naval Operations for information as to the status of the diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese, and had requested to be kept fully informed on this subject.

32. The Japanese diplomatic messages acquired by Naval Intelligence at Washington were not transmitted to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as such. Reasons advanced for this course of action were that the Japanese might intercept the naval messages and learn of the Navy's success in decrypting Japanese codes; that the volume of intercepted messages was so great that the transmission of them, particularly during the critical period, would have overtaxed the Navy's communications facilities; and, that it was the duty of the Chief of Naval Operations to evaluate such information and to advise CinCPac of the important facts learned.

33. Various of the warning messages sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were based on the information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages.

34. The warnings sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, during November (particularly the "war warning" of the 27th) and early December, 1941, indicated in unmistakable language that the diplomatic negotiations had ceased, that war with Japan was imminent, and that Japanese attacks might occur at any moment.

35. The Chief of Naval Operations did not advise the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, of certain intercepted Japanese messages indicating interest in the location of ships in Pearl Harbor. These were more specific than other intercepted messages indicating Japanese interest in the movements of ships to or from other ports.

36. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was not fully advised of certain other information obtained from intercepted Japanese messages after the November 27th "war warning," which made further evident the termination in fact of the diplomatic negotiations and the Japanese intention to wage war.

37. On the morning of 7 December 1941, there was brought to the attention of the Chief of Naval Operations an intercepted message in which the Japanese Government instructed its representatives to present to the State Department at 1 p. m. the Japanese Government's final reply terminating the diplomatic negotiations. Mention was made of the fact that 1 p. m. Washington time was about dawn at Honolulu and about the middle of the night in the Far East. No one stated that this indicated an air attack at Pearl Harbor.

38. This so-called "1 p. m. delivery message," which consisted of one sentence, had been intercepted at a naval radio intercept station at Bainbridge Island in the State of Washington and forwarded to the Navy Department by teletype. It was decrypted and available in the Navy Department at about 0700 on December 7th. It was sent to the Army for translation because there was no Japanese translator on duty in the Navy Department at that time. The translation, which could have been done by a qualified translator in a few minutes, was not received from the Army until after 0900.

39. Although he was in possession of this highly significant information several hours before the attack, and there were available means whereby the information could have been transmitted to Admiral Kimmel immediately, including a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army, Admiral Stark initially was not disposed to, and did not, send any message to Admiral Kimmel. Instead he relied on the transmission of a message by the War Department to General Short, which was to be furnished also to Admiral Kimmel.

40. Admiral Stark has previously testified that he did not consider it necessary to telephone to Admiral Kimmel on the morning of 7 December and that he had not telephoned at any time previous to the attack, but that one regret which he had was that he had not telephoned a message that morning to Admiral Kimmel or paralleled the Army message on the naval radio system.

41. The message sent by General Marshall on 7 December 1941, which was received after the attack, advised that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum at 1 p. m., that they were under orders to destroy their code machine, that it was not known just what significance the hour set might have but that the addressees were to be on the alert accordingly, and that the naval authorities were to be informed.

42. The warnings which were sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, indicated, as to the possible places of Japanese attack, on November 24th, that a "surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility," and, on November 27th, that "an agressive movement by the Japanese is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippnes, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo."

43. Although the warnings which were sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, drew attention to probable Japanese objectives to the southward and southeastward of Japan, and did not specifically mention Pearl Harbor, both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. They did not regard such an attack as probable.

44. The Japanese established several codes in November, 1941, which were to be used in radio transmissions to convey to their representatives information concerning the status of relations between Japan and the United States, and

other countries. These were known as the "winds" code and the "hidden word" code. The "winds" code was designed to indicate a break in diplomatic relations, or possibly war, with England or the United States or Russia by the use in weather broadcasts of certain Japanese words signifying wind directions.

45. The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December, 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have.

46. No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines, although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op–20–G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op–20–G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message.

47. On the morning of December 7th, the intercepted "hidden word" code message was translated by Kramer. In his haste, due to the necessity of delivering other messages, including the "1 p. m. delivery message," he overlooked a code word relating to the United States and translated the message as meaning only that "relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations." He testified that he later discovered the error and a few minutes before 1 p. m. on December 7th, he telephoned the correction to his superior officer in the Office of Naval Intelligence and to an officer of Army Military Intelligence.

48. Except for the omission of the United States, the "hidden word" code message was literally translated and did not sufficiently reflect previous diplomatic interceptions which indicated that the message was to convey the idea of a crisis involving the countries in question.

49. The sources of intelligence as to the Japanese which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, had prior to the attack included, in addition to the Chief of Naval Operations, the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, and the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet.

50. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, the telephone lines of the Japanese Consul General and the Japanese Vice Consul at Honolulu were tapped for some months prior to the attack. These were discontinued on 2 December 1941 because the District Intelligence Office feared that the existence of such taps might be discovered, resulting in undesirable complications. No information of military or naval significance was obtained by means of the telephone taps.

51. On 6 December 1941 the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu delivered to the District Intelligence Officer a transcript of a trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation between a person in Honolulu named "Mori" and a person in Japan. This was examined by the District Intelligence Officer. It was decided that the conversation should be studied further by a Japanese linguist of the District Intelligence Office, who was to listen to the recording of the conversation. This was not done until after the attack. The transcript furnished on December 6th indicated that the person in Japan was interested, among other things, in the daily flights of airplanes from Honolulu and in the number of ships present. During the conversation, references were made to flowers, which, it now appears, may have been code words signifying the

presence or absence of ships, and a method of conveying information to the approaching Japanese ships, which presumably would have been listening in on the conversation. Prior investigations indicate that the "Mori conversation" was also brought to the attention of General Short on 6 December 1941.

52. Under the supervision of the District Intelligence Officer of the FOURTEENTH Naval District, copies of various cable messages from and to the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, via a commercial communications company, were obtained during the first week of December, 1941. This was the first time that such messages had been obtained. The messages were in code and efforts were made immediately to decrypt and translate them. Some messages were decrypted before the attack. These contained no information of particular significance.

53. No information secured at Oahu prior to the attack by means of the telephone taps or through the interception of messages of the Japanese Consul General indicated the likelihood of war or of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

54. One of the Japanese Consul General's messages, which was obtained by the District Intelligence Officer and turned over on 5 December 1941 to the Radio Intelligence Unit for decryption and translation, was a message dated December 3rd. This message was in a Japanese code known as the "PA–K2." It was decrypted and translated by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor after the attack. The message was one in which the Japanese Consul General advised of a change in a method which had been established for communication by visual signals from Oahu, whereby lights in houses on the beach, the use of a sailboat, certain want ads to be broadcast over a local radio station, and bonfires, would convey information as to the presence or absence of various types of warships of the Pacific Fleet. Although the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor was unable to decrypt this message prior to the attack, the message was decrypted and translated in rough form on 6 December 1941 by a civilian translator in Op–20–G of the Navy Department in Washington. That section had received the message from an Army radio intercept station at Fort Hunt, Virginia. Captain Kramer testified he had no specific recollection of having seen this translation prior to the attack, but the evidence indicates that the rough translation was shown to him on the afternoon of December 6th and that due to the pressure of work on other important Japanese diplomatic messages, no action was taken on the translation until 8 December 1941.

55. On 2 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu received a coded message from Tokyo which stated that in view of the existing situation, the presence of ships in port was of utmost importance, that daily reports were to be submitted, that the reports should advise whether or not there were observation balloons at Pearl Harbor, and whether or not the warships were provided with anti-torpedo nets. This message was intercepted by an Army radio intercept station at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, and apparently was forwarded by mail to the War Department for decryption and translation. The translation supplied by the Army indicates that the message was translated on 30 December 1941.

56. On the afternoon of 6 December 1941, the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu sent two messages in the "PA–K2" code which indicated the likelihood of an air attack. The first reported that there were no signs of barrage balloon equipment at Pearl Harbor, that in all probability there was considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, and that the battleships did not have torpedo nets. The second message reported on the ships at anchor on December 6th, and stated that it appeared that no air reconnaissance was being conducted by the Fleet Air arm. These messages were not obtained by Naval Intelligence at Honolulu prior to the attack. They were, however, both intercepted by an Army intercept station at San Francisco and were forwarded by teletype to the Army. The translations of these messages furnished by the Army indicate that they were translated on December 8th. They could have been decrypted and translated in the Navy Department in about an hour and a half.

57. There were no formal arrangements whereby the Navy communicated to the Army estimates of the location and movements of Japanese naval forces. Officers of the Far Eastern Section of Military Intelligence at Washington had access to charts maintained in the Far Eastern Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence showing such information, and had access to radio intelligence information available in the Navy Department, and the situation was discussed with them. At Pearl Harbor, an intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Air Force received some general information concerning Japanese movements from the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

58. The War Department had information which led that Department to believe that Japanese naval forces were in the Marshalls in November, 1941. This appears from a War Department dispatch of 26 November 1941 to General Short, information to Admiral Kimmel, concerning a special photographic reconnaissance to be flown over Truk and Jaluit, in order to obtain information, among other things, as to the number and location of naval vessels. The reconnaissance was not flown because the special Army planes were not made ready.

59. On 27 November 1941, a Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin was distributed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to his command. This bulletin set forth the available information concerning the composition of the Japanese Navy. It revised an earlier bulletin on the same subject and pointed out that the principal change was a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This arose from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces. The bulletin stated, among other things, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet consisted of ten carriers which were organized into five divisions, each having two carriers.

60. Current information, derived from traffic analyses, concerning the location and movements of Japanese naval forces was obtained by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who received it primarily from the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Such information also was contained in dispatches from the Radio Intelligence Unit in the Philippines and from the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C.

61. Fortnightly Intelligence bulletins were issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence and mailed to the Pacific Fleet, among others. These included summaries of the information concerning Japanese naval forces which had been received from the Radio Intelligence Units at Pearl Harbor and at the Philippines.

62. On November 26th, ComFOURTEEN sent a dispatch to OpNav, information to CincPac, CincAF, and ComSIXTEEN, which summarized the information as to Japanese naval movements obtained by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor during the preceding month. The dispatch indicated that the Commander Second Fleet had been organizing a task force comprising units of various fleets. This dispatch stated that there was believed to be a strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls, which included at least one carrier division unit (not necessarily a carrier), plus probably one-third of the submarine fleet. The estimate was that a strong force might be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia while component parts might operate from Paleo and the Marshalls.

63. The radio intercepts by the radio intelligence unit located in the Philippines were considered by OpNav to be the most reliable because of the location of the unit. On 26 November 1941, the radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, in a dispatch to CincPac, OpNav and others, commented on the above dispatch of ComFOURTEEN and stated that traffic analysis for the past few days had indicated that the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet, was directing various fleet units in a loose-knit task force that apparently would be divided into two sections. The first section was expected to operate in the South China area. The second section was expected to operate in the Mandates. It was estimated that the second section included "CarDiv 3, RYUJO, and one MARU." This dispatch also stated that the ComSIXTEEN unit could not confirm the supposition that carriers and submarines in force were in the Mndates, and that their best indications were that all known carriers were still in the Sasebo-Kure area. It was stated that this evaluation was considered to be reliable.

64. From time to time after November 27th, there were sighting reports from the Asiatic Fleet and other observers, copies of which were received by Admiral Kimmel, which confirmed the movement of important Japanese naval forces to the southward of Japan. These, however, did not report the movement of carriers.

65. After November 27th, the Radio Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor continued the practice of preparing daily summaries of the information received through their traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications, which were submitted to Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, for transmittal to Admiral Kimmel on the following morning. Admiral Kimmel received and initialed these summaries daily on and after 27 November. On December 6th, he initialed the summary dated December 5th, which was the last one he received prior to the attack.

66. On November 28th, Admiral Kimmel received a communication intelligence summary dated November 27th, which stated, among other things, that there was no further information on the presence of a carrier division in the Mandates and that "carriers were still located in home waters." The next day, he received

the November 28th summary which indicated, among other things, the view that the Japanese radio intelligence net was operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval communications and "IS GETTING RESULTS." There was no information set forth in the summary as to carriers. On the following day, Admiral Kimmel received the summary dated November 29th, which, among other things, indicated that Carrier Division 3 was under the immediate command of the Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. On December 1st, Admiral Kimmel received the previous day's summary which stated as to carriers that the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicated the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this had not been confirmed.

67. The December 1st summary, which Admiral Kimmel received, states that all Japanese service radio calls of forces afloat had changed promptly at 0000 on 1 December; that previously service calls had been changed after a period of six months or more and that calls had been last changed on 1 November 1941. This summary stated, and was underscored by Admiral Kimmel, that "The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicates an additional progressive step in preparing for operations on a large scale." It also stated, among other things, that a large number of submarines were believed to be east of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan, and as to carriers that there was "no change."

68. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel examined a memorandum which Layton had prepared on December 1st at his request. This contained Layton's estimate, on the basis of all available information, of the location of Japanese naval forces. This estimate placed in the Bako-Takao area Carrier Division 4 and Carrier Division 3, which included four carriers, and the "KASUGA MARU" (believed to have been a converted carrier). The estimate placed one carrier "KORYU (?) plus plane guards" in the Marshalls area.

69. Layton's written estimate made no mention of Japanese Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. This omission was deliberate. The reason was that Layton considered that the information as to the location of those carriers was not sufficient to warrant a reliable estimate of their whereabouts.

70. On 2 December 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Layton had the following conversation:

"Captain LAYTON. As best I recall it, Admiral Kimmel said, 'What! You don't know where Carrier Division 1 and Carrier Division 2 are?' and I replied, 'No, sir, I do not. I think they are in home waters, but I do not know where they are. The rest of these units, I feel pretty confident of their location.' Then Admiral Kimmel looked at me, as sometimes he would, with somewhat a stern countenance and yet partially with a twinkle in his eye and said, 'Do you mean to say that they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it?' or words to that effect. My reply was that, 'I hope they would be sighted before now,' or words to that effect." * * *

"Captain LAYTON. His question was absolutely serious, but when he said, 'Where are Cardivs 1 and 2?' and I said, 'I do not know precisely, but if I must estimate, I would say that they are probably in the Kure area since we haven't heard from them in a long time and they may be refitting as they finished operations only a month and a half ago,' and it was then when he, with a twinkle in his eye, said, 'Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head?' or words to that effect. In other words, he was impressing me on my complete ignorance as to their exact location." * * *

"Captain LAYTON. This incident has been impressed on my mind. I do not say that I quote him exactly, but I do know that he made such a statement to me in the way to point out to me that I should know where they are but hadn't so indicated their location."

71. The December 2nd radio intelligence summary, which was delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 3rd, stated as to carriers:

"Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information. However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change on the 1st of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb."

72. The radio intelligence summary delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 4th stated, in part, "No information on submarines or carriers." The summary delivered on December 5th made no mention of carriers. The summary delivered on December 6th stated, in part, "No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

73. Other than radio intelligence and sighting reports from other sources, the only practicable way by which the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, could have

obtained information as to the location or movements of Japanese naval forces from 27 November to 7 December 1941 was by long distance air reconnaissance.

74. Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the Navy had the obligation, through ComFOURTEEN, to conduct distant reconnaissance, and under Annex VII, Section VI, to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, naval forces were to be supplemented by available Army aircraft if the naval aircraft were insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations. As previously pointed out, the latter plan was not in operation because an agreement between the Commanding General and ComFOURTEEN that threat of a hostile attack was imminent was a prerequisite and no such agreement had been made prior to the attack. The Naval Base Defense Air Force Plan, which implemented the agreements for joint Army–Navy air action, similarly was not operative prior to the attack.

75. No patrol planes were under the command of Admiral Bloch. The only Navy planes suitable for long distance reconnaissance were the Pacific Fleet patrol planes.

76. The Pacific Fleet patrol planes were under the control of Admiral Kimmel, and he had the responsibility for their utilization. They were operated after 22 November 1941 in accordance with schedules approved by him at that time, which were not revised prior to the attack. The schedules stressed training operations. They did not provide for distant reconnaissance from Oahu.

77. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he decided on November 27th that there should be no distant reconnaissance.

78. There is no evidence of any specific discussion between Admiral Kimmel and members of his staff on or after the receipt of the "war warning," as to the advisability or practicability of long range reconnaissance from Oahu. The War Plans Officer thought that the subject must have been discussed, but could recall no specific discussion. The Commander of the Fleet patrol planes, who had not been informed of any of the significant warning messages, testified that Admiral Kimmel had no such discussion with him.

79. The joint estimate by Admiral Bellinger, Commander, Fleet Patrol Planes, and General Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, which was used as a basis for the joint Army-Navy agreements, was prophetic in its estimate that in the event of attack on Hawaii, the most likely and dangerous form of attack would be an air attack to be launched at dawn from carriers about 200 miles from Oahu. This estimate stated that the action open as a counter-measure included daily patrols as far as possible from Oahu, to sectors through 360 degrees, to reduce the possibilities of surface or air surprise. It further stated that such patrols could be effectively maintained with the personnel and matériel available at the time (March, 1941) for a very short period and that such patrols were not practicable unless other intelligence indicated that surface raid was probable within narrow limits of time. According to Admiral Bellinger, it was realized by the responsible officers of the Pacific Fleet that another course of action which was always open was to fly a patrol of less than 360 degrees, with the available aircraft, covering the more dangerous sectors.

80. A daily search of the Fleet operating areas to the southward of Oahu was being carried out prior to the attack, in accordance with the provisions of the Pacific Fleet letter on security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas.

81. No distant reconnaissance was flown from Oahu during the critical period 27 November to 7 December 1941. The last previous distant reconnaissance flown from Oahu appears to have been for several days during the summer of 1941 on a sector toward Jaluit. This reconnaissance had been directed by Admiral Kimmel at Admiral Bloch's request.

82. Late in November, 1941, the Army planned to conduct a reconnaissance flight from Oahu to Jaluit and Truk, with the Navy assisting by providing intelligence. The reconnaissance was not flown because the Army planes were not made ready prior to the attack.

83. The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere. Under the provisions of Pacific Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow Five, when that plan became effective, the Pacific Fleet patrol planes were to maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area, having due regard for time required for overhaul and repair of planes and for conservation of personnel.

84. In the war warning of November 27th, which advised that negotiations with Japan had ceased and that an aggressive move by Japan was expected

within a few days, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that Admiral Kimmel "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46."

85. The dispatch of November 28th repeated an Army dispatch, which, among other things, advised General Short that Japanese future action was unpredictable but that hostile action was possible at any moment. The Navy dispatch directed that Admiral Kimmel was to undertake no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act and that he was to "be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL–46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur."

86. The establishment of long distance air reconnaissance from Oahu would have been an "appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46."

87. The Fleet patrol planes available at Oahu in the week preceding the attack were not sufficient to have conducted 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days.

88. Prior to the attack, requests had been made by the Pacific Fleet to the Navy Department to increase the number of patrol planes assigned to the Fleet. Some new replacement planes had been sent to the Fleet during October and November, 1941. Additional planes, as evidenced by the prompt arrival of reenforcements after December 7th, could have been made available by the Navy Department, but at the expense of defenses in other areas. The Navy Department presumably knew that the number of planes available at Oahu were not sufficient to conduct 360 degree reconnaissance daily for more than a few days. The evidence in prior investigations indicates that after November 27th, responsible officers in the Navy Department thought that reconnaissance was being conducted from Oahu to the extent practicable with the planes available there.

89. There were sufficient Fleet patrol planes and crews in fact available at Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128 degrees to a distance of about 700 miles.

90. The sectors north of Oahu were generally recognized as being the most likely sectors from which a Japanese attack would come, if the Japanese were to attack Pearl Harbor.

91. If a daily distant reconnaissance had been flown from Oahu after 27 November 1941, with the available patrol planes, the northern sectors probably would have been searched.

92. On the morning of 7 December 1941, shortly before the air attack on Pearl Harbor, there were reports of suspected and actual hostile submarine activity. The second advised of a surface and depth charge attack on a submarine. Only the latter report reached responsible officers. Due to reports on previous days of sound contacts with submarines, confirmation was sought. The action initiated by ComFOURTEEN, in dispatching the ready duty destroyer, was in accord with the provisions of the Fleet security letter.

93. Confirmation of the report of the sinking of a submarine was not received by Admiral Kimmel or by Admital Bloch prior to the air attack.

94. There is no evidence warranting the conclusion that a Japanese submarine entered Pearl Harbor prior to December 7th. The one midget submarine known to have been in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7th was sunk after making an ineffectual attack.

95. Evidence of the approach of a large flight of planes from the northward, obtained by Army enlisted men operating a radar installation for instruction purposes, was not communicated either to the Navy or to responsible Army commanders.

96. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and ComFOURTEEN had no previous warning of the air attack, which was initiated by the enemy at 0755. The attack was skillfully executed, and resulted in serious losses of life and damage.

97. The battleships each had two 5″ anti-aircraft guns ready and two machine guns manned, which was in excess of the requirements of Condition III as prescribed in the Fleet Security Letter. As to Fleet aircraft based at Oahu, seven were in the air (3 on morning security patrol armed with depth charges and 4 engaged in tactics with submarines); ten were on 30 minutes notice; and the balance of forth-four on four hours notice.

98. As a result of adherence to Fleet schedules which had been issued in September, 1941, the Pacific Fleet battleships, with one exception, were all in port and were either sunk or damaged. Due to the fortunate coincidence which resulted in the aircraft carriers being at sea, they were uninjured.

99. It has been learned, since 7 December 1941, that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl Harbor left Saiki Anchorage, near the Bongo Channel, sometime between 20 and 22 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded to Tankan Bay, Etorofu Island, in the Kuriles. The force then assembled and fueled. It departed on or about 28 November 1941, East Longitude Time, and proceeded in an easterly direction to about 170° West Longitude, then southeast to a point about 200 miles from Oahu.

100. The Japanese striking force included three Carrier Divisions, among which were Carrier Divisions 1 and 2. Five days before the attack, the Fleet Intelligence Officer had advised Admiral Kimmel that he could not reliably estimate the location of Carrier Divisions 1 and 2.

101. The Japanese carriers launched their planes from a position 200 miles due north of Oahu.

Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit No. 3

Vol. I, No. 12
8 Dec. 1944

United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE

U. S. S. Nevada Ayres on 7 December 1941

(See story of *PEARL HARBOR* on page 1)

Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or without credit, so long as proper classifying is observed.

"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key Navy, Marine and Army Commands. Any requests for additional distribution may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.

Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore, Vol. I, No. 25 will be issued on 18 December.

CONTENTS

	Page
PEARL HARBOR: The Planning Stage	1-12
[illegible]	12
Jap [illegible] Sunk in MANILA Harbor	13-15
MANILA Strike Results	16-17
Probable Conversion of Jap Hospital Ship	18
Instrument AA Armament on Jap Freighter Transports	19
MANILA PHILIPPINE Islands	20-31
KUMANATORI Class CL	32-33
Long Delay Bomb Fuse	33
Floating Mines in JAPAN Sea	34-35
New Jap Rifle Grenade	35
USNAVO Ships Under Victim of Fire	36
Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctrine	37-43
Long-Stalked Lights Used on JACK	44 45
New Army Air Division	45
Jap Artificial Camouflage	46 47
Thumbnail Portraits of HELEN	48
[illegible]	49
Sidelight on Surrender	50
Jap Develop INDO-CHINA	51-54
Jap Ordnance vs. Allied Aircraft	55 56
Jap Anti-Sub Heads	56
Weekly Photo Coverage	57 58
LUZON Airfields	59-62
Enclosures:	
"Japanese Infantry Weapons"	
Revised Drawing of TAMATO Class BB	

12 0121 Confidential

17 PEARL HARBOR: The Planning Stage

When Jap planes struck clustered U. S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect air-tested plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the